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•	 Chinese	 OCGs,	 Russian/Georgian	 OCGs,	 Italian	 mafias,	
Motorcycle gangs and OCGs of British, Dutch and Turkish 
origin constitute the majority of cases. Differences in terms 
of investment strategy exist among criminal groups and 
countries. 
•	 Drivers	 of	 criminal	 investments	 are	 profit,	 money	
laundering, control of the territory, influence on the political 
sphere,	social	consensus,	personal	benefit	or	concealment	
of criminal activities. 
3. What proceeds are confiscated?
•	 According	 to	 the	 few	 available	 data,	 assets	 confiscated	
from OC are increasing in Europe in terms of both number 
and value .  
•	 Most	 confiscated	 assets	 are	 movable	 goods	 (cash	
and	 vehicles)	 while	 there	 is	 	 almost	 no	 confiscation	 of	
companies.
•	 As	a	result,	a	gap	exists	between	where	OCGs	invest	and	
what is recovered by European authorities.
4. What research and policy 
implications?
•	 The	study	should	extend	to	all	28	EU	MS	in	order	not	to	miss	
the transnational nature of organised crime investments.
•	 All	 the	 experts	 of	 the	 EU	 28	 MS	 (LEAs,	 AROs,	 FIUs,	
prosecutors, researchers, private organisations) should 
network to collect better data and cases of organised 
crime	infiltration	in	legitimate	businesses.
•	 An	 innovative	 methodology	 should	 be	 developed	 for	
shifting	 from	 a	 cold	 picture	 of	 past	 cases	 (such	 as	 this	
report)  to an assessment of the factors facilitating criminal 
infiltration,	in	order	to	reduce	the	risk	that	this	could	occur.
•	 The	 organization	 of	 LEAs,	 FIUs	 and	 AROs	 should	 be	
reshaped so as to focus on these high-risk situations. So, 
the prevention activity of public agencies and private 
companies. 
•	 At	the	same	time,	the	confiscation	of	infiltrated	companies	
should be improved, and the use of instruments alternative 
to	 seizure	 (e.g.	 administrative	 penalties	 and	 temporary	
suspensions) should be increased.
Key Findings                   
1. Where do organised crime proceeds 
come from?
•	 The	 main	 illicit	 markets	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 generate	
around	110	billion	euro	each	year.	This	figure	corresponds	
to approximately 1% of the EU GDP. 
•	 Illicit	drugs	(heroin,	cocaine,	cannabis,	amphetamines	and	
ecstasy)	remain	the	most	profitable	‘traditional’	market	(28	
billion euro yearly at EU level). Among emerging criminal 
activities,	 fraud	 appears	 to	 the	 most	 lucrative	 (29	 billion	
euro each year from MTIC VAT fraud alone).
•	 Illicit	revenues	are	shared	by	a	plurality	of	organised	crime	
groups and criminal actors. The use of business facilitators 
and of legitimate companies to cover illicit trade is also 
widespread.
•	 The	 poly-crime	 nature	 of	 criminal	 groups	 in	 Europe	
expands the economies of scale among illicit markets, 
reduces	 groups’	 operational	 costs	 and	 increases	 their	
profit	margins.
2. Where are organised crime 
proceeds invested in the legitimate 
economy?
•	 Illicit	proceeds	are	widely	laundered	in	the	European	legal	
economy. Evidence of organised crime investments is 
found in almost all EU MS.
•	 In	the	7	OCP	countries,	 investments	concentrate	 in	areas	
with	a	 strong	presence	of	organised	crime	 (e.g.	Southern	
Italy),	 ones	 strategic	 for	 illicit	 trafficking	 (e.g.	 Andalusia),	
with	 key	ports	and	airports	 (e.g.	Amsterdam/Rotterdam),	
border	regions	(e.g.	north-western	Italy	and	south-western	
France),	tourist	areas	(e.g.	PACA	or	Costa	del	Sol)	and	large	
cities	(e.g.	Rome,	Madrid,	London,	Paris,	Berlin,	Bucharest).
•	 Bars	 and	 restaurants,	 construction,	 wholesale	 and	
retail	 trade	 (especially	 of	 food	 products	 and	 clothing),	
transportation, hotels and real estate are traditional 
sectors	of	infiltration.
•	 There	 is	 growing	 evidence	 of	 infiltration	 into	 renewable	
energy, waste and scrap management, logistics, money 
transfer	businesses	(MTB)	and	VLT,	slot	machines,	betting	
and gaming.
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This	 is	 the	final	 report	 of Project OCP – Organised Crime 
Portfolio	(www.ocportfolio.eu).1 Aim of OCP is to carry out an 
exploratory study of the economics of organised crime in 
Europe, and in particular to address three research questions, 
which are covered by the three sections of this report:
•	 Where organised crime proceeds are generated, from 
which illicit markets	(Part	1);
•	 Where these proceeds are then invested in the legitimate 
economy, in which regions, assets and business sectors 
(Part	2);
•	 The extent to which these proceeds are confiscated by 
European	authorities	(Part	3).
The project focuses on seven EU member states	 (Finland,	
France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United 
Kingdom), represented by OCP partners, and for which 
provides an in-depth analysis. However, the report also 
presents a broader examination of the situation in Europe as 
a whole.
OCP deals with issues crucial from a policy standpoint but which 
are characterised by a lack of data and of previous studies. 
OCP addresses this research gap by adopting an innovative 
methodology and using a wide range of information, both 
qualitative and quantitative, deriving from very different sources.
Despite its pioneering nature and its data limitations, this report 
represents a first step towards better understanding 
of how the organised crime business works. In line with the 
Transcrime research agenda, it is a starting point for a 
better identification and reduction of the opportunities 
exploited	by	criminals	to	infiltrate	illicit	and	legitimate	markets	
in Europe. 
In this sense, this report constitutes an important tool for both 
public and private institutions to improve the assessment of 
the risks	of	organised	crime	infiltration	and	to	strengthen	the	
tracing and the confiscation of criminal assets in Europe. 
Part 1: Where do organised crime 
proceeds come from? Illicit 
markets in Europe
Illicit	markets	in	Europe	are	changing	rapidly	in	size,	products,	
actors, routes and flows, but they remain key sources of 
proceeds for organised crime in Europe. 
To analyse their role in the economy of OCGs, Project OCP 
has produced one of the first measurements at European 
level of the revenues from illicit markets, and a review of 
the main criminal actors among which these revenues are 
shared.2 In particular:
•	 For	some	markets	(heroin,	cocaine,	trafficking	of	firearms,	
illicit trade in tobacco products, counterfeiting, MTIC 
fraud), OCP has calculated new estimates for all the 28 EU 
MS;
•	 For other markets it has collected existing estimates, 
in	 some	 cases	 available	 for	 all	 the	 28	 MS	 (cannabis,	
amphetamines, ecstasy, cargo theft) or only in few 
countries	(trafficking	in	human	beings,	illegal	gambling	and	
match-fixing,	extortion	racketeering	and	usury).
Both when calculating and collecting estimates, OCP has 
employed	 a	 transparent	 and	 verifiable	 methodology,	 which	
is described in detail in Chapter 2 and in the Methodological 
Annex.
How large are the revenues from illicit markets? 
Appraising the magnitude of the revenues generated by illicit 
markets is not straightforward. Data are lacking, and there 
is	 the	 risk	 to	 produce	 ‘mythical	 numbers’	 with	 no	 empirical	
proof. Taking into account these challenges, the estimates 
calculated by OCP reveal that:
•	 Illicit markets in the European Union produce about 110 
billion euro each year.3
1.	Project	OCP	has	been	carried	out	with	the	financial	support	from	the	Prevention	of	
and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union - European Commission, 
DG Home Affairs, and has been developed by an international consortium of eight 
partners:	 Transcrime	 –	 Joint	 Research	 Centre	 on	 Transnational	 Crime	 (www.
transcrime.it) of the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano and the Università 
degli	Studi	di	Trento	(Italy),	coordinator	of	the	project;	Police	University	College		(PCF	
–	Finland);	Agence	de	Gestion	et	de	Recouvrement	des	Avoirs	Saisis	et	Confisqués	
(AGRASC	–	France);	An	Garda	Síochána	-	Criminal	Assets	Bureau	 (CAB	–	 Ireland);	
Guardia	 di	 Finanza	 (GDF	 –	 Italy);	 Universiteit	 Utrecht	 (UU	 -	 The	 Netherlands);	
Universidad	 Rey	 Juan	 Carlos	 (URJC	 –	 Spain);	 Durham	 University	 (UDUR	 –	 United	
Kingdom).
2.	Focus	has	been	posed	on	ten	main	illicit	markets:	trafficking	of	illicit	drugs	(heroin,	
cocaine, cannabis, amphetamine, ecstasy), trafficking in human beings, illicit trafficking 
in	firearms,	illicit	trade	in	tobacco	products,	counterfeiting,	illegal	gambling	and	match	
fixing,	 extortion	 racketeering,	 usury,	 fraud	 and	 organised	 property	 crime.	 Not	 all	 of	
them	can	be	defined	‘markets’,	as	not	all	of	them	imply	the	existence	of	a	demand	and	a	
supply,	but	they	are	often	defined	as	‘markets’	for	the	sake	of	simplicity.	Corruption	has	
not been considered as an illicit market per se but as an enabler on which organised 
crime often relies when active in the illicit and the legitimate economy. 
3.	 This	 figure refers to the estimate of the annual revenues only from those illicit 
markets for which estimates were available or have been produced for all the 28 EU 
MS:	trafficking	of	illicit	drugs	(heroin,	cocaine,	cannabis,	amphetamines,	ecstasy),	illicit	
trafficking	in	firearms,	illicit	trade	in	tobacco	products,	counterfeiting,	MTIC	fraud	and	
cargo theft. It does not include trafficking in human beings, illegal gambling and match 
fixing,	 extortion	 racketeering	 and	 usury,	 for	 which	 quantifications	 exist	 only	 in	 few	
countries. Estimates refer to different years, but most to 2010.
Executive summary                         
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•	 This	 figure	 is approximately 1% of the EU GDP.4 The 
weight on GDP is higher in southern and eastern European 
countries	(see	maps	below).
•	 The	 seven	 OCP	 countries	 (Finland,	 France,	 Ireland,	 Italy,	
the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom) produce 
about 60% of this amount (64 billion).
•	 Illicit drugs	are	still	the	most	profitable	‘traditional’	market	
(nearly	 28	 billion	 yearly	 at	 EU	 level,	 20	 in	OCP	 countries	
alone);	of	which	heroin	is	the	most	profitable	(8	billion	euro	
in the EU). However, new synthetic substances	 (such	
as methamphetamines) and the increase in home-made 
illicit drugs	(such	as	home-grown	cannabis)	are	reshaping	
this	market	(see	Section	4.1).
•	 Fraud,	 in	 its	 various	 forms	 (e.g.	MTIC	 fraud,	VAT	carousel	
fraud,	 plastic	 fraud,	 insurance	 fraud,	 social	 benefits	 fraud,	
etc.	-	see	Section	4.9)	is	becoming	one	of	the	most	profitable	
illicit activities, attracting many OCGs. MTIC fraud alone 
produces more than 29 billion euro at EU level each year 
according to the estimates calculated in this report.5
Table 1 – Revenues from illicit markets per year – billion euro
Illicit market
7 OCP       
countries
Whole EU
Illicit drugs 20.2 27.7
Heroin 5.7 8.0
Cocaine 5.3 6.8
Cannabis 5.4 6.7
Amphetamines 1.6 2.8
Ecstasy 2.2 3.5
Trafficking in human 
beings (THB)
Estimate available only in few EU MS
Illicit trafficking in        
firerarms (ITF)
- 0.4
IIllicit trade in tobacco 
products (ITTP)
5.2 9.4
Counterfeiting 21.6 42.7
Illegal gambling Estimate available only in few EU MS
Extortion racketeering Estimate available only in few EU MS
Usury Estimate available only in few EU MS
MTIC fraud 16.9 29.3
Cargo theft 0.36 0.42
TOTAL 64.2 109.9
•	 Counterfeiting is potentially	 very	 profitable	 (estimated	
to produce 42 billion euro annually in the EU), given the 
willingness	 of	 European	 citizens	 to	 purchase	 counterfeit	
products. However, it is still unclear if and how the actual 
illicit	 supply	 is	 able	 to	 satisfy	 the	 potential	 demand	 (see	
Section 4.5).
•	 Illicit trade in tobacco products	 (see	 4.4)	 is	 able	 to	
produce	revenues	equal	to	those	of	some	illicit	drugs	(e.g.	
cocaine in OCP countries) according to estimates.
6. For example in Italy THB for sexual exploitation has been estimated to produce 
around	3	billion	of	euro	annually	(Mancuso,	2014;	see	Section	4.2).
7. It covers the following illicit markets and activities: heroin, cocaine, cannabis, 
amphetamines,	ecstasy,	ITTP,	counterfeiting,	illicit	trafficking	in	firerarms,	MTIC	frauds	
and cargo thefts. 
8. It covers the following illicit markets and activities: heroin, cocaine, cannabis, 
amphetamines,	ecstasy,	ITTP,	counterfeiting,	illicit	trafficking	in	firerarms,	MTIC	frauds	
and cargo thefts.
Revenues - Mn euro
< 1,000
1,000 - 3,600
3,601 - 11,900
> 11,900
Not available
Figure 1 – Estimates of the revenues from illicit markets in 
the EU. Absolute values7
Figure 2 – Estimates of the revenues from illicit markets in 
the EU. Percentage of GDP 20108
% of GDP 2010
< 0.66 %
0.66 - 1.03 %
1.04 - 1.34 %
> 1.34 %
Not available
Source: Transcrime-OCP estimates. In italics estimates by other authors
Source: Transcrime elaboration on OCP estimates 
Source: Transcrime elaboration on OCP estimates  and Eurostat data 
•	 Trafficking in human beings	(for	both	sexual	and	labour	
exploitation purposes) is an important activity for OCGs, 
but estimates of the scale of revenues are almost non-
existent	(except	in	some	countries).6
•	 There are few measures of the proceeds from organised 
property crime and illicit trafficking in firearms (ITF). 
Especially the former has attracted a large number of 
criminal groups given the high returns and the low risks 
(for	example	the	theft	of	medicines,	see	Section	4.10),	but	
only	limited	figures	on	cargo	theft	are	available	(about	420	
million euro in revenues at EU level).
•	 Given	 the	 lack	 of	 figures	 on	 these	 markets,	 the	 overall	
quantification	(110 billion) may be underestimated.
4. The rate has been calculated on the consolidated EU GDP 2010, reference year for 
most of the estimates.
5.   Missing Trader Intra Community fraud refers to a particular type of organised VAT 
fraud	producing	a	loss	to	the	government	budget	and	an	extra	profit	for	the	fraudster.	
Typically, a company buys goods free of VAT from a supplier located in one EU MS, and 
sells it domestically, including the VAT in the price, but disappearing before remitting 
the	VAT	to	the	government	(see	Section	4.9).
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Who shares the illicit revenues? The actors 
Revenues from illegal markets in Europe are shared by a 
plurality of actors and not monopolized by a few criminal 
organisations. The number, nature, composition and level of 
organisation of these actors change according to the country, 
the market, the opportunities and the particular stage of the 
illicit supply chain in which they are active:
•	 Although large and structured groups may be still 
important in those criminal activities entailing a high level 
of organisation, smaller groups and free-lance criminals 
have become central, especially in emerging markets such 
as synthetic drugs, home-grown cannabis, fraud or ITTP 
(see	respectively	4.1,	4.4,	4.9).
•	 Criminal groups composed of one dominant nationality 
or ethnicity still	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 some	 markets	 (for	
instance Albanian and Turkish OCGs in heroin trafficking) 
but they are increasingly changing into heterogeneous, 
multi-ethnic and inter-connected OCGs.
•	 Also important are functional links, such as those with 
the	countries	of	origin	of	illicit	goods	(e.g.	the	links	of	gangs	
from quartiers sensibles in France with North African 
groups in the trafficking of cannabis – see 5.2) and cultural 
ones (e.g.	 among	 different	 national	 chapters	 of	 Outlaw 
Motorcycle gangs - see 5.1).
•	 Some criminal groups specialize in particular illicit 
activities	(e.g.	some	Eastern	European	OCGs	in	organised	
theft – see 4.10) and move across Europe to carry out these 
activities	(e.g.	property	crimes	or	frauds).
•	 But most groups are increasingly involved in multiple 
crimes, i.e. active in more than one market simultaneously 
(e.g.	Chinese	OCGs	 in	 counterfeiting,	 sexual	 exploitation,	
illegal gambling and tax fraud in Italy – see 5.4).
•	 This may lead to economies of scale deriving from the use 
of the same routes and channels to traffic different illicit 
goods, which may reduce operational costs and increase 
OCGs’ profit margins.
Given this fragmented and dynamic picture, it is difficult to 
assess who earns how much in illicit markets in Europe. 
Future research should seek a better understanding of how 
illicit proceeds are split among the different criminal actors 
and the different members of the same criminal group.
Where and how will criminal groups produce illicit 
revenues in the future? Emerging trends 
The evidence collected by project OCP has highlighted some 
emerging trends which must be taken into account to fully 
understand how the revenues of illicit markets may change 
in the future: 
•	 First, there is evidence that OCGs may gradually shift 
from	 traditional	markets	 (e.g.	 drugs	 or	 THB)	 to	 new,	 less	
risky,	 underrated	 but	 very	 profitable	 illicit	 activities,	 such	
as fraud or organised property crime	(e.g.	of	medicines,	
vehicles, car parts). Besides creating new actors, these 
activities	 may	 also	 attract	 traditional	 OCGs	 (e.g.	 Italian	
mafias	such	as	Camorra	groups).	
•	 Second, increasing use is made of legitimate companies 
in illicit markets, for example:
- In fraud schemes, as shell companies in VAT carousels, 
excise	or	insurance	frauds;
- As fronts for illicit activity	 (e.g.	 .	 transport	or	shipping	
companies	to	hide	the	smuggling	of	drugs);
- To ‘launder’ stolen products	 (e.g.	 fake	 wholesalers	
in order to repack and sell stolen medicines back to 
hospitals and pharmacies, see 4.10).
•	 Third, new products are emerging in a twilight zone 
between licit and illicit. For example, illicit white 
cigarettes, which are legally produced in one country and 
illegally	 smuggled	 to	 other	 (see	 4.4),	 are	 expanding;	 or	
firearm	 replicas	 which,	 when	 manipulated,	 can	 become	
illicit	firearms	(see	4.3).
These trends are reshaping illicit markets in Europe, but 
they are also important drivers of the business strategies 
of organised crime groups when they move from the illegal 
economy	to	legitimate	markets	(see	Part	2).
From the generation of illicit revenues to investments in 
the legitimate economy
Not all the proceeds generated by illicit markets are then 
available for investment in the legitimate economy. Criminal 
groups must cover a range of expenses, including: 
•	 Operational costs, such as the purchase of wholesale 
drugs	and	transportation	costs;
•	 Management costs, such as the payment of salaries of 
criminal	group	members	or	subsidies	to	their	families;
•	 Personal expenses, to cover living expenses or the cost of 
a	certain	lifestyle;
•	 Money laundering costs, such as the fees paid to 
professionals	hired	to	launder	illicit	proceeds;
Applying	 an	 innovative	 methodology	 (see	 chapter	 6)	 to	
the heroin market, this report estimates that, for instance, 
between 25% and 42% of the revenues from heroin in the 7 
OCP	countries	(between	1,160	and	3,160	million	euro)	may	be	
available, after subtracting costs, for investment in the legal 
economy.9
9. The model developed in Chapter 6 covers the costs for purchase of raw 
materials and costs of living of the criminal actors involved in the supply chain. It 
does not cover transportation costs, management costs and money laundering 
fees.
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Part 2: Where do proceeds go? 
Organised crime investments in 
the European legitimate economy
Once all the costs of illicit operations have been covered, where 
are the proceeds invested in the legitimate economy? OCP 
provides a first exploratory overview of the investment 
portfolio of organised crime groups in the 7 OCP countries. 
It considers:
•	 The geographic regions	where	investments	occur;
•	 The types of assets;
•	 The business sectors;
•	 The different investment strategies of criminal actors;
•	 The drivers which could explain these different 
investments strategies.
To this end, given the lack of official data and in order to 
collect as much evidence as possible, a broad definition of 
investment	 was	 used	 (see	Chapter	 2)	 to	 conduct	 a	 large-
scale collection of cases of investments from a wide variety 
of sources	 ( judicial	 files,	 reports	 by	 LEAs,	 FIUs,	 AROs,	
academic studies, open sources).
Legend
OCP Countries
Low 
Medium-Low
Medium-High
High
Non-OCP Countries
Low
Medium-Low
Medium-High
High
Figure 3a – European regions (NUTS 2) with evidence of organised crime investments - Percentages of the country total10
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
10.	 Classes	 identified	 using	 Jenks	 natural	 breaks	 optimization.	 Although	
references to OCGs are available in most countries, in some cases they do not 
report indications about the relevant NUTS 2, or the number of references with 
NUTS 2 indication is too low to be meaningful and representative. Therefore, 
some	countries	 (Austria,	Bulgaria,	Cyprus,	Czech	Republic,	Denmark,	Estonia,	
Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, 
Portugal,	Slovakia)	are	classified	according	to	their	national	values
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In which geographic areas do criminal investments 
occur?
Although the analysis focused systematically only on the 
7	 OCP	 countries	 (which	 represent	 70%	 of	 the	 evidence	
gathered), cases of organised crime investments were found 
in almost all EU MS (24 out of 28), and in a large number of 
non-EU neighbouring countries as well.
A	concentration	of	investments	was	found	in	specific	regions:
•	 In Italy:	the	southern	regions,	Lazio	and	north-western	
regions	(especially	Lombardy);
•	 In  France:	PACA	-	Provence-Alpes-Côte	d’Azur,	Île-de-
France and	eastern	border	regions;
•	 In Spain: Andalusia, Madrid and, to a lesser extent, south 
eastern	regions;
•	 In UK:	the	London	area	and	south-western	Scotland;
•	 In the Netherlands: Amsterdam and Rotterdam and their 
neighbouring	areas;
•	 In non-OCP countries: some areas like Berlin, the 
Düsseldorf-Köln area, Bucharest and the Romanian 
border with Moldavia.11 
According to this exploration, criminal investments tend to be 
larger in areas with a historically strong presence of OCGs 
(e.g.	southern	Italy),	in	border regions, or in areas which may 
play a crucial role in illicit trafficking	 (e.g.	 Andalusia,	 or	
Rotterdam and Marseille with their harbours), large urban 
areas	(e.g.	London,	Amsterdam,	Madrid,	Berlin)	and	tourist or 
coastal areas	 (e.g.	Côte	d’Azur,	Murcia,	Malaga	or	European	
capitals) which can provide investment opportunities, for 
example in the real estate or hotel sector.
While	 some	 regions	 (e.g.	 southern	 Italy	 –	 see	 8.4)	 witness	
the	 infiltration	 of	 mainly local groups, other areas record 
investments of a wide range of OCGs: for instance southern 
Spain	 has	 cases	 of	 investments	 by	 Italian	 mafias,	 Russian	
OCGs,	Motorcycle	gangs	and	other	groups	(see	Section	8.6).
In which types of assets?
Evidence collected by the OCP project shows that assets of 
all types make up the investment portfolios of organised crime 
groups:
•	 Registered assets, such as cars or boats, which are 
instrumental	 to	 many	 illicit	 activities	 (e.g.	 boats	 for	 drug	
transportation), as well as status-symbols for criminal 
group	 members	 and	 reflection	 of	 the	 criminal	 group’s	
culture	(e.g.	“choppers”	for	motorcycle	gangs);
•	 Movable goods, such as jewels, valuables, luxury-watches, 
but	also	financial	instruments	and	bank	accounts/cash;
•	 Real estate properties, ranging from lands, to villas, to 
flats. Immovable goods are considered safe investments 
by	OCGs	because	 they	ensure	high	 returns	 (especially	 in	
areas with buoyant real estate markets, such as PACA or 
Costa	del	Sol	–	see	8.2	and	8.6)	and	profits	in	the	forms	of	
rents. Owning real estate can also facilitate illicit activities 
(e.g.	houses	can	host	brothels	or	deposits	for	illicit	goods),	
fraud	(e.g.	mortgage	frauds	–	see	in	Ireland	8.3)	and	control	
of	the	territory	(e.g.	in	Italy,	see	8.4);
•	 Companies, which are crucial investments and play a 
multifaceted role in the strategies of criminal organisations.
In which business sectors?
According to the evidence collected, the business sectors with 
the	most	cases	of	criminal	investments	are	(see	Section	7.3):	
•	 Bars	and	restaurants;	
•	 Construction;
•	 Wholesale and retail trade, in particular of food products 
and	of	clothing;
•	 Transportation;	
•	 Real	estate	activities;
•	 Hotels.
Other economic activities that, according to the collected 
data, have emerged in recent years as particularly attractive to 
organised crime investments are, among others, renewable 
energy, waste and scrap management, money transfer 
businesses (MTB) and casinos, VLT, slot machines, 
betting and gaming (see	7.3).
Although future research projects should examine the factors 
and vulnerabilities determining the attractiveness of these 
sectors, there seems to be a prevalence of:
•	 Cash-intensive sectors, which can facilitate money 
laundering;
•	 Low-tech, labour-intensive and not export-oriented 
sectors;
•	 Sectors with a high involvement of public administration 
and/or public subsidies;
•	 Territorial-specific sectors,	 which	 can	 benefit	 and/or	
facilitate the control of the territory by criminal groups.
•	 Sectors with weak or developing regulation, which may 
imply	weaker	monitoring	or	more	infiltration	opportunities 
(e.g.	renewable	energy	or	VLT	and	gaming).	
But above all, these sectors are often functional for 
the commission of other illicit activities: for example, 
transportation is often used as a front for the trafficking of illicit 
goods or MTB for transferring illicit funds.
Despite these general rules, there are differences among 
countries. These may depend on many variables, including 
the	country’s	business	 structure	and	entrepreneurial	 culture	
(e.g.	criminal	investments	in	agriculture	and	fishery	are	higher	
in Spain than, for instance, in Finland – see 8.6), investment 
opportunities, differences in terms of national administrative 
and regulatory systems or the nature of the illicit activities 
conducted	by	 the	criminal	 groups	active	 in	 the	country	 (e.g.	
the	infiltration	of	transportation	companies	is	higher	in transit 
countries like the Netherlands – see 8.5).
11.  Since the collection of cases was systematic only in the 7 OCP countries, the 
evidence collected in other EU MS should be interpreted cautiously and only as 
a preliminary picture of the situation.
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12. The data collection, which focused on the 7 OCP countries, may overestimate 
the	 role	 and	 the	 weight	 of	 OCGs,	 such	 as	 Italian	 mafias	 or	 British	 OCGs,	
originating from the 7 OCP EU MS.
What are the differences among actors?
Besides countries and business sectors, there are also 
differences among organised crime groups.
•	 First, as in illicit markets, a plurality of criminal actors, 
ranging from large and structured organisations to smaller 
and	looser	criminal	gangs,	invest	in	the	legitimate	economy;
•	 Taking into account data biases12 the criminal groups 
for which there is most evidence of investments in the 
legitimate economy are Italian mafias	(especially	Camorra	
and	 ‘Ndrangheta),	 Chinese OCGs, Russian/Georgian 
OCGs but also Motorcycle gangs and criminal groups of 
British, Dutch and Turkish	origin	and	nationality;
•	 Evidence of Italian mafia investments can be found 
not only in Italy but also in a large number of European 
countries, and in particular in real estate, construction 
companies, bars, restaurants and the wholesale and retail 
of	food	products;
•	 Chinese OCGs presence is especially high in the wholesale 
and retail trade, bars and restaurants, personal services 
(e.g.	 massage	 parlours)	 and	 money	 transfer	 agencies.	
Moreover, there is growing evidence of transfers of illicit 
proceeds	generated	in	Europe	(e.g.	from	counterfeiting,	tax	
fraud	or	 labour	 exploitation)	 to	China	 (especially	 through	
MSB)	(e.g.	in	Italy,	Spain	and	UK);
•	 Russian/Georgian OCGs are, according to the evidence 
collected, present in the largest number of EU countries, 
in particular in the wholesale and retail trade, bars, 
restaurants,	real	estate,	hotels	and	casinos	and	gaming;
•	 Evidence can be found of investments by Motorcycle 
gangs in the private security industry, construction, 
renovation and repair and retail of vehicles, with an 
increasing level of sophistication and in a larger number of 
countries	 (including	southern	EU	MS	such	as	Spain	–	see	
8.6);
•	 Turkish, Colombian and North African OCGs seem 
to prefer moving and investing the proceeds generated 
in	Europe	(e.g.	from	drug	trafficking)	abroad,	often	in	their	
country of origin (e.g.	 in	 real	 estate),	 also	 using	money	
transfer	agencies	under	their	control;
Other emerging issues should be highlighted:
•	 First,	 the	 evidence	 collected	 confirms	 the	 key	 role	 that	
professionals and company service providers may play 
especially	in	high-level	money	laundering	and	fraud	schemes;
•	 Second, the growing role of freelance entrepreneurs, 
belonging to the so-called grey area, connected with 
multiple OCGs at the same time, and acting either as 
frontmen for criminal groups or as facilitators	(e.g.	of	Cosa	
Nostra or Camorra investments in the wind power sector in 
Italy, see Section 8.4).
Figure 3b – Business sectors with highest evidence of organised crime investments - 7 OCP countries
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
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Figure 4 - European countries with evidence of organised crime investments - Selected categories of OCGs
Cosa Nostra
Chinese OCGs
Camorra
'Ndrangheta
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
Motorcycle gangsRussian OCGs
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•	 Third, the increasing number of cases of cooperation 
and joint ventures between different groups in the 
management of legitimate businesses and legitimate 
markets	(e.g.	between	Camorra	and	Chinese	OCGs	in	the	
clothing industry).13 
What are the drivers of organised crime investments? 
In summary, the OCP project shows that the investments in 
the legitimate economy are widely used by criminal groups to 
serve a variety of purposes, and in particular:
•	 To launder criminal proceeds;
•	 To increase profits, e.g. through speculation on the real 
estate	market;
•	 To strengthen control of the territory, e.g. through 
investments in real estate properties or in highly territorial-
specific	businesses;
•	 To infiltrate the local political, business and 
administrative sphere, e.g. with companies active in 
public	procurements;
•	 To increase social consensus, e.g. through the creation of 
jobs	or	the	provision	of	public	services;
•	 To satisfy personal benefits, including the purchase of 
status	symbols;
•	 To facilitate illicit activities, for example through the 
investment in and control of: 
-	Wholesale	trade	companies	(especially	of	food	products)	
as	fronts	for	drug	trafficking;
- Transportation, logistics and import-export companies, 
to cover the smuggling of illicit, counterfeit or stolen 
goods;
- Bars and restaurants, clubs and hotels as covers for 
prostitution	rings	or	drug	markets;
- Money service businesses to facilitate the transfer of illicit 
funds across borders.
-	Oil	and	gas	companies	 to	commit	 fraud	 (e.g.	 tax	 frauds,	
excise frauds, fuel laundering, etc.).
Criminal groups in Europe do not invest in the legal economy 
solely	 to	 launder	 money;	 they	 use	 legitimate	 businesses	
as tools to exert their power, influence and to exploit 
economies of scale with the criminal activities in which they 
are involved. OCGs do not discriminate between illicit and 
legitimate markets, but see them as a continuum along 
which	to	grasp	profit	opportunities	and	expand	their	influence.
Part 3: What proceeds are 
recovered? The confiscation of 
criminal assets in Europe 
But to what extent are the proceeds generated by organised 
crime from illicit markets and then invested in the legitimate 
economy recovered by the authorities?
Despite the general consensus on the crucial role of the 
confiscation of criminal assets	in	the	fight	against	organised	
crime	in	Europe	(as	confirmed	by	the	introduction	of	the	new	
Directive	2014/42/EU),	answering	this	question	is	not	simple.	
First, because of the lack of statistics;	 second,	because	of	
the many differences among the confiscation regimes in 
EU	 countries	 (e.g.	 different	 types	 of	 confiscation,	 predicate	
offences and types of assets – see Chapter 10) which make it 
difficult to compare the available data.
In order to gain better understanding of these problems, and in 
an attempt to answer the question above, OCP has:
•	 Assessed the level of availability of data	on	confiscated	
assets	throughout	the	28	EU	MS;
•	 Analysed, on the basis of the available data, the amount 
and types of assets confiscated for serious and 
organised crime across the 7 OCP countries.
What is the availability of data on confiscated assets in 
Europe?
According to the assessment conducted by OCP among EU 
AROs	and	AMOs,	it	emerges	that	(see	Chapter	11	for	details):
•	 Data	 on	 confiscated	 assets	 in	 Europe	 are	 lacking and 
of poor quality.	 While	 some	 countries	 (e.g.	 Italy,	 the	
Netherlands)	collect	good	statistics,	others	do	not;
•	 The use of IT systems	to	organise	data	is	infrequent;	
•	 Owing to the legislative differences, methods and criteria 
for	the	collection	of	data	on	confiscation	vary	widely	across	
EU	MS;
•	 Data are often collected within the same country by several 
agencies, involved in different stages of the asset recovery 
process or based in different geographic locations. This 
means	that	statistics	are	not	often	available	in	a	centralized	
dataset,	with	uniform	information;	
•	 Data can refer to different stages of the asset recovery 
process and even provide overlapping information on the 
same	court	proceedings;	
•	 It is often not possible to clearly distinguish the main 
offence(s)	for	which	an	asset	was	confiscated;
•	 Other useful information	 (e.g.	 location	 and	 condition	 of	
the	confiscated	asset,	date	of	seizure/confiscation,	type	or	
name	of	the	related	criminal	group)	is	often	missing;
•	 In most cases, assets are not associated with a unique 
ID code throughout the recovery process, and this makes 
it impossible tracing the assets throughout the whole 
process.
13.	 Other	 interesting	 cases	 can	 be	 found	 among	 Italian	 mafias	 for	 the	
management	 of	 some	 important	 fruit	 markets	 in	 Italy	 (see	 8.4)	 and	 a	
sophisticated	 money	 laundering	 scheme	 involving.	 ‘Ndrangheta,	 former	 Irish	
paramilitary members, and Spanish OCGs aimed at investing into tourist resorts 
in	Southern	Europe	(see	8.4).
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How many and what types of assets are confiscated, 
according to the available data?
Despite these obstacles to determine a clear picture of the 
state	of	confiscation	overall,	the	case	by	case	analysis	of	the	
7	OCP	countries	reveals	that	(see	Chapter	12):
•	 The number and value	 of	 confiscated	 assets	 has	
increased over past ten years in most of the countries for 
which	data	are	available;	
•	 The	majority	 of	 confiscated	 assets	 are	movable assets. 
Cash, bank accounts, vehicles, boats and, to a much lesser 
extent,	real	estate	are	commonly	seized	(see	below);
•	 Except for in Italy, there is a clear absence of confiscated 
companies.	Confiscation	of	companies	is	not	a	widespread	
practice, despite the evidence of criminal investments 
across many different business sectors in EU MS. 
The available data therefore show that significant 
discrepancy between what criminals invest in and what 
is actually confiscated by EU authorities, not only in terms of 
amount but also in terms of types of criminal assets. 
Research and policy implications
Given its pioneering nature, its data limitations and the limited 
number of EU MS covered, this report has to be considered 
only a first step towards a better understanding of the 
economics of organised crime in Europe, and a starting point 
for	further	studies	in	this	field.	In	particular,	the	OCP	report	has	
highlighted several challenges which should be addressed by 
future	research	and	policy	initiatives	(see	Chapter	13).
From a research standpoint:
•	 This report provides a cold picture of the activity of OCGs 
in illicit and legitimate markets in Europe according to 
police and judiciary cases. However, there is the need to 
pass from cold pictures of past cases to heat maps of 
risk, which could highlight not only where risks of criminal 
infiltration	 are,	 but	 also	 where	 they	 could	 emerge	 in	 the	
future. 
•	 In order to do so, it is necessary to extend the study to all 
the 28 EU MS, in order not to miss the transnational nature 
of criminal investments and to identify the areas where to 
focus research and policy initiatives.
•	 OCP	 has	 provided	 a	 ‘wide-angle’	 picture,	 highlighting	
macro patterns and trends of OCGs in illicit and 
legitimate markets. There is the need enrich this macro 
approach with a micro approach which could focus on 
more	 specific	 issues.	 Future	 research	 initiatives	 should	
integrate	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 study	 with	 other	 research	
projects, more limited-in-scope, conducted at EU level.15
From a policy perspective:
•	 This	 report	 has	 clearly	 highlighted	 that	 data	 in	 this	 field	
(e.g.	on	confiscated	assets,	on	STRs,	etc)	across	EU	MS	are	
lacking and of poor quality. EU agencies should propel the 
collection of better data across European countries and 
guarantee access to researchers	active	in	this	field.	
•	 This report has shown that a discrepancy exists between 
what	 criminals	 invest	 in	 and	 what	 is	 confiscated	 by	
European authorities, in particular with regard to criminal 
investments in legitimate businesses. There is the need to 
improve the confiscation of companies, by improving 
their tracing (e.g.	 through	 strengthening	 the	 financial	
investigation skills of European LEAs and FIUs and 
giving them better access to centralised registries and 
IT tools),16 by improving the regulation	 (e.g.	widening	 the	
use extended confiscation or third-party confiscation) 
and improving the management of the companies once 
confiscated.	 Also	 the	 use	 alternative instruments 
to	 seizure	 (such	 as	 temporary	 suspension	 of	 business	
administration or administrative penalties for companies 
‘polluted’	 by	 organised	 crime)	 should	 be	 explored	 and	
expanded.
14.	The	considered	data	is	from	Patja	(Finland),	AGRASC	(France),	CAB	(Ireland),	
ANBSC	(Italy)	and	PNSD	(Spain).	See	chapter	12	for	details.	
15.		For	example	with	the	findings	of	Project	ARIEL	(www.arielproject.eu),	funded	
by	 DG	 Home	 Affairs	 and	 expected	 to	 finish	 in	 spring	 2015.	 ARIEL	 has	 been	
carrying out a script analysis of some selected cases studies of organised crime 
infiltration	 into	 legitimate	companies	 in	5	pilot	EU	countries	 in	order	 to	better	
understand how OCGs acquire and keep control of European corporate entities. 
16.	For	example	EU	funded	Project	EBOCS	(www.ebocs.eu)	will	produce	an	 IT	
prototype available to LEAs, FIUs and AROs to ease the collection and analysis 
of data on shareholders and administrators across different business registries 
of	 five	 EU	MS.	 Should	 this	 pilot	 tool	 be	 extended	 to	 other	 countries,	 it	 would	
facilitate	 in	a	crucial	way	 transnational	 investigations	 to	 identify	 the	beneficial	
owners	behind	infiltrated	legitimate	businesses.
Figure 5 – Average percentages of types of assets confis-
cated in five OCP countries14
Source: OCP analysis on AROs public reports and OCP data
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•	 Finally, this report has stressed the need for better public-
private partnerships (e.g. through a more effective 
exchange of data and of best practices) to prevent that 
criminal groups could exploit loopholes in legal supply 
chains to carry out criminal activities such as theft, fraud, 
counterfeiting or money laundering. 
Based on the current research gaps and the policy perspective, 
future projects should adopt a more integrated approach 
to	better	combat	organised	crime	 infiltration	and	prevent	 its	
spread in new areas of the European legitimate economy.
The development of risk assessments should be coupled 
with an holistic analysis of the opportunities that organised 
criminal	 groups	 exploit	 to	 infiltrate	 the	 legal	 economy.	 In	
turn this requires a micro-approach focusing also on the 
contextual vulnerabilities, such as legislation and the level 
and type of crime control policies. All 28 EU MS need to 
collaborate in the systematic collection of homogenous and 
comparable data. The data collection process should require 
the collaboration of experts from different countries and 
backgrounds	 (including	 LEAs,	 FIUs	 and	 AROs,	 academic,	
public officials and representatives of the private sector) to 
allow for a better interpretation of information as well as to 
increase the shared knowledge regarding this phenomenon. 
Finally, European institutions and national governments 
should provide human and technological resources in order to 
meet these challenges. The organisation of LEAs, FIUs and 
AROs could be reshaped in order these agencies can better 
identify, assess and manage the risks	of	criminal	infiltration	
into illicit and legitimate markets. 
Following an opportunity reduction approach and focusing 
on high-risk situations could lead to the achievement of these 
results with fewer resources and less costs for European 
citizens.
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ACFE  Association	of	Certified	Fraud	Examiners
AGRASC Agence de la Gestion et Recouvrement   
		 des	Avoirs	Saisis	et	Confisqués	(France)
AML  Anti-Money Laundering 
ANBSC	 		 Agenzia	Nazionale	per	l'amministrazione		
		 e	la	destinazione	dei	beni	sequestrati	e		 	
		 confiscati	(Italy)
ANDEMA Asociación Nacional para la defensa de   
	 	 la	Marca	(Spain)
ARIEL	 	 Assessing	the	Risk	of	the	Infiltration	of		 	
	 	 Organized	Crime	in	EU	MSs	Legitimate		 	
  Economies
ARO  Asset Recovery Office
ASIC  Australian Securities and Investments   
  Commission 
ATO  Australian Tax Office 
ATS  Amphetamine-Type Stimulants
AWP	 	 Amusement	with	prize
BASCAP  Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting   
  and Piracy
BMC  Bandidos Motorcycle Club
BOOM   Bureau Ontnemingswetgeving Openbar   
	 	 Ministerie	(Criminal			 	 	
  Assets DeprivationBureau of     
  the Public Prosecution    
	 	 Service)	(Netherlands)
BRIFN   Brigade de recherches and    
	 	 d’investigations	financières		 	 	
	 	 nationale	(France)
CAB		 	 Criminal	Assets	Bureau	(Ireland)
CARIN   Camden Assets Recovery Interagency   
  Network 
CASE   Center for Social and Economic   
  Research
CEART   Centres of Excellence in Asset Recovery  
  and Training
CENSIS		 	 Centro	Studi	Investimenti	Sociali	(Italy)
CFT   Combating the Financing of Terrorism
CICO   Centre of Intelligence against the   
	 	 Organized	Crime	(Spain)
CJA   Criminal Justice Act
CJIB   Centraal Justitieël Incassobureau   
	 	 (Netherlands)
CMC   Cannonball MC
COSC   Central	Office	for	Seizure	and			 	
	 	 Confiscation	(Belgium)
CPB   Centraal	Planbureau	(Netherlands		 	
  Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)
DGDDI		 	 Direction	générale	des	douanes	et	droits		
	 	 indirects	(France)
DIA		 	 Direzione	Investigativa	Antimafia	(Italy)
DNA  	Direzione	Nazionale	Antimafia	(Italy)
DOCI   Database on Organised Crime   
  Investments
DPP		 	 Director	of	Public	Prosecutions	(Ireland)
EC   European Commission
ECAB   Europol Criminal Assets Bureau 
ECB   European Central Bank
EMCDDA  European Monitoring Centre for Drugs   
  and Drug Addiction
EMI  Euromonitor International
ESAET   Environment Services Association   
  Education Trust
ETA  Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
ETS   Emission Trading System
EU   European Union
FATF  Financial Action Task Force
FARC   Revolutionary Armed Forces of   
  Colombia
FCTC   Framework Convention on Tobacco   
  Control
FIU   Financial Investigation Unit
GBP  UK Pound Sterling
GDF		 	 Guardia	di	Finanza	(Italy)
GDO		 	 Grande	Distribuzione	Organizzata
GDP   Gross Domestic Product
GPS   General Population Survey
Acronyms                                                  
19 
GRECO    Group of Special Response to Organised  
  Crime
GTRIC   General Trade-Related Index of   
  Counterfeiting for Economies
HAMC   Hells Angels MC
HMRC		 	 Her	Majesty's	Revenue	and	Customs		 	
	 	 (UK)
HLM		 	 Habitation	à	Loyer	Modéré
HRDU   High Risk Drug Users
HS  	code	Harmonized	System	Code
ICPR   Institute for Criminal Policy Research 
ILO   International Labour Office
ILU   International Liaison Officers Units 
IMF  International Monetary FUnd
INHESJ   Institut National des Hautes Études de la  
	 	 Sécurité	et	de	la	Justice	(France)
IPOL   National Police Intelligence Service   
	 	 (Netherlands)
IPR   Intellectual Property Rights
IRA   Irish Republican Army
ISS   Internal Security Strategy
ISTAT		 	 Istituto	Centrale	di	Statistica	(Italian		 	
  National Statistics Institute)
ITF   Illicit Trafficking in Firearms
ITTP   Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products
JARD		 	 Joint	Asset	Recovery	Database	(UK)
KLPD   Koninklijke Landelijke Politie Dienst   
	 	 (Netherlands)
LEA   Law Enforcement Agency
LECRIM		 	 Ley	de	Enjuiciamiento	Criminal	(Spain)
MAOC-N  Centre Maritime Analysis and    
  Operations against drug trafficking
MC   Motor Club
MHRA   Medicines and Healthcare Products   
  Regulatory Agency
MS  Member State
MTB   Money Transfer Businesses
MTEC   Missing Trader Extra-Community
MTIC   Missing Trader Intra-Community
MOKAS-FIU  Unit for Combating Money Laundering   
	 	 (Cyprus)
MUP	 	 Ministry	of	the	Interior	(Croatia)	
NACE		 	 Nomenclature	Générale	des	Activités		 	
	 	 Économiques	dans	les	Communautés		 	
	 	 Européennes
NAO		 	 National	Audit	Office	(UK)
NBI   National	Bureau	of	Investigation	(Finland)
NCA  	National	Crime	Agency	(UK)
NFA	 	 National	Fraud	authority	(UK)
NHS   National	Health	Service‏	(UK)
NPS   New Psychoactive Substances
NUTS   Nomenclature of Territorial Units for   
  Statistics
NWCU		 	 National	Wildlife	Crime	Unit	(UK)
OC   Organised Crime
OCCT   Organised Crime and Counter Terrorism  
  Unit 
OCG   Organised Crime Group 
OCJS   Offending, Crime and Justice Survey
OCP   Organised Crime Portfolio
OCTF   Organised Crime Task Force
OECD   Organisation for Economic Cooperation   
  and Development
OFDT   Observatoire Français des Drogues et   
  des Toxicomanies
OLAF   European Anti-Fraud Office
OMCG   Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs
ONDRP		 	 Observatoire	National	de	la	Délinquance		
	 	 et	des	Réponses	Pénales	(France)
OPC   Organised property crime
OSCE		 	 Organization	for	Security	and	Co-	 	
  Operation in Europe
PACA		 	 Provence-Alpes-Côte	d'Azur
PACCO   Action Plan Against Organised Crime
PCF  Police college of Finland
PFRC   Personal Finance Research Centre
PIAC		 	 Plateforme	d’Identification	des	Avoirs		 	
	 	 Criminels	(France)
PNSD		 	 Plan	Nacional	Sobre	Drogas	(Spain)
POCA   Proceeds Of Crime Act
PPO	 	 Public	Prosecution	Office	(Netherlands)
PIAC		 	 Plateforme	d’Identification	des	Avoirs		 	
	 	 Criminels	(France)
PIRA   Provisional Irish Republican Army
PSNI   Police Service of Northern Ireland
REITOX		 	 Réseau	Européen	d'	‏Information	sur	les		
	 	 Drogues	et	les	Toxicomanies	(European			
  information network on drugs    
  and drug addiction)
RIRA   Real Irish Republican Army
SALW   Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAC		 	 Servizio	Analisi	Criminale	(Italy)
SCI  Société	Civile	Immobilière	(France)
SEPI   Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones   
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	 	 Industriales	(Spain)
SFO		 	 Serious	Fraud	Office	(UK)
SFO		 	 Strafrechtelijk	Financieel	Onderzoek		 	
	 	 (Netherlands)
SGI		 	 Société	de	Gestion	Immobilière	(France)
SIPPI   Sistema Informativo Prefetture e Procure  
	 	 dell'Italia
STRJD   Service Technique de Recherches   
  Judiciaires et de Documentation‏   
	 	 (France)
SOCTA   Serious and Organised Crime Threat   
  Assessment
SOCA		 	 Serious	Organised	Crime	Agency	(UK)
TFEU   Treaty on the Functioning of the   
  European Union
THB   Trafficking in Human Beings
TTI   Texas Transportation Institute
VAT   Value Added Tax
VLT   Video lottery terminal
VRT   Vehicle Registration Tax
UAE   United Arab Emirates
UB   United Brotherhood
UCO	 	 Central	Operative	Unit	(Spain)
UDEF		 	 Economic	and	Fiscal	Crime	Unit	(Spain)
UDUR		 	 Durham	University	(UK)
UEFA   Union of European Football Associations
UIF		 	 Unità	di	Informazione	Finanziaria	(Italy)
UK		 	 United	Kingdom	(Great	Britain,	Scotland,		
  Wales and Northern Ireland)
UN   United Nations
UNAFEI   United Nations Asia and Far East   
  Institute
UNODC   United Nations Office on Drugs and   
  Crime
UOKFK   Unit Combating Corruption and Financial  
	 	 Crimes	(Czech	Republic)
URJC		 	 Universidad	Rey	Juan	Carlos	(Spain)
USD   US dollars
UU		 	 Utrecht	University	(Netherlands)
WAP   Weighted Average Price
WEEE   Waste Electrical and Electronic   
  Equipment
WHO		 	 World	Health	Organization
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Project OCP – Organised Crime Portfolio
This	 report	 presents	 the	 final	 results	 of Project OCP – 
Organised Crime Portfolio	 (www.ocportfolio.eu). Project 
OCP	 has	 been	 carried	 out	 with	 financial	 support	 from	 the	
Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the 
European Union - European Commission, DG Home Affairs, 
and has been developed by an international consortium of 
eight partners:
•		 Transcrime	 –	 Joint	 Research	 Centre	 on	 Transnational	
Crime	 (www.transcrime.it) of the Università Cattolica del 
Sacro Cuore di Milano and the Università degli Studi di 
Trento	(Italy),	coordinator	of	the	project
•		 Police	College	of	Finland	(PCF	–	Finland)
•		 Agence de Gestion et de Recouvrement des Avoirs Saisis 
et	Confisqués	(AGRASC	–	France)
•		 An	 Garda	 Síochána	 -	 Criminal	 Assets	 Bureau	 (CAB	 –	
Ireland).
•		 Guardia	di	Finanza	(GDF	–	Italy)
•		 	Utrecht	University	(UU	-	The	Netherlands)
•		 Universidad	Rey	Juan	Carlos	(URJC	–	Spain)
•		 Durham	University	(UDUR	–	United	Kingdom)
The aim of OCP is to provide a first exploration of the 
economics of organised crime in Europe, and in particular 
to understand:
•		 Where	organised	crime	proceeds	are	generated,	from	what	
illicit markets;
•		 Where	these	proceeds	are	then	invested in the legitimate 
economy,	in	what	regions,	assets	and	business	sectors;
•		 To	 what	 extent	 these	 proceeds	 are confiscated and 
recovered by European authorities.
Background: the gap in the research
In the past thirty years, awareness has grown at international 
level that in order to combat organised crime effectively, 
it is necessary first to disrupt its business cycle: from 
the sources of its illicit proceeds to its investments in the 
legitimate economy.
In recent years, numerous regulatory and policy measures 
have been introduced at European level to address this 
issue. They include a range of legal instruments in both the 
anti-money laundering field	 (Riccardi	 &	 Savona,	 2013;	
Unger et al., 2014, for a review) and that of the confiscation 
and recovery of criminal assets, such as the new Directive 
2014/42/EC	 (European	 Commission,	 2008;	 Forsaith	 et	 al.,	
2012;	European	Parliament,	2014).
However, despite these advances, numerous questions 
remain unanswered from a research perspective: there 
is a lack of knowledge on how the economics of organised 
crime actually work: i.e. where organised crime proceeds are 
produced, from what illicit markets, where these proceeds 
are	 invested	 in	 the	 legitimate	 economy	 (in	 what	 geographic	
regions, types of assets and business sectors), and to 
what	 extent	 they	 are	 eventually	 confiscated	 by	 the	 public	
authorities.
This is due primarily to the lack of data and information that 
would enable comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon. 
Organised	crime	groups	do	not	publish	financial	statements,	
and it is necessary to rely on indirect proxies for their business 
(see	Chapter	 2	 for	 details),	 such	 as	 data	 on	 the	 portfolio	 of	
confiscated	 assets	 or	 other	 judicial	 evidence	 which	 affords	
understanding of how criminals make and then spend their 
money. But also this information is scarce: statistics on 
confiscated assets are very limited across Europe, and they 
are very difficult to compare owing to the different regulations 
(see	 Part	 3).	 Similarly,	 also	 other	 useful	 information	 (e.g.	 on	
suspicious	transaction	reports,	financial	investigations,	etc.)	is	
very poor and fragmented.
For this reason, the available studies in this field furnish 
only a partial understanding of the dynamics of the 
economics of organised crime: they usually focus either 
on specific countries	 (see	 Chapters	 4	 and	 8	 for	 a	 review)	
and therefore miss the increasingly transnational nature of 
criminal	 investments;	 or	 they	 analyse	 only	 specific illicit 
markets	(see	Chapter	3),	not	taking	account	of	the	links	that	
organised crime groups are able to establish between the 
illegal	 and	 the	 legitimate	 economy;	 and	 only	 a	 few	 studies	
explore the differences in terms of business strategies among 
different criminal groups.
This lack of knowledge makes it more difficult for LEAs, 
FIUs and AROs in Europe to obtain an overall picture 
of the mechanisms of the organised crime business, and 
thus determine where to focus their investigative and asset 
recovery resources. Similarly, also public authorities and 
private companies	 (including	 banks	 and	 the	 other	 entities	
subject to AML obligations) are unable correctly to assess 
where the risk of criminal investments is higher so that they can 
improve their preventive action and reduce the opportunities 
for	organised	crime	infiltration.	
1. Introduction                                                   
Michele Riccardi (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
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How Project OCP addresses this gap
Project	 OCP	 –	 Organised	 Crime	 Portfolio	 (www.ocportfolio.
eu) aims to address this knowledge gap. It provides a 
pioneering analysis of the economics of organised crime 
groups	(OCGs)	in	Europe, in particular by answering the three 
following research questions:
•		 Where	do	organised	crime	proceeds	originate?	From	what	
illicit markets? What is their scale?
•		 Where	 are	 these	 proceeds	 invested	 in	 the	 legitimate	
economy? In what regions, assets and business sectors?
•		 To	what	extent	are	these	proceeds	and	assets	recovered	
and	confiscated?
In order to address these questions, Project OCP builds on 
previous research initiatives,17 primarily the project entitled 
Gli investimenti delle mafie – Mafia investments	 (www.
investimentioc.it), carried out in 2012 by Transcrime with 
funding from the Italian Ministry of the Interior, and which 
analysed the illicit markets and investments in the legitimate 
economy	of	mafia	groups	in	Italy	(Transcrime,	2013a).	
Employing the same approach as the Italian project, OCP 
extends	 the	 study	 to	 European	 level,	 and	 for	 the	 first	 time	
adopts a transnational perspective. It focuses on seven EU 
countries	(Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain and the United Kingdom), represented by the OCP 
partners, but also presents a broader analysis of the situation 
in Europe as a whole.
In order to maximise the amount of usable data, OCP has 
collected a wide range of information, both qualitative 
and quantitative, deriving from very different sources, and 
including	 statistics	 on	 confiscated	 assets,	 data	 from	 police	
investigations, judicial evidence, academic literature and 
open sources, all of them analysed employing an innovative 
methodology	(see	Chapter	2	and	the	Methodological	Annex).	
Given the diversity of these data and the pioneering 
methodology, this report aspires to be only a first 
exploration of this phenomenon and a first step towards 
better understanding of how its business cycle works, from 
the origin of illicit proceeds, through its investments in the 
legitimate	economy,	to	its	disruption	through	confiscation.	
Structure of this report
The report is structured into three parts which precisely reflect 
the three research questions addressed by the project.18 After 
a brief description of the main methodological issues in 
Chapter	2	(definitions,	classifications,	sources	and	data):
Part 1 focuses on the origin of organised crime proceeds, i.e. 
illicit markets. In particular:
•		 Chapter 3 provides a summary analysis at European 
aggregate level, with a measurement of the scale of the 
revenues from illicit markets and a review of the main 
criminal	groups	which	share	these	proceeds;
•		 Chapter 4 focuses on 10 illicit markets	(illicit	drugs,	THB,	
ITF,	ITTP,	counterfeiting,	illegal	gambling	and	match	fixing,	
extortion racketeering, usury, fraud, organised property 
crime);
•		 Chapter 5 provides an in-depth analysis of illicit markets 
in the 7 European countries	 covered	 by	 OCP	 (Finland,	
France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, United 
Kingdom);
•		 Chapter 6 constitutes a bridge between Part 1 and 2 by 
presenting an exploratory assessment of what proportion 
of the revenues generated by illicit markets may be 
available for investment in the legitimate economy.
Part 2	 analyses	 where	 (in	 what	 regions,	 types	 of	 assets,	
business sectors, and with what differences among criminal 
actors) organised crime proceeds are then invested in the 
legitimate economy. In particular:
•		 Chapter 7 provides an analysis of organised crime 
investments	at	European	aggregate	level;
•		 Chapter 8 focuses on criminal investments in the 7 OCP 
countries	 (Finland,	France,	 Ireland,	 Italy,	 the	Netherlands,	
Spain,	United	Kingdom);	
•		 Finally, Chapter 9 explores the impact and the costs of 
organised crime investments on the European legitimate 
economy.
Part 3 studies the extent to which organised crime proceeds 
are	 eventually	 confiscated	 by	 European	 authorities.	 In	
particular: 
•		 Chapter 10 provides an overview of the regulatory 
framework for criminal asset recovery in Europe, with a 
focus	on	the	seven	OCP	countries;	
•		 Chapter 11 provides an assessment of the availability of 
data	on	confiscated	assets	in	Europe;
•		 Finally	Chapter 12, based on the available data, provides 
an analysis of confiscated assets in the 7 OCP countries. 
The report concludes by examining the research and policy 
implications stemming from the analysis and discussing 
future research follow-ups on Project OCP. 
Who can benefit from this report?
Despite its data limitations and its pioneering nature, this 
report is a starting point towards better comprehension 
of	the	opportunities	exploited	by	organised	crime	to	infiltrate	
illicit markets and legitimate businesses in Europe. 
	17.	For	a	complete	list	of	related	projects	and	research	initiatives	see	http://www.
ocportfolio.eu/links.php.	
18. This report is also structured to reflect the activities of the project and to 
incorporate its deliverables. In particular, a single report has been produced 
(instead	of	a	plurality	of	deliverables)	so	as	to	enable	better	comprehension	of	
the results of the analysis carried out by OCP, and to provide an easy-to-handle 
product for policy-makers, investigators, researchers and other stakeholders. 
Specifically,	Deliverable	D1	is	incorporated	in	Chapter	2	(description	of	the	data	
available	and	collected)	and	in	Chapter	11	(assessment	of	the	availability	of	data	
on	confiscated	assets);	Deliverable	D3	is	incorporated	in	Chapter	2	(description	
of the methodology developed for the analysis) and in the Methodological 
Annex;	Deliverable	D4	is	incorporated	in	Part	1,	 in	particular	Chapters	3,	4	and	
5	 (estimate	 of	 the	 amount	 of	 organised	 crime	 proceeds	 from	 illicit	 markets)	
and	 in	 Part	 2,	 in	 particular	 in	 Chapters	 7	 and	 8	 (Analysis	 of	 organised	 crime	
investments);	 Deliverable	 D5	 is	 incorporated	 in	 Part	 2,	 and	 in	 particular	 in	
Chapter	 9	 (assessment	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 OC	 investments	 on	 the	 European	
legitimate	 economy);	 Deliverable	 D6	 is	 incorporated	 in	 Part	 2,	 in	 particular	
in	Chapters	 7	 and	8	 (analysis	 of	 selected	economic	 sectors	with	 evidence	of	
organised	crime	investments).	The	Final	public	conference	(Deliverable	D7)	was	
held on 27 November 2014 in Brussels, at EU Commission premises, with the 
presentation	of	the	final	results	of	the	Project.	
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In particular, it represents an invaluable support tool for:
•		 LEAs and FIUs, to identify the areas in the illicit and the 
legitimate economy on which to focus their investigative 
activity;
•		 AROs,	to	develop	more	effective	confiscation	policies;
•		 Public authorities, such as local governments and 
public contractors, as a basis for better assessment and 
prevention	of	the	risk	of	criminal	infiltration	of	the	legitimate	
economy;
•		 Banks and other AML covered entities	 (e.g.	 auditing	
firms,	 law	firms,	real	estate	agencies,	casinos),	to	respond	
better to AML obligations, and in particular to develop 
more	effective	CDD	activities;
•		 Private companies, to determine more precisely the 
vulnerabilities in the supply-chain which may be exploited 
by criminal groups for illicit trade purposes.
The	final	report	of	Project	OCP	constitutes	a	solid	basis	for	the	
future development of a risk assessment tool which could 
be used by both public and private institutions to reduce 
the opportunities for criminal infiltration of the legitimate 
economy, and thereby strengthen the prevention of organised 
crime business. 
In addition, this report can also be used by European public 
authorities to determine the gaps that must be addressed 
from both a regulatory and policy standpoint, for example to 
improve the availability of data	 in	 this	field	 (see	 research	
and policy implications in Chapter 13).
What is new about this report?
With	respect	 to	 the	existing	 literature	 in	 this	field,	 this	
report provides a range of innovative contributions, in-
cluding:
•		 One	of	the	first	quantifications	at	European	level	of	
the scale of the illicit revenues from illicit markets19 
(Part	1)
•		 A	comprehensive	literature	review	of	the	main	
criminal actors involved in illicit markets in Europe 
(Part	1)
•		 An	estimation	of	how	much	remains	of	the	
revenues from illicit markets, after subtracting 
costs, for investment in the legitimate economy 
(Part	1)
•		 A	map	of	the	geographic	regions	in	Europe	with	
evidence	of	organised	crime	investments	(Part	2)
•		 A	list	of	the	business	sectors	most	exposed	to	
organised	crime	investments	(Part	2)
•		 A	first	assessment	of	the	availability	of	statistics	on	
confiscated	assets	across	EU	member	states	(Part	
3)
•		 An	analysis,	based	on	the	available	statistics,	of	
what	assets	are	confiscated	across	EU	MS	(Part	3)
17. In particular, estimates of almost all of the 28 EU MS are available for the 
following illicit markets and activities: illicit trafficking in heroin, cocaine, 
cannabis,	 ecstasy,	 amphetamines,	 illicit	 trafficking	 in	 firearms,	 illicit	 trade	 in	
tobacco products, counterfeiting, MTIC frauds, and cargo theft.
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As a consequence of its exploratory nature, this report 
necessarily adopts a pioneering methodology, including 
the use of a wide range of data and sources, and broad 
classifications, in order not to limit the scope of the study 
excessively and thereby maximise the amount of collectable 
and analysable information. 
Some of the methodological assumptions on which the 
next chapters are based are briefly discussed here, while 
more details are provided in the Methodological Annex. 
In particular Section 2.1	 addresses	 some	 definitory	 and	
taxonomical	 issues	 (the	 definition	 and	 classification	 of	
organised crime adopted by this study, the selection and 
classification	 of	 illicit	 markets,	 and	 definition	 of	 organised 
crime investment);	 while	 Section 2.2 briefly explains what 
data and sources were employed, and how, for the analyses 
presented in the three parts of the report. 
2.1. Definitions and classifications
How organised crime has been defined
Organised crime is a mutable concept, constantly evolving 
and changing faster than academia and legislation can create 
taxonomies	to	define	it	(Finckenauer,	2005;	Hagan,	2006).	
Considering the exploratory nature of this study and the 
lack of official data on organised crime, it has been decided 
to	 keep	 the	 definition	as broad as possible in order not to 
exclude any emerging phenomena, on the one hand, and to 
maximise the amount of collectable information on the other.
The focus is primarily on what organised crime groups 
do rather than on who they are. In particular, building on the 
definition	 of	 serious and organised crime adopted by 
Europol	SOCTA	2013	(Europol,	2013a,	p.	41),	this	report	studies	
the economic activity of:
2. Methodological      
remarks                                                   
Any	criminal	actor	(a	large	organisation,	a	smaller	gang,	
or a loose network of individuals) which:
•	 can	 be	 profiled	 as	 a	 criminal organisation falling 
under	 the	definition	provided	by	 the	EU	Framework	
Decision	2008/841/JHA;20
The	adoption	of	such	a	broad	definition	has	some	drawbacks,	
but it also has some advantages: 
•		 First,	 it	 is	 broad	 enough	 to	 overcome	 the	 substantial 
differences across EU MS in terms of organised crime 
legislation	and	legal	definitions	(see	Calderoni,	2010;	Allum	
&	Boer,	2013,	for	a	review).22
•		 Second,	 it	 increases the amount of data and 
information which could be collected and employed for 
the	 analysis:	 e.g.	 many	 sources	 (including	 the	 statistics	
on	seized	and	confiscated	assets)	often	do	not	specify	 if	
actors	fall	under	the	legal	definition	of	organised crime, but 
instead indicate what are the main illegal activities in which 
these actors have been involved.23
20.	The	Framework	Decision	defines	as	a	“criminal	organisation	any	structured	
association, established over a period of time, of more than two persons acting in 
concert with a view to committing offences which are punishable by deprivation 
of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more 
serious	 penalty,	 to	 obtain,	 directly	 or	 indirectly,	 a	 financial	 or	 other	 material	
benefit"	 (Council	Framework	Decision	2008/841/JHA	of	24	October	2008	on	
the	fight	against	organised	crime,	OJ	L	300,	11.11.2008,	p.	42).
21.	“These	areas	of	crime	are	the	following:	terrorism,	trafficking	in	human	beings	
and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms 
trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, 
computer	crime	and	organised	crime”	Official	Journal	C	326,	26/10/2012	P.	0001	
–	0390,	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT
22. Substantial differences exist across EU MS in terms of organised crime 
legislation,	for	example	with	regard	to	defining	criminal	organisation	offences,	the	
types	 and	 number	 of	 related	 offences,	 penalties	 and	 sanctions	 (see	Calderoni,	
2010, p. 55-121 for a review).
Diana Camerini, Michele Riccardi, Cristina Soriani and Priscilla Standridge (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
•	is	involved	in	serious crimes	as	identified	by	art.	83(1)	
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union	(often	referred	to	as	Euro	crimes)21 and in other 
criminal activities	 (illicit	 trade	 in	 tobacco	products,	
counterfeiting,	 illegal	 gambling	 and	 match-fixing,	
extortion racketeering, usury, fraud and organised 
property crime) which are not listed in the TFEU but 
are considered relevant to the purposes of this study 
(see	below	for	a	broader	discussion	of	the	selection	of	
illicit markets).
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•		 Third,	it	includes	some	emerging criminal activities and 
illicit markets (such	as	fraud	or	organised	theft)	which	do	
not	 currently	 fall	 under	 the	 EU	 definition	 of	 organised	 or	
serious crimes but are increasing their organised nature 
and gaining prominence in the business cycle of criminal 
groups	because	of	their	low	risk	and	high	profitability	(see	
Chapters 3 and 4).
It will be the task of future research projects in this area to 
sharpen	 the	 definitions,	 limit	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 analysis	 and	
focus	on	specific	actors,	offences	or	illicit	conducts.
How organised crime groups have been classified
Classifying criminal groups into a limited number of clearly 
identifiable	categories	is	very	difficult:	as	shown	by	this	report	
and	by	previous	studies	(e.g.	Kleemans,	2007;	Europol,	2013a;	
Paoli, 2014), a plurality of criminal actors, ranging from large 
organisations to occasional networks of individual criminals, 
and with an increasing multi-ethnic nature, are active in 
Europe.24
However, in some parts of this report a simplified classification 
of criminal groups, based on the dominant geographical 
provenance	 and/or	 ethnicity	 of	 their	 members,	 has	 been	
adopted, resulting in 35 categories of OCGs25 (see	 the	
Methodological Annex for details). In some parts of the report 
an	even	more	simplified	classification	into	5	macro-categories	
has been used.26
When possible, the native nationality of the members of 
the	criminal	organisation	was	taken	(e.g.	criminals	with	North	
African	origin	but	with	French	citizenship	have	been	classified	
as	 ‘North	African’).	However,	 it	has	 to	be	underlined	 that	 the	
data sources did not always specify if the nationality of 
the group referred to the actual country of birth, to the ethnic 
background or to the country where these people lived.27 For 
this	 reason	 this	 classification	 has	 to	 be	 taken	 prudently.	 If	
groups involved more than one nationality or ethnicity, when 
possible the one most frequently mentioned has been used to 
categorize	the	whole	group.
Which illicit markets have been selected, and why
As illustrated in the introduction, Part 1 of this report presents 
the results of an analysis of 10 illicit markets and criminal 
activities28 that have been considered crucial, from both 
a	 financial	 and	 strategic	 point	 of	 view,	 for	 the	 economy	 of	
organised	crime	groups	in	Europe	(Table	2).
Although the list of serious crimes	(often	referred	to	as	Euro 
crimes) of art. 83(1) of the TFEU was used as a starting point 
for the selection, it was expanded to include additional crimes 
(Table	2).	Some	of	them,	despite	not	being	listed	by	art.	83(1)	
(i.e.	 counterfeiting,29 illegal gambling, extortion racketeering, 
usury, frauds and organised theft) were covered because of 
their increasing prominence in the economy of criminal groups 
in Europe. 
On the other hand, some were not included in the analysis 
presented in Part 1 of this report. In particular: 
•		 Corruption was considered not to be an illicit market 
per se, but rather as an enabler	 (Europol,	2013a;	Riccardi	
&	 Sarno,	 2013)	 employed	 horizontally	 by	 criminal	 groups	
across	 illicit	 markets	 and	 to	 infiltrate	 the	 legitimate	
economy;
•		 Also	cybercrime, or computer crime, was not considered 
a market, but rather a facilitator of certain other illegal 
activities	 (e.g.	 identity	 theft	 to	 commit	 plastic fraud, see 
3.9);	
•		 Money laundering is in effect the topic of Part 2 which 
focuses on how illicit proceeds are integrated and invested 
in the legitimate economy.
How organised crime investments have been defined
While Part 1 focuses on the source of organised crime proceeds 
(illicit	markets),	Part 2	 explores	where	 (what	 regions,	assets	
and business sectors) criminal groups invest these proceeds 
in the legitimate economy, and therefore how their portfolios 
of holdings are composed.
But whilst data on illicit markets are scarce, even less 
information is available on the assets of criminals and criminal 
23.	For	example,	 in	most	EU	countries	asset	recovery	statistics	(see	Section	2.2	
and Section 3) include only indications on the predicate main offences for which 
assets	 have	 been	 seized	 or	 confiscated,	 but	 they	 usually	 do	 not	 specify	 the	
type	and	nature	of	the	criminal	actor	from	whom	assets	have	been	confiscated.	
Similarly, media or open sources do not always specify if a criminal actor targeted 
by an investigation has been prosecuted on organised crime charges, but often 
report if the group was involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking or other illicit 
activities. 
24.	According	 to	Europol	SOCTA,	 70%	of	 the	 groups	 identified	 in	Europe	are	
multi-national	 in	 their	 membership	 (Europol,	 2013a,	 p.	 34);	 and	 especially	 in	
transit countries characterised by a multicultural population, such as France, 
Netherlands	 and	 the	 UK,	 multi-ethnic	 OCGs	 may	 be	 the	 general	 rule	 (see	
Chapters 4 and 8).
25. For the complete list of the categories and the methodology used to create 
them,	see	the	Methodological	Annex.	The	only	identified	categories	of	criminal	
groups	 that	 have	 not	 been	 classified	 according	 to	 their	 geographical	 origin	
are	 Camorra	 OCGs,	 ‘Ndrangheta	 OCGs,	 Cosa	 Nostra	 OCGs,	 Apulian	 OCGs	
and	Motorcycle	gangs	(which	may	have	different	national	chapters	in	different	
countries	 but	 maintain	 a	 well-defined	 criminal	 identity).	 The	 approach	 of	
classifying OCGs according to their main geographical provenance has been 
employed also by previous reports and studies, including Europol SOCTA 2013 
(Europol,	2013a).	It	should	be	noted	that	the	ethnicity	of	criminal	members	is	also	
one of items of information most frequently mentioned by open sources and 
media reports. In those countries where available data have made it possible 
to distinguish with a higher degree of detail the geographic provenance of 
each	 individual	 criminal	 (e.g.	 in	 the	Netherlands),	 groups	have	been	classified	
according	to	the	geographic	origin	of	the	majority	of	their	members	(see	5.5	and	
the Methodological Annex for details).
26.	Chinese-speaking	OCGs,	Russian/Georgian-speaking	OCGs,	Italian	mafias	
–	 including	 Camorra,	 Cosa	 Nostra,	 ‘Ndrangheta	 and	 other	 Italian	 mafias	 –	
Motorcycle	 gangs	 and	 Other	 OCGs.	 The	 five	 macro	 categories	 have	 been	
identified	because	they	are	 those	most	 represented	 in	 terms	of	 references	to	
investments	in	the	legitimate	economy	(see	Chapters	7	and	8).
27.	For	example,	 in	the	analysis	of	 illicit	markets	 in	the	Netherlands	(see	5.5)	 it	
has	not	been	possible	to	determine	the	native	origin	(e.g.	Surinamese,	Turkish,	
etc)	of	criminals	included	in	the	PPO	database	as	Dutch	citizens.	It	has	also	to	
be	considered	 that	national	 laws	 regulating	 the	acquisition	of	 citizenship	may	
be	 different	 in	 some	 countries,	 and	 therefore	 the	 status	 of	 first	 and	 second	
generation immigrants may be recorded differently in different countries. 
28. Although, for the sake of simplicity, in this report they are all termed 
“markets”,	 some	of	 them	(e.g.	 fraud	or	extortion)	do	not	necessarily	 imply	 the	
existence of a supply and demand but simply criminal activities able to generate 
illicit revenues.
29.	 In	 fact,	 art.	 83(1)	 of	 the	 TFEU	 includes	 only	 counterfeiting	 of	 means	 of	
payment. It has been decided to extend the analysis of counterfeiting to other 
goods	(e.g.	clothes,	medicines,	car	parts,	etc)	since	it	is	a	crucial	business	activtiy	
for	some	criminal	groups,	such	as	Chinese	or	Camorra	OCGs	(see	Section	4.5).
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groups	in	the	legitimate	economy	(see	Section	2.2).	Firstly,	the	
available information is usually not sufficient to clearly identify 
the nature	 (e.g.	 fully	 or	 partially	 owned), purpose (e.g.	 for	
personal	use	or	for	profit), origin	(e.g.	licit	or	illicit) and actual 
status (e.g. confiscated	or	not)	of	these	assets.	This	makes	it	
necessary to adopt a very broad definition of investment as: 
This	definition	includes:
incomes	(e.g.	salaries	or	inheritances)	of	the	members	of	
the	criminal	group;30 
•		 Assets	 acquired	 for	 personal use/consumption	 (e.g.	
a personal residence), with the expectation of future 
appreciation	 (e.g.	 investments	 in	 the	 stock	 market)	
or instrumental for illicit activity (e.g.	 a	 boat	 used	 to	
transport	illicit	drugs);
•		 Assets	 that	 have been confiscated as well as assets 
that have not been confiscated	for	various	reasons	(e.g.	
because the asset had been transferred and the relevant 
legislation does not allow for third party confiscation).31
It	 should	 be	 emphasised	 that	 the	 definition	 of	 investment	
adopted in this study always implies some form of capital 
injection in an asset by the criminal or the criminal group, 
while it does not include cases of indirect control and 
influence over legal companies through intimidation or 
extortion racketeering. 
Covered by 
OCP 
Listed in art. 
83(1) TFEU 
(Euro crimes)
“Crime areas” 
Europol 
SOCTA 2013
Sections OCP 
report
Collection 
of available 
estimates by 
OCP
Production of 
new estimates 
by OCP 
Illicit drug trafficking 
(Heroin,	Cocaine,	
Cannabis, 
Amphetamines, 
Ecstasy)
✓ ✓ ✓ 4.1 ✓ ✓
Trafficking in human 
beings	(THB) ✓ ✓ ✓ 4.2 ✓ -
Illicit trafficking in 
firearms	(ITF) ✓ ✓ ✓ 4.3 ✓ ✓
Illicit trade in 
tobacco products 
(ITTP)
✓ - - 4.4 ✓ ✓
Counterfeiting ✓
Only of means 
of payment ✓ 4.5 ✓ ✓
Illegal gambling and 
match-fixing ✓ - - 4.6 ✓ -
Extortion 
racketeering ✓ - - 4.7 ✓ -
Usury ✓ - - 4.8 ✓ -
Fraud ✓ - ✓ 4.9 ✓ ✓
Organised property 
crime ✓ - ✓ 4.10 ✓ -
Corruption - ✓ - - -
Computer crime - ✓ ✓ - -
Money Laundering - ✓ ✓ - -
Table 2 - The 10 illicit markets analysed by Project OCP
Any	possession	and/or	acquisition	of	any	type	of	asset	
in	 the	 legal	 economy	 (e.g.	movable	 goods,	 registered	
assets, real estate properties, companies or their 
shares) by individuals belonging to a criminal group, 
acting	 on	 its	 behalf	 and/or	 involved	 in	 one	 of	 the	
criminal	activities	previously	identified.
•		 Investments	made	by	individual members of the criminal 
organisation or as a result of a business strategy of the 
whole group;	
•		 Assets	 purchased	 directly	 with	 the	 proceeds of crime, 
with already-laundered money or even with legal 
30.	In	the	cases	and	evidence	collected	by	this	project	(see	2.2	below)	it	is	often	
not possible to determine a clear and direct link between the proceeds of crime 
and the investment in the legal economy. In these cases, assets are included in 
the analysis if they are acquired or possessed by a person belonging to or acting 
on	behalf	of	a	criminal	group	which	has	been	identified	as	conducting	or	having	
conducted	an	illicit	activity	as	above	defined.
31.	I.e.	the	confiscation	of	assets	transferred	to	third	parties	(see	Part	3).
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2.2. Data, sources and methodology of 
analysis
This Section briefly describes the information, the data 
sources, the methodology of collection and of analysis 
employed in the three parts of the report. 
2.2.1 Part 1: Illicit markets in Europe
For	 the	 10	 illicit	 markets	 identified	 above	 (see	 Table	 2),	 the	
following activities were carried out:
•		 The	 collection,	 through	 a	 systematic	 literature	 review,	 of	
available estimates;
•		 The	identification,	through	a	systematic	literature	review, of 
the criminal actors	involved;
•		 The	 development of new estimates for some illicit 
markets.32
Literature review
A variety of sources were consulted, including:
•		 Academic	studies	and	research	reports;
•		 Reports	 by	LEAs,	 FIUs	 and	AROs	 (e.g.	 annual	 reports	 by	
Italian	DIA	–	Direzione	Investigativa	Antimafia,	Dutch	KLPD,	
etc.);
•		 Institutional	reports	(e.g.	by	FATF,	OECD,	etc.);
Priority was given to studies carried out in the last ten years.33 
Although the focus of the literature review was on the seven 
OCP countries	(Italy,	Spain,	France,	Ireland,	UK,	Netherlands	
and Finland), data on other European countries mentioned in 
the sources consulted were collected and analysed.
As	a	result	of	the	literature	review,	information	on	actors	and/or	
estimates was collected from 255 documents, and organised 
into	 a	 database	 (see	 the	Methodological	 Annex	 for	 details).	
Table	3	shows	the	number	of	studies	identified	and	consulted	
for each illicit market and each OCP country. In brackets, the 
number of available estimates.34
It is evident that the coverage is not uniform: existing studies 
and	 estimates	 focus	 on	 particular	 illicit	 markets	 (e.g.	 drug	
trafficking	or	THB)	and	on	particular	countries	(e.g.	Italy,	UK	and	
the Netherlands). This may be due to different threat levels 
(e.g.	studies	on	extortion	-	see	4.7	-	are	much	more	common	
in	 Italy,	where	 it	 is	a	 traditional	activity	of	mafia	groups,	 than	
in Ireland) but also to the different amounts of attention that 
certain criminal activities receive in academic and political 
circles and from the media	in	certain	countries	(for	example,	
illicit drugs have attracted more studies than organised theft, 
and illicit markets have been studied much more in Italy than 
in Spain).
For this reason, the above table is useful because it clearly 
identifies	the	areas	for	future	investment	in	terms	of	research, 
policy, and public awareness. Because OCGs have been 
moving their resources and interests from traditional markets 
such	as	drugs	to	emerging	ones	such	as	fraud	(see	Chapter	3),	
academic research and media should change their priorities 
accordingly.
Finland France Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain UK TOTAL
Illicit drugs 3	(5) 15	(8) 9	(9) 28	(32) 12	(6) 10	(10) 18	(17) 64	(87)
THB 3	(0) 6	(1) 3	(0) 19	(3) 4	(1) 3	(0) 7	(2) 42	(7)
ITF 2(0) 3	(0) 3	(0) 14	(3) 7	(0) 2	(0) 3	(0) 33	(3)
ITTP 2	(0) 5	(0) 10	(1) 16	(3) 2	(0) 3	(0) 8	(1) 30	(5)
Counterfeiting 1	(1) 4	(1) 3	(1) 13	(4) 3	(1) 8	(2) 8	(4) 38	(14)
Illegal gambling 1	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 13	(4) 1	(1) 0	(0) 1	(1) 16	(6)
Extortion racketeering 1	(0) 1	(0) 2	(0) 14	(2) 2	(0) 2	(0) 3	(0) 9	(2)
Usury 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 9	(3) 1	(0) 0	(0) 1	(1) 10	(4)
Fraud 1	(0) 2	(1) 2	(1) 13	(1) 2	(2) 1	(0) 11	(5) 27	(9)
Organised property crime 1	(2) 1	(2) 3	(4) 5	(4) 2	(2) 2	(2) 4	(8) 10	(23)
TOTAL 15 (8) 36 (13) 27 (16) 74 (59) 26 (13) 27 (15) 45 (39) 255 (248)
Table 3 - Literature review on illicit markets: number of identified studies and of available estimates (in brackets) per illicit 
market and per OCP country
32.	Heroin	(see	Section	4.1),	cocaine	(Section	4.1),	firearms	trafficking	(Section	
0),	 illicit	 trade	 in	 tobacco	 products	 (Section	 4.4),	 counterfeiting	 (Section	 4.5)	
and	fraud	(specifically,	MTIC	fraud	–	see	4.9).	New	estimates	were	developed	
for those illicit markets where, thanks to the availability of data, it was possible 
to calculate a new estimation for all the 7 OCP countries and, in most cases, for 
all the EU 28 MS.
33. However, in the case of missing information, some studies conducted before 
2005 on actors and trends in illicit markets or providing estimates were included.
34. This number does not include the estimates made by Transcrime for the 
specific	purposes	of	Project	OCP.	
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Methodology of estimates
As mentioned above, estimates of the scale of illicit markets 
in Europe were: 
•		 collected, from those available in the literature, for all the 10 
illicit markets listed above, and
•		 calculated,	specifically	for	the	purpose	of	Project	OCP,	for	
selected markets.35
What exactly do estimates measure?
The estimates of the scale of illicit markets gathered or 
developed by this report refer, for most markets, to the 
magnitude of the revenues produced, i.e. the value of the 
goods and services sold, most often at the retail level.
However, slight differences can be detected among different 
markets;36 a detailed description of what was precisely 
estimated for each illicit activity is provided in the relevant 
Section of Chapter 4 and in the Methodological Annex. 
Which available estimates have been collected?
Only estimates satisfying the following criteria were collected 
from the literature review:
•		 Produced	or	published	in	the	last	ten	years;37
•		 Covering	at	least	one	of	the	seven	OCP	countries;
•		 Using	a	transparent	and	verifiable	methodology;38
•		 Measuring	 the	 revenues	 generated	by	 illicit	markets	 as	 a	
whole	or	earned	by	actors	in	the	given	market;39
•		 For	which	 it	was	 possible	 to	 determine	 the	 time-range	 in	
which	 the	 revenues	were	produced	 (e.g.	 annually,	weekly,	
etc.).
How have new estimates been calculated?
In the case of illicit markets40 with a good availability of 
data across the seven OCP countries and the other EU 28 
MS,	 it	 was	 decided	 to	 calculate	 new	 estimates.	 New	 figures	
were produced which could be more easily compared across 
countries and markets. Innovative methodologies building on 
previous	studies	and	estimations	were	employed	(see	Chapter	
4 and the Methodological Annex for a detailed description). 
In	most	cases	(e.g.	cocaine,	heroin,	counterfeiting,	 ITTP),	 the	
new	figures	refer	to	demand-side	estimates	(i.e.	based	on	the	
number	 of	 actual	 or	 potential	 users/consumers),	 sometimes	
adjusted with supply-side	 variables	 (e.g.	 seizures	 by	 the	
police which decrease the actual supply of illicit goods).
2.2.2. Part 2: Organised crime investments 
in Europe
After the concept of organised crime investment had been 
defined	(see	2.1)	it	had	to	be	operationalised into one or more 
proxies which could allow the collection of data and information 
to be analysed. There follows a brief description of the proxies 
adopted, the data sources used to collect the information, 
the methodology employed for their organisation into a 
database	(database	DOCI)	and	for	their	analysis.
Identification of the proxies 
Building	on	previous	studies	(in	particular	Transcrime,	2013a;	
but	 also	 Schneider,	 2004;	 van	 Duyne	 &	 Soudijn,	 2009;	
Riccardi,	 2014a;	 Soriani,	 2013;	 Kruisbergen,	 Kleemans,	 &	
Kouwenberg, 2014), the original intent of Project OCP was to 
collect data on assets confiscated from criminal groups 
based on the assumption that they can be considered a good 
proxy for criminal investments. 41
The	 idea	was	 to	 analyse,	 as	 done	 in	 previous	 research	 (e.g.	
Transcrime, 2013a), some of the characteristics of these 
assets	 (e.g.	 their	 location,	 typology,	 ownership	 and,	 for	
confiscated	 companies,	 the	 related	 business	 sector)	 to	
present a picture of the preferences of criminal groups, in 
terms of geographic regions, types of assets and business 
sectors, when investing in the legitimate economy. 
However, besides the bias and limitations usually attributed 
to	 confiscated	 assets	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 criminal	 investments	
(see	Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	95,	for	a	review),42 it soon became 
evident that this was not possible for two main reasons:
•		 The	 lack of data on confiscated assets across EU 
countries	 (see	 Part	 3,	 in	 particular	 Chapter	 11):	 only	 few	
EU	MS	(such	as	Italy	or	the	Netherlands)	produce	statistics	
on the asset recovery process in a systematic way, and 
only few of them provide disaggregated information for 
each	confiscated	asset	which	allow	an	in-depth	statistical	
analysis;
35.	Heroin	(see	Section	4.1),	cocaine	(Section	4.1),	firearms	trafficking	(Section	
0),	illicit	trade	in	tobacco	products	(Section	4.4),	counterfeiting	(Section	4.5)	and	
fraud	(specifically,	MTIC	fraud	–	see	Section	4.9).
36. For example, the revenues from MTIC fraud refer to the percentage of the 
VAT	gap	attributable	to	organised	VAT	fraud	(see	4.9)
37. However, in the case of missing information, studies issued before 2005 were 
also covered.
38.	A	much	larger	number	of	estimates	and	figures	was	found.	However,	many	
did not give any indication of how they had been calculated. It was decided not 
to	include	these	figures	in	the	literature	review	since	they	risked	being	“mythical	
numbers”	not	backed	by	empirical	support	or	proof	(see	Chapter	3).
39. As illustrated in Chapter 3, it is often not possible to determine the share of 
the revenues earned by each actor in a given illicit market, and only aggregate 
figures	on	the	magnitude	of	the	proceeds	generated	by	the	market	as	a	whole	
can be collected or produced.
40.	Heroin	(see	Section	4.1),	cocaine	(Section	4.1),	firearms	trafficking	(Section	
0),	illicit	trade	in	tobacco	products	(Section	4.4),	counterfeiting	(Section	4.5)	and	
fraud	(specifically,	MTIC	fraud	–	see	Section	4.9).
41.	 In	 Transcrime,	 2013a,	 the	 universe	 of	 assets	 confiscated	 in	 Italy	 between	
1983	and	2012	was	used	as	a	proxy	for	the	investments	of	mafia	groups	in	the	
country’s	legitimate	economy.	Similarly,	the	universe	of	companies	confiscated	
from	 mafia	 groups	 has	 been	 analysed	 by	 Riccardi,	 2014,	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	
companies	controlled	by	mafia	organisations	in	Italy.
42.	In	particular,	the	use	of	data	on	confiscation	(a)	may	lead	to	underestimations	
or overestimations of certain types of assets depending on the focus of law 
enforcement on certain crimes, the ease of taking certain types of assets into 
custody,	 and	 the	 legal	 instruments	 at	 the	 disposal	 of	 prosecutors;	 (b)	 may	
furnish an outdated picture of criminal investments, because sometimes very 
long	periods	can	elapse	between	the	investigation,	seizure	and	final	confiscation	
of assets, resulting in a representation of the state of criminal investments 
many	 years	 prior	 to	 the	 confiscation;	 (c)	 makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 compare	 data	
across countries, since country regulations on asset recovery may vary widely 
(Transcrime,	2013a,	p.95).
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•		 The	unrepresentativeness of these data: in most EU MS 
the	majority	of	seized	assets	are	cash	and	bank	accounts,	
while,	 for	 example,	 the	 confiscation	of	 companies	or	 real	
estate properties is very limited, not because of the lack of 
criminal investments in these types of assets but because 
it	is	not	foreseen	by	law	or	very	seldom	applied	(see	Part	3,	
Chapter 12).
These problems made it necessary to consider other possible 
proxies for criminal investments. A possible alternative 
solution could have been analysis of personal holding 
statements (e.g.	 from	 tax	 agency	 records)	 of	 recognised	
members	of	criminal	groups	(such	in	e.g.	Meloen	et	al.,	2003)	
but this would have implied problems of access due to privacy 
reasons and would have led to a very limited number of 
cases concentrated in few countries, while the aim of the 
project was on the contrary to provide a broad exploration 
of this phenomenon in the seven OCP countries and beyond.
For this reason it was necessary to extend the collection and 
analysis to any evidence of organised crime investment, 
as	defined	in	2.1,	from	a	wide	variety	of	sources,	including	both	
single cases and aggregate studies, for example:
•		 Seizures	 of	 assets	 from	 criminal	 groups	 during	 police	
operations;
•		 Findings	 from	studies	analysing	 the	personal	spending	of	
members	of	a	specific	criminal	organisation;
•		 Indications,	taken	from	FIU	reports,	of	the	financial	interest	
of	certain	criminal	groups	in	specific	business	sectors
Data sources 
This evidence was gathered from diverse sources	 (see	 the	
Methodological Annex for details), including:
•		 Judicial	files;
•		 LEA	reports	and	police	operations	files;	
•		 Institutional	reports	(e.g.	FATF,	FIUs,	etc.);
•		 Academic	studies;
•		 Media	reports.
Only sources including evidence of criminal investments in 
the legal economy occurring between 2005 and December 
2013 were considered.43 Although the focus was primarily on 
the 7 OCP countries, the review of sources also yielded cases 
occurring in other EU member states. 44
Media reports were used as a residual source of data 
regarding	 police	 operations,	 seizures	 and	 confiscation	
when it was not possible to gather directly information 
from the official sources. In particular, media reports were 
collected using media aggregators and search engines 
but also by developing a prototype software for the 
collection of newspaper articles	specifically	on	organised	
crime	 investments,	 organised	 crime	 infiltration	 and	 money	
laundering cases, called iNotitium (www.inotitium.com).
The collection of data and organisation in a database
For each case of organised crime investment, information 
was collected, if available, on the geographic location of the 
investment, the type of asset, the related business sector 
(if	the	case	referred	to	an	 investment	 in	a	company)	and	the	
related criminal group.45
Once collected, this information was entered in a database 
called	DOCI	(Database	on	Organised	Crime	Investments).	The	
database was structured so that each item of evidence could 
generate multiple records, in the manner described below 
(see	the	Methodological	Annex	for	details).	These	records	are	
called references or mentions of organised crime investments 
in this study.
43. In some cases, it was not possible to determine the exact year and date of the 
investment. In this case, the date of the source was taken as a proxy.
44. For example, if a police operation conducted in an OCP country discovered 
that the criminal actor possessed or had acquired assets in another EU MS.
Box 1 – iNotitium: a search engine for media 
reports on organised crime news in Europe
The iNotitium platform was developed to collect news 
from open sources based on keywords. This platform 
compiles	 data	 based	 on	 logical	 (Boolean)	 operators	
combining concepts, and it processes the information 
using Natural Language Processing techniques in 
different	 languages	 (English,	 French,	 Italian,	 Spanish,	
Dutch and Finnish). It facilitated the analysis of most 
of the open source information used because it makes 
it possible to follow an item of information across 
countries and newspapers.
45.	Details	on	the	classification	adopted	for	geographic	regions,	types	of	assets,	
business sectors and criminal groups are provided in the Methodological Annex.
Example 1: 
“The	 police	 found	 evidence	 of	 infiltration	 in	 the	
economy	 of	 Côte	 d'Azur	 by	 Russian	 criminal	 groups	
and	Italian	Camorra”.
•		 2	 references:	 1)	 Russian	 criminal	 groups	 in	 Côte	
d'Azur	and	2)	Italian	Camorra	in	Côte	d'Azur.
Example 2: 
“The	Caligola	Operation	led	to	the	confiscation	of	com-
panies,	controlled	by	the	‘Ndrangheta,	in	the	construc-
tion,	wholesale	trade	and	manufacturing	sectors”.
•		 3	 references:	 1)	 ‘Ndrangheta	 in	 the	 construction	
sector,	2)	‘Ndrangheta	in	the	wholesale	trade	sector,	
3)	‘Ndrangheta	in	the	manufacturing	sector.
Each reference does not necessarily correspond to a 
single	asset	(i.e.	if	the	sentence	says	that	“Three	com-
panies	were	seized	in	the	construction	sector”	it	is	re-
corded	only	once	as	 “construction”).	Hence	 the	num-
ber of references cannot be interpreted as the number 
of assets, of real estate properties, of companies, etc.
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As a result of the collection of data, 4,859 references to 
organised crime investments were entered in the DOCI.46 
Most	of	them	(30.2%)	came	from	academic	studies,	followed	
by	institutional	reports	(28.1%),	media	(27.7%)	and	LEA	reports	
(11.5%).47 As mentioned, they came from both aggregate studies 
and	cases.	 In	particular,	1,244	cases	were	 identified.	 In	terms	
of geographic coverage, more than 70% of the references 
referred, as expected, to the seven OCP countries, most 
frequently to Italy and the Netherlands.48
Methodology of analysis, bias and limitations
The DOCI is an attempt to organise and systematically 
harmonise highly fragmented information from qualitative 
sources. Whilst collections of cases exist at the national level 
(e.g.	 the	 Organised	 Crime	 Monitor	 managed	 by	 the	 Dutch	
WODC	–	see	5.5),	this	is	the	first	attempt	to	collect	cases and 
evidence from different European countries in a single 
dataset. 
However,	given	 the	wide	definition	of	 investment,	 the	variety	
of the sources and the highly diverse nature of the evidence 
collected, it is evident that the references included in the 
DOCI cannot be ‘counted’ and analysed from a strictly 
statistical standpoint. On the contrary, any attempt to 
quantify its records must be made very cautiously.
For this reason, the analyses reported in Part 2 adopted a 
predominantly qualitative approach, and limited the 
analysis of the information included in the DOCI to simple 
descriptive	statistics	using	classes	(e.g.	business	sectors	with	
high or medium or low evidence of criminal investments).
In fact, this kind of analysis is believed sufficient, given the 
aim of this report, which, as mentioned, is to provide not an in-
depth analysis of a few cases but a broader exploration of 
the ‘macro patterns’ and ‘macro trends’ of the economics 
of OCGs in Europe.
2.2.3. Part 3: The confiscation of criminal 
assets in Europe
Building on the previous parts, Part 3 presents the results of 
two analyses:
•	 An	 assessment	 of	 the level of availability of data on 
confiscated assets	in	Europe;
•	An	analysis,	on	the	basis	of	the	available	data,	of	the	assets 
confiscated in the 7 OCP countries.
Survey among EU asset recovery and asset management 
offices
To	 achieve	 the	 first	 objective,	 a	 survey was conducted 
among the EU asset recovery and asset management offices 
of the 28 EU MS using primarily a questionnaire	 (see	 the	
Methodological Annex). The results are reported in Chapter 11.
Additional information was sourced from official reports 
published by the agencies and contacts with agencies 
themselves for the purpose of the project.
Data on confiscated assets: sources and analysis
To achieve the second objective, data were gathered 
from the relevant national agencies either:
•		 by accessing directly, when possible, the relevant 
databases;50
Figure 6 – Percentages of references collected by type of 
source49
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
Figure 7 – Percentages of references collected by OCP and 
non-OCP country
49. Note that in this chart the number on which percentages are calculated 
(4,936)	is	higher	than	the	number	of	references	(4,859)	because	77	references	
are related to two or more sources.
50. For example, some data have been provided for the purpose of this project 
by	 the	 Criminal	 Asset	 Bureau	 (Ireland),	 Guardia	 di	 Finanza	 (Italy),	 PPO	 (the	
Netherlands)	(see	Chapter	12	and	the	Methodologiclal	Annex	for	details).
46.	 Note	 that	 also	 references	 collected	 through	 the	 ARIEL	 project	 (www.
arielproject.eu) were included in the database and used for the purpose of the 
OCP analysis.
47. To be stressed is that the proportion of different types of sources varied 
among countries. For example, while most of the references to the Netherlands 
and France came from academic studies, those to the UK and Spain came from 
the	media	(see	the	Methodological	Annex	for	details):
48. Germany, Sweden and Slovenia were the non-OCP countries with the highest 
number of references to criminal investments. For Sweden and Slovenia, this 
was also due to the fact that they were covered by another project, coordinated 
by	Transcrime	(Project	ARIEL	–	www.arielproject.eu),	which	led	to	the	collection	
of	a	significant	number	of	cases	and	investigations	related	to	money	laundering	
and	criminal	 infiltration	 in	 the	 legitimate	economy	which	were	 included	 in	 the	
DOCI and used for the purpose of the OCP analysis.
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•		 or	 by	collecting data published in public ARO and AMO 
reports	 (e.g.	 the	 annual	 reports	 on	 the	 activities	 of	 the	
agency).
Owing	to	the	differences	across	EU	MS	in	terms	of	confiscation	
regimes	(e.g.	types	of	confiscation	allowed,	predicate	offences,	
etc. - see Chapter 10) and criteria for collecting and organising 
data	(see	Chapter	11),	an	attempt	was	made	to	organize and 
harmonize the collected data according to a standard 
template	(see	the	Methodological	Annex	for	details).
The analysis of	 the	 available	 data	 (see	 Chapter	 12)	 then	
focused, when possible, on:
•		 Types	of	confiscated	assets
•		 Trend	of	confiscated	assets
•		 Geographical	distribution	of	confiscated	assets
•		 Organised	crime	group	and	nationality	of	owners
•		 Related	offences
•		 Value	of	confiscated	assets
•		 Limitations	of	the	analysis
As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 analysis	 of	 data	 on	 confiscated	
assets in Europe has some serious limitations due primarily 
to legal differences among EU MS, for example in terms of 
types	 of	 confiscation	 allowed,	 foreseen	 predicate	 offences,	
and	classification	of	assets	(see	Chapter	10).	
These diversities are heightened by the fact that often, in the 
same country, data are collected by multiple agencies active 
at	 different	 phases	 of	 the	 confiscation	 process	 or	 based	 in	
different jurisdictions.
In summary, it is almost impossible to gain a clear picture 
of the overall situation within and across EU countries. 
Data collected in different countries may measure different 
phenomena, thus making it difficult to adopt a comparative 
approach. However, some general conclusions have been 
drawn taking account of the limitations that emerged 
throughout the analysis.  

33 | Section 1
WHERE DO 
ORGANISED CRIME 
PROCEEDS COME 
FROM? 
ILLICIT MARKETS IN 
EUROPE
Part 1.                 
The	first	step	in	the	study	of	the	economics	of	organised	crime	groups	is	to	 identify	the	sources	of	their	 illicit	
proceeds. Accordingly, the aim of Part 1 is to understand where organised crime revenues are generated, 
and in particular which illicit markets produce the highest revenues and what are the criminal actors among 
whom these revenues are shared.
This Part is structured as follows:
•		 Chapter 3	provides	a	summary	analysis	at	European	aggregate	level;
•		 Chapter 4 provides in-depth descriptions of 10 illicit markets	(illicit	drugs,	THB,	ITF,	ITTP,	counterfeiting,	
illegal	gambling	and	match	fixing,	extortion	racketeering,	usury,	fraud,	organised	property	crime);
•		 Chapter 5 provides in-depth descriptions of the 7 European countries	covered	by	OCP	(Finland,	France,	
Ireland,	Italy,	the	Netherlands,	Spain,	United	Kingdom);
•		 Chapter 6 constitutes a bridge between Part 1 and 2 by presenting an exploratory assessment of what fraction 
of the revenues generated by illicit markets may be available for investment in the legitimate economy.
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This chapter furnishes an overview at European level on:
•		 The	scale of the revenues produced by illicit markets in 
Europe	(Section	3.1);	
•		 The	main criminal actors among whom these revenues 
are	shared	(Section	3.2);
•		 The	emerging trends as regards illicit markets in Europe 
(Section	3.3);
•		 The	costs arising from illicit markets and suffered by the 
European	society	and	economy	(Section	3.4).
In	 doing	 so,	 it	 summarizes	 the	 detailed	 analyses	 conducted	
in Chapter 4 and 5, respectively on 10 illicit markets and 7 
OCP	 countries.	 For	 the	 first	 time,	 after	 numerous	 estimates	
and studies at national level, a European-level comparative 
analysis of the role that illicit markets play in the economy 
of criminal groups is presented, including one of the first 
quantifications of the illicit proceeds generated at EU level.
3.1. Revenues from illicit markets
Estimating organised crime revenues from illicit markets
Quantifying the amount of proceeds that organised crime 
groups earn from participating in illicit markets is far from easy.
First,	illegal	markets	are	by	definition	characterised	by	a	lack 
of data and high dark numbers. Accounting standards do 
not apply to the criminal economy as they do to the legitimate 
one. Estimation methodologies vary widely across illicit 
markets	 and	countries	 (see	 respectively	Chapters	4	 and	5),	
and this may lead to very different results even within the same 
country.51 Despite the increasing number of exercises of this 
kind, estimation methodologies have not yet obtained general 
consensus.52 
As	a	result,	any	quantification	of	illicit	markets	risks	producing	
only guess-estimations or mythical numbers not backed 
by	any	empirical	support	or	proof	 (Singer,	 1971;	Reuter,	 1984;	
Calderoni, 2014c) more useful for lobbying purposes than for 
research or policy-making.
Second,	 whilst	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 estimate	 the	 size	 of	 criminal	
markets as a whole, it is even harder to assess the share of 
the markets attributable to organised crime. As will be 
highlighted below, illicit markets are very seldom under the 
monopoly	 of	 one	 single	 criminal	 organisation	 (Transcrime,	
2013a, p. 42). Instead, they are characterised by a plurality 
of actors varying from large traditional criminal organisations 
to small-scale actors and individuals. The role, nature, 
composition and level of cooperation among these actors 
constantly change, thus making it almost impossible to 
determine how much each of these actors may earn. 
Third, still little is known about the business strategy of 
organised crime groups. E.g., how much of the proceeds 
of the wholesale of a shipment of cocaine is reinvested in 
cocaine	 trafficking?	How	much	 is	 used	 to	 cover	 the	 group’s	
management expenses? And how much is laundered and 
invested in the legitimate economy? Despite their nature 
as	 enterprises,	 criminal	 groups	 publish	 neither	 financial	
statements nor balance sheets, so that these questions can 
only be addressed with hypotheses based on fragmented and 
not often comparable information.
The estimates provided by Project OCP
Taking all these limitations into account, OCP has tried, as 
said, to measure the scale of the revenues from illicit markets 
through	 (a)	 a	collection of existing estimates	 and	 (b)	 the	
production of new estimates for some selected markets 
(heroin,	cocaine,	ITF,	ITTP,	counterfeiting	and	MTIC	fraud).
The results are presented in the following tables. In particular: 
•		 Table	 4	 presents	 the	 estimates	 of	 the	annual revenues 
from all the illicit markets covered for the seven OCP 
countries;
•		 Table	 5	 and	Table	 6,	 focusing	 on	 selected	 illicit	markets,	
allow comparison between OCP countries and the rest of 
the European Union. 
51. An example is provided by estimates of the illicit drugs market, for example 
cocaine	(see	4.1	for	details).	Slight	differences	in	consumption	rates	may	entail	
huge differences in estimations of the total revenues at national level.
52. In this regard, the inclusion of some criminal markets in national accounting 
for the calculation of the GDP has been introduced as an obligation for European 
countries	 by	 22	 September	 2014.	 According	 to	 Eurostat,	 “both	 declared	 and	
undeclared	 (which	 includes	 illegal)	activities	need	 to	be	 taken	 into	account	 in	
order	to	have	a	full	and	accurate	picture	of	the	value	of	production/consumption	
in	a	given	period”	(Eurostat,	2014).	Although	common	methodological	guidelines	
have been agreed between the European Commission and the Member States 
on the production and trafficking in drugs, and alcohol and tobacco smuggling, 
European MS, through their relevant statistical offices, are implementing this 
calculation by using various methodologies which are not often made publicly 
available.	For	Italy	see	ISTAT	(2014).
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In	order	to	make	these	figures	as	harmonised	and	comparable	
as possible, preference has been given to estimates that use 
the same methodology and data sets across different 
countries.53 Where	not	available,	country-specific	estimates,	
selected	on	the	basis	of	their	verifiability,	consistency	and	level	
of update, have been used.54
Illicit revenues across markets
Although the purpose of these tables is not to provide a precise 
accounting of criminal proceeds, but only a rough proxy of 
the magnitude of illicit markets in OCP countries and the 
other EU member states, it is possible to highlight some key 
findings.
At European level, the magnitude of criminal revenues from a 
selected	number	of	 illicit	markets	(heroin,	cocaine,	cannabis,	
ecstasy, amphetamines, ITTP, counterfeiting, MTIC fraud and 
cargo theft) amounts approximately to at least 110 billion 
euro per year. At least around 64 billion euro of revenues are 
generated on average every year in the seven OCP countries. 
These	figures	represent,	on	average,	about	0.9% of the GDP 
of European countries in 201055	 (Table	5),	although	for	some	
European countries, especially Southern and Eastern ones, 
the	rate	is	much	higher	(see	Table	6	and	Figure	8).
The overall figures on illicit revenues may be very 
conservative. Some important illicit markets, such as 
trafficking in human beings, both for sexual and labour 
exploitation purposes, or extortion, illegal gambling and other 
types of fraud different from MTIC fraud, lack estimates 
for most of the 28 EU MS, and thus are not included in this 
calculation. 
In regard to the distribution across illicit markets, the 
estimates	confirm	a	prominent	role	in	terms	of	profitability	of	
illicit drugs and fraud. The trafficking in illicit drugs	(heroin,	
cocaine, cannabis, and amphetamine-type drugs) may alone 
produce annual revenues amounting to nearly 20 billion euro 
                                                                                       OCP countries – Estimates (million euro)
Illicit Market Finland France Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain UK
Heroina 102 957 623 1,370 54 271 2,321
Cocainea 17 755 90 1,699 85 1,200 1,452
Cannabisb 21 1,277 47 1,356 305 1,575 787
Amphetaminesc 41 55 16 284 19 338 811
Ecstasy 47 190 30 639 73 558 702
Trafficking	in	human	beings	(THB) N/A 3,000d N/A 3,082e 460f N/A 151g
Illicit	trafficking	in	firearms	(ITF) N/A N/A N/A 93h N/A N/A N/A
Illicit trade in tobacco products 
(ITTP)a
146 2,083 277 546 249 635 1,304
Counterfeitinga 280 5,746 456 4,596 1,986 3,928 4,570
Illegal gambling N/A N/A N/A 425h 130f N/A 1,128i
Extortion racketeering N/A N/A N/A 5,253j N/A N/A N/A
Usury N/A N/A N/A 4,634k N/A N/A N/A
Fraud	(MTIC	fraud)a 2,956 2,957 2,958 2,959 2,960 2,961 2,962
Organised	property	crime	(Cargo	
theft)m
0.3 48 0.8 11 47 21 233
TOTAL (Heroin, Cocaine, Can-
nabis, Amphetamines, Ecstasy, 
ITTP, Counterfeiting, MTIC 
frauds, Cargo theft)
1,084 16,010 1,708 15,993 3,428 10,834 15,142
TOTAL 1,084 19,010 1,708 29,480 4,018 10,834 16,596
a Transcrime-OCP,	2014.	For	ITF,	no	estimates	at	national	level	have	been	produced	by	OCP	but	only	aggregates	at	EU-28	level	(see	Table	5);b Caulkins,	Kilmer,	&	
Graf,	2013;	c Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009;	d	INHESJ,	2012; e	Mancuso,	2014a,	referring	to	THB	for	sexual	exploitation;	f	Unger,	2007;	g	Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013;	h Calderoni 
et	al.,	2014b;	i Groom	&	Davies,	1998	(in	UNODC	2011a);	j	Lisciandra,	2014;	k	Scaglione,	2014;	l Ellison,	Collard,	&	Forster,	2006;	m Europol, 2009b.
Table 4 - Estimates of the annual revenues from illicit markets in the seven OCP countries
53. Estimates produced for the purpose of Project OCP on heroin, cocaine, 
ITTP, counterfeiting and MTIC fraud, were obtained by applying a common 
methodology and uniform datasets across countries for each illicit market. Also 
to	 obtain	 estimates	 of	 cannabis	 (Caulkins,	 Kilmer,	 &	Graf,	 2013),	 ecstasy	 and	
amphetamines	(Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009),	and	cargo	theft	(Europol,	2009b),	within	
each market the methodology applied was the same for all countries. Details on 
how these estimates were calculated are presented in Chapter 4 and in the 
Methodological Annex.
54. Although in most cases a range, with a lower and a higher bound, was 
estimated, for the sake of simplicity Table 4 and Table 5 report only the 
midpoint of the range, i.e. the arithmetic mean. In other cases, an adjusted mean 
(often	 referred	 to	 as	 best	 estimate)	 has	 been	 used	 (see	 Chapter	 4	 and	 the	
Methodological Annex for details).
55. The amount of proceeds has been compared with 2010 GDP because most 
of	the	estimates	of	illicit	markets	take	2010	as	their	reference	year	(see	Chapter	
4 and the Methodological Annex for details).
36 | Part 1
Illicit Market
OCP countries (million 
euro)
% of GDP OCP countries 
(2010)
European Union 
(million euro)
% of GDP EU 28 
(2010)
Heroin 5,696 0.08% 7,996a 0.06%
Cocaine 5,297 0.07% 6,765c 0.05%
Cannabis 5,368 0.07% 6,689e 0.05%
Amphetamines 1,564 0.02% 2,778c 0.02%
Ecstasy 2,239 0.03% 3,456d 0.03%
TOTAL DRUGS 20,163 0.28% 27,685 * 0.23% 
ITF - - 370e 0.003%
ITTP 5,240 0.07% 9,373b 0.08%
Counterfeiting 21,562 0.30% 42,711e 0.35%
MTIC frauds 16,872 0.23% 29,329f 0.24%
Cargo theft 361 0.005% 424e 0.003%
TOTAL 64,199 0.88% 109,891 0.89%
aEU 19 and Norway.
bEU 28.
cEU 24.
dEU 25.
eEU 27.
fEU 26.
*The	figures	may	not	add	up	due	to	rounding.
Source: Transcrime elaboration
Table 5 - Estimates of the revenues per selected illicit markets – OCP countries and EU as a whole 
EU Member State
Estimate* (mil-
lion euro)
% of GDP (2010) EU Member State
Estimate* (mil-
lion euro)
% of GDP (2010)
Austria 3,246 1.1% Latvia 514 2.8%
Belgiuma 2,516 0.7% Lithuania 455 1.6%
Bulgariad 565 1.6% Luxembourgb 161 0.4%
Croatiae 134 0.3% Maltag 93 1.4%
Cyprusf 324 1.9% Netherlands 3,427 0.6%
Czech	Republicc 1,317 0.9% Poland 2,584 0.7%
Denmarka 1,555 0.7% Portugala 1,072 0.6%
Estoniaa 180 1.2% Romaniad 2,308 1.9%
Finland 1,084 0.6% Slovakia 882 1.3%
France 16,010 0.8% Slovenia 379 1.1%
Germany 17,645 0.7% Spain 10,835 1.0%
Greece 3,583 1.6% Swedenb 2,133 0.6%
Hungary 1,102 1.1% United Kingdom 15,141 0.9%
Ireland 1,708 1.1% OCP COUNTRIES 64,199 0.9%
Italy 15,994 1.0% EUROPEAN UNION 109,521h 0.9%h
*The estimates include only the following illicit markets: heroin, cocaine, cannabis, amphetamines, ecstasy, ITTP, counterfeiting, MTIC frauds, organised cargo theft. 
Estimates	by:	Transcrime-OCP	research	team,	Caulkins,	Kilmer,	&	Graf	(2013)	(cannabis),	Kilmer	&	Pacula	(2009)	(ecstasy	and	amphetamine),	and	Europol	(2009b)	
(Cargo	theft).
aHeroin	excluded;	bHeroin	and	cocaine	excluded;	cCounterfeiting	excluded;	dHeroin,	amphetamine	and	ecstasy	excluded;	eOnly	heroin,	cocaine	and	ITTP	included;	
fHeroin,	cocaine	and	MTIC	fraud	excluded;	gCocaine	and	amphetamines	excluded;	hThis sum includes estimate of counterfeiting for the 27 EU, so it is not a sum of 
the previous rows.
Table 6 - Estimates of the revenues in EU 28 MS – aggregate figures
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in the OCP countries, and about 28 billion euro in the EU as 
a	whole	(see	Section	4.1	for	details),	thus	confirming	its	central	
role in the economy of criminal groups. 
In the OCP area, there are no substantial differences among 
heroin,	cocaine	and	cannabis	(all	ranging	between	5.3	and	5.7	
billion euro per year). However, at EU level, revenues from the 
heroin market are substantially higher than those for any 
other	substance:	they	amount	to	around	8	billion	euro	(see	4.1	
for further comments).
As mentioned, also fraud,	 in	 its	 various	 forms	 (see	 Section	
4.9), is becoming one of the most lucrative illegal activities for 
criminal	 organisations	 in	 Europe	 (PwC,	 2011;	 Europol,	 2013a;	
OLAF, 2013). Although estimates of the proceeds from fraud 
are	 scarce	 in	 the	 literature,	 this	 project’s	 quantification	 of	
MTIC (missing trader intra community) fraud, a type of 
organised	VAT	fraud,	confirms	that	it	could	generate	revenues	
comparable to those produced by illicit drugs.
The proceeds from counterfeiting	are	significant.	However,	
it	 should	be	borne	 in	mind	 that	 the	figures	 reported	 in	Table	
4 and Table 5 are estimates of the potential revenues that 
may be generated if the potential demand for counterfeit 
products,	based	on	European	citizens’	inclination	to	purchase	
counterfeit	 products,	 is	 fully	 satisfied	 (see	 Section	 4.5	 for	
details). It is not clear if the actual supply is able to satisfy this 
demand.
Also substantial are the revenues from the illicit trade in 
tobacco products	 (more	 than	 5	 billion	 euro	 on	 average	
per year in the 7 OCP countries alone), which is emerging 
as	 a	 particularly	 profitable	 illicit	 trade,	 with	 a	 magnitude	
comparable to the trade in illicit drugs such as heroin or 
cocaine.
Finally, the available estimates on organised property 
crime	 are	 limited	 to	 a	 somewhat	 outdated	 quantification	 of	
the proceeds from cargo theft calculated by Europol in 2009 
(Europol,	 2009b).	 It	 can	be	 hypothesised	 that,	 on	 extending	
the	 estimate	 to	 other	 forms	 of	 property	 crime	 (e.g.	 theft	 of	
medicines,	car	parts,	fuel,	metal,	etc.),	the	figure	is	much	higher.
Illicit revenues across countries
Cross-country comparisons are impeded by the fact that 
estimates, for some illicit markets, are available only in some 
EU MS. 
Focusing on the illicit markets for which an estimate is 
available	in	most	EU	MS	(see	Table	6),	it	is	not	surprising	that	
the four biggest European economies	 (Germany,	 Italy,	
France and UK) are those that produce the highest revenues 
from illicit markets. However, in terms of percentage ratio to 
GDP, southern and eastern EU MS are those that record the 
highest	values	(see	Table	6	and	Figure	8).
Focusing on OCP countries: 
Italy and the United Kingdom are by far the countries with 
the highest amount of annual revenues from illicit drugs 
(respectively	 5.0	 and	 5.3	 billion	 euro	 per	 year).	 These	 two	
countries	 are	 followed	 by	 Spain	 (which	 records	 the	 largest	
revenues from the cannabis market, according to Caulkins, 
Kilmer	 and	Graf ’s	 2013	 estimates)	 and	 France,	 both	 slightly	
above 3 billion euro. 
France	 is	 instead	the	OCP	country	with	the	most	significant	
level	 of	 revenues	 from	 ITTP	 and	 counterfeiting	 (see	 4.4,	 4.5	
and 5.2). As for counterfeiting, this is also affected by the 
estimation methodology adopted, which takes account of the 
turnover	 in	 some	 legitimate	manufacturing	 sectors	 (such	 as	
clothing or accessories) which in France are very large. 
Italy also records high revenues from extortion (which	is	the 
traditional criminal activity producing the highest amount of 
annual	 revenues,	 as	 confirmed	by	 previous	 studies,	 see	4.7)	
and usury, but there are no comparable estimates for other 
countries. 
Finally, to be noted is that the methodology adopted to 
estimate most of these illicit markets – a methodology strongly 
influenced by the number of users or consumers of the illicit 
goods	and	services	sold	at	 the	 retail	 level	 (see	Chapter	4)	–	
may underestimate the magnitude of criminal proceeds in 
Figure 8 - Scale of illicit markets in EU-28 MS. Estimates of the revenues from selected markets. Absolute values (left) and 
percentages of GDP (right)
Revenues - Mn euro
< 1,000
1,000 - 3,600
3,601 - 11,900
> 11,900
Not available
% of GDP 2010
< 0.66 %
0.66 - 1.03 %
1.04 - 1.34 %
> 1.34 %
Not available
Source: Transcrime elaboration on OCP estimates and Eurostat data
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countries such as the Netherlands, Ireland and Finland, 
which have smaller populations than the other OCP countries.
In particular, given the nature of the Netherlands as a transit 
country	playing	a	crucial	role	in	many	illicit	trades	(see	Section	
5.5 for a detailed review), it is likely that the OCGs active here 
may be able to generate revenues much higher than those 
estimated above. In facts, proceeds produced at the wholesale 
level or outside the country do not enter the calculation.
Figure 8 shows the EU 28 MS according to the scale of selected 
illicit markets for which estimates are available for most of the 
countries: heroin, cocaine, cannabis, ecstasy, amphetamines, 
ITTP, counterfeiting, organised MTIC fraud and cargo theft.56
3.2. Actors
Illicit markets in Europe are characterised by a plurality of 
criminal actors	ranging	from	large	and	‘traditional’	OCGs	to	
smaller gangs and loose networks supported by individuals 
hired on an occasional basis.
Most illicit markets, especially at the retail level, are not 
under the monopoly	 of	 few	 large,	 well-identifiable	 criminal	
organisations. And, given this fragmentation, determining what 
amount is earned by each actor is almost impossible. 
Project OCP has examined the organised crime groups and 
other criminal actors most frequently mentioned in the 
sources, hypothesising that they are those that earn the 
highest revenues. 
Organised crime groups and illicit markets in Europe: an 
overview
Organised crime groups in Europe are increasingly 
characterised by greater flexibility, fluidity and permeability 
(Europol,	2013a;	Interpol,	2014a).	The	evolution	of	trafficking 
routes, marketplaces	 (no	 longer	 solely	 physical	 but	 also	
virtual) and means of payment	 (such	as	bitcoins	and	other	
virtual currencies) has provided new opportunities for new 
flexible criminal networks operating on multiple dimensions 
(Europol,	2013a).
Criminal groups are increasingly transnational and 
interethnic, and they operate simultaneously in different 
illicit markets: according to Europol, of the 3,600 OCGs 
identified	as	active	in	Europe	more	than	30%	are	reported	to	
be poly-crime groups and more than 70% are multinational 
in their membership	(Europol,	2013a,	p.	33).
Even those OCGs with strong territorial vocation are now 
forced to move outside their area of control in order to 
penetrate new illicit markets. The gradual shift towards a 
global perspective has altered the modus operandi and even 
the	structures	of	many	hierarchically	organised	OCGs	(DNA,	
2014, p. 364). 
This trend may explain why in many illicit markets OCG 
strategy is often oriented more towards cooperation 
than competition. This applies, for example, to the drugs 
markets	or	product	counterfeiting	(see	Sections	4.1.7	and	4.5),	
where traffickers of different origins are distributed along the 
supply chain. 
All these elements also impact in terms of who earns what: 
the poly-criminal nature of OCGs and the use of the same 
routes and channels for different illicit trades may reduce 
transportation costs, generate economies of scale and 
hence increase the profit margins of criminal groups. On 
the other hand, the increasing cooperation among groups may 
impact on the way these groups share illicit proceeds.
Future	 research	 in	 this	 field	 should	 take	 account	 of	 these	
issues. It will be crucial to determine how illicit revenues are 
shared not only across criminal groups but also within the 
same group among different members and affiliates.  
Profiling criminal actors in European illicit markets
The	 most	 frequent	 ‘profiles’	 of	 criminal	 actors	 operating	 in	
European illicit markets are the following:
•		 Traditional mafia-type OCGs, such as criminal groups 
affiliated	 to	 Italian	 mafias	 and	 to	 some	 Chinese	 criminal	
organisations, composed of permanent members often 
tied	 by	 (natural	 or	 fictive)	 kinship.	 In	 recent	 decades,	
many of them have reshaped their organisational 
structure, changing from hierarchical groups to networked 
organisations, especially when they are involved in 
certain	 illicit	 markets	 (Williams,	 2001;	 Calderoni,	 2012;	
Berlusconi, 2014). Most of these OCGs are able to operate 
simultaneously in multiple illicit activities, and they easily 
move commodities and capital across borders. 
•		 Hierarchical OCGs: these have a strict division of tasks 
and	 roles	 within	 the	 organisation	 (Europol,	 2013a).	 Since	
many OCGs are adopting more flexible structures or 
leadership, rigid hierarchical criminal groups seem to be 
a	 phenomenon	 that	 “less	 and	 less	 reflects	 the	 reality”	
(Bakowski,	 2013).	 However,	 many	 OCGs	 operating	 in	
Europe are still hierarchically organised: for instance, 
Russian	clans	(Ionescu,	2011;	Kegö &	Molcean,	2011),	outlaw	
motorcycle	gangs	(see	Section	5.1.1.)	or	Vietnamese	OCGs	
active	in	cannabis	trafficking	(EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013a).
•		 Loose criminal networks represent more than 40% of 
OCGs	active	 in	the	EU,	according	to	Europol	(2013a),	and	
they exhibit a high degree of flexibility, mobility and ability 
to adapt to new market opportunities. They may involve, on 
an occasional basis and according to the opportunity and 
need, individual criminals or smaller groups that perform 
specific	tasks	or	address	specific	requirements.
•		 Criminal groups formed by ex-military members, such 
as former soldiers of the armies of the former Soviet Union 
or the former Yugoslavia, who create criminal groups to 
exploit local institutional instability, as well as opportunities 
in	grey	markets,	in	particular	in	firearms	trafficking	(Borov	&	
Bowers,	2002;	UNODC,	2010a	–	see	4.3),	and	then	move	to	
other illicit markets. 
•		 Former paramilitary and separatist/terrorist groups 
(such	as	former	IRA,	ETA	or	Corsican	independentist	group	
members), whose illegal actions, once instrumental to the 
pursuit of political and ideological goals, have gradually 
56. The classes with absolute value were calculated on the basis of the following 
classification:	 Very	 Low	 as	 <	 -0.5	 standard	 deviations	 from	 the	 average;	 Low	
as	between	-0.5	and	0.5	standard	deviations;	Medium	as	between	0.5	and	 1.5	
standard deviations and High as > 1.5 standard deviations. The value reported in 
figure	are	approximated.	Regarding	the	%	of	GDP	(2010,	retrieved	from	Eurostat),	
the	classes	are	divided	according	to	percentiles	(see	the	Methodological	Annex).
39 | Part 1
Illicit market HIGHER EVIDENCE OCGs LOWER EVIDENCE OCGs
Heroin Albanian, Balkan, Turkish, African
Bulgarian, Romanian, Other Eastern European, British, 
Dutch,	Italian	mafias,	Other	Italian	,	Lithuanian,	Motorcycle	
gangs, Middle Eastern, Other Asian, North African
Cocaine
Colombian,	African,	Albanian,	'Ndrangheta,	
Spanish
British, Finnish, French, Other Italian, Motorcycle gangs, 
Other Western European, Balkan, Bulgarian, Romanian, 
Russian/Georgian,	Mexican,	North	African,	South	American
Cannabis
Albanian, Chinese, Dutch, North African, 
Other Asian, Spanish
African,	Russian/Georgian,	Turkish,	Italian	mafias,	British,	
Finnish, French, Irish, Motorcycle gangs
Other illicit drugs 
British, Dutch, Lithuanian, Other Eastern 
European
British, Finnish, Motorcycle gangs, Other Western 
European,	Albanian,	Russian/Georgian,	Turkish,	Chinese,	
Other Asian
THB
African, Albanian, Balkan, Bulgarian, 
Romanian,	Russian/Georgian,	Other	Eastern	
European, Chinese, Other Asian
British,	Dutch,	Finnish,	Italian	mafias,	Other	Italian,	
Lithuanian, Motorcycle gangs, Spanish, Other Western 
European,	North	African,	Turkish,	Japanese	Yakuza,	
Colombian, South American
ITF
Albanian, Balkan, Turkish, Other Eastern 
European,	Russian/Georgian,	'Ndrangheta,	
Other Western European
Dutch, ETA, Finnish, IRA, Other Italian, Motorcycle gangs, 
Romanian, Bulgarian, African, North African, Middle 
Eastern, Chinese, South American
ITTP
Russian/Georgian,	Other	Eastern	European,	
Other Asian
Apulian, Albanian, Balkan, British, Irish, IRA, Bulgarian, 
Romanian, Lithuanian, Other Eastern European, Turkish, 
Chinese
Counterfeiting
Camorra,	Chinese,	Other	Asian,	Russian/
Georgian, Other Eastern European
African, North African, Albanian, Bulgarian, Other Italian, 
IRA, Other Western European, Romanian, Lithuanian, 
Middle	Eastern,	Turkish,	Japanese	Yakuza
Illegal gambling 
and	match	fixing
Chinese,	Other	Asian,	'Ndrangheta Other	Italian,	Other	Eastern	European,	Russian/Georgian
Extortion 
racketeering
Italian	mafias,	Romanian,	Russian/Georgian,	
Other Eastern European, Turkish, Middle 
Eastern, Chinese, Other Asian
British, Bulgarian, Dutch, ETA, Finnish, French, Irish, IRA, 
Lithuanian, Motorcycle gangs, Other Italian, Other Western 
European, Spanish, African, Colombian, South American
Usury -
Italian	mafias,	Other	Italian,	Albanian,	Balkan,	Chinese,	
Other Asian
Fraud
Bulgarian, Romanian, Other Eastern 
European,	Russian/Georgian,	Chinese,	Other	
Asian
British, Dutch, Irish, IRA, Lithuanian, Middle Eastern, North 
American,	Italian	mafias,	Other	Italian,	Other	Western	
European, Balkan, Turkish, African, North African
Organised 
property crime
Russian/Georgian,	Other	Eastern	European	
Albanian, Balkan, Bulgarian, Romanian, Turkish, French, 
Irish,	Italian	mafias,	Other	Western	European,	Chinese,	
North African
Source: Transcrime literature review (see Chapter 3, 4 and 5)
Table 7 - Categories of OCGs active in illicit markets in Europe 
changed	 into	 pure	 profit-oriented	 criminal	 organisations.	
For example, former IRA members are now involved in fuel 
laundering and tobacco smuggling between Ireland and 
Northern	Ireland	(see	5.3),	while	Corsican	groups	(see	5.2)	
are involved in a wide array of illicit activities, from drug 
trafficking	to	extortion	(An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a;	
West Sands Advisory, 2012). 
•		 Current terrorist groups that may have developed into 
“terrorist	 enterprises”	 or	 criminal	 groups	 active	 in	 the	
“market	of	violent	products”	(Myres,	2012,	p.	698)	directly	
engaged in criminal activities to fund and support their 
political action. Evidence has been found of cooperation 
between organised transnational terrorists and European 
OCGs	 (West	 Sands	Advisory,	 2012;	 EMCDDA	&	 Europol,	
2013a, p. 120). 
•		 Intermediaries and brokers who operate in a twilight 
zone	 between	 legal	 and	 illegal,	 offering	 intermediation	
services and expertise to other criminal actors in several 
illicit	markets	(e.g.	firearms	trafficking,	see	4.3).	They	often	
have a high degree of specialisation and may establish 
stable connections with traditional groups and other 
OCGs to help them organise local or international deals, 
launder	criminal	money,	 or	 exploit	 loopholes	 in	 countries’	
regulations. 
Categories of OCGs per illicit market and per OCP 
country 
Despite the increasing inter-ethnic nature of criminal groups 
active in Europe, this study attempted to classify OCGs 
according to main geographical provenance	and/or	ethnic 
origin	(see	2.1	for	details	about	the	classification).	
40 | Part 1
Country HIGHER EVIDENCE OCGs LOWER EVIDENCE OCGs
Finland Finnish, Motorcycle gangs
Russian/Georgian,	Romanian,	Other	Eastern	
European, Other Asian
France
French, African, North African, Albanian, Other 
Eastern	European,	Russian/Georgian
British,	Corsican,	Dutch,	Italian	mafias,	Other	
Italian, Motorcycle gangs, Bulgarian, Romanian, 
Balkan, Turkish, Other Asian, South American
Ireland Irish, IRA, British, Chinese
African, Bulgarian, Lithuanian, Other Asian, 
Other	Eastern	European,	Romanian,	Russian/
Georgian
Italy
Italian	mafias,	Other	Italian,	Albanian,	Bulgarian,	
Romanian,	Other	Eastern	European,	Russian/
Georgian, Chinese, Other Asian, North African
African, Balkan, Turkish, French, Lithuanian, 
Spanish, Colombian, South American, 
Japanese	Yakuza
Netherlands
Dutch,	‘Ndrangheta,	Bulgarian,	Other	Eastern	
European, Turkish, African, Chinese
Albanian, Balkan, Romanian, Other Italian, 
Other Western European, Colombian, South 
American,	Japanese	Yakuza
Spain
Spanish,	Camorra,	Bulgarian,	Romanian,	Russian/
Georgian, Chinese, Colombian, Other South 
American
British, ETA, Irish, IRA, Motorcycle gangs, Other 
Italian, Romanian, Other Eastern European, 
Albanian, Balkan, Turkish, African, North 
African, Middle Eastern
United Kingdom 
British, Irish, Chinese, Other Asian, Other Eastern 
European, Turkish
Dutch,	IRA,	'Ndrangheta,	Spanish,	Other	
Western European, Albanian, Balkan, 
Lithuanian,	Russian/Georgian,	African,	North	
African, Middle Eastern, Colombian, South 
American
Source: Transcrime literature review
Table 8 - Evidence of organised crime groups active in illicit markets. 7 OCP countries (in at least one illicit market)60
In particular, drawing on the in-depth analyses reported by 
Chapters	4,	5	and	Table	7	 shows	all	 the	groups	 identified	 in	
at least one country of Europe,57 classifying them between 
higher evidence	 groups	 (those	mentioned	 in	 the	 literature	
in reference to at least three countries) and lower evidence 
groups	(those	mentioned	 in	few	countries,	 in	any	case	fewer	
than three).58
Although the results may be biased by the fact that the 
literature review focused on the 7 OCP countries,59 Chinese 
OCGs and Italian mafia groups, as well as Russian/
Georgian OCGs, are those involved in the highest number 
of illicit markets. Eastern European OCGs, groups of East 
Asian origin and Turkish OCGs show quite substantial 
evidence of activity in illicit markets.
The	 results	 confirm	what	was	 said	 above:	 out	 of	 the	35	OC	
groups	 identified,	 it	 appears	 that	 only	 very few operate 
exclusively in their home country, or at least in those types 
of markets that were selected for this analysis. 
3.3 Emerging trends
Criminal groups move across illicit markets as they move 
across borders, in search of new opportunities	for	profit	and	
the activities and modi operandi which guarantee the highest 
return with the lowest risk. 
Answering the question where do criminal proceeds come 
from? means also answering the question what illicit 
markets are OCGs in Europe moving towards? The 
evidence collected by Project OCP has highlighted some 
emerging trends which must be taken into account for fully 
understanding of how the revenues of illicit markets may 
change in the future.
The shift from traditional to emerging illicit markets
First, OCGs may shift from traditional	markets	(e.g.	drugs	or	
THB) to new, less risky, underrated but equally profitable 
illicit activities, such as fraud or organised theft. 
As seen above, illicit drug trafficking still occupies a crucial 
role in the economy of criminal groups, in terms of both the 
illicit revenues generated and the number and type of actors 
involved. The emergence of new synthetic substances 
59.  And this may overestimate the role and weight of OCGs originating from the 
7	OCP	countries,	such	as	Italian	mafias,	Dutch	OCGs	or	British	OCGs.
60.	Illicit	drugs	is	considered	one	market	(no	disaggregation	for	heroin,	cocaine,	
cannabis and other illicit drugs).
57. Larger Europe has been considered here. It includes all EU 28 MS plus 
Switzerland,	 Norway,	 Iceland,	 Liechtenstein,	 Albania,	 Serbia,	 Bosnia	 and	
Herzegovina,	FYR	Macedonia,	Montenegro	and	Kosovo.
58.	 In	 particular,	 the	 literature	 frequently	 refers	 to	 “Europe”	 or	 the	 “European	
Union”	 without	 specifying	 the	 countries	 with	 OCG	 presence.	 In	 these	 cases,	
evidence is not reported in the table.
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(such	 as	 methamphetamines),	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	
growth of home-made illicit drugs	 (such	 as	 home-grown	
cannabis) on the other, are reshaping this market, increasing 
profit	margins	 (e.g.	by	abating	transportation	costs)	but	also	
attracting	a	wider	range	of	actors	(see	Section	4.1).
But other new illegal activities have begun to play an 
increasingly central role in the economy of OCGs. In particular, 
fraud,	in	its	multiple	forms	(e.g.	MTIC frauds, VAT carousel 
fraud, excise frauds, plastic frauds, etc. - see Section 4.9 
for details) is attracting a large number of actors, including 
‘traditional’	 criminal	 organisations	 such	 as	 Italian	 mafias	 (in	
particular Camorra OCGs, see 3.2 and 4.9), because of its high 
rewards	and	low	risks	(Europol,	2013a).
In this framework, the use of cybercrime and ICT for 
fraudulent or criminal purposes is an increasingly common 
element	 of	 OCGs’	 modus operandi: mass-marketing and 
phishing	steal	identities	and	financial	data	for	use	in	payment	
card	and	other	frauds	(see	Section	4.9);	at	the	same	time,	the	
internet (and	 especially	 the underground web) multiplies 
the channels through which illicit goods such as drugs, 
counterfeit	and	stolen	products	can	be	sold	(FATF,	2014).
Emerging illicit markets are also those that until recently were 
not considered characteristic of OCGs, but which have greatly 
strengthened their organised nature: this is the case, for 
example, of organised property crimes (see	Section	4.10).	
The	huge	 returns	 (with	 low	 risks)	guaranteed	by	 the	 theft	of	
certain	 goods,	 for	 example	 medicines	 (mainly	 anti-cancer	
and immunosuppressive), are attracting numerous criminal 
actors,	ranging	from	Eastern	European	OCGs	to	Italian	mafias	
(Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014).	
Although counterfeiting is less perceived as a serious crime 
(Eurobarometer,	 2011),	 it	may	potentially generate billions of 
euro	 of	 illegal	 proceeds,	 given	 the	 significant	 propensity	 of	
European	citizens	to	buy	counterfeit	products	(see	4.5).	
Lastly, illicit trade in tobacco products (ITTP), is a growing 
and evolving market characterised by a plurality of products 
(e.g.	 smuggled,	 counterfeit	 and	 illicit whites), criminal 
opportunities	and	criminal	actors	(see	Section	4.4).	
The overlaps among different illicit markets 
Some illicit markets are crucial not only because of the 
high proceeds that they can generate, but also because 
they facilitate other criminal activities. For example, illegal 
gambling creates the ideal environment in which demand for 
loans may arise, thus facilitating usury	(see	4.6	and	4.8).
Overlaps among different illicit markets may occur also in 
terms of products and sale channels. In this regard, illicit 
trades are emerging as combinations of different illegal 
activities (e.g.	 counterfeiting,	 smuggling,	 theft,	 fraud).	
Examples may include: 
•		 Medicines: stolen medicines may be adulterated before 
being sold on both legal and illegal markets. At the same 
time, e-pharmacies sell both stolen and counterfeit 
medicines	 (Interpol	 2014c;	 Riccardi,	 Dugato,	 &	 Polizzotti,	
2014;	see	4.10);	
•		 Vehicles and car parts: stolen car parts are often used in 
the production of counterfeit goods. Vice versa, counterfeit 
documents may be used to steal and smuggle stolen cars 
(see	e.g.	Gounev	&	Bezlov,	2008;	see	4.10);
•		 Credit cards fraud:	the	mass	theft	of	financial	and	digital	
identities is often a precondition for carrying out plastic 
frauds or	other	types	of	fraudulent	activity	(see	4.9)
•		 Tobacco products: the same vendors at the retail level 
may	 sell	 both	 counterfeit	 and	 smuggled	 cigarettes	 (see	
Section	4.4);
•		 Firearms: firearms	 traffickers	 may	 handle	 stolen,	
converted	or	illegally	manufactured	weapons	(see	4.3).
The increasing involvement of legitimate companies in 
illicit markets
Besides these trends, an increasing role of legitimate 
businesses	 in	 illicit	markets	 can	 be	 identified.	 For	 example,	
companies are becoming crucial:
•		 for	 committing	 fraud: e.g. in VAT carousel schemes 
(through	 the	 setting	 up	 of	 shell	 businesses	 in	 various	
countries) and also in fuel-related frauds	 (e.g.	 fuel	
smuggling	or	excise	tax	frauds);
•		 as	 fronts for illicit trafficking: e.g. the use of 
transportation	 firms	 or	 wholesale	 food	 companies	 to	
smuggle	drugs	(see	also	Part	2,	Chapters	7	and	8);
•		 for	product laundering purposes: e.g. legal wholesalers 
may be exploited to acquire and then sell on the legal 
market	(often	using	falsified	documents	or	new	packaging)	
stolen	 goods	 (e.g.	medicines	–	 see	4.10	 -	 or	 car	parts)	 or	
adulterated	products	(such	as	fuel).	
New products in a twilight zone between licit and illicit
Equally important is the emergence of new products on 
the boundary between legal and illegal markets: this is 
the case, for example, of illicit whites cigarettes	 (see	 4.4.1),	
produced legally in one country and then illegally distributed 
in	others;	or	firearm replicas, which, manipulated, can become 
illegal	firearms	(see	4.3).
All these overlaps between illicit products and activities and 
legitimate markets must be taken into account also when 
analysing criminal investments, as in Part 2 of this report.
3.4. Social and economic costs
Although the focus of OCP is on the revenues from illicit 
markets, these crimes produce costs for the European 
society and economy	 that	are	significant	and	warrant	brief	
discussion.
The main types of costs suffered by the victims of illicit 
markets	and	organised	crime	can	be	classified	in	the	following	
categories,	also	by	building	on	previous	research	(e.g.	Levi	et	
al., 2013): 
•		 Health and safety costs: especially drugs and THB, as 
well as ITTP, seem to be associated with health damage. 
Medical harms arise from toxic substances present in drugs 
(Levi	et	al.,	2013,	p.	16)	and	in	many	counterfeit	medicines.	
The trafficking in human beings also causes health costs 
for its victims, both in sexual exploitation and forced labour. 
Counterfeit products – toys, games, spare parts of vehicles 
–	of	poor	quality	pose	a	serious	threat	to	consumers’	safety	
(see	4.5).	
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•		 Loss of taxes: local governments, as well as the EU, suffer 
tax losses as a result of criminal activities like VAT fraud, 
excise fraud and ITTP. Because the price of cigarettes 
mostly	 consists	 of	 taxes	 (80.1%),	 the	 consumption	 of	
smuggled and counterfeit tobacco products causes 
significant	losses	for	the	state	budget	(see	4.4).	
•		 Loss of consumers’ wealth: some forms of illicit activities, 
such as fraud or organised property crime, directly target 
the	possessions	of	individuals	(Levi	et	al.,	2013).	The	costs	
associated with replacing stolen possessions or other 
consequential	costs	may	add	to	these	figures.
•		 Loss of legal companies’ revenues: companies may 
suffer direct losses from a variety of illicit activities. The loss 
caused by organised theft often exceeds the value of the 
stolen product. In the case of copper theft from a railway, 
the costs of repairing the damage to the infrastructure 
and the disruption of rail transport exceed the value of the 
actual	copper	(see	Section	4.10).	 In	addition,	damage	to	a	
company’s	 reputation	may	cause	additional	 losses	 (e.g.	 if	
stolen medicines are adulterated and placed back on the 
legal market, causing harm to patients). When companies 
suffer considerable damage, job losses may ensue.
•		 Distortion of market competition: companies are 
not	 only	 victims	 of	 crime;	 they	 may	 also	 be	 (wittingly	 or	
not) accomplices or perpetrators. Companies that use 
illegal goods and services gain an unfair advantage over 
companies that do not. Furthermore, unfair competition 
can also arise from the counterfeiting and smuggling of a 
wide	array	of	goods	(UNICRI,	2011;	Savona,	2014,	p.	7).	
•		 Insurance costs and security costs: organised theft and 
fraudulent	activities	(e.g.	‘cash-for-crash’	scams	–	see	5.7)	
victimize	 insurance	 companies,	 and	 this	 raises	 insurance	
costs. Moreover, sectors vulnerable to certain illicit 
activities	 (e.g.	 transport	 companies	 to	 cargo	 theft)	 may	
sustain higher costs to ensure protection and insurance. 
•		 Law enforcement costs: although it is difficult to 
quantify	 the	 spending	 by	 LEAs	 specifically	 combating	
illicit markets and organised crime, the costs may exceed 
several hundred millions of euro, considering both LEAs at 
European	level	(e.g.	Europol,	Eurojust,	OLAF)	and	National	
Police forces. In the UK alone, costs exceed 500 million 
euro,	according	to	Levi	et	al,	(2013).	Additional	costs	derive	
from the prosecution and punishment of members of 
OCGs. 
•		 Violence: it is difficult to determine exactly the costs of 
violence by criminal groups operating in illicit markets, but 
they may derive from an array of violent actions ranging 
from intimidation, vandalism, arson to homicides.
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4.1.1. Introduction
Despite the emergence of new illegal markets, illicit drug 
trafficking is still one of the main sources of income 
for OCGs	 (Reuter	 &	 Truman,	 2004;	 Europol,	 2013a).	 The	
trafficking	 in	 illicit	 drugs	 from	 producer	 countries	 (e.g.	
Afghanistan, Colombia, Morocco, etc.) to consumer markets 
requires a minimum level of organisation and the participation 
of	 several	 actors	 (independent	 traffickers,	OC	groups,	 loose	
groups, etc.) with different roles along the supply chain. This 
trafficking generates a substantial flow of money, which OCGs 
may	 use	 to	 finance	 other	 illicit	 activities	 or	 to	 invest	 in	 the	
legitimate economy. 
However, the fact that the drugs market may produce a 
large amount of money does not mean that all the actors 
involved in its supply are affluent. The presence of numerous 
competitors entails that drug suppliers are unable to apply 
high profit margins and do not have the power to charge 
more	 than	 their	 marginal	 costs	 (Reuter	 &	 Kleiman,	 1986).	
Indeed,	 several	 studies	 (Reuter,	 MacCoun,	 &	 Murphy,	 1990;	
Levitt	&	Venkatesh,	1998)	have	shown	that	many	of	the	actors	
supplying illicit drugs, especially those at the bottom, make 
modest incomes and may have a modest impact in terms of 
investment in the legal economy. 
This Section reports estimates of the revenues of the illicit 
drugs	market	 across	European	 countries	 (Section	4.1.2)	 and	
analyses the main OCGs	involved	in	drug	trafficking	(Section	
4.1.7). The drugs considered in this Section are heroin, cocaine, 
cannabis	 and	 amphetamine-type	 drugs	 (which	 include	
amphetamines, methamphetamines and ecstasy). 
The illicit drug market is rapidly changing, with new 
substances	 (e.g.	 cathinones,	 piperazines,	 etc.)	 adding	 to	
the classic drugs. However, the market for these new drugs 
is, currently, particularly volatile and their consumption 
seem	restricted	to	small	groups	(EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013).	
Although in the near future these substances may represent 
a possible source of income for several OCGs, there are 
currently few reasons to assume that they will have an impact 
on the legal economy.
4.1.2. Estimates of the illicit drugs market
Although it is widely acknowledged that the supply of illegal 
drugs represents a large share of the revenues of OCGs 
(Reuter	&	Truman,	2004;	Transcrime,	2013a),	estimating	 the	
amount of money that OCGs collect from the drugs market is 
hampered by various factors. First, it is difficult to estimate 
the scale of the market because of the lack and diversity of 
61.	 As	 mentioned	 above	 (see	 2.1),	 not	 all	 of	 them	may	 be	 clearly	 defined	 as	
‘markets’.	While	some	involve	the	voluntary	exchange	of	goods	between	actors	
(e.g.	illicit	drugs	or	firearms),	others	do	not	(e.g.	frauds).	However,	for	the	sake	of	
brevity	in	this	report	they	are	all	referred	to	as	‘illicit	markets’	or	‘illicit	activities’	
or,	in	some	cases,	‘illicit	trafficking’.
4. Focus on ten illicit 
markets                                                   
prominence and strategic role in the economy of OCGs and, 
because of the significant threat posed to European society, 
economy	and	political	environment	(see	3.4).	
For each illicit market, the analysis will cover two aspects: 
•		 estimates	of	 the	 scale	of	 illicit	 revenues	 from	a	 review	of	
available estimates and a description of those calculated 
ex	novo;	
•		 the	criminal	actors	 involved	 in	 the	market,	with	a	specific	
focus on organised crime groups.
This chapter conducts in-depth analysis focusing on 10 
illicit markets:61	 illicit	 drugs	 (cocaine,	 heroin,	 cannabis,	
amphetamines and ecstasy – see Section 4.1), trafficking in 
human	beings	(see	4.2),	illicit	trafficking	in	firearms	(ITF	–	see	
4.3),	illicit	trade	in	tobacco	products	(ITTP	-	4.4),	counterfeiting	
(4.5),	 illegal	 gambling	 and	 match-fixing	 (4.6),	 extortion	
racketeering	 (4.7),	 usury	 (4.8),	 fraud	 (4.9)	 and	 organised	
property	crime	(4.10).	
As discussed in 2.1, these markets have been selected by 
drawing on the list of serious crimes (Euro crimes) provided 
by	 art	 83	 (1)	 of	 the	 TFEU	 because	 of	 their	 profitability, 
4.1 Illicit drugs market                                                                                                                               
Luca Giommoni (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
44 | Part 1
available	data	and	sources;	secondly,	 it	 is	difficult	to	quantify	
how much of this amount of money goes to OCGs rather than 
to other non-organised actors. 
Estimates of the illicit drug market may generate very different 
values according to the data, assumptions and methodology 
employed. In the past ten years there has been a flourishing 
of estimates of the value of the illicit drug market across 
European	 countries	 (Pudney	 et	 al.,	 2006;	 Kilmer	 &	 Pacula,	
2009;	 Transcrime,	 2013a).	 However,	 due	 to	 the	 differences	
in the data and methods adopted, the various attempts have 
produced	different	figures	(see	the	Methodological	Annex	for	
details) that are often difficult to compare.
As regards the second difficulty, it should be borne in mind that 
only some of the revenues generated by the illicit drug 
market go to OCGs. As said above, numerous actors are 
involved in the supply of illicit drugs, with different roles along 
the	 supply	 chain	 (Reuter	&	Haaga,	 1989;	Caulkins	&	Reuter,	
1998). Hence, the total revenues generated by the market 
must be divided among independent traffickers, retail dealers, 
criminal	organisations,	loose	groups	and	other	actors	(Matrix	
Knowledge	 Group,	 2007;	 Caulkins,	 Gurga,	 &	 Little,	 2009).	
Scholars have not yet been able to fully understand how 
proceeds distribute along the supply chain, although some 
hypotheses	can	be	made	(see	Chapter	6).
This Section presents the estimates of the illicit markets for 
heroin, cocaine, cannabis and amphetamines. 
•		 In	 an	 attempt	 to	 produce	 comparable	 figures	 across	
countries and markets, the estimates for heroin and 
cocaine presented in this Section have been calculated 
by	 Transcrime	 specifically	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 OCP	
project on the basis of the methodology described in 
detail in the Methodological Annex. The new estimates 
will be compared with previous estimates reported in the 
academic literature. 
•		 For	cannabis and	amphetamine-type	drugs	(amphetamines 
and ecstasy),	 no	 specific	 figures	were	 calculated;	 rather	
the most updated and solid estimates available in the 
academic literature are reported and commented on.
It	should	be	stressed	that	the	figures	presented	here	represent	
the total value generated by drug trafficking at the retail level 
in	the	28	EU	MS	(i.e.	the	total	expenditure	of	drug-consumers).	
They do not refer only to the revenues attributable to OCGs 
but to all the actors involved in the supply of illicit drugs.
Given the limitations described above, estimated for each 
country was a lower and upper bound as well as a best 
value.62Although the methodology adopted was consistent with 
the	most	recent	literature	in	the	field	(see	the	Methodological	
Annex for details) these values must be taken cautiously and 
only as proxies for the magnitude of the wealth that criminal 
groups may obtain from the illicit drugs trade and then launder 
in the legitimate economy. 
4.1.3. Estimates of the heroin market
Table 9 presents the revenues of the heroin market estimated 
by using the methodology described in the Methodological 
Annex.	 According	 to	 these	 figures,	 the	 European	 heroin	
market	may	be	quantified	as	amounting	to	between 6.4 and 
10.7 billion euro, with a mid-value of almost 8.0 billion 
euro.63 The 7 OCP countries alone, with an expenditure of 5.7 
billion euro, account for 71% of the entire EU heroin market. 
The United Kingdom is by far the biggest market in Europe 
for heroin, with a range estimated between 1.8 and 3.1 billion 
euro. Besides the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and 
France are the biggest markets for heroin. The heroin market 
in Italy is estimated at between 1.1 and 1.8 billion euro, while 
the	 expenditure	 on	 heroin	 in	 Germany	 has	 been	 quantified	
at between 0.9 and 1.6 billion euro. Slightly lower is the value 
of	the	heroin	market	 in	France,	which	this	study	quantifies	at	
between 0.7 and 1.3 billion euro. 
Besides these four major markets, several other European 
countries record substantial expenditure on heroin, such as 
Ireland	(623	million	euro),	Austria	(317.5	million	euro)	and	Spain	
(270.5	million	euro).	
As already said, minor changes in the estimation methodology 
may	 lead	 to	 remarkable	 differences	 in	 the	 final	 figures.	
Nevertheless, there are important similarities between 
these figures and the previous estimates, and this may 
confirm	 the	 consistency	 of	 the	 estimation.	 For	 instance,	 the	
mid-value of heroin expenditure for France, the Netherlands 
and Spain lay between the lower and upper bounds estimated 
in	Kilmer	and	Pacula	(2009).	In	the	UK,	in	particular,	Kilmer	and	
Pacula	 (2009)	quantified	 the	national	 expenditure	on	heroin	
at 2.3 billion euro, a value which perfectly matches the best 
estimate provided here, which is also similar to the recent 
estimate	by	Kilmer	et	al.	 in	2013	 (2.5	billion	euro)	but	slightly	
higher	 than	 that	by	Mills,	Skodbo	and	Blyth	 (2013)	 (1.5	billion	
euro). 
The main differences between these estimates and previous 
ones regard Ireland, Finland and Italy. These discrepancies 
are mainly due to the different methodological approaches 
adopted	 in	 previous	 studies.	 For	 instance,	 Connolly	 (2005),	
using	a	seizure-based	approach,	estimated	the	heroin	market	
in Ireland at about 54 million euro, which is far lower than the 
figure	 provided	 here.	 For	 the	 purpose	 of	 these	 estimates,	 it	
was	preferred	not	to	rely	too	closely	on	seizures,	because	they	
may	be	affected	by	factors	other	than	consumption/demand,	
such as law enforcement effectiveness, illicit trade routes and 
supply	(see	the	Methodological	Annex	for	details).
4.1.4. Estimates of the cocaine market
Table 11 presents the estimates, developed by Transcrime for 
the purpose of the OCP Project, of the cocaine market across 
EU	MS.	 According	 to	 these	 figures,	 the	European cocaine 
market is worth between 5 and 7.5 billion euro. The 
revenues of the 7 OCP countries are equal to 5.3 billion euro 
(mid-value),	and	they	account	for	78%	of	the	entire	EU	market.	
As in the case of heroin, Italy and the United Kingdom are 
the	biggest	markets	for	cocaine	(respectively	1.7	and	1.5	billion	
euro according to midpoint estimates). After Italy and the 
UK, the countries with the highest expenditures on cocaine 
are Spain, France and Germany. To be noted is that, in Spain, 
revenues from the cocaine market are far higher than those 
from	heroin	(see	also	Section	5.6).	This	may	reflect	the	greater	
62.	The	best	value	 is	calculated	using	the	most	reliable	(or	best)	assumptions	
for estimating the drugs market derived from the literature. These assumptions 
regard the number of users, the quantity of drug consumed per user, and drug 
purity	(for	more	detailed	discussion	see	the	Methodological	Annex).	
63.	It	is	worth	stressing	again	that	this	figure	represents	the	total	revenues	from	
the heroin market and not what OC groups earn from dealing in heroin. This 
means that the 8 billion euro must be shared among several different actors and 
that only part of the sum goes to OCGs.
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Country
Best estimate 
(million euro)
Min (million euro) Max (million euro) Reference year
Austria 318 254 423 2011
Croatia 79 63 105 2010
Czech	Republic 64 51 85 2012
Finland* 102 81 136 2005*
France 957 766 1,276 1999
Germany 1,193 954 1,590 2011
Greece 54 44 73 2012
Hungary 19 15 25 2010-2011
Ireland 623 498 830 2006
Italy 1,370 1,096 1,826 2012
Latvia 205 164 273 2010
Lithuania 36 29 48 2007
Malta 18 14 23 2012
Netherlands 54 43 72 2012
Norway 163 130 217 2008
Poland 84 67 111 2009
Slovakia 29 23 38 2008
Slovenia 37 30 50 2011
Spain 270 216 361 2011
United Kingdom 2,321 1,857 3,094 2010-2011
Total OCP Countries 5,697 4,557 7,595
Total EU 19 and 
Norway
7,996 6,395 10,656
*	Several	indicators	suggest	that,	over	the	past	ten	years	or	so,	buprenorphine	and	other	medical	opioids	have	replaced	heroin	in	Finland	(see	Varjonen,	Tanhua,	&	
Forsell, 2013).
Source: Transcrime elaboration on EMCDDA and Kilmer & Pacula (2009) data
Table 9 - Estimates of the revenues of the heroin market (EU 19 MS and Norway)
Figure 9 - Estimates of the scale of heroin market for the available EU MS. Absolute values (left) and percentages of GDP 
(right)
Revenues - Mn euro
< 101
101 - 700
701 - 1,300
> 1,300
Not available
% of  GDP 2010
< 0.03 %
0.03 - 0.05 %
0.06 - 0.13  %
> 0.13 %
Not available
Source: Transcrime elaboration on estimates reported in Table 9 and Eurostat data
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Country
Best estimate #
(million euro)
Min (million 
euro)
Max (million 
euro)
Reference year Source Notes
Finland 49 33 99 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
France 577 430 1,031 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
Ireland 213 142 427 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
54 2004 Connolly, 2005
Italy
1,153 2011 Giommoni, 2014
1,842 2009 Transcrime, 2013a
2,453 2010
Fabi,	Ricci,	&	Rossi,	
2011
3,340 2009 Rossi, 2013
1,980 2008 Di Censi et al., 2010
1,623 1,326 2,649 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
1,467 887 2,046 2005
Baldassarini	&	
Corea, 2009
862 855 868 2005 Canzonetti,	2009
Netherlands 79 52 157 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
Spain 360 240 721 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
United 
Kingdom
1,508a 2010
Mills,	Skodbo,	&	
Blyth, 2013
Crack 
cocaine 
and	heroin;	
Whole	UK;	
OCG share
1,360b 2010
Mills,	Skodbo,	&	
Blyth, 2013
Crack 
cocaine 
and	heroin;	
England and 
Wales;	OCG	
share
2,500 2006 Kilmer et al., 2013
2,303 1,536 4,607 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
1,714c 1,390c 2,037c 2003-2004 Pudney et al., 2006
a	Original	figure:	1,300	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(Source	ECB).
b	Original	figure:	1,172	million	GBP.	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(Source	ECB).
c The	original	figures	were	1,207,	979	and	1,434	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2003	exchange	rate	(Source	ECB).
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 10 - Previous estimates of the revenues of the heroin market for OCP countries
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availability of cocaine in Spain, given its role as destination 
country	for	shipments	from	South	America	(EMCDDA,	2014;	
see Section 5.6). Much smaller is the estimate of the revenues 
from cocaine in Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
Cross-checking the values reported in Table 11 with previous 
estimates	(see	Table	12	below)	seems	to	confirm	the	validity	
of	 the	OCP	estimates.	The	figures	provided	here	 for	France,	
Italy, the Netherlands and United Kingdom fall within the 
range	estimated	by	Kilmer	and	Pacula	(2009).	As	for	the	UK,	
the OCP estimate closely matches the assessment by Mills, 
Skodbo	 and	Blyth	 (2013)	 considering	 powder	 cocaine	 alone	
(1,380.5	million	euro).	Although	obtained	using	a	seizure-based	
approach,	also	the	estimate	by	Connolly	(2005)	for	Ireland	is	
close	 to	 the	 one	 provided	 here	 and	 quantified	 at	 75	million	
euro. 
The main differences regard the Italian cocaine market, in 
particular	when	comparing	 the	figure	provided	here	with	 the	
results	obtained	by	Fabi,	Ricci	and	Rossi	 (2011),	Rossi	 (2013)	
and	 Sallusti	 (2013).	 These	 differences	 may	 be	 due	 to	 the	
adoption of different consumption rates.61 However, to be 
Country
Best estimate 
(million euro)
Min (million euro) Max (million euro) Reference year
Austria 131 98 147 2008
Belgium 87 65 97 2008
Bulgaria 17 12 19 2012
Croatia 32 24 36 2012
Cyprus N/A N/A N/A N/A
Czech	Republic 56 42 63 2012
Denmark 82 61 92 2013
Estonia 18 14 21 2008
Finland 17 13 19 2010
France 755 563 845 2010
Germany 823 615 922 2012
Greece 16 12 18 2004
Hungary 21 16 24 2007
Ireland 90 67 101 2011
Italy 1,699 1,268 1,902 2008
Latvia 6 4 6 2011
Lithuania 7 5 8 2012
Luxembourg N/A N/A N/A N/A
Malta N/A N/A N/A N/A
Netherlands 85 63 95 2005
Poland 83 62 93 2012
Portugal 24 18 27 2012
Romania 39 29 43 2010
Slovakia 11 8 12 2010
Slovenia 15 11 17 2012
Spain 1,199 895 1,343 2011
Sweden N/A N/A N/A N/A
United Kingdom 1,452 1,084 1,625 2012
Total OCP countries 5,297 3,953 5,930
Total EU 24 6,765 5,049 7,575
Source: Transcrime elaboration on EMCDDA and Frijns & Van Laar (2013)
Table 11 - Estimates of the revenues of the cocaine market (EU 24 MS)
61. In particular, a higher rate per consumption was adopted by previous studies. 
For example, Fabi, Ricci and Rossi assumed 2 grams of cocaine per day per 300 
days	of	consumption	in	a	year.	Sallusti	(2013)	assumed	an	annual	consumption	
by frequent cocaine users of between 225 and 195 grams. The OCP estimate 
adopts a consumption rate based on previous studies, such as Frijns and van 
Laar	et	al.	(2013)	and	Kilmer	and	Pacula	(2009).
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Country
Best estimate #
(million euro)
Min (million 
euro)
Max (million 
euro)
Reference year Source Notes
France 488 129 1,257 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
Ireland 75 2004 Connolly, 2005
Italy
1,171 2011 Giommoni, 2014
10,266 2009 Sallusti, 2013
1,711 2010 Transcrime, 2013a
9,771 2009
Fabi,	Ricci,	&	Rossi,	
2011
12,590 2008 Rossi, 2013
5,413 2005 Di Censi et al., 2010
2,489 658 6,415 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
3,231 2,774 3,688 2005
Baldassarini	&	
Corea, 2009
4,030 3,963 4,096 2005 Canzonetti,	2009
Netherlands 102 27 157 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
Spain 1,963 519 721 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
United 
Kingdom
1,067a 2010
Mills,	Skodbo,	&	
Blyth, 2013
Powder 
cocaine;	
Whole	UK;	
OCG share
944b 2010
Mills,	Skodbo,	&	
Blyth, 2013
Powder 
cocaine;	
England and 
Wales;	OCG	
share
3,133 828 8,073 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
3,484c 2,545 4,607 2003-2004 Pudney et al., 2006
Sum powder 
and crack 
cocaine
a Original	figure:	920	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
b	Original	figure	814	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
c	Original	figures:	973	(powder)	and	1,480	(crack)	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2003	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 12 - Previous estimates of the revenues of the cocaine market for the OCP countries
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noted is that the OCP estimate is consistent with Giommoni 
(2014),	 who	 quantified	 cocaine	 consumption	 in	 2012	 in	 Italy	
using	data	from	wastewater	analysis	(1,171	million	euro).
4.1.5. Estimates of the cannabis market
Because	 no	 specific	 estimates	 have	 been	 calculated	 for	
the purpose of the OCP project, this Section reports the 
estimates provided by one of the most comprehensive 
studies on cannabis in Europe, i.e. Caulkins, Kilmer and Graf 
(2013).	 According	 to	 these	 figures	 (see	 Table	 13),	 which	
combine information from a web survey and EMCDDA data, 
the cannabis market in Europe ranges between 6.7 and 9.8 
billion euro before adjusting for the consumption gap.65 The 
latter	is	defined	as	the	difference	between	actual	consumption	
and what would be estimated on the basis of surveys. As the 
Methodological Annex points out, there are several difficulties 
in estimating revenues from the drugs market. One of them is 
that estimates of the number of drug users through household 
surveys may not capture the entire user population but only 
part	 of	 it.	 Caulkins,	 Kilmer	 and	 Graf	 (2013)	 do	 not	 correct	
their estimate according to this factor but point out that the 
reported values are conservative and should be adjusted 
according to this consumption gap.66
Figure 10 - Estimates of the scale of cocaine market for the available EU MS. Absolute values (left) and percentages of GDP 
(right)
Revenues - Mn euro
< 51
51 - 550
551 - 1,050
> 1,050
Not available
% of  GDP 2010
< 0.022 %
0.022 - 0.033 %
0.034 - 0.05 %
> 0.05 %
Not available
Source: Transcrime elaboration on estimates reported in Table 11 and Eurostat data
65.	 Differences	 between	 lower	 (6.7	 billion	 euro)	 and	 upper	 (9.8	 billion	 euro)	
bounds reflect the different methods employed. One used a consumption-
based approach, while the other used a spending-based method. For a more 
detailed	discussion	see	Caulkins,	Kilmer	and	Graf	(2013).
66.	As	the	authors	write:	“This	paper	does	not	calculate	or	advocate	for	the	use	
of	a	particular	“consumption	gap”	adjustment;	we	think	this	is	best	done	ex	post	
in	a	judgmental	way,	not	via	some	calculation	that	creates	an	artificial	sense	of	
precision. If one believes that these survey-based estimates only capture half 
of	 the	market	 (an	estimate	that	 is	not	uncommon	 in	 the	alcohol	 literature,	but	
generally	 larger	 than	 the	figures	 typically	used	 for	cannabis),	 then	 the	market	
would	 be	 13.4	 billion	 to	 19.6	 billion	 euro—still	 lower	 than	 UNODC’s	 estimate	
(2005)	 and	 the	 upper	 bound	 offered	 by	 Kilmer	 and	 Pacula	 (2009).	 Those	
comfortable with the more conventional adjustment of bumping up by 25% 
would	estimate	the	range	to	be	8.4	billion	to	12.1	billion	euro”	(Caulkins,	Kilmer,	
&	Graf,	2013,	p.	314).
The expenditure on cannabis for the 7 OCP countries 
represents about 80% of the entire cannabis market 
in Europe. According to the estimates presented in Table 13, 
Spain, with 1.6 billion euro, is the biggest market for cannabis in 
Europe,	followed	by	Italy	(1.4	billion),	France	(1.3	billion)	and	the	
United	Kingdom	(0.8	billion).	
Table 14 shows that cannabis has a large variance in terms 
of estimates across different studies. This may suggest the 
adoption by different authors of very different methods, data 
and sources. In particular, estimates by Caulkins, Kilmer and 
Graf	 (2013)	 present	 generally	 lower	 values	 with	 respect	 to	
previous	studies	(see	Table	14).	This	is	due	to	the	results	of	a	
web survey suggesting a lower rate of consumption per user 
with	 respect	 to	 previous	 evidence	 (Caulkins,	 Kilmer,	 &	Graf,	
2013, p. 314). 
4.1.6. Estimates of the market of 
amphetamine-type drugs
Table 15 and Table 16 report the estimates by Kilmer and 
Pakula	 (2009)	 of	 the	 revenues	 for	 amphetamine-type	
drugs	 (namely	 amphetamines, methamphetamines and 
ecstasy) across European countries. Given the novelty of 
these substances and the scant literature about them, there 
are many fewer studies compared with those on cannabis, 
heroin and cocaine. 
Owing to the lack of knowledge about these substances, 
in particular in terms of rate of consumption per user, no 
OCP-specific	estimates	 are	 given	here,	 but	 only	 the	figures 
provided by previous studies, in particular Kilmer and Pacula 
(2009).	 Considering	 the	 scant	 information	 on	 consumption	
patterns,	Kilmer	and	Pacula	were	not	confident	in	providing	a	
best	estimate,	but	calculated	“the	 largest,	but	still	defensible	
range”	 (Kilmer	&	Pacula,	 2009,	p.	43).	This	produced	a	 very	
large interval between the lower and the upper bound of the 
estimates.
According	to	the	estimates	by	Kilmer	and	Pacula	(2009),	the	
value of the illicit market for amphetamine-type drugs for the 
7 OCP countries ranges between 1.1 and 5 billion euro, with 
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the ecstasy market worth between 486 and 2,515 million, and 
the amphetamine market between 610 and 2,516 billion. Italy 
and UK are the largest markets, among the OCP countries, for 
both ecstasy and amphetamines, followed by Spain.
4.1.7. Actors
As reported in previous chapters, according to Europol there 
are 3,600 organised crime groups in Europe, of which at least 
30%	are	involved	in	drug	trafficking	(Europol,	2013a).	Owing	to	
the involvement of complex criminal organisations, like Italian 
mafias,	 many	 popular	 accounts	 describe	 the	 drugs	 market	
as being controlled by few, big and very organised criminal 
organisations	 (e.g.	 Saviano,	 2008;	 Glenny,	 2009).	 However,	
the academic literature describes the organisation of the 
drugs supply-chain in almost the opposite terms. 
Profits	 connected	 to	 the	 trafficking,	 low	 entry	 barriers,	 and	
combined repression by law enforcement agencies make the 
illicit drugs market a competitive business with numerous 
competitors and few opportunities to monopolize the 
business	 (Pearsons	 &	 Hobbs,	 2001;	 Kenney,	 2007).	 Some	
ethnicity-based	OCGs	(for	instance	Albanians	and	Turkish	for	
heroin) may have a key role in the supply chain, also because 
of proximity to illicit trafficking routes. However, this does not 
mean	that	a	few	organisations	monopolize	the	supply	of	drugs.	
As Zaitch points out with regard to the cocaine market, there 
Figure 11 - Estimates of the scale of cannabis market for the 
available EU MS. Absolute values (above) and percentages 
of GDP (below)
Revenues - Mn euro
< 51
51 - 500
501 - 1,000
> 1,000
Not available
Source: Transcrime elaboration on estimates reported in Table 13 and 
Eurostat data
Country Estimate 
(million euro)
Reference year
Austria 52 2008
Belgium 125 2008
Bulgaria 17 2008
Cyprus 7 2009
Czech	Republic 47 2010
Denmark 41 2010
Estonia 7 2008
Finland 21 2010
France 1,277 2010
Germany 563 2009
Greece 28 2004
Hungary 43 2007
Ireland 47 2010
Italy 1,356 2008
Latvia 9 2007
Lithuania 15 2008
Luxembourg 5 2005
Malta 0.7 2001
Netherlands 305 2009
Poland 134 2006
Portugal 62 2007
Romania 8 2010
Slovakia 43 2006
Slovenia 45 2007
Spain 1,575 2009
Sweden 69 2010
United Kingdom 787 2010-2011
Total OCP       
countries
5,368
Total EU-27 6,689
Source: Caulkins, Kilmer, & Graf, 2013
Table 13 - Estimates of the revenues of the cannabis 
market (EU 27)
% of  GDP 2010
< 0.019 %
0.019 - 0.038 %
0.039 - 0.05 %
> 0.05 %
Not available
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are	 numerous	 groups	 different	 in	 size,	 structure	 and	means	
which collaborate and compete with several others in order to 
smuggle	drugs	to	Europe	(Zaitch,	2007).67
Indeed, according to many observers, the prime objective of 
any	group	supplying	drugs	is	not	to	monopolize	the	supply	of	
drugs and to control prices, but rather to reduce the risk of 
arrests and violence	(Paoli,	2002,	2004;	May	&	Hough,	2004;	
Kenney,	2007;	Babor	et	al.,	2010).	According	to	the	literature,	
although some criminal groups can gain a large share in the 
supply	of	some	drugs,	they	do	not	seem	able,	nor	willing,	to	fix	
drug	prices	(Paoli,	2002).	
Despite the fragmentation of the drugs supply chain, the 
next Sections identify the main criminal groups active 
in	 the	 supply	 of	 illicit	 drugs	 (heroin,	 cocaine,	 cannabis	 and	
amphetamine-type drugs) across European countries, with 
a particular focus on the seven OCP countries. To be noted 
Country
Estimate #
(million euro)
Min (million 
euro)
Max (million 
euro)
Reference year Source Notes
Finland 137 61 286 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
France
2,233 997 4,647 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
789 746 832 2005
Legleye,	Lakhdar,	&	
Spilka, 2008
Ireland 49 22 101 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
379 2004 Connolly, 2005
Italy
547 2012 Giommoni, 2014
3,140 1,649 4,632 2008 Transcrime, 2013a
9,511 2010
Fabi,	Ricci,	&	Rossi,	
2011
7,030 2009 Rossi, 2013
3,579 2008 Di Censi et al., 2010
2,956 1,320 6,154 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
1,155 793 1,516 2005
Baldassarini	&	
Corea, 2009
4,319 4,248 4,390 2005 Canzonetti,	2009
Netherlands 387 173 805 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
Spain 1,600 716 3,324 2005
Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009
United 
Kingdom
1,392a 2010
Mills,	Skodbo,	&	
Blyth, 2013
Whole UK
1,228b 2010
Mills,	Skodbo,	&	
Blyth, 2013
England and 
Wales
1,515 677 3,152 2005 Kilmer et al., 2013
1,464c 850c 2,078c 2003-2004 Pudney et al., 2006
a Original	figure:	1,200	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
b Original	figure:	1,059	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
c	Original	figures:	1,031	(average),	598.5	(min)	and	1,463.5	(max)	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2003	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 14 - Previous estimates of the revenues of the cannabis market for the OCP countries
67.	 For	 instance	 the	 Palermo	 ‘maxi-trial’,	 investigating	 the	 transcontinental	
trafficking	 in	 heroin	 during	 the	 1980s,	 confirmed	 the	 competitiveness	 in	 the	
supply	 of	 illicit	 drugs,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 absence	 of	 a	monopoly.	 As	 Letizia	 Paoli	
points	out	after	examination	of	the	judicial	acts	“A	precise	reading	of	the	judicial	
acts reveals, however, that the various phases were managed by members 
of	 different	 mafia	 families	 who,	 rather	 than	 considering	 themselves	 part	 of	
the same economic unit, jealously guarded their own networks of clients and 
suppliers	as	well	as	their	specializations”	(Paoli,	2004,	p.	198).
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again is that these groups may act either in collaboration or 
in	competition	with	several	other	actors	(both	organised	and	
structured	or	‘freelance’).	
4.1.7.1. Actors in the heroin market
The  Balkan route is the shortest path connecting 
Afghanistan	 (the	 main	 producer	 of	 opium)	 to	 Europe	
(EMCDDA,	 2014).	 The	 heroin	 travels	 from	 Afghanistan	 to	
Western and Central Europe across Turkey. Once it has 
crossed the Turkish border, the Balkan route splits into three 
branches: the Northern, the Southern and the Western. 
The Northern branch crosses Bulgaria and Romania to 
countries in Western and Central Europe. The Southern 
branch traverses Greece and Albania, heading mainly for 
Italy. The Western branch involves several Balkan countries 
(Croatia,	 Montenegro,	 Serbia,	 Bosnia	 and	 Herzegovina,	
Kosovo, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Slovenia)	 (UNODC,	2014b).	A	 secondary	 source	of	 supply	 is	
the Northern route, which crosses the Russian Federation to 
supply the Baltic states, Scandinavian countries, Germany 
and	Bulgaria	(EMCDDA,	2008).	
The supply of heroin from South-West Asia to Europe seems 
to involve numerous criminal groups, such as independent 
Country Estimate (million 
euro)
Min (million 
euro)
Max(million 
euro)
Austria 90 35 144
Belgium 34 13 55
Cyprus 2 1 3
Czech	
Republic
158 62 255
Denmark 57 22 92
Estonia 8 3 13
Finland 41 16 66
France 55 21 88
Germany 511 199 822
Greece 9 3 14
Hungary 67 26 107
Ireland 16 6 26
Italy 284 111 457
Latvia 25 10 40
Lithuania 5 2 8
Luxembourg 1.2 0.5 2
Netherlands 19 7 30
Poland 164 64 264
Portugal 12 5 20
Slovakia 39 15 61
Slovenia 3 1 5
Spain 338 132 544
Sweden 31 12 50
United 
Kingdom
811 317 1,305
Total OCP 
Countries
1,564
Total EU 24 2,778
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the 
arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the 
original authors.
Country Estimate (million 
euro)
Min (million 
euro)
Max(million 
euro)
Austria 95 21 169
Belgium 54 12 97
Cyprus 11 2 19
Czech	
Republic
304 66 542
Denmark 12 3 22
Estonia 19 4 33
Finland 47 10 83
France 190 41 338
Germany 430 93 767
Greece 35 8 62
Hungary 61 13 109
Ireland 30 7 54
Italy 639 139 1,140
Latvia 9 2 17
Lithuania 6 1 11
Luxembourg 3 1 5
Malta 0.8 0.2 1.5
Netherlands 73 16 130
Poland 19 4 35
Portugal 17 4 31
Slovakia 70 15 126
Slovenia 22 5 39
Spain 558 121 995
Sweden 48 10 85
United 
Kingdom
702 152 1,251
Total OCP 
Countries
2,239
Total EU 25 3,456
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the 
arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the 
original authors.
Source: Kilmer & Pacula, 2009
Source: Kilmer & Pacula, 2009
Table 15 - Estimates of the revenues of the market for 
amphetamines in 24 EU MS (2005)
Table 16 - Previous estimates of the revenues of the market 
for ecstasy in 25 EU MS (2005)
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traffickers, OCGs, and loose networks. Table 17 reports the 
main OCGs involved in the supply of heroin across European 
countries, according to the evidence collected from the 
available	 literature	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 OCP	 countries	 (see	
Chapter 2 for details on the data collection methodology). As 
the table shows, although there are several groups supplying 
heroin in Europe, Albanian and Turkish OCGs seem to have 
key positions as both retailers and wholesalers in most EU 
countries	 (Kleemans,	 2004;	 Paoli	 &	 Reuter,	 2008;	 Reuter	 &	
Trautmann,	2009;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013).
There are several reasons for their large presence. Paoli 
and	Reuter	 (2008)	 identify	 at	 least	 four	 reasons.	 First,	 their	
low social position within host countries with few opportunities 
for legal employment. Second, the immigrant diaspora of both 
Albanians and Turkish across several European countries. 
Third, the strong family ties of these communities, which 
create opportunities for business, as well as making them 
more resilient to law enforcement investigation. Fourth, the 
geographical proximity of Albania and Turkey to trafficking 
routes,	 which	 facilitates	 the	 access	 to	 raw	materials	 (in	 this	
case heroin). 
The large presence of Albanian and Turkish OCGs does not 
mean that they act as a single group or that they are able to 
monopolize	the	market	(Paoli	&	Reuter,	2008).	Although	they	
may have the same ethnicity, this does not signify that they will 
necessarily	cooperate;	rather,	they	may	compete	against	each	
other. 
Besides Turks and Albanians, other groups involved in the 
distribution of heroin at various levels of the supply system 
are Italian OCGs like Cosa Nostra and Camorra in France 
and Italy, African groups in France and Denmark, and 
Motorcycle gangs in Germany and Scandinavian countries 
(Kinzig	&	Luczak,	2004;	Kleemans,	2004;	DIA,	2011b).	These	
may compete or cooperate with Albanians and Turks with 
different roles along the supply chain. 
4.1.7.2. Actors in the cocaine market
Bolivia, Colombia and Peru are the only countries producing 
cocaine worldwide, with half of the production concentrated 
in	Colombia	(UNODC,	2014b).	The	trafficking	of	cocaine	from	
South America to Europe requires numerous steps and a 
minimum level of organisation. 
Table 18 reports the main groups involved in the supply of 
cocaine to Europe. Like heroin, numerous groups cooperate 
and	 compete	 in	 the	 cocaine	market;	 however,	Colombians 
seem to have a dominant position in the import and wholesale 
distribution	 of	 cocaine	 to	 Europe	 (Paoli	 &	Reuter,	 2008).	As	
said in regard to the large presence of Albanians and Turks in 
heroin trafficking, four factors may explain the dominant role 
of Colombians in cocaine distribution: low socio-economic 
status, a large immigrant diaspora, strong family ties, and 
proximity	to	production	countries	(Paoli	&	Reuter,	2008).	
Since the 1990s, owing to the high levels of violence in the 
most populated cities, many Colombians have fled their 
country, with many of them arriving in Europe. According 
to the Colombian Institute of Statistics, in 2005 there were 
almost 300,000 Colombians in Spain, where they represented 
the largest community	 outside	 America	 (Departamento	
Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, 2005). The large 
presence of the Colombian community, as well cultural and 
language similarities, may explain the key role of Spain as 
the destination country for cocaine shipments from South 
America.	 In	 fact,	 according	 to	 the	 EMCDDA	 (2014),	 Spain	
with	20.2	tons	is	the	first	European	country	for	the	quantity	of	
cocaine	seized	(see	also	Section	5.6).	
Owing to the importance of ports like Rotterdam and 
airports like Schiphol-Amsterdam, also the Netherlands 
is a hub-country for the shipment of cocaine to Europe, 
which may explain the involvement of Dutch OCGs in the 
European	cocaine	market	(Kinzig	&	Luczak,	2004;	Kleemans,	
2004).	However,	 the	 relatively	 low	figures	 on	Dutch	 cocaine	
consumption levels suggest that the Netherlands is more 
likely	to	be	a	transit	country	than	a	sole	destination/consumer	
Figure 12 – Estimate of the scale of amphetamine and ecstasy market for the available EU MS. Absolute values (left) and 
percentages of GDP (right)
Revenues - Mn euro
< 51
51 - 450
451 - 850
> 850
Not available
Source: Transcrime elaboration on estimates reported in Table 14, Table 15 and Eurostat data
% of GDP 2010
< 0.023 %
0.023 - 0.049 %
0.050 - 0.086 %
> 0.086 %
Not available
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OCGs European Countries Sources
African OCGs France, Denmark, Netherlands Reuter,	2009;	Reuter	&	Trautmann,	2009;	DNA,	2011;	REITOX,	
&	EMCDDA.,2012a;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013
Albanian OCGs France, Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland,	Netherlands,	UK
Reuter,	2008;	REITOX,	&	EMCDDA.	2012a,	2013;	EMCDDA	&	
Europol,	2013;	Europol,	2013a;	Trautmann,	Kilmer,	&	Turnbull,	
2013;	UNODC,	2014b,	2014c
Other Asian OCGs UK, Germany SOCA,	2012;	Europol,	2013a
Camorra Italy DNA, 2011
Cosa Nostra Italy, France DNA, 2011
Other Eastern European 
OCGs Finland, Sweden, UK
McSweeney,	Turnbull	&	Hough,	2008;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	
2013;	UNODC,	2014b
Motorcycle gangs Germany, Finland REITOX	&	EMCDDA,	2013
Romanian OCGs Italy, Romania EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013;	UNODC,	2014b
Turkish OCGs France, Germany, Netherlands, UK
Kleemans,	2004;	Paoli	&	Reuter,	2008;	Reuter,	2009;	Reuter	
&	Trautmann,	2009;	SOCA,	2012;	REITOX	&	EMCDDA,	2013;	
EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013;	Europol,	2013a
Table 17 - Criminal groups involved in the supply of heroin across European countries
OCGs European Countries Sources
African OCGs France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, UK
KLPD-IPOL,	2009;	Reuter	et	al.,	2009;	DNA,	2011;	REITOX	
&	EMCDDA,	2012a,	2012c;	UNODC,	2010a,	2013b,	2014a;	
Europol, 2013a
Albanian OCGs France, Netherlands, Italy, Germany, 
Switzerland
DNA,	2011;	REITOX	&	EMCDDA,	2012a;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	
2013;	Trautmann	et	al.,	2013	
Camorra Italy, Spain DNA,	2011;	Transcrime,	2013a	
Colombian OCGs Italy, France, UK, Spain, Netherlands Kleemans,	2004;	Paoli	&	Reuter,	2008;	SOCA,	2012;	UNODC,	
2010a;	DNA,	2011;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013;	Europol,	2013a;	
Dutch OCGs Germany, Netherlands Kinzig	&	Luczak,	2004;	Kleemans,	2004
Motorcycle gangs Denmark, Finland Kerkelä,	2011;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013;	OSAC,	2014a	
‘Ndrangheta
France, Netherlands, Italy, Germany, 
Spain
DIA,	2014;	DNA,	2011,	2014
North-African OCGs Italy, Netherlands, Spain UNODC,	2010a;	DNA,	2011;	REITOX	&	EMCDDA,	2012c	;	
EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013
South American OCGs Italy, UK, France Reuter	et	al.,	2009;	UNODC,	2010a;	DNA,	2011;	Europol,	2013a
Spanish OCGs UK, Spain, Italy McSweeney,	Turnbull,	&	Hough,	2008;	DNA,	2011
Table 18 - Main groups involved in the supply of cocaine across European countries
country. Hence, once cocaine has been imported into the 
Netherlands, Dutch OCGs may take part in the business 
and	move	the	drug	to	other	consumer	markets	(in	particular	
Germany).
Italian OCGs have lost the primary role in international 
cocaine	 trafficking	 that	 they	 had	 during	 the	 1990s	 (Paoli,	
2004;	EMCDDA,	2014).	Law	enforcement	counteractions,	as	
well	 as	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 criminal	 groups	 (e.g.	 African,	
Colombian)	 have	 limited	 the	 key	 role	 of	 the	 Italian	mafias	 in	
cocaine trafficking in Europe. However, among the Italian 
mafia	 groups,	 the	 Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta seems still to 
retain an active role in cocaine trafficking across EU countries. 
The	ubiquity	of	 ‘Ndrangheta	networks	across	Europe,	strong	
family ties, and reluctance to collaborate with law enforcement 
authorities	enable	the	‘Ndrangheta	to	retain	an	important	role	
in	 the	 Italian	 and	 German	 distribution	 of	 cocaine	 (Europol,	
2013a). 
In the past few years, also African OCGs have emerged 
as	major	 actors	 in	 the	 supply	 of	 cocaine	 to	 Europe	 (Reuter,	
2009), supported by the expansion of African communities 
in Europe and the new trafficking routes from West African 
States	(UNODC,	2014b).
4.1.7.3. Actors in the cannabis market
Cannabis is the most consumed and trafficked illicit 
psychotropic substance	 in	 Europe	 (EMCDDA,	 2014).	
According	 to	various	sources,	 the	 large	size	of	 the	cannabis	
market and the domestic production of cannabis plants have 
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increased the involvement of OCGs in the supply of cannabis 
products	(EMCDDA,	2012;	EMCDDA	&	Europol	2013).	
Unlike coca or opium, cannabis plants can be grown quite 
easily in almost any part of the world. According to UNODC 
data,	 Leggett	 and	 Pietschmann	 (2008)	 reported	 that	
cannabis is produced in at least 172 countries across the 
world:	 “it	 appears	 that	 many	 countries	 can	 satisfy	 much	 of	
domestic demand with locally produced cannabis […], and this 
trend appears to be growing in many important markets”	
(Leggett	&	Pietschmann,	2008,	p.	190).	Indeed,	an	increase in 
indoor-grown cannabis has been recently highlighted by EU 
agencies	(EMCDDA,	2012a).
Although cannabis can be easily produced in almost every 
part of the world, most of the drug destined to Europe is 
ascribable	 to	five	non-EU	countries:	Morocco, Afghanistan 
and Lebanon	 for	 resin	 cannabis	 (or	 hashish),	 and	Albania 
and South Africa	for	herbal	cannabis	(marijuana)	(EMCDDA,	
2012). 
Moroccan groups are the major producers of cannabis 
resin and also have a leading role in its import into Europe. 
Their presence is closely related to the main entry points 
of	 cannabis	 into	 Europe	 (primarily	 Spain,	 but	 also	 France,	
Italy and Portugal), which are also major consumer markets 
(Leggett	 &	 Pietschmann,	 2008;	 Paoli	 &	 Reuter,	 2008;	
EMCDDA, 2012a). Albanian groups in several countries 
close to Albania – such as Greece, Italy, Slovenia, Hungary – 
are involved in the trafficking of cannabis resin. In regard to 
the	supply	of	cannabis	products	(both	herbal	and	resin)	from	
producer to consumer countries, Albanians and Moroccan 
OCGs seem to collaborate with several indigenous groups 
(EMCDDA,	 2012a,	 2014;	 EMCDDA	 &	 Europol,	 2013).	 Dutch 
groups, in particular, seem to have extended their activities 
beyond national borders to act as brokers between the major 
suppliers	and	importers	(EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013).	
In	recent	years,	several	European	countries	 (e.g.	 the	UK,	see	
Section 5.7) have witnessed the involvement of Vietnamese 
OCGs	in	the	indoor	cultivation	of	cannabis	plants	(Silverstone	&	
Savage,	2010;	Silverstone,	2011;	EMCDDA,	2012a).	Vietnamese	
OCGs have been able to exploit a large immigrant high-skilled 
and low-cost gardening labour force. This has facilitated the 
spread of domestic herbal resin, replacing the more expensive 
Moroccan	hashish	(EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013).	
Similarly, Chinese OCGs	 have	specialized	 in	 the	production	
and wholesale distribution of herbal cannabis in the United 
Kingdom	and	Ireland	(see	also	Sections	5.3	and	5.7)	(EMCDDA	
&	Europol,	2013).
4.1.7.4. Actors in the market of amphetamine-type 
drugs
As synthetic products produced in laboratories, both 
amphetamines and ecstasy can be produced almost 
everywhere. However, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland 
and the Baltic countries	 are	 commonly	 identified	 as	 the	
main European countries for the production and export of 
amphetamine-type	drugs	(EMCDDA,	2013,	2014).	
Several criminal groups are involved in the supply of 
amphetamines. Table 20 reports the main groups involved in 
the trafficking of amphetamine-type drugs across European 
countries. The involvement of OCGs in the amphetamine 
business is mainly associated with retrieving precursors, 
production	and	import/export	(Reuter,	2009;	EMCDDA,	2013).	
Dutch and Belgian OCGs seem to play a prominent role in the 
large-scale production of amphetamines, given their expertise 
in chemical processing and amphetamine production, and the 
availability	 of	 raw	materials	 (such	 as	 benzyl	 methyl	 ketone)	
(Paoli	&	Reuter,	2008).	
Moreover, after the production, Belgian and Dutch OCGs 
seem to cooperate with several other groups in the trafficking 
of amphetamine-type drugs. Polish OCGs, besides engaging 
in small-scale production, are active in the large-scale supply 
to Scandinavian and Baltic countries, but also to the 
United Kingdom and Ireland. Lithuanian groups have a 
preeminent position in the brokering of amphetamine-type 
drugs destined for Baltic and Scandinavian areas, as well as 
for Russia and other Russian-speaking countries.
The	 production	 and	 import/export	 of	 amphetamine-type	
stimulants is undertaken by several criminal groups of various 
nationalities. However, the main actors in the retail supply are 
independent	 local	dealers.	As	Paoli	and	Reuter	 (2008)	point	
out, amphetamine-type drugs are widespread in closed 
settings (i.e.	 discos,	 parties,	 etc.)	 where	 ethnic	 groups	 are	
often less integrated than indigenous people.
OCGs European Countries Sources
Albanian OCGs Greece, Italy, Slovenia, Hungary
DNA,	2011;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013;	DIA,	2014;	REITOX	&	
EMCDDA	(2012b)
Chinese OCGs Ireland, UK
An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012;	Silverstone,	2011;	EMCDDA	
&	Europol,	2013	
Dutch OCGs
France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain Belgium, Germany
Reuter	et	al.,	2009;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013
North-African OCGs
Spain, Portugal, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, France
Paoli	&	Reuter,	2008;	Reuter	et	al.,	2009;	Reuter	&	Trautmann,	
2009;	DNA,	2011;	EMCDDA,	2012;	REITOX,	&	EMCDDA,	2012b;	
EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013
Other Asian OCGs
Belgium,	Czech	Republic,	
Germany, Ireland, France, Hungary, 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, UK
McSweeney,	Turnbull,	&	Hough,	2008;	Reuter	et	al.,	2009;	
Silverstone	&	Savage,	2010;	Silverstone,	2011;	An	Garda	
Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013
Spanish OCGs Spain, Italy, Portugal DNA,	2011;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013
Table 19 - Groups involved in cannabis trafficking across European countries
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4.1.7.8. Conclusions
This Section has presented estimates of the revenues for the 
illicit drug market and the groups involved in drug trafficking. 
The	estimates	for	heroin	and	cocaine	have	been	specifically	
made by Transcrime for this report, whilst the estimates 
for cannabis and synthetic drugs are those reported by, 
respectively,	Caulkins,	Kilmer	and	Graf	(2013),	and	Kilmer	and	
Pacula	(2009).	
According to the estimates, the overall illicit drugs market for 
the 7 OCP countries is worth between 15.5 and 24.5 billion 
euro	(see	Figure	13).	Heroin	(5.7	billion	euro),	cocaine	(5.3	billion	
euro)	and	cannabis	 (5.8	billion	euro)	 seem	 to	be	 the	biggest	
markets in term of revenues, while the scale of amphetamine-
type drugs is smaller. New drugs are rapidly emerging, but 
their consumption seems still restricted to a few user groups. 
Further research in these new markets is needed to estimates 
their value.
Figure 13 - Estimates of the scale of overall illicit drugs market for the available EU MS. Absolute values (left) and percentages 
of GDP (right)
Revenues - Mn euro
< 101
101 - 1,800
1,801 - 3,500
> 3,500
Not available
% of  GDP 2010
< 0.09 %
0.09 - 0.17 %
0.18 - 0.34 %
> 0.34 %
Not available
Source: Transcrime elaboration on estimates reported in Table 4 and Eurostat data
OCGs European Countries Sources
British OCGs UK, Spain, Portugal
McSweeney,	Turnbull,	&	Hough,	2008;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	
2011;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013;	Europol,	2013a
Chinese OCGs Italy, Netherlands
DIA,	2012b;	DNA,	2012;	Iadeluca,	2012;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	
2013
Dutch OCGs
Germany, Netherlands, UK, Spain, 
Portugal
McSweeney,	Turnbull,	&	Hough,	2008;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	
2013;	Europol,	2013a	
Lithuanian OCGs
Scandinavian countries, Baltic 
countries, Russia, Spain, Ireland, UK
EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013;	Europol,	2013a
Other Eastern 
European OCGs
Baltic countries, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Scandinavian countries, UK
Toufik	&	Berber,	2011;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013;	Europol,	
2013a;	OSAC,	2014b;	
Other Western 
European OCGs
Germany, Portugal, Spain, UK
McSweeney,	Turnbull,	&	Hough,	2008;	BKA,	2012;	EMCDDA	&	
Europol,	2013;	Europol,	2013a
Table 20 - Groups involved in the trafficking of amphetamine-type drugs across European countries
Several groups are involved in the supply of these illicit 
drugs. Heroin and cocaine seem to involve the larger presence 
of	 some	 specific	 groups	 (Turkish	 and	 Albanian	 OCGs	 for	
heroin, and Colombians for cocaine). More fluid and dynamic 
is the market for cannabis and amphetamine-type drugs, 
where	the	involvement	of	organised	groups	is	mainly	confined	
to production or export across countries. The emerging 
trend of the domestic production of cannabis facilitates the 
involvement	 of	 immigrants	 in	 production	 (Vietnamese	 and	
Chinese)	and	Western	country	OCGs	(i.e.	Dutch)	in	high-level	
distribution. 
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4.2.1. Introduction
Trafficking	 in	 human	 beings	 (THB)	 is	 a	 serious	 violation	 of	
human rights that affects many people around the world, 
especially women and children. This crime includes a 
complex array of actions with which perpetrators reduce 
their victims to what many experts describe as “modern 
slavery”	(Danailova-Trainor	&	Belser,	2006;	UNODC,	2009,	p.	
6;	OSCE,	2010,	p.	9).	UNODC,	that	is	responsible	for	assisting	
states in the implementation of the Trafficking in Persons 
Protocol,68 groups the purposes for which THB is perpetrated 
into three different categories: 
•		 sexual exploitation, which is aimed at obtaining 
“economic	profits	from	forced	commercial	sexual	activity”	
(UNODC,	2012b,	p.	34);	
•		 forced labour and slavery, whose purpose is to extract 
both	 economic	 (for	 example,	 reduced	 manpower	 costs)	
and	non-economic	advantages	from	the	victims;	
•		 removal of organs, which may be carried out for 
commercial	purposes	(UNODC,	2012b,	p.	57).	
Although	the	profits	and	financial	gains	from	this	market	are	
“the	area	of	trafficking	about	which	the	least	is	known”	(OSCE,	
2010, p. 53), according to experts and investigative evidence 
the	proceeds	from	THB	are	“huge”,	especially	when	the	crime	
is	 undertaken	 by	 transnational	 groups	 (OSCE,	 2010,	 p.	 53).	
Therefore, THB undoubtedly plays a crucial role in the 
organised crime economy, and criminal networks structure 
themselves	 “like	 any	 other	 business,	 and	 every	 form,	 size,	
cooperation between networks, etc. is conceivable as long as 
it	seeks	to	maximize	profits”	(UNODC,	2010a,	p.	40).
The phenomenon of THB is difficult to capture because of 
its wide diffusion and the low reporting rate. However, there 
is a large body of literature on THB, and many experts and 
institutions have sought to determine the magnitude of this 
market since the late 1990s. For the purposes of this project, 
the focus will be put on human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation, which is the most frequently reported form of 
THB	in	the	European	Union	(UNODC,	2012b).	However	some	
figures	on	human	trafficking	as	a	whole	are	also	provided.
4.2.2. Estimates of the revenues from THB
The most recent study seeking to measure THB at global and 
regional	level	was	conducted	by	the	ILO	(2014).	This	estimated	
at 150.2 billion US dollars	(114.2	billion	euro)	the	annual	global	
illegal	proceeds	generated	in	2012	from	forced	labour	(which	
includes forced sexual exploitation, domestic work and non-
domestic slavery, with trafficking for the removal of organs 
excluded). As regards Europe, the same study estimates 
the annual returns from forced labour at 46.9 billion US 
dollars	(corresponding	to	35.6	billion	euro),	with	forced	sexual	
exploitation accounting for nearly 56%,69 and non-domestic 
labour for around 43%.70 This study does not determine the 
share that can presumably be attributed to organised crime. 
As	 regards	 the	 European	 Union,	 UNODC	 (2010b)	 estimates	
that the value of transnational trafficking to Europe for sexual 
exploitation purposes is equivalent to 3 billion US dollars per 
year. 
As far as country-level estimates are concerned, focusing in 
particular on OCP countries, few studies in Italy, Netherlands, 
UK,	and	a	reference	in	France,	have	been	found	(see	Table	21).	
The majority of these studies provide estimates only on sexual 
exploitation, with a few exceptions.
•		 Italy has been reported to be one of the top destination 
countries	 for	 trafficked	 people	 (UNODC,	 2006,	 p.	 20).	
According	to	SOS	 Impresa’s	report	on	organised	crime	 in	
Italy, in 2009 the overall THB market provided OCGs with 
870	million	euro	of	revenues	(SOS	Impresa,	2010,	p.	7).71 As 
far as sexual exploitation is concerned, the most recent 
result	 for	 Italy	 has	 been	 presented	 in	 Mancuso	 (2014a),	
who	estimated	the	total	revenues	generated	by	the	mafia	
and other criminals from outdoor and indoor exploitation of 
foreign women as ranging between 1.1 and 5.0 billion euro. 
Similar results on sexual exploitation were obtained by 
Transcrime	 (2013a,	 pp.	43–44),	which	 reported	 revenues	
of between 1.8 and 7.5 billion euro.72 According to the same 
study, OCGs presumably control between 20% and 40% of 
these	proceeds	(Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	355).
•		 Netherlands: the unlawful earnings in 2003 from illegal 
prostitution in the Netherlands were reported to be 
equivalent to 460 million euro, whereas illegal work 
generated 490 billion euro. These results have been 
presented	in	Unger	(2007,	p.	66),	on	the	basis	of	the	studies	
conducted	 by	 Smekens	 and	 Verbruggen	 (2005)	 and	
WODC	(2003,	p.	60)	(see	also	UNODC,	2011a,	p.	24).
68.	 The	 “Protocol	 to	 Prevent,	 Suppress	 and	 Punish	 Trafficking	 in	 Persons,	
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against	 Transnational	 Organized	 Crime”,	 also	 called	 “Trafficking	 in	 Persons	
Protocol”,	was	adopted	by	General	Assembly	 resolution	55/25.	 It	entered	 into	
force	on	25	December	2003.	It	is	the	first	global	legally	binding	instrument	with	
an	agreed	definition	of	trafficking	in	persons.	The	Protocol	is	part	of	the	“United	
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and the Protocols 
Thereto”,	 signed	 in	 2000	 in	 Palermo.	 The	 full	 text	 of	 the	 Convention	 and	 of	
the	 supplemented	 Protocols	 is	 available	 at	 http://www.unodc.org/documents/
treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf.
69. The proceeds of sexual exploitation were estimated on the basis of the 
likely average earnings generated by the victims per act of sexual intercourse. 
Starting	 from	 information	 collected	 by	 ILO	 and	 Kara	 (2008),	 the	 average	
earnings per encounter were multiplied by the number of monthly encounters. 
From	 the	 resulting	figure,	 the	monthly	wages	and	costs	were	 subtracted.	The	
total over the 12 months was multiplied by the estimated number of victims in 
the	region.	The	exploiters’	final	net	profits	were	obtained	by	assuming	that	they	
retain	around	70%	of	the	victims’	earnings.	
70.	For	each	region	and	each	sector	of	forced	labour	(agriculture	or	other	non-
domestic	 work),	 the	 annual	 profits	 were	 obtained	 as	 the	 difference	 between	
the monthly value added generated by each victim and the monthly wage paid 
to	him/her,	with	this	total	multiplied	by	12	months	and	by	the	number	of	forced	
labourers.
71.	This	result	was	obtained	by	dividing	the	number	of	global	revenues	(32	billion	
US dollars) by the 2.7 million people exploited and then the total related to the 
number of irregular immigrants in four regions of Italy between 2000 and 2007. 
However, the methodology is not clearly described in the study.
72.	These	figures	were	obtained	as	 the	 sum	of	 the	 indoor	 sexual	 exploitation	
market	 in	2004/2005	and	outdoor	sexual	exploitation	market	 in	2008/2009.	
See Table 21 for the details.
4.2. Trafficking in human beings                                                                                                                               
Diana Camerini and Marina Mancuso (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
58 | Part 1
Country
Estimate #
(million euro)
Min (million 
euro)
Max (million 
euro)
Reference year Source Notes
France 3,000 N/A
INHESJ - ONDRP, 
2012
Italy
600 2009 SOS Impresa, 2010
Italian	mafia’s	
share
1,238 702 1,774 2004-2005 Mancuso, 2014a
Indoor sexual 
exploitation 
of foreign 
women
1,844 432 3,255 2008-2009 Mancuso, 2014aa 
Outdoor 
sexual 
exploitation 
of foreign 
women
4,127 1,170 2,957 2004-2005 Transcrime, 2013a
Indoor sexual 
exploitation 
of foreign 
women
2,597 609 4,584 2008-2009 Transcrime, 2013ab
Outdoor 
sexual 
exploitation 
of foreign 
women
Netherlands 460 2003
Unger,	2007	(from	
WODC, 2003 and 
Smekens and Ver-
bruggen, 2005)
United 
Kingdom
151c 2010
Mills,	Skodbo,	&	
Blyth, 2013
393d 2003
Dubourg	&	Prichard,	
2008
a The total revenues from outdoor and indoor sexual exploitation of foreign women range between 1.1 and 5.0 billion euro. 
b The total revenues from outdoor and indoor sexual exploitation of foreign women range between 1.8 and 7.5 billion euro. 
c Original	figure:	130	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	currency	rate	(source	ECB).
d Original	figure:	277	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2003	currency	rate	(source	ECB).
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 21 - Estimates of the revenues from sexual exploitation for OCP countries
•		 United Kingdom: a recent study commissioned by the 
Home Office on the scale of several illegal markets revealed 
that the magnitude of sexual exploitation is probably 
around	130	million	GBP	(i.e.	151	million	euro)	(Mills,	Skodbo,	
&	Blyth,	2013).	Similar	figures	were	obtained	 in	a	previous	
study, which estimated sexual exploitation at around 277 
million	GBP	(corresponding	to	393	million	euro)	(Dubourg	
&	Prichard,	2008,	p.	18).	
•		 France:	 INHESJ	 -	 ONDRP	 (2012)	 reported	 that	 the	
revenues deriving from sexual exploitation in France were 
equal	to	around	3	billion	euro	per	year	(INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	
2012,	p.	227),	but	this	figure	is	not	explained	in	detail.
As regards other OCP countries, estimates are lacking, 
although	 studies	 on	 how	 the	 market	 works	 (and	 who	 the	
relevant actors are) exist.73
4.2.3. Actors
If	 detailed	 information	 on	 THB	 in	 Europe,	 and	 its	 financial	
magnitude, is rather limited, knowledge about the actors 
involved, and in particular the role played by OCGs, is even 
more sparse. As illustrated above, there are few studies on 
the share of the market attributable to OCGs. The literature 
confirms	that	loose criminal networks, hierarchical groups, 
smaller gangs and individual criminals are significant 
players in	 THB	 (Aronowitz,	 2009;	 UNODC,	 2010b,	 p.	 35;	
Vermeulen,	Van	Damme,	&	De	Bondt,	2010)	and	many	that	all	
of them were found to launder the money received from THB 
activities	 (UNODC,	 2010b,	 p.	 52;	 see	 also	 Part	 3).	 However,	
worldwide	 investigations	and	expert	 reports	 (OSCE,	2010,	p.	
22) show that THB is increasingly conducted by a number of 
73.	See	Lethi	&	Aromaa	(2002).
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loosely connected networks	of	“specialists,	all	playing	their	
own	particular	part	in	the	criminal	operation”	(UNODC,	2010b,	
p. 34). This appears to apply also to the European Union. There 
are	flexible	and	highly	organized	groups	able	to	operate	on	a	
large scale, and more informal groups with a smaller number 
of	members	(Aronowitz,	2009;	Vermeulen,	Van	Damme,	&	De	
Bondt, 2010). 
As	 reported	 by	 Europol,	 “in	 many	 MS,	 the	 criminal	 groups	
and networks involved in THB meet most of the EU criteria 
for defining them as organised crime (OC).	Although	there	
are some indications of hierarchically structured OC groups, 
human trafficking networks are more likely to be organised in 
small groups, operating both independently and in cooperation 
with	other	crime	groups”	(Europol,	2011b,	p.	6).
In terms of the main nationality and geographical provenance, 
according to Eurostat74	 (2013)	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 criminal	
actors involved seem to come from EU MS	 (i.e.	 76%	 of	 all	
convicted traffickers in 2010).75 However, the literature on 
THB also highlights the active role of foreign criminal groups 
(Savona	 et	 al.,	 2003;	 Abbatecola,	 2006;	 UNODC	 &	 SADC,	
2007;	Becucci	&	Garosi,	2008;	Picarelli,	2009).	
Criminal groups are often characterised by strong familial 
and/or ethnic bonds	 (Savona	 et	 al.,	 2003;	 Bosco,	 Di	
Cortemiglia,	&	Serojitdinov,	2009),	and	they	have	consolidated	
contacts	 in	 various	 countries	 (Europol,	 2011b).	 Despite	 the	
increasing	 inter-ethnicity	 of	 these	 groups	 (see	 3.2),	 multi-
ethnic groups in the EU THB market are more sporadic 
(OSCE,	 2010,	 p.	 46).	Also	 to	 be	 emphasised	 is	 that,	 in	most	
cases, these groups exploit persons of the same geographical 
origin or ethnicity.76
According to Europol, the main criminal groups active in THB 
in the European Union are Nigerian, Chinese and Eastern 
European OCGs: 
•		 Nigerian OCGs appear to be the groups most active in 
outdoor sexual exploitation in the European Union. They 
mainly exploit fellow countrywomen. Sex trafficking from 
Nigeria	to	EU	is	often	organised	and	managed	by	‘madams’,	
i.e. previously sexually exploited women who have become 
traffickers by attracting, hosting and subjugating young 
Nigerian	 women	 for	 prostitution	 purposes	 (OSCE,	 2010,	
p.	 45;	 Mancuso,	 2014b).	 According	 to	 investigative	 and	
research	 evidence	 (see,	 e.g.,	 operation	 Black Leaves, 
UNODC,	 2010b,	 p.	 54;	 Europol,	 2011b;	 Fondation	 Scelles,	
2012, p. 173), Italy and Spain represent for Nigerians 
the most important trafficking hubs. From Italy, most of 
the victims of Nigerian OCGs are trafficked to France, 
Netherlands and other countries in northern Europe, or 
they are moved to Turkish and Greek illegal sex markets 
(UNODC,	2010b,	p.	54).	
•		 Chinese OCGs: Chinese-speaking criminal groups 
(including	Chinese	Triads)	 are	 active	 in	THB	 in	 regard	 to	
both sexual and labour exploitation. Traditionally, forced 
labour takes place in textiles shops, restaurants and 
illegal clothing factories. However, Chinese OCGs are 
increasingly involved in trafficking for sexual exploitation 
in	 Europe	 (UNODC,	 2010b),	 so	 that	 in	 2008	 Chinese	
were	reported	to	be	“the	 largest	foreign	group	 involved	 in	
sexual	exploitation”	 (UNODC,	2010b,	p.	51).	The	preferred	
locations for sexual exploitation are massage parlours 
and other indoor places. LEA reports have revealed that 
Chinese OCGs often operate in connection with other 
South	Asian	groups,	particularly	in	Italy	and	the	UK	(e.g.	see	
the Qian Liu and Qian Ba Operations by the Italian Guardia 
di	Finanza,	Section	8.4).	
•		 Eastern European OCGs: Bulgarian-speaking criminal 
groups, with Albanian OCGs and other Balkan OCGs 
(UNODC,	 2010b,	 p.	 45),	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 among	 the	
most violent groups engaged in human trafficking activities 
(Europol,	2011b,	p.	11).	Romanian-speaking	OCGs	and	Roma	
criminal groups are often mentioned in regard to women 
sexual	 exploitation	 (both	 indoor	 and	 outdoor),	 but	 also	
forced labour. Exploitation of Roma children by Romanian 
OCGs	 (and	 in	 some	 cases	 by	 Bulgarian	 and	 Albanian	
OCGs) is a crime widespread throughout the European 
Union. In the UK, between 2005 and 2008, Roma children 
were forced to commit petty crimes or to beg regularly in 
the	 streets	 (UNODC,	 2010a).	 Interestingly,	 many	 of	 the	
people arrested were accused of money laundering. 
Other most frequently reported organised groups in Europe 
are Albanian-speaking OCGs, Russian OCGs, Hungarian 
OCGs and Turkish	groups	(Europol,	2011b,	p.	11).	For	a	more	
complete review of the groups involved, see Table 22.
74 Data on people suspected, prosecuted and convicted for human trafficking 
between	2008	and	2010	(Eurostat,	2013).
75. However, it must be borne in mind that, in many cases, it is very difficult 
to identify and convict criminals coming from Africa and extra-EU countries 
because cooperation among the countries may be lacking and because of the 
difficulties in obtaining the extradition of these people.
76.	One	of	the	most	recent	study	on	THB	(UNODC,	2012b)	reveals	that	63.6%	of	
victims exploited in Europe have European origins. Victims from Africa are the 
second	most	exploited	group	(17.6%),	with	a	prevalence	of	abused	people	coming	
from	West	Africa	 (mainly	Nigeria)	 (UNODC,	2012b,	 p.	 58).	Among	EU-citizens	
victims,	40.1%	are	exploited	domestically	(i.e.	in	their	country	of	residence),	and	
59.9% are victims of cross-border exploitation within the EU area. Eurostat data 
reveal	that,	in	2013,	more	than	68%	of	identified	and	presumed	THB	victims	were	
adult women, whereas the male and female children detected as exploited in the 
EU	represented	15%	of	total	abused	persons	(Eurostat,	2013,	p.	34).
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OCG European Countries Sources
African OCGs
Austria, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, UK
BKA,	2008,	2009,	2010,	2012;	Dutch	National	Rapporteur	
on	Trafficking	in	Human	Beings,	2010;	OSCE,	2010;	Europol,	
2011b;	DIA,	2012a,	2013b;	FEDPOL,	2013
Albanian OCGs France, Italy, UK
INHESJ	–	ONDRP,	2010;	OSCE,	2010;	DIA,	2010a,	2010b,	
2011a,	2011b,	2012a;	2012b;	DNA,	2011,	2012
Balkan OCGs
France, Greece, Italy, UK, 
Switzerland
INHESJ	–	ONDRP,	2010;	OSCE,	2010;	UNODC,	2010b;	DNA,	
2010,	2012;	FEDPOL,	2012,	2013
Bulgarian OCGs
Austria, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, 
Spain
An	Garda	Síochána	&	Department	of	Justice,	Equality	and	
Law	Reform,	2006;	BKA,	2006,	2008;	OSCE,	2010;	DIA,	
2010b,	2011a;	Europol,	2011b;	DNA,	2012;	CSD,	2012,	Fiscalía	
General del Estado, 2013
Chinese OCGs
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, UK
An	Garda	Síochána	&	Department	of	Justice,	Equality	and	
Law	Reform,	2006;	Ward	&	Wylie,	2007;	INHES	-	OND,	2009;	
INHESJ	–	ONDRP,	2010;	Lebov,	2010;	OSCE,	2010;	DNA,	2010,	
2012
Other Asian OCGs Germany, Italy, UK OSCE,	2010;	DIA,	2012a;	DNA,	2010,	2011,	2012
Other Eastern 
European OCGs
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Poland, UK
Viuhko	&	Jokinen,	2009;	OSCE,	2010;	UNODC,	2010b;	BKA,	
2010,	2011,	2012;	Jokinen,	Ollus,	&	Aromaa,	2011;	An	Garda	
Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a;	INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012;	DIA,	2012a,	
2012b;	OSAC,	2014b
Romanian OCGs
Austria, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland,	Italy,	UK,	Spain,	Switzerland
OSCE,	2010;	Passi,	2011;	DIA,	2012a,	2013a;	DNA,	2010,	2012;	
FEDPOL,	2012;	INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012;	Fiscalía	General	del	
Estado, 2013
Russian/Georgian	
OCGs
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Poland
Viuhko	&	Jokinen,	2009;	UNODC,	2010a;	BKA,	2010,	2011,	
2012;	Cheloukhine	&	Haberfeld,	2011;	Kegö	&	Molcean,	2011;	
DNA,	2011,	2012;	Iadeluca,	2012
Turkish OCGs Belgium, Germany, Netherlands
BKA,	2009,	2010,	2011,	2012;	OSCE,	2010;	Dutch	National	
Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings, 2010
Table 22 - Main OCGs involved in THB across Europe
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4.3.1. Introduction
According to the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing 
of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components 
and Ammunition,	 “Illicit trafficking in firearms shall mean 
the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement 
or	 transfer	 of	 firearms,	 their	 parts	 and	 components	 and	
ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party 
to that of another State Party if any one of the States Parties 
concerned	does	not	authorize	it	in	accordance	with	the	terms	
of	this	Protocol	or	if	the	firearms	are	not	marked	in	accordance	
with	article	8	of	this	Protocol”	(UN,	2001,	p.	3).
Although modest in terms of both the size and the number 
of criminal groups	 involved	 at	 EU	 level	 (Europol,	 2013a,	 p.	
31), especially if compared with other illegal markets, illicit 
trafficking	in	firearms	(ITF)	nevertheless	represents	a	crucial	
illicit activity for OCGs. 
Weapons	are	 not	 only	 a	 source	of	 profit	 for	OCGs;	 they	 are	
also essential assets for criminal activities: for example, to 
intimidate victims of sexual exploitation, or to protect the 
trafficking	of	other	illicit	goods	(e.g.	during	the	transport	of	illicit	
drugs	(DG	Home	Affairs,	2013)).	Consequently,	the	purchase	
of	 illicit	 firearms	 can	 be	 considered	 also	 an	 investment	 in	
criminal	equipment	(UNODC,	2012a).
Weapons and ammunitions are durable goods, easy to 
stock and conceal, and which can be used after decades 
if	 kept	 in	 good	 condition	 (Small	 Arms	 Survey,	 2007,	 p.	 43;	
UNODC, 2010a, p. 129). Their storage does not require any 
particular	effort,	nor	specific	trading	skills.	Low	market	entry	
and	 exit	 barriers,	 and	 low	 capital	 intensity	 make	 firearms	 a	
liquid asset easy to trade and ready to be converted into 
cash. These various drivers and opportunities, together with 
persistent demand by criminals and warlords in unstable world 
regions, make ITF an attractive business that may generate 
substantial	proceeds	to	be	reinvested	in	licit	and	(other)	illicit	
activities	(UNODC,	2011a).	
There is strong evidence that Europe is a strategic context 
for	 OCGs	 involved	 in	 the	 illicit	 trade	 of	 firearms	 (European	
Commission, 2013b). Firstly, Europe is an important trading 
marketplace and source area for arms trafficked abroad – 
e.g.	arms	from	new	EU	MS	such	as	Croatia	 (Antoliš,	2007,	p.	
81), and in some cases produced also in Western European 
countries	 (Davis,	 Hirst,	 &	 Mariani,	 2001,	 p.	 21–24;	 UNODC,	
2010a,	p.	 143;	Wezeman,	Wezeman,	&	Béraud-Sudreau,	2011,	
p. 36–37). It is a transit area,	because	these	firearms	are	re-
exported, in particular to regions engaged in armed conflicts, 
including neighbouring countries such as North Africa and 
Middle	 East	 (Davis,	 Hirst,	 &	 Mariani,	 2001;	 Antoliš,	 2007).	
But the European Union is also a fruitful destination area 
for arms imported from the Western Balkans and sold to the 
criminal	underworld	in	Europe	(Sagramoso,	2001;	KLPD-IPOL,	
2009, pp. 80–85).
4.3.2. Estimates of the illicit firearms 
market
The	 literature	agrees	 that	determining	 the	actual	 size	of	 the	
illicit	firearms	market	is	complicated	and	difficult	(Small	Arms	
Survey,	 2001;	 Spapens,	 2007),	 and	 it	 is	 even	 more	 difficult	
to determine the share of the market that can be attributed 
to OCGs. The present Section will illustrate that only few 
estimates exist, but they vary widely and are often based on 
unclear methodologies. 
At international level
Since the early 2000s, only a limited number of studies on 
the	 international	 spread	of	 illicit	 firearms	have	 attempted	 to	
assess the magnitude of this market at international level. 
The	 Small	 Arms	 Survey	 (2001)	 reported	 that	 the	worldwide	
ITF market amounted to 1 billion US dollars annually, but the 
estimation methodology used is unclear. UNODC indicated far 
lower	 figures,	 reporting	 that	 “illicit	 trading	 in	 firearms	 brings	
in	 around	 $170	 million	 to	 $320	 million	 annually”77	 (UNODC,	
2010a, p. 129), which would correspond to 10% and 20% 
respectively of the legitimate market. 
As	 regards	 worldwide	 cross-border	 financial	 flows	 linked	 to	
firearms	 trafficking,	 Baker	 (2005)	 produced	 an	 estimate	 of	
6-10 billion US dollars annually in 2005, of which developing 
countries accounted for 3-4 billion US dollars.78 A survey 
published	by	Haken	 (2011,	p.	25)	on	 the	proceeds	generated	
by transnational criminal groups in 12 criminal markets 
also	 included	 figures	 on	 illicit	 firearms	 trafficking	 proceeds.	
Exploiting information from Small Arms Survey and the 
UNODC,	Haken	assumed	“the	value	of	the	illicit	trade	of	SALW	
to	be	between	$	300	million	and	$	1	billion”,79 corresponding to 
0.1%	of	the	income	(650	billion	US	dollars)	generated	by	OCGs	
in all criminal markets.
At national level
Whilst few estimates exist at international level there are even 
fewer at the country one, and most of them focus on Italy. 
Calderoni	et	al.	 (2014b)	quantified	this	market	at	 Italian	 level	
as ranging between a minimum of 46.1 and a maximum 
of 140.9 million euro. These results updated the estimates 
previously	 presented	 in	 Transcrime	 (2013a,	 pp.	 306–307)	
with the same methodology. In particular, two estimation 
approaches	 were	 used	 in	 Transcrime	 (2013a):	 the	 first	
adopted a demand-side perspective, while the second 
used the standpoint of supply. The estimates run under the 
demand-side model revealed that the ITF market in Italy to 
yield between 74.4 and 148.8 million euro in 2010, this being 
4.3. Illicit trafficking in firearms                                                                                                                              
Diana Camerini (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
77.	 Equivalent	 to	 127.5	 and	240	million	 euro	 respectively	 using	 the	31/12/2010	
exchange	rate	(Source	ECB).
78.	 Equivalent	 to	 5.1	 and	 8.5	 billion	 euro	 respectively	 using	 the	 31/12/2005	
exchange	rate	(Source	ECB).
79.	 Equivalent	 to	 231	 and	 770	 million	 euro	 respectively	 using	 the	 31/12/2011	
exchange	rate	(Source	ECB).
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the result obtained as 10% and 20% respectively of the sum 
of import and export values plus the national production of 
legally traded small arms and ammunition. According to the 
supply-side	perspective,	which	started	from	data	on	seizures	
and	assumed	that	they	represent	8-10%	of	total	illicit	firearms	
actually traded in the country, the revenues generated in Italy 
amounted	to	46.7	million	euro	(Transcrime,	2013a).	
Previous	 research	 exploring	 the	 size	 of	 the	 firearms	market	
on	 Italy	was	 conducted	 by	 SOS	 Impresa	 (2010),	 but	 as	 also	
highlighted	by	UNODC	(2011a),	the	provided	figure	of	5.8	billion	
euro	 of	 income	 for	 organised	 crime	 in	 2009	 (equivalent	 to	
0.03% of Italian GDP for 2009) may have been overestimated.
New estimates
For	the	purpose	of	this	study,	an	assessment	of	the	size	of	the	
ITF was carried out as a percentage of the revenues of the legal 
firearms	market	for	the	European	Union	considered	as	a	whole.	
Adopting the same demand-side approach as proposed by 
Transcrime	 (2013a)	 and	 by	Calderoni	 et	 al.	 (2014b),	 the	 ITF	
market was estimated to range between 246.5 and 493.0 
million euro, corresponding respectively to 10% and 20% of 
the revenues obtained in 2012 by legal companies operating 
in	the	firearms industry. A full description on the methodology 
adopted, as well as sources and background data, is provided 
in the Methodological Annex.
4.3.3. Actors
The activities and the structure of organised crime groups 
engaged	 in	 firearms	 trafficking	 in	 Europe	 is	 still	 largely 
unexplored by the academic literature. Studies describing the 
role and modi operandi of actors involved in ITF across the EU 
are quite rare, because ITF is more crucial in unstable regions 
of Africa and other developing areas. However, detailed 
information on the logistics of ITF and on the structure of 
the supply (Antoliš,	 2007;	 Spapens,	 2007)	 is	 available	 and	
may aid understanding of the environment and the framework 
in which OCGs operate.
The structure of the ITF market and types of actors
As said above, not all forms of ITF necessarily require high 
levels of organisation.	Most	of	the	illicit	firearms	circulating	
in	Europe	seem	to	derive	 from	 licit	circuits	 (Spapens,	2007).	
Weapons and ammunition can be transferred to the illegal 
domain through on-paper fake exports, conversion of non-
lethal	firearms	or	reactivation	of	neutralized	weapons,	frauds	
committed by registered owners, or simply by theft from 
private	owners	or	official	dealers	(Stohl,	2004;	Spapens,	2007,	
p.	365).	Unauthorized	production	by	official	factories	and	illicit	
manufacturing	(also	by	means	of	3D	printing	technology)	are	
also used. 
Consequently, the ITF does not need to be undertaken 
exclusively within the permanent or long-term structure 
of an organised crime group	 (Shaw	 &	 Mangan,	 2014).	
Burglars	stealing	guns	from	legitimate	owners	(Stohl,	2004,	p.	
22) provide the best example of actors involved in ITF outside 
the	 domain	 of	 organised	 crime	 (Hales,	 Lewis,	 &	 Silverstone,	
2006).
For these reasons, the actors involved in the ITF can be 
divided	into	two	broad	categories.	The	first	consists	of	single 
individuals who operate mainly independently and conduct 
their business on a small scale by selling small quantities of 
weapons	or	ammunition	without	a	licence	(Braga	et	al.,	2002;	
Stohl,	2004).	Their	main	target	buyers	are	small	scale/street	
criminals. As in the case of retailers in the illicit drugs market 
(see	 Section	 4.1),	 it	 can	 be	 assumed	 that	 this	 small-scale 
ITF	 does	 not	 generate	 sufficient	 profits	 (exceeding	 living	
expenditures) to be laundered in the legitimate economy. 
Indeed,	the	“illegal	trade	of	firearms	is	not	very	profitable	itself”	
(KLPD-IPOL,	 2009)	 and,	 as	 frequently	 remarked,	 is	 often	 a	
secondary	source	of	profit	for	criminal	actors	(Europol,	2013a,	
p. 31).
The	 second	 category	 comprises	 actors	 (such	 as	 OCGs,	
terrorists, former military groups, arms brokers, and transfer 
intermediaries) who systematically or periodically move 
significant quantities of arms and ammunitions. The 
purpose of the trade may be military, political or also economic 
(i.e.	 the	 exchange	 of	 arms	 for	 other	 illicit	 goods).	 For	 these	
actors,	firearms	trafficking	can	be	a	strategic	activity	and	also	
a substantial source of income.
Organised crime groups involved in ITF
The literature reports a predominant role in the ITF by groups 
located in eastern European countries and the western 
Balkans,80	 which	 have	 accumulated	 significant	 surpluses	 in	
arms and ammunition since the Cold War and the conflicts 
that afflicted the Western Balkan regions during the 1990s 
(Soccoja,	2009;	Europol,	2013a).	
80.	In	particular,	UNODC	(2010a,	p.	141)	estimated	the	ITF	from	Eastern	European	
countries as amounting to at least 33 million US dollars between 2007 and 2008.
Type of firearms / Firearm parts Estimate (million euro) Min (million euro)a Max (million euro)b
Revolvers and pistols 73 49 98
Shotguns,	rifles,	carbines	and	muzzle-loaders 116 78 155
Cartridges and other ammunition, projectiles and parts 180 120 240
EU 27 370 247 493
a Estimate	of	the	ITF	market	equivalent	to	10%	of	the	legal	market	(EU	27).
b	Estimate	of	the	ITF	market	equivalent	to	20%	of	the	legal	market	(EU	27).
Table 23 - Estimates of the revenues on the ITF market in the European Union (EU 27) (2012)
Source: Transcrime elaborations based on Eurostat data 2012
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In particular, in the European Union the main OCGs active in 
this market are:
•		 Former Yugoslavian (mostly	Kosovar	and	Croatian) and 
Albanian OCGs, which are reported to be responsible 
for	 the	 supply	 of	 significant	 quantities	 of	 weapons	 and	
ammunition	 stockpiled	 in	 the	 Western	 Balkans	 (Antoliš, 
2007;	 Europol,	 2013a)	 and	 purchased	 by	 European-
based criminals. There is evidence that the destinations 
of	 firearms	 traded	 by	 these	 groups	 are	 the	 Netherlands	
(KLPD-IPOL,	2009),	France	(Davis,	Hirst,	&	Mariani,	2001;	
Arsovska	 &	 Kostakos,	 2008),	 and	 Italy.	 Italy	 is	 both	 a	
destination and transit country, where the ITF performed 
by	Balkan	groups	fulfils	the	demand	by	Italian	OCGs	(Small	
Arms	Survey,	2013);	at	the	same	time	firearms	may	be	re-
traded or shipped, through southern Italian ports, to south 
American	countries	(Antoliš, 2007) or to North Africa.
•		 “(Italian) mafias have generally relied on the availability of 
weapons”	(Small	Arms	Survey,	2013,	p.	75),	exploiting	their	
connections with Albanian, Balkan and other groups based 
in	Eastern	European	countries	(Small	Arms	Survey,	2013),	
from	 which	 they	 often	 acquire	 firearms	 in	 exchange	 for	
other	 illicit	assets	 (typically	drugs).	As	said,	 Italian	mafias	
are	 both	 final	 users	 of	 illicit	 weapons	 and	 facilitators	 of	
ITF towards non-EU countries, since they are reported 
to re-trade weapons to other European countries, South 
America	 (Antoliš,	 2007,	 p.	 82),	 as	 well	 as	 Africa	 (Black,	
2009).	 ‘Ndrangheta	 members	 in	 particular	 have	 been	
found transferring weapons and ammunition from Europe 
to	 Canada	 (DNA,	 2008,	 p.	 131)	 and	 the	 USA	 (see	 the	
New Bridge Operation, 2014, conducted by the FBI and 
the	 Italian	 Police	 (The	 Associated	 Press,	 2011)).	 Intense	
firearms	 trafficking	 is	 conducted	 both	 nationally	 (mainly	
within	 the	 southern	 regions	 of	 Italy)	 (DNA,	 2006,	 2008)	
and between the two coasts of the Adriatic Sea, and it may 
also	be	connected	with	other	Italian	OCGs	(Davis,	Hirst,	&	
Mariani,	2001;	DNA,	2008).	
•		 Russian OCGs seem to exploit illicit drug and human 
trafficking routes through Poland and Ukraine to conduct 
illegal weapon transactions. Russians have been found 
to transfer illicit weapons and ammunition from Eastern 
European	 countries	 to	 Spain	 (Costa	 del	 Sol),	 where	 they	
conduct	 other	 illicit	 businesses	 (Davis,	 Hirst,	 &	 Mariani,	
2001;	Cheloukhine	&	Haberfeld,	2011).
•		 Turkish groups	 are	 engaged	 in	 firearms	 trafficking	 in	
Europe	(Europol,	2006)	as	wholesale	suppliers	of	weapons	
originating from unstable regions in the Middle East. 
Turkish	groups	operate	in	the	Netherlands	(Spapens,	2007;	
KLPD-IPOL, 2009), where they rank third in importance 
as	 firearms	 traffickers	 after	 Dutch	 criminals	 and	 other	
western	European	groups	(such	as	the	‘Ndrangheta).
•		 Outlaw motorcycle gangs are increasingly involved in 
the	 illicit	 firearms	 trade.	 Europol	 (2011a;	 2013a)	 reported	
that	such	gangs	engage	in	firearms	smuggling	from	South-
Eastern Europe to the Scandinavian countries. 
As	in	other	criminal	markets,	firearms	trafficking	in	Europe	is	
increasingly	characterized	by	groups of mixed ethnicity or 
nationality	(KLPD-IPOL,	2009),	which	facilitate	cross-border	
transfers	or	access	 to	other	 illicit	businesses	 (Davis,	Hirst,	&	
Mariani, 2001). 
OCGs European Countries Sources
Albanian OCGs
Albania, Greece, Italy, Bulgaria, 
Romania
Davis,	Hirst,	&	Mariani,	2001;	Rynn,	Gounev,	&	Jackson,	2005;	
DIA,	2006,	2012b,	2014;	Vreja,	2007;	Parente,	2010;	DNA,	2011,	
2012;	Europol,	2011a;	Iadeluca,	2012;	Small	Arms	Survey,	2013
Balkan OCGs
Croatia, Bulgaria, France, Italy, 
Romania, Netherlands, Greece, 
Serbia,	Spain,	Switzerland,	UK
Davis,	Hirst,	&	Mariani,	2001;	Rynn,	Gounev,	&	Jackson,	2005;	
Antoliš,	2007;	Vreja,	2007;	Weenink	&	Laan,	2007;	Arsovska	
&	Kostakos,	2008;	DNA,	2010;	Europol,	2011a;	Lavorgna,	
Lombardo,	&	Sergi,	2013
Other	Italian/Italian	not	
specified	OCGs
Croatia, Germany, Poland, Spain, 
Switzerland
BKA,	2006,	2012;	Antoliš,	2007;	Europol,	2011a;	FEDPOL,	2011,	
2013;	Transcrime,	2013a
IRA Ireland, UK Davis,	Hirst,	&	Mariani,	2001;	West	Sands	Advisory,	2012
Motorcycle gangs 
OCGs
UK, Scandinavian countries Europol,	2011a,	2013a;	Passi,	Vähäsarja,	&	Pelli,	2013
'Ndrangheta
Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, 
Switzerland
Parente,	2010;	DNA,	2010,	2011,	2012;	DIA,	2011b,	2012b,	2013a,	
2013b;	KLPD-DNR,	2011;	FEDPOL,	2013;	Small	Arms	Survey,	
2013;	Transcrime,	2013a
Russian/Georgian	
OCGs
Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, 
Georgia, Greece
Davis,	Hirst,	&	Mariani,	2001;	Baker,	2005;	Arasli,	2007;	
Busuncian,	2007;	Traughber,	2007;	Vreja,	2007;	Cheloukhine	
&	Haberfeld,	2011;	DNA,	2011,	2012;	Iadeluca,	2012;	Lavorgna,	
Lombardo,	&	Sergi,	2013
Turkish OCGs
Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, Romania, 
Netherlands
Rynn,	Gounev,	&	Jackson,	2005;	Vreja,	2007;	KLPD-IPOL,	
2009;	BKA,	2012;	Lavorgna,	Lombardo,	&	Sergi,	2013
Table 24 - Main OCGs active in the ITF across Europe
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4.4.1. Introduction
The	illicit	trade	 in	tobacco	products	 is	defined	by	Article	1	of	
the	World	Health	Organization	(WHO)	Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control (FCTC)	 as	 “any	 practice or conduct 
prohibited by law and which relates to tobacco production, 
shipment, receipt, possession, distribution, sale or 
purchase, including any practice or conduct intended to 
facilitate	such	activity”	(WHO,	2003).	
The illicit cigarette market yields remarkable criminal 
revenues in the European Union	 (see	 below).	 According	
to the literature, the trade is managed either by OCGs, small 
groups or independent criminal entrepreneurs. Given the 
plurality	of	actors	involved,	assessing	organised	crime’s	share	
of ITTP proceeds is difficult. 
In contrast to other illegal markets, which are engendered 
by morally induced prohibitions on goods and services, 
the cigarette black market handles a substantially legal 
commodity and promotes an activity – cigarette smoking – 
which	 is	 neither	 illegal	 nor	 even	deviant	 (von	Lampe,	 2002).	
Moreover, cigarettes are highly taxed, widely consumed, 
relatively easy to transport, and possess an attractive 
weight-to-value ratio	(Allen,	2011).
Some of their intrinsic features make cigarettes the most 
illegally trafficked goods in the world. 
•		 First,	 taxes	 account	 for	 a	 large	 share	 of	 cigarettes’	 final	
retail	 prices	 (Merriman,	 Yurekli,	 &	 Chaloupka,	 2000).	
In	 2013,	 an	 average	 of	 80.1%	 of	 the	 final	 retail	 price	 of	
cigarettes81 in the EU consisted of taxes, from a minimum 
of 69.3% in Luxembourg to a maximum of 87.5% in Greece 
(European	Commission,	 2013d).	Owing	 to	high taxation, 
illicit tobacco has particular appeal for potential smugglers 
because	they	can	make	large	profits	by	diverting	tobacco	
products into the illicit market, where sales are largely tax 
free	(Joossens	&	Raw,	2012,	p.	232).	
•		 Secondly,	cigarettes	are	widely	consumed	in	the	EU.	In	2012,	
an average 28% of Europeans smoked, with differences 
among Member States, from a minimum of 13% in Sweden, 
to	a	maximum	of	40%	in	Greece	(Eurobarometer,	2012b).	
Since 2009, smoking prevalence has remained relatively 
stable despite consecutive cigarette price increases. This 
shows that, due to its addictive nature, the demand for 
tobacco is inelastic and not particularly sensitive to price 
changes	(Perucic,	2012).	
•		 Thirdly,	illicit	tobacco	trade	is	a	high-profit and relatively 
low-risk activity. In particular, Western Europe has 
the highest cigarette prices in the world and offers 
large	 incentives	 to	 tobacco	 smugglers	 (Euromonitor	
International, 2013a). Moreover, the sanctions imposed on 
tobacco smugglers by the EU Member States are relatively 
mild	 and	 differ	 among	 countries	 (European	Commission,	
2013c, p. 13). Differing sanctions provide an opportunity 
for smugglers to choose their entry points into the EU 
according	to	where	the	lowest	sanctions	apply	(European	
Commission, 2013c, p. 13). 
•		 Other	 exogenous	 conditions	 facilitate	 the	 supply	 of	 illicit	
tobacco products. The presence of informal distribution 
networks, corruption, organised crime, widespread 
street-selling, as well as public tolerance of the ITTP, can 
influence the ITTP to a greater extent than cigarette prices 
and	taxation	(Joossens	et	al.,	2000;	Joossens	et	al.,	2009).	
Other ITTP facilitators are geographical proximity to 
countries with cheaper cigarettes, the presence of Transit 
Trade Regimes that allow the suspension of customs 
duties, excise taxes, VAT on goods destined for third 
countries, and the misconduct of tobacco manufacturers 
(Joossens	et	al.,	2000;	Lakhdar,	2008;	OCCRP,	2011).
The supply of illicit tobacco meets demand when its price is 
significantly	lower	than	the	legal	one.	Indeed,	price	is	the	main	
factor in determining the consumption of illicit tobacco. Illicit 
cigarettes cost on average between 25% and 90% less than 
legal	 cigarettes	 (Joossens	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Moreover,	 smokers	
in low socio-economic circumstances are more likely to 
consume	 illicit	 tobacco,	 according	 to	 the	 literature	 (NEMS	
Market	 Research,	 2009;	 Siggens,	 Murray,	 &	 Walters,	 2010;	
Joossens et al., 2012). 
ITTP definitions and classification
The ITTP is a multifaceted phenomenon comprising 
diverse activities. The main categories are tobacco 
smuggling, which includes small-scale and large-scale 
cigarette smuggling, illicit tobacco manufacturing, 
which includes the counterfeiting of legal brands, and the 
distribution of illicit whites, cigarettes legally produced in 
one country but intended for smuggling into countries where 
there	is	no	prior	legal	market	for	them	(Allen,	2011).
•		 Small-scale smuggling comprises ant-smuggling and 
bootlegging. Ant smuggling is the border crossing by 
single individuals purchasing cigarettes within the legally 
allowed quantities, but with the purpose of reselling 
them	 (Joossens	 et	 al.,	 2000,	 2009).	 Bootlegging is 
the purchase, by individuals or small groups, of small 
quantities of cigarettes in low tax jurisdictions with the aim 
of	making	extra	 income	 (Hornsby	&	Hobbs,	2007).	Given	
its small scale, bootlegging accounts for a small share 
of	 global	 illegal	 cigarette	 smuggling	 (Joossens,	 Naett,	 &	
Howie, 1992). Large-scale smuggling involves the illegal 
transportation, distribution and sale of large consignments 
of	 tobacco	 smuggled	 over	 long	 distances	 (Joossens	 et	
al., 2000, 2009). Large-scale smugglers generally divert 
tobacco from the legal supply chain or smuggle counterfeit 
products	 (Joossens	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 This	 type	 of	 smuggling	
requires a more complex organisation. Illicit manufacturing 
is the production of tobacco products contrary to law 
(Joossens	et	al.,	2009).	It	includes	tobacco	counterfeiting,	
and the production of cigarettes bearing false trademarks 
(Allen,	2011).	According	to	KPMG,	counterfeit	cigarettes	do	
not account for a large share of illicit cigarettes in Europe, 
around	5.8%	in	2013	(KPMG,	2014).
81.	 Average	 total	 tax	 as	 %	 of	 the	 WAP	 (Weighted	 Average	 Price)	 in	 28	 EU	
Member States.
4.4. lllicit trade in tobacco products                                                                                                                              
Monica Angelini and Francesco Calderoni (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
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•		 Illicit whites cigarettes are legally produced in one 
country and then exported to other countries where they 
do not have legitimate distribution. In 2013, they accounted 
for 33% of all illicit cigarettes consumed in the EU and were 
mainly	produced	in	Belarus	(KPMG,	2014).	The	proximity	of	
the	EU’s	eastern	border	to	non-EU	countries,	among	them	
Belarus, makes the area particularly suitable for tobacco 
smuggling	(Czyżowicz	&	Brodziński,	2013).
4.4.2. Estimates of the ITTP market 
Data availability
Several	attempts	have	been	made	to	estimate	the	size	of	the	
global	 illicit	 cigarette	market;	 and	according	 to	 the	data	and	
methodology used, either bottom-up or top-down estimates 
have been produced. Described below are the main data 
and	methodologies	used	to	assess	the	illicit	tobacco	market;	
further details on their possible limitations are provided in the 
Methodological Annex. 
•		 Cigarette exports minus cigarettes imports: one 
indication	of	the	size	of	the	ITTP	is	the	gap	between	official	
cigarette	exports	and	official	imports	(Merriman,	2002).	
•		 Customs seizures of tobacco: customs	 seizures,	
combined with other data, are used to produce ITTP 
estimates. The usual arithmetic is to multiply the 
total	 number	 of	 cigarettes	 seized	 by	 10	 (Euromonitor	
International, 2013a). 
•		 Surveys on tobacco users’ purchasing behaviours: 
these surveys collect self-reported data on illicit tobacco 
purchases, sources and prices. They can help assess the 
various forms of tax avoidance, such as cross-border 
shopping, direct purchases, and duty-free purchases 
(Joossens	et	al.,	2012).	
•		 Official cigarette sales minus reported consumption: 
with this method, the ITTP prevalence is calculated as 
the difference between registered cigarette sales and 
cigarettes	declared	as	being	smoked	(Lakhdar,	2008).	
•		 Empty Pack Surveys (EPSs): EPSs are an example 
of	 observational	 data	 collection	 (Joossens	 et	 al.,	 2012).	
Private	market	analysis	companies,	financed	by	 the	main	
tobacco manufacturers, periodically collect a sample of 
empty cigarette packs in a number of medium and large 
cities. The aim is to assess the share of domestic, non-
domestic and counterfeit packs in each of the markets 
surveyed	(KPMG,	2014).	
Country
Estimate #
(million euro)
Min (million euro)
Max (million 
euro)
Reference year Source
Ireland 156a 2010 IBEC, 2012
Italy
1,139 1,002 1,276 2012 Calderoni, 2014a
752 661 842 2011 Transcrime, 2013a
a Original	figure:	3	million	euro	per	week.
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 25 - Previous estimates of the revenues of the ITTP in OCP countries
Available estimates 
Several studies have estimated the size of the ITTP at 
global, continental and national level. The presence 
of a cigarette legal market, the impact of the ITTP on the 
effectiveness	 of	 tobacco	 control	 policies,	 and	 governments’	
financial	 losses	 due	 to	 cigarette	 tax	 evasion,	 are	 important	
factors	 in	 estimating	 the	 illicit	 cigarette	market	 (Transcrime,	
2013a, p. 340).
Measuring the illicit tobacco trade is methodologically 
challenging.	 Illegal	 traders	 are	 unlikely	 to	 keep	 records;	
data	on	illicit	trade	are	usually	difficult	to	collect;	estimations	
of illicit trade have limitations because they do not clearly 
describe	 their	 methodology;	 and	 the	 data	 source	 may	
bias	 the	 estimate	 (Joossens	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Moreover,	 the	
agendas of the estimators may influence the ITTP estimation 
process.	 Tobacco	 manufacturers	 may	 prefer	 high	 figures	
to	 attract	more	 attention	 by	 the	 law	 enforcement	 agencies;	
policy-makers	may	prefer	 lower	figures	 in	order	not	 to	 raise	
inefficiency	or	corruption	issues;	and	tobacco	control	activists	
may	prefer	either	higher	figures,	 for	example	 to	highlight	 the	
manufacturers’	role	in	the	ITTP,	or	lower	ones,	for	example	to	
minimise the unwanted effects of tobacco control measures 
(Calderoni,	2014a).	
Despite the abundance of estimates, there is no general 
consensus on the methodology to use, and many existing 
studies are based on various sources collected at irregular 
intervals	(Calderoni,	2014a).	For	this	reason,	a	combination	of	
methods and sources, including informed expert judgement, 
is	often	necessary	to	validate	ITTP	estimates	(Joossens	et	al.,	
2009). 
Estimates of the size of the ITTP at European level
•		 Joossens	 and	 colleagues	 estimated	 that	 58	 billion	
cigarettes in the EU in 2007 were illicit, around 8.5% of the 
European	market	(Joossens	et	al.,	2009).
•		 According	 to	 Euromonitor	 International	 (EMI),82 the total 
number of illicit cigarettes ranges between 67.3 billion 
cigarettes	 in	 2007	 (8.8%	 of	 total	 consumption)	 and	 77.3	
billion	 in	 2012	 (12.2%	 of	 total	 consumption)	 (Euromonitor	
International, 2013b).
82. EMI, a private company providing yearly estimates in 80 countries worldwide, 
publishes	periodic	 reports	on	 the	global	 (and	regional)	 illicit	 tobacco	markets,	
estimating	their	size,	revenues	and	related	tax	losses	(Euromonitor	International,	
2013a). Some authors argue that the methodology used is not detailed and 
challenge	 the	 reliability	 of	 its	 estimates	 (Blecher,	 2010;	 Blecher	 et	 al.,	 2013).	
However, EMI is the only source providing yearly global estimates of the ITTP 
(Calderoni,	2014a).	
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•		 According	to	KPMG	Project	Sun,	the	total	amount	of	 illicit	
cigarettes in the EU ranges from a minimum of 56.8 billion 
cigarettes in 2006 to a maximum of 65.7 billion cigarettes in 
2012. In 2013, the total amount of illicit cigarettes decreased 
to 58.6 billion, corresponding to 10.5 % of total consumption 
in	Europe	(KPMG,	2014).83
Estimates of the proceeds of the ITTP 
While several studies have attempted to measure the ITTP in 
terms of volumes of illicit cigarettes and in terms of penetration 
of the tobacco market, few studies have estimated the 
proceeds of tobacco smugglers in EU countries. According 
to the literature on OCP countries, previous estimates of ITTP 
proceeds are available for Ireland and Italy. In Ireland, in 2010, 
tobacco smugglers earned up to 3 million euro per week from 
tobacco	smuggling	(approximately	156	million	euro	per	year).	
However,	no	clear	details	on	how	this	figure	was	calculated	are	
available. In Italy, the proceeds of the ITTP oscillated between 
661.4 and 841.8 million euro in 2011, and between 1.0 and 1.3 
billion	euro	 in	2012	 (see	Table	25).	HM	Revenue	&	Customs,	
the British tax agency, annually estimates the market share of 
illicit tobacco out of total consumption, as well as the tax gap 
caused	by	 tobacco	 tax	evasion.	 In	fiscal	year	2012-2013,	 the	
tax	evasion	in	the	UK	was	1.1	billion	GB	pound	(1.3	million	euro)	
(HMRC,	2014).
In an attempt to produce comparable estimates across 
countries, for the purpose of the OCP project, a new 
estimate – building on KPMG data on illicit cigarettes, EMI 
data on cigarettes legal prices, and the methodology adopted 
by	 Transcrime	 (2015)	 –	 was	 produced	 for	 each	 of	 the	 7	
OCP countries and the other EU MS in order to assess the 
proceeds of the illicit cigarette market in 2013.
The KPMG Project Sun does not provide estimates of the 
revenues	 and	 profits	 of	 the	 tobacco	 illicit	 market.	 However,	
because the ITTP is estimated at country level, KPMG is a good 
starting point for estimates of ITTP proceeds at continental 
and	national	level	(Transcrime,	2013a).
The estimation reported here assumed that the price of an 
equivalent 20-cigarette pack in the illegal market is 66% of 
the price of a legal pack in any of the 28 EU countries. This 
assumption stemmed from the methodology adopted by 
Joossens	and	colleagues	in	2009	(Joossens	et	al.,	2009,	p.	7).	
However, unlike that study, which calculated illicit prices as a 
fraction of the Marlboro price and may have over-estimated 
illicit prices and proceeds, the OCP approach calculated 
two illicit prices, one as a fraction of the Marlboro brand, and 
one as a fraction of the cheapest brand sold in the country. 
Depending on the price used, a minimum estimate and a 
maximum estimate of the ITTP proceeds were produced. 
The results are presented in Table 26.
According to this approach, in 2013, the criminal proceeds of 
the ITTP in the 7 OCP countries ranged between 4.8 and 5.6 
billion euro. 
Considering	 the	 whole	 EU	 28,	 the	 figure	 ranged	 between	
8.4 and 10.3 billion euro. OCP countries are important in the 
European ITTP panorama: indeed, one fourth of EU countries 
(7	 OCP	 countries)	 account	 for	 more	 than	 half	 of	 European	
ITTP proceeds. 
Country
Estimate 
(million euro)
Min (million 
euro)
Max(million 
euro)
Austria 133 118 147
Belgium 130 117 142
Bulgaria 195 173 216
Croatia 23 17 28
Cyprus 9 7 10
Czech	
Republic
42 35 49
Denmark 40 36 44
Estonia 33 28 38
Finland 146 133 159
France 2,083 2,004 2,163
Germany 1,805 1,567 2,042
Greece 455 416 494
Hungary 73 63 83
Ireland 277 255 299
Italy 546 485 607
Latvia 61 51 71
Lithuania 80 69 91
Luxembourg 3 3 2
Malta 9 8 10
Netherlands 249 225 272
Poland 601 534 667
Portugal 25 23 27
Romania 251 207 296
Slovakia 12 10 13
Slovenia 24 22 27
Spain 635 577 694
Sweden 132 114 150
United 
Kingdom
1,304 1,154 1,453
Total OCP 
Countries
5,240 4,833 5,647
Total EU 28 9,373 8,452 10,294
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Philip Morris International and KPMG data
Table 26 - Estimates of the revenues of the ITTP market 
(EU 28) (2013)
83. Since 2006, KPMG Project Sun, previously called Project Star, provides 
ITTP estimates at the national level for EU Member States. It is an example of 
combination	of	methodologies	(Allen,	2011)	and	is	based	on	data	on	legal	sales,	
consumer	surveys	and	empty	packs	surveys	(EPSs)	(KPMG,	2014,	p.	313).	
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of	tobacco	transport	and	distribution	(Joossens	et	al.,	2000).	
Small-scale smuggling, on the other hand, does not require 
such a degree of organisation, and it is instead carried out by 
single individuals or small gangs that purchase cigarettes 
in relatively smaller quantities and use less sophisticated 
methods	(FATF,	2012b).	
According to various sources, stable and organised criminal 
groups,	such	as	the	 Italian	mafia-type	organisations,	Eastern	
European or Asian criminal organisations, are involved in 
different	 phases	 of	 the	 illicit	 tobacco	 trade	 (van	 Duyne,	
von	 Lampe,	 &	 Passas,	 2002;	 von	 Lampe,	 2005;	 Kegö,	
Leijonmarck,	 &	 Molcean,	 2011).	 However,	 according	 to	 a	
study carried out in 2014 on the Italian ITTP, the presence of 
mafia-type	 organisations	 is	 an	 important	 driver	 of	 the	 ITTP,	
although it is not the main one. Indeed, the prevalence of the 
illicit tobacco trade may be as high or even higher also in Italian 
regions	with	a	very	low	presence	of	mafias	(Calderoni,	2014a).	
The literature agrees that those involved in the illicit tobacco 
trade are mainly small groups or independent criminal 
entrepreneurs	 (van	 Duyne,	 2003;	 von	 Lampe,	 2006,	 2011;	
Hornsby	&	Hobbs,	2007;	Calderoni,	2014a).	
Other sources have repeatedly reported the involvement of 
tobacco manufacturers in tobacco smuggling. It has been 
argued	 that	 a	 cigarette	 black	 market	 of	 any	 significance	 is	
intrinsically linked to large-scale smuggling, and that large-
scale smuggling would not be possible without the tacit 
connivance of cigarette manufacturers	 (Dantinne,	 2001;	
Joossens	 &	 Raw,	 2002).	 In	 many	 countries,	 governments	
have	 taken	 legal	action	over	 the	fiscal	 losses	caused	by	 the	
industry’s	involvement	in	tax	evasion	and	smuggling	schemes	
by	 exploiting	 transit	 trade	 regimes	 (Beelman	 et	 al.,	 2000;	
Calderoni, 2014a). Moreover, in early 2000s, the European 
Commission	 filed	 a	 civil	 action	 against	 three	major	 tobacco	
manufacturers: Philip Morris International, RJ Reynolds, 
and	 Japan	 Tobacco	 International	 (Framework	 Convention	
Alliance, 2008).85 Increasing pressure on the tobacco industry 
resulted in stricter controls on its supply chain, the 
implementation of tracking and tracing measures, and the 
signature of cooperation agreements among the four major 
tobacco	 manufacturers	 (Philip	 Morris	 International-PMI,	
Japan Tobacco International-JTI, British American Tobacco-
BAT, Imperial Tobacco Limited-ITL) and the European Anti-
Fraud	Office	(OLAF)	(Joossens,	Ross,	&	Stokłosa,	2014).86
Finally, some sources report the involvement of terrorist 
groups in the illicit tobacco trade. According to these sources, 
terrorist groups exploit the cigarette trade to generate 
financial	 support	 for	 their	 terrorist	 actions	 (Coker,	 2003;	
Shelley	&	Melzer,	2008).	However,	some	scholars	have	argued	
that	 the	 involvement	 of	 terrorists	 in	 the	 ITTP	 is	 rare	 (Shen,	
Antonopoulos,	&	von	Lampe,	2010;	von	Lampe,	2011).	
84. The classes with absolute value were calculated on the basis of the following 
classification:	 Very	 Low	 as	 <	 -0.5	 standard	 deviations	 from	 the	 average;	 Low	
as	between	-0.5	and	0.5	standard	deviations;	Medium	as	between	0.5	and	 1.5	
standard deviations and High as > 1.5 standard deviations. Regarding the % 
of	 GDP	 (2013,	 retrieved	 from	 Eurostat),	 the	 classes	 are	 divided	 according	 to	
percentiles:	Very	Low	<	25%;	Low	between	25	and	50%;	Medium	between	50	
and 75% and High > 75%.
85.	 In	 November	 2000	 in	 New	 York,	 the	 European	 Commission	 filed	 a	 civil	
action against Philip Morris International, RJ Reynolds, and Japan Tobacco 
International	accusing	the	companies	of	“an	ongoing	global	scheme	to	smuggle	
cigarettes, launder the proceeds of narcotics trafficking, obstruct government 
oversight	of	 the	 tobacco	 industry,	 fix	prices,	bribe	 foreign	public	officials,	 and	
conduct	 illegal	 trade	 with	 terrorist	 groups	 and	 state	 sponsors	 of	 terrorism”	
(Framework	Convention	Alliance,	2008).
86. In 2004, the EU and Member States dropped the case against Phillip Morris 
International in return for a legally binding agreement. PMI agreed to pay the EC 
1 billion US dollars over 12 years. In December 2007, JTI, having acquired RJ 
Reynolds, agreed to the payment of 400 million USD over 15 years. In July 2010, 
BAT agreed to pay 200 million USD over 20 years, and ITL, in September 2010, 
agreed to pay 300 million USD over 20 years. In addition, the four manufacturers 
agreed	 to	make	additional	 payments	 if	 authorities	 seize	 their	 genuine	brands	
diverted	from	the	legal	supply	chain	(Framework	Convention	Alliance,	2008).	
Figure 14 - Scale of ITTP market in EU-28 MS. Absolute 
values (above) and percentages of GDP (below)84
Revenues - Mn euro
< 101
101 - 600
601 - 1,150
> 1,150
Not available
% of  GDP 2010
< 0.05 %
0.05 - 0.07 %
0.08 - 0.17 %
> 0.17 %
Not available
Source: Transcrime elaboration on estimates reported in Table 26 and Eurostat 
data
4.4.3. Actors 
The actors involved in tobacco smuggling vary according 
to the modi operandi used. Indeed, the sophistication 
and	complexity	of	organisations	depends	upon	the	size	and	
ambitions of the groups involved in the smuggling of tobacco 
(FATF,	2012b).	
In	particular,	the	potential	profits	associated	with	large-scale	
smuggling create incentives for the participation of organised 
crime networks, which adapt rapidly to smuggling counter-
measures, and are flexible in their use of different methods 
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Country Nationality 1 Nationality 2 Nationality 3 Source (1;2;3) OCGs Source
Finland Latvian Russian Finnish Transcrime, 2015 - -
France Romanian French - Transcrime, 2015 - -
Ireland Irish Lithuanian British Transcrime, 2015
Irish criminal 
gangs
Gilsenan	&	Brophy,	
2013
-Chinese groups
-Eastern 
European groups
IBEC, 2012
-IRA Kaplan, 2009
Italy Italian Ukrainian Tunisian Transcrime, 2015
-Camorra
-Sacra Corona 
Unita
The European House 
Ambrosetti, 2011
-Chinese criminal 
organisations
-Romanian 
organised crime
DIA,	2010a,	2010b;	
The European House 
Ambrosetti, 2011
-Eastern 
European groups DNA, 2010, 2011, 
2012;	Virgilio,	2013
‘Ndrangheta GdF, 2010
Russian, Slavic, 
Ukrainian, 
Lithuanian, 
Bulgarian, 
Moldovan groups
DNA, 2010, 2011, 
2012;	Virgilio,	2013
Spain Spanish Polish Chinese Transcrime, 2015
-Romanian, 
British, Bulgarian 
and French 
criminal 
organisations
Baquero, 2013
- British criminal 
organisations
Lalam et al., 2012
- Asian groups
-Spanish criminal 
groups
AEAT, 2014
-Galician criminal 
groups
Europa Press, 2013
-IRA Páramo,	2013
Netherlands Dutch
Middle 
Eastern
Polish
Van Duyne et al., 
2007
- -
United 
Kingdom
British Polish Irish Transcrime, 2015
Chinese, Eastern 
European groups
O’Reilly,	2012
Table 27 - Main actors of the ITTP in the 7 OCP countries
According	to	a	study	by	Transcrime	(2015),	the	majority	of	the	
ITTP actors involved in tobacco smuggling activities in the 
EU are Eastern Europeans	 (50%),	 mainly	 from	 Romania, 
Lithuania and Poland,	and	extra-EU	Europeans	(25%),	mainly	
from Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. 
As far as OCP countries are concerned, Table 27 synthesises 
the three most prevalent nationalities of smugglers in each 
country. However, because the analysis is focused on law 
enforcement information concerning the actors reported 
during	 tobacco	 seizures,	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 determine	
whether they are individual smugglers or members of 
larger organised crime networks. According to the available 
literature, there is evidence of the presence of organised 
criminal groups in four out of seven OCP countries: Ireland, 
Italy,	Spain,	UK	(see	Table	27).
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4.5.1. Introduction
Counterfeiting87 is one of the largest, most lucrative and 
attractive businesses for organised crime groups. Also 
UNODC	comments	that	“as	a	global,	multibillion	dollar	crime,	
organised criminal groups have not hesitated to cash in on the 
trade	in	counterfeit	goods”	(UNODC,	2014a,	p.	2).	
The	main	reason	for	counterfeiting’s	attractiveness	is	its	low-
risk/high-profit nature	(OECD,	2008;	UNICRI	&	ICC	BASCAP,	
2013).	 Low	 risk	 is	 first	 of	 all	 associated	 with	 globalisation:	
intensification	 of	 international	 trade	 and	 delocalisation	 of	
production have complicated the full traceability of goods, 
thus making the detection of counterfeit goods extremely 
difficult	 (UNICRI,	2007;	UNODC,	2010a).	Secondly,	 Internet-
based commerce has facilitated the uncontrolled promotion 
and spread of imitations around the globe. Moreover, if 
counterfeiting is compared to other illicit crimes, lower risks 
result from the milder legal and social penalties associated 
with it. Indeed, counterfeiting is socially more tolerated than 
other crimes because buying a fake product does not create 
in many consumers a sense of having supported criminal 
activities	(UNICRI,	2007).88
Counterfeiting’s	high	profitability	can	be	associated	with	 the	
high demand for counterfeit products	(see	below)	and	very	
low production and distribution costs. OCGs can save money 
by exploiting forced labour and using the same logistics, 
storage and transportation means to move counterfeit 
products	together	with	other	illicit	commodities	(UNICRI,	2007,	
p. 109). Moreover, counterfeiting seems to facilitate money 
laundering	 (UNICRI,	2007;	Hoorens	et	al.,	2012).	As	 reported	
in Part 2, the preferred business sectors for investments by 
the main OCGs involved in counterfeiting are the wholesale 
and retail trade of clothing, clothing accessories, car parts 
and food products, because legal shops serve both to launder 
illegal proceeds and to sell imitations on the legal market 
together with genuine products.
Owing to the high degree of organisation required by the 
supply chain of counterfeit items, as well as the large amount 
of initial capital to be invested in manufacturing capability 
(UNICRI,	2007),	criminals	involved	in	this	market	often	operate	
as members of an OCG	 (UNODC,	 2010a).	 However,	 “not	 all	
acts of counterfeiting are unequivocally ascribable to large 
criminal	organizations”	 (UNICRI,	2007,	p.	 103).	Small groups 
of criminals, usually involved in other illicit activities, seem 
to	play	a	significant	role	 in	the	“final	endpoint	distribution”	of	
knockoffs	on	the	retail	market	(UNICRI,	2007,	p.	110).	
The European Union is believed to be one of the most 
lucrative destination areas for imitations, with most of 
them	 originating	 from	 East	 Asia	 (UNODC,	 2010a).	 However,	
Europe is also an important production, transit and sale area 
of	counterfeit	products	(UNICRI,	2007,	p.	112;	Europol,	2013a,	
p. 22). As described in more detail below, criminal groups in 
Italy, Spain and Portugal have established important local 
production	 centres,	 often	 specializing	 in	 specific	 sectors	 or	
supply	phases	of	product	counterfeiting	(see	Section	5.4.2.5).
4.5.2. Estimates of the revenues from 
counterfeiting 
Despite general agreement on the importance of the 
counterfeiting market, estimates of its monetary size are 
scarce and often non-comparable. Firstly, they vary in terms of 
methodology: some adopt a consumer approach, with surveys 
seeking	to	quantify	consumers’	expenditure	on	fake	products;	
others use a supply-based	approach,	estimating	the	size	of	the	
counterfeiting	market	as	a	share	of	legitimate	production;	and	
yet others adopt enforcement-based	 approaches	 (Hoorens	
et	 al.,	 2012)	 using	 mainly	 data	 from	 seizures.	 The	 available	
studies also differ by geographical scope - some provide 
global estimates, others national ones - and by the product 
categories included in the estimations. 
The two most important studies on global counterfeit trade 
have been carried out by:
•		 OECD (2008), which estimated the worldwide 
international	 trade	 in	 counterfeit	 tangible	 products	 (with	
pirated products excluded) to have reached 200 billion US 
dollars89	in	2005	(OECD,	2008,	p.	15).90 Applying the same 
methodology to 2007 data, in 2009 OECD updated this 
estimate to 250 billion US dollars. 91
•		 Frontier Economics and BASCAP, which adopted 
the same methodology as OECD but extended the 
computations to include non-tangible pirated products 
and products domestically produced and consumed. 
According to this exercise, the world counterfeit market 
ranges between 455 and 650 billion US dollars92	(Frontier	
Economics, 2011).
87.	Various	definitions	of	counterfeiting	can	be	found	in	the	literature	(for	a	review	
see Transcrime, 2010, p. 6-10). For the purpose of this report, counterfeiting 
is	 understood	 in	 its	 broadest	 sense	 as	 “infringement	 of	 intellectual	 property	
rights of any kind, including trademarks, patents, industrial designs, copyrights 
and	 related	 rights”	 (Transcrime,	 2010,	 p.	 6).	 The	 usual	 distinction	 between	
counterfeiting and piracy is not taken into account here.
88. According to many researchers, consumers are often unaware of the 
damage caused by counterfeiting in terms of its negative impact on the legal 
market,	the	state	budget	and	consumers’	health	and	safety	(IACC,	2005;	OECD,	
2008,	p.	133–170;	UNODC,	2014a).
4.5. Counterfeiting                                                                                                                              
Diana Camerini (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
89. Corresponding to 212 billion euro using the December 31 2005 exchange 
rate	(source	ECB).
90.	This	figure	results	from	a	calculation	using	the	GTRIC	index	(General	Trade	
– Related Index of Counterfeiting for Economies), which evaluates the likelihood 
of an economy producing counterfeit goods, weighted with the likelihood of 
products	(identified	with	2-digit	Harmonised	System	codes)	being	susceptible	
to imitation or counterfeiting.
91.	 Like	 the	 previous	 figure,	 this	 estimate	 “does	 not	 include	 domestically	
produced	 and	 consumed	 products,	 or	 non-tangible	 pirated	 digital	 products”	
(OECD,	2009,	p.	1).
92. Figure obtained by summing estimates of the value of the international 
counterfeit	 products	 market	 (285-360	 billion	 US	 dollars),	 those	 concerning	
domestically	 produced	 and	 consumed	 counterfeit	 products	 (140-215	 billion	
US	 dollars)	 and	 digitally	 pirated	 products	 (30-75	 billion	 US	 dollars)	 (Frontier	
Economics, 2011, p. 5).
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Country Type of market
Estimate #
(million euro)
Reference year Sources
Finland Unlicensed PC software 162a 2011 BSA, 2012
France Unlicensed PC software 2,121b 2011 BSA, 2012
Ireland Unlicensed PC software 111c 2011 BSA, 2012
Italy
Clothing, footwear, clothing accessories, 
jewellery and watches, electrical appliances, ICT 
equipment, CDs, DVDs, tapes, toys, watches and 
jewellery, perfumes and cosmetics, glasses
3,028 – 6,055 2008
Calderoni 
et	al.,	2014b;	
Transcrime, 2013a
Food products, tobacco and alcohol, perfumes 
and cosmetics, clothing and accessories, electric 
appliances, ICT equipment, CDs, DVDs and 
software, watches and jewellery, spare parts of 
vehicles, games and toys, medicines
7,107 2008 CENSIS, 2009
Clothing, fashion accessories, multimedia 3,300 2007 Confcommercio
Fashion wear, consumer electronics, toys, 
perfumes and cosmetics, medicines, foodstuffs, 
other consumption goods
7,800 2009
SOS Impresa, 
2010
Unlicensed PC software 1,496d 2011 BSA, 2012
Netherlands Unlicensed PC software 498e 2011 BSA, 2012
Spain
All products sold to retail customers 992 2012 ANDEMA, 2013
Unlicensed PC software 940f 2011 BSA, 2012
United 
Kingdom
Physical goods only 104g 2010
Mills,	Skodbo,	&	
Blyth, 2013
Clothing and footwear 4,483h 2006
Ledbury 
Research, 2007
Unlicensed PC software 1,502i 2011 BSA, 2012
Total EU 27 Unlicensed PC software 10,820j 2011 BSA, 2012
a Original	figure:	210	million	US	dollars.	Converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
b	Original	figure:	2,754	million	US	dollars,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
c Original	figure:	144	million	US	dollars,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
d Original	figure:	1,945	million	US	dollars,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
e Original	figure:	644	million	US	dollars,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
f Original	figure:	1,216	million	US	dollars,	converted	into	euro	using	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
g Original	figure:	90	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
h Original	figure:	3,009	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2006	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
i Original	figure:	1,943	million	US	dollars,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
j Original	figure:	14,433	million	US	dollars,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
Table 28 - Estimates of the revenues of counterfeit markets in the 7 OCP countries and EU
There are even fewer estimates at European level. As 
regards EU MS, estimates based on consumer surveys are 
available.	They	sometimes	cover	all	market	sectors	 (like	 the	
Spanish research conducted by ANDEMA, 2010) or focus 
on	 only	 a	 single	 industry,	 either	 in	 multiple	 countries	 (like	
the	 Business	 Software	 Alliance’s	 country-level	 estimates	
on	 pirated	 software	market)	 or	 a	 single	 area	 (like	 Ledbury’s	
research on counterfeit clothing and accessories in the UK). 
As far as OCP countries are concerned, the following studies 
furnish estimates: 
•		 In	 Italy, among the most recent estimates, those by 
Calderoni	 et	 al.	 (2014b)	 and	 Transcrime	 (2013a)	 both	
calculate	 the	 size	 of	 the	 counterfeiting	market	 in	 Italy	 as	
5% and 10% of the turnover obtained by legal companies 
operating in sectors exposed to counterfeiting risks.93 
According to these studies, the counterfeiting market in 
Italy was ranged between 3,028 and 6,055 million euro in 
2008.	In	line	with	this	figure	is	CENSIS’s	(2009)	estimation	
of the turnover of counterfeiting in Italy at 7.1 billion euro in 
2008,	 but	 the	 methodology	 used	 is	 not	 specified.	 Other	
estimates for Italy are set out in Table 28.
93. In particular clothing and accessories, sunglasses, CDs, DVDs and cassettes, 
computers and software, toys, perfumery and body care items, as well as 
jewellery and watches, with the tobacco sector excluded.
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•		 In	 Spain, a survey commissioned by the Asociación 
Nacional	 Para	 la	 Defensa	 de	 la	 Marca	 (ANDEMA),	 and	
conducted	 on	 1,000	 people/individuals,	 estimated	
the average voluntary and involuntary expenditure on 
counterfeits in 2010 at around 38.16 euro per person, thus 
resulting in a total consumption of counterfeit goods for 
505	million	 euro	 (ANDEMA,	 2010).	 A	more	 recent	 study	
by ANDEMA updated the magnitude of total expenditure 
in counterfeit products at around 992 million euro in 2012 
(ANDEMA,	2013).
•		 In	 2007,	 a	 study	 conducted	 by	 the	 Alliance	 Against	 IP	
Theft and Ledbury Research94 revealed that 44% of UK 
consumers had bought an item of fake clothing or footwear 
at least once in the previous three years, spending overall 
around	3,000	million	GBP	per	annum	(Ledbury	Research,	
2007).
Also	 to	 be	 mentioned	 is	 the	 Business	 Software	 Alliance’s	
(BSA)	 estimate	 of	 the	 commercial	 value	 of	 unlicensed	 PC	
software in the European Union at 14 billion95 US dollars in 
2011	 (equivalent	 to	 10.8	 billion	 euro).	 Considering	 only	 OCP	
countries, the market magnitude was estimated at 8.8 billion 
dollars	(equivalent	to	6.8	billion	euro)96	(BSA,	2012).
New estimates
New estimates have been calculated for the purpose 
of this study. The methodology applied was the same as 
the	 one	 used	 by	 Calderoni	 et	 al.	 (2014b)	 and	 Transcrime	
(2013a),	 with	 a	 further improvement to take account of 
country-level	differences	in	consumers’	willingness	to	accept	
counterfeit products. The results are reported in Table 29 
and Figure 15. A detailed description of the method, data, and 
assumptions used to generate these estimates is provided in 
the Methodological Annex.
Table 29 shows the results obtained using two different 
methodologies of estimate with the same baseline data. The 
second column sets out the new estimates of the counterfeit 
market in the European Union, which represent the revenues 
resulting from the potential demand for counterfeit 
products in each EU MS.	 These	 figures,	 in	 fact,	 have	
been calculated on the basis of the share of consumers 
that, in each country, declared that they are strongly 
willing to accept counterfeit products (according	 to	 the	
Eurobarometer	 2011	 survey).	 This	 country-specific	 share	
is	 indicated	 in	 the	 first	 column	 of	 Table	 29.	 This	 share	 was	
multiplied by the total turnover of legal companies operating 
Figure 15 - Estimates of the scale of the counterfeit market for the available EU MS. Absolute values (left) and percentages of 
GDP (right)97
Revenues - Mn euro
< 501
501 - 2,600 
2,601 - 4,750
> 4,750
Not available
% of GDP 2010
< 0. 26 %
0.26 - 0.31 %
0.32 - 0.41 % 
> 0.41 %  
Not available
Source: Transcrime elaboration on estimates reported in Table 29
94. Ledbury conducted a survey on 1,023 UK adults aged 16 years old and above 
to explore their attitudes towards the consumption of counterfeit clothing and 
footwear.
95.	These	figures	reflect	the	commercial	value	of	unlicensed	PC	software.
96.	Exchange	rate	at	December	31st	2011,	as	reported	by	ECB	website	http://sdw.
ecb.europa.eu/curConverter.do.
97. The classes with absolute value were calculated on the basis of the following 
classification:	 Very	 Low	 as	 <	 -0.5	 standard	 deviations	 from	 the	 average;	 Low	
as	between	-0.5	and	0.5	standard	deviations;	Medium	as	between	0.5	and	 1.5	
standard deviations and High as > 1.5 standard deviations. Regarding the % 
of	 GDP	 (2013,	 retrieved	 from	 Eurostat),	 the	 classes	 are	 divided	 according	 to	
percentiles:	Very	Low	<	25%;	Low	between	25	and	50%;	Medium	between	50	
and 75% and High > 75%.
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Country
% of the respondents willing 
to accept counterfeit 
products
OCP estimate
(million euro)
5% of the legal market
(million euro)
10% of the legal 
market (million euro)
Austria 16.25% 1,899 584 1,169
Belgium 9.25% 1,320 714 1,427
Bulgaria 15.5% 244 79 157
Cyprus 28.0% 296 53 106
Czech	
Republic
9.00% N/A N/A N/A
Denmark 13.50% 931 345 689
Estonia 10.75% 49 23 46
Finland 7.25% 280 193 386
France 10.0% 5,746 2,873 5,746
Germany 9.75% 8,198 4,204 8,408
Greece 16.25% 1,501 462 924
Hungary 9.00% 254 141 282
Ireland 8.5% 456 268 537
Italy 8.25% 4,596 2,785 5,571
Latvia 9.50% 53 28 56
Lithuania 13.50% 100 37 74
Luxembourg 6.75% 63 47 94
Malta 15.25% 61 20 40
Netherlands 10.25% 1,986 969 1,938
Poland 5.25% 676 644 1,287
Portugal 7.50% 512 341 682
Romania 17.75% 436 123 246
Slovakia 14.50% 257 89 177
Slovenia 18.25% 183 50 100
Spain 12.75% 3,928 1,540 3,081
Sweden 15.50% 1,706 550 1,101
United 
Kingdom
6.50% 4,569 3,515 7,030
Total OCP 
Countries
9.07% 21,562 12,144 24,288
Total EU 26 
(sum of the 
rows)
12.08% 40,214 20,676 41,353
EU 27 10.0% 42,711 21,356 42,711
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Eurostat data and Eurobarometer, 2011
Table 29 - Estimated scale of the market of counterfeit products. 98 (2010)
98. Digital piracy is not treated here.
99. The sensitive sectors were selected on the basis of OECD, 2008. In particular, 
they	were	selected	according	to	the	GTRIC-P	index,	which	identifies	and	ranks	
the	most	sensitive	goods	according	to	data	on	seizures	and	total	 international	
trade	 (OECD,	 2008,	 p.	 124).	 According	 to	 this	 methodology,	 the	 ten	 most	
sensitive	 products	 are	 the	 following:	 headgear	 &	 other	 parts,	 leather	 articles	
and saddling, tobacco, umbrellas, clocks and watches, articles of apparel and 
clothing, footwear, special woven fabric, miscellaneous manufactured articles, 
toys,	 games,	 and	 sports	 equipment	 (product	 names	 were	 associated	 with	
product	codes	according	to	the	2-digit	harmonised	system	classification	–	see	
HS	 code	 search	 at:	 http://www.foreign-trade.com/reference/hscode.htm).	 See	
Methodological Annex for further details.
in the business sectors most vulnerable to counterfeiting99 to 
obtain a monetary estimate of the counterfeit market. 
The third and fourth columns	instead	report	the	size	of	the	
counterfeiting market assuming, as done by previous studies 
(e.g.	Calderoni	 et	al.,	 2014b;	Transcrime,	2013a),	 that	 its	 size	
ranges between 5% and 10% of the total turnover of these 
sectors. 
According	to	the	OCP	estimate,	the	size	of	the	counterfeiting	
market in the 7 OCP countries is approximately 21.6 billion 
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euro. Considering the aggregate EU 27100,	the	figure	amounts	
to 42.7 billion euro, which is exactly equivalent to 10% of the 
total EU legal market according to the second methodology.101 
Obviously,	these	figures	have	various	limitations.	In	particular,	
they assume that the potential demand for counterfeit 
goods	 (as	 proxied	 by	 consumers’	 propensity	 towards	 fake	
products as estimated by Eurobarometer) can be entirely 
fulfilled,	without	taking	account	of	all	the	constraints	(e.g.	both	
technical and related to the level of law enforcement) to which 
counterfeiters	are	subject	(see	the	Methodological	Annex).
4.5.3. Actors 
According to many scholars, and owing to the high degree 
of organisation and investments required to manufacture, 
move	 and	 distribute	 counterfeit	 products	 (UNODC,	 2010a;	
UNICRI	&	 ICC	BASCAP,	2013;	UNICRI	&	UIBM,	2014),	OCGs	
seem to be the dominant players in this market. 
The available evidence shows that the OCGs operating in 
the counterfeit market across Europe adopt some degree of 
specialisation	in	product	counterfeiting	(UNODC,	2010a).	This	
may take the form of specialisation along the supply chain: 
some groups are expert in the manufacture of counterfeits, 
and	establish,	manage	or	run	manufacturing	clusters	(mainly	
located in China). Other groups may deal only with wholesale 
and retail distribution. Specialisation may occur by 
product sector as well. In Europe, for example, Camorra is 
‘well-reputed’	for	the	design	and	manufacture	of	clothing	and	
accessories, and is also widely involved in DVD and CD piracy 
activities	 (Treverton	 et	 al.,	 2009).	More	marginally,	Camorra	
groups have been found to be involved in the counterfeiting of 
electronics, car parts or medicines, although some evidence 
has recently emerged in relation to the theft and adulteration 
of	medicines	stolen	from	Italian	hospitals	(Faucon,	Plumridge,	
&	Falconi,	2014;	Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014).	
Chinese groups are often involved in the counterfeit market 
in	Europe	(UNICRI,	2007;	UNODC,	2010a).	Together	with	other	
Asian groups, they seem to engage in almost all phases of the 
supply chain: from illegal manufacturing with illegal production 
plants and laboratories also found in some EU MS such as Italy 
(e.g.	UNODC,	2013a,	p.	 127,	DNA,	2012),	 to	the	 importation	of	
knockoffs manufactured in China or the smuggling of CDs 
and	 DVDs,	 for	 example	 into	 the	 UK	 and	 Spain	 (Union	 des	
Fabricants,	 2003;	 UNICRI,	 2007).	 UNODC	 reports	 that	 55%	
of	the	fake	products	seized	 in	2008	at	the	European	Union’s	
borders originated from China and 10% from Taiwan, often 
passing	through	free	trade	zones	like	the	United	Arab	Emirates	
(UNODC,	 2010a,	 p.	 179,	 2013a,	 p.	 125).	 More	 often,	 Chinese	
groups operate in Europe in partnership with other local 
criminal groups	 (DNA	2012,	 2014;	 UNICRI	&	 ICC	BASCAP,	
2013). For example, cooperation is active with the Italian 
Camorra OCGs, as the latter groups were found to complete 
the production of imitation made in East Asia by labelling the 
goods	with	fake	tags	(Eurojust,	2011a,	p.	42).	Although	limited,	
there is evidence that the illegal proceeds obtained by Chinese 
OCGs in the counterfeiting industry may be widely laundered 
in	 the	 legitimate	 European	 economy,	 especially	 in	 Italy	 (see	
Box 32).
As said, Italian Camorra is historically engaged in the 
counterfeiting market, especially in the counterfeiting of 
clothing and fashion accessories and the piracy of CDs and 
DVDs	(Treverton	et	al.,	2009;	DNA,	2014).	The	southern	Italian	
region of Campania, and in particular the areas of Naples 
and Caserta, are most frequently affected by the presence 
of	 illegal	 garment	 factories	 (UNODC,	 2010a,	 p.	 180;	 UNICRI,	
2014). According to the literature, the role of the Camorra has 
evolved in recent decades, from the manufacturing of low-
OCGs European Countries Sources
Camorra
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, UK
Union	des	Fabricants,	2003;	Treverton	et	al.,	2009;	UNICRI,	
2007,	2011;	Eurojust,	2010;	DIA,	2011b,	2012b,	2013a;	DNA,	2011,	
2012,	2014;	Transcrime,	2013a;	UNICRI	&	ICC	BASCAP,	2013;	
UNODC,	2010a,	2013a,	2014a;	UNICRI	&	UIBM,	2014
Chinese OCGs Italy, Spain, UK
Union	des	Fabricants,	2003;	Treverton	et	al.,	2009;	UNICRI,	
2007,	2011;	Silverstone,	2011;	DIA,	2012a,	2012b,	2013a;	DNA,	
2011,	2012;	Iadeluca,	2012;	IRACM	&	Przyswa,	2012;	UNICRI	
&	ICC	BASCAP,	2013;	UNODC,	2010b,	2014b;	Wang,	2013;	
UNICRI	&	UIBM,	2014
Japanese	Yakuza Italy
UNICRI,	2007,	2011;	DNA,	2011;	UNICRI	&	ICC	BASCAP,	2013;	
UNODC, 2014a
North African OCGs Spain, Portugal, Italy DNA,	2011;	BBC	News,	2013a
Other Asian OCGs Italy,	UK,	Czech	Republic
UNODC,	2010a;	DNA,	2010,	2011;	UNICRI,	2011;	DIA,	2012b;	
UNICRI	&	ICC	BASCAP,	2013;	Interpol,	2014a,	2014c
Other Eastern 
European OCGs
Italy, Spain UNICRI,	2007;	UNODC,	2010a;	DIA,	2012a
Russian/Georgian	
OCGs 
UK, Italy
UNICRI,	2007,	2011;	DNA,	2011;	UNICRI	&	ICC	BASCAP,	2013;	
Interpol, 2014a, 2014c
Turkish OCGs France, Italy UNICRI	&	ICC	BASCAP,	2013;	UNICRI	&	UIBM,	2014
Table 30 - Main OCGs active in the counterfeiting market across Europe 
100. he estimate does not cover all the EU 28 MS because data for Croatia are 
not available.
101.	The	average	EU	consumer’s	propensity	to	purchase	counterfeit	goods	was	
about 10% of the respondents to the Eurobarometer survey.
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level products to the confection of original haute couture 
fashion	products	(which	may	be	diverted	to	the	fake	market)	or	
to the importing of raw materials, textiles, tools and machinery 
from	China	and	Asia	to	perform	the	final	supply	chain	phases	
(UNODC,	 2010a,	 p.	 180).	 The	 available	 evidence	 shows	 that	
counterfeit garments are then exported to other European 
countries, such as Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, 
Switzerland	 and	 UK	 (UNICRI,	 2007).	 The	 illegal	 proceeds	
obtained in the counterfeiting market are then laundered by 
Camorra	groups	in	a	variety	of	sectors	(UNICRI,	2011,	p.	97).	
Evidence of the participation of Russian, the Japanese 
Yakuza,	 and	 Northern	 African	 OCGs	 in	 the	 counterfeiting	
industry has also been reported. In particular, Russian OCGs 
are associated with the smuggling of CDs, DVDs and software, 
e.g.	 in	the	UK	(UNICRI,	2007,	p.	118).	 In	 Italy	there	is	evidence	
of the Japanese Yazuka’	 s	 involvement	 in	 CD	 and	 DVD	
counterfeiting	and	credit	card	frauds	(DNA,	2011,	pp.	201,	671).	
Northern African smugglers of counterfeit products have 
been	 caught	 in	 Spain,	 Portugal	 and	 Italy	 (DNA,	 2011,	 p.	 281;	
BBC News, 2013a). 
75 | Part 1
4.6.1. Introduction
‘Gambling’	 refers	 to	 different forms of betting, such as 
casino games, lotteries and slot machines	 (Calderoni	 et	
al., 2014b). Although gambling is legal in many countries, the 
demand for illegal gambling services even in these countries 
is growing. 
The academic literature on this issue is scant, and some 
previous	 studies	 have	 minimized	 the	 involvement	 of	 OCGs	
in	 this	 field	 (e.g.	 Reuter	 &	 Rubinstein,	 1982).	 However,	 the	
connection between organised crime and illegal gambling 
has	 been	 highlighted	 by	 several	 authors	 (such	 as	 Pinto	 &	
Wilson,	 1990;	 Liddick,	 1999;	 Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Calderoni	
et	 al.,	 2014b),	 who	 provided	 evidence	 of	 organised	 crime’s	
management of illegal casinos, poker and slot machines 
in several countries. At the same time, there is increasing 
evidence of the involvement of OCGs in the related illicit 
activity of match-fixing, i.e. the manipulation of sports 
events	in	order	to	obtain	a	fraudulent	profit	from	bets	on	them.
There are several reasons why OCGs may be interested and 
active in the illegal gambling market:
•		 First,	illegal	gambling	requires	a	high level of organisation 
and management expertise to make it credible, and to 
handle	 finance,	 protection,	 security	 and	 debt	 collections.	
A complex gambling venue requires specialised workers 
such as dealers, supervisors, managers, security staff, 
cashiers	 etc.	 (Ferentzy	&	Turner,	 2009,	p.	 112).	A	 criminal	
organisation is one of the few actors able to provide these 
resources. 
•		 Second,	the	available	statistics	on	the	legal	market	reveal	
high and still growing worldwide demand for gambling 
activities. OCGs may decide to meet this demand with 
illegal gambling services, especially in areas where 
legal casinos are banned or limited, or where regulation is 
weaker	(Calderoni	et	al.,	2014b).
•		 Third,	 both	 illegal	 and	 legal	 gambling	 can	 provide	
opportunities for other illicit activities	 (Ferentzy	 &	
Turner, 2009, p.119). Casinos and slot machine halls furnish 
criminals with places for recreation and socialisation, and 
can facilitate money laundering, theft, fraud, and usury 
(FATF,	2009,	pp.	26-27;	Europol,	2014a;	McAfee,	2014).	For	
example, criminal groups running illegal casinos or bingo 
halls can also provide loans, at usurious interest rates, to 
those who play and become short of cash.
This Section analyses the role that OCGs may play in Europe in 
both illegal gambling	(e.g.	unlicensed	casinos,	illegal	betting,	
illegal lotteries and game machines) and legal gambling 
activities, since criminals can also control licensed casinos, 
video lotteries and slot machines, in particular as means to 
launder	 money	 (Banca	 d’Italia-UIF,	 2014;	 Calderoni	 et	 al.,	
2014b,	 p.	 111;	 Ministero	 dell’Economia	 e	 delle	 Finanze,	 2014).	
It	 also	 analyses	 the	 related	 (and	 emerging)	 illegal	 activities	
of match-fixing and match-manipulation, which in some 
countries have proved to be important sources of revenues 
for	organised	criminals	(see	e.g.	the	Netherlands,	Section	5.5).
As illustrated below, these three dimensions often overlap 
and cannot be clearly distinguished. For example, authorised 
licensees may disconnect licit gaming machines from the 
authorized	 control	 network	 and	 then	 alter	 them	 to	 produce	
illegal	 revenues	 (Calderoni	 et	 al.,	 2014b,	 p.	 112).	 The	 overlap	
between these dimensions also makes it difficult to estimate 
the	size	of	the	 illegal	gambling	market	 in	the	Europe,	and	the	
share of this market attributable to OCGs.
Organised crime and illegal gambling
OCGs have been traditionally interested in illegal gambling 
activities. The conventional image of illegal gambling 
associates it with clandestine casinos, gambling halls, and 
illicit betting on horse races. But also in Europe there is growing 
evidence of new illegal gambling activities, such as adulterated 
gaming machines and illegal online gambling services 
(Ministero	dell’Economia	e	delle	Finanze,	2014,	pp.	18-25).	
Organised crime and legal gambling
As said above, besides illegal gambling, organised crime 
groups have been historically attracted to legal gambling 
activities.102 Owing to their cash-intensive nature, licensed 
casinos and bingo halls have always been used as channels 
for money laundering, both in Europe and in the USA and 
Canada	 (Ferentzy	&	Turner,	2009;	FATF,	2009;	Calderoni	et	
al., 2014b).103 VLT and betting services also constitute one 
of the sectors most infiltrated by OCGs, according to the 
analysis	 carried	 out	 in	 Part	 2	 (see	 in	 particular	 Chapter	 7).	
Indeed, casinos and gambling providers are, like banks or 
accounting	 firms,	 among	 the	 entities covered by EU anti-
money laundering obligations (Directive	 2005/60/EC;	
Directive	2006/70/EC;	see	also	the	proposal	 for	a	 fourth	EU	
AML Directive).104
More	 recently,	 OCGs	 have	 benefited	 from	 technological	
advances, in particular the Internet, and from weak regulation 
of	the	Web,	to	extend	their	interests	in	two	directions:	the	first	
comprises online gambling and online betting websites,105 
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102.	There	is	a	large	body	of	literature	on,	for	instance,	the	involvement	of	mafias	
and other organised crime groups in the management of USA casinos, such as 
those	of	Las	Vegas	and	Atlantic	City	(Ferentzy	&	Turner,	2009).	
103. In the late 1970s, it was estimated that 80% of slot machine sales were 
controlled	by	organised	crime	groups	 in	 the	USA	(Ferentzy	&	Turner,	2009,	p.	
127). Furthermore, video gaming and lottery machines appear to be a major 
source of income for OCGs in Canada, where the Hells Angels, Asian-based 
organised crime groups, traditional organised crime groups, and East European-
based	ones	are	all	involved	in	the	illegal	operation	of	these	machines	(Ferentzy	
&	Turner,	2009).
104. EU Commission, Proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the use 
of	 the	 financial	 system	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 money	 laundering	 and	 terrorist	
financing,	 available	 on	 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=CELEX:52013PC0045:EN:NOT.
105. In particular, the proliferation of gambling operators, games and betting 
services on the Internet facilitates money laundering and impairs the traceability 
of	 both	 the	 players	 and	 the	 beneficial	 owners	 behind	 these	 online	 platforms	
(Transcrime,	2013a).
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the second slot machines	 (AWP)	 and	 video-lottery 
terminals	(VLT).106
Organised crime and match-fixing
Match-fixing, especially in football, is a growing area of 
interest for many OCGs. Criminals manipulate the results 
of	 matches	 by	 corrupting	 and/or	 intimidating	 players	 and/
or	 referees	 in	order	 to	profit	 from	(legal	or	 illegal)	betting	on	
them. According to a recent study, 7% of 27,000 football 
games played per year under the UEFA rules are suspected of 
manipulation	(De	Sanctis,	2014,	p.	97).
Although	Asia	 is	a	critical	 region	 (Interpol,	2011),	evidence	of	
match-fixing	can	be	found	also	in	Europe;	and	it	is	reportedly	
often committed by transnational criminal networks. 
Several police operations,	involving	European	countries	and/
or Europe-based criminal groups, have been carried out in this 
field:	 for	example,	 investigations	conducted	during	the	2008	
European football championships, when 1 billion euro107 of bets 
were interdicted and almost 12 million108 euro in cash were 
seized,	leading	to	the	arrest	of	around	1,300	people	(Interpol,	
2011). In November 2009, the German Federal Police detected 
two hundred suspicious matches across nine countries, and 
one hundred suspected players, referees, coaches, league 
officials	 and	 criminals	 operating	 in	 Germany,	 Switzerland,	
Turkey, Greece, UK, Netherlands, Hong Kong and Malaysia 
(Hill,	2008,	p.	 10).	 In	 Italy,	 in	2010	alone	more	 than	30	active	
investigations	 on	 illegal	 gambling	 related	 to	 match-fixing	 in	
connection	 with	 organised	 crime	 were	 reported	 (Interpol,	
2011). 
In 2006, Italy was also hit by the so-called Calciopoli match-
fixing scandal,	 which	 involved	 high-profile	 football	 players	
and	 coaches	 (The	 Guardian,	 2006);	 six	 years	 later,	 some	
Italian	 football	 clubs	 were	 again	 involved	 in	 a	 match-fixing	
scandal on an international scale from Singapore to South 
America to Europe, where even people in Hungary were 
arrested	(Daily	Mail,	2012).	
4.6.2. Estimates of the illegal gambling 
market
Owing to a lack of data, and to the overlap between legal and 
illegal gambling, estimating the proceeds of illegal gambling is 
difficult. Only a few estimates exist, and most of them either 
focus	on	certain	sectors	(e.g.	VLT	or	online	gaming)	or	do	not	
state the methodology used for the calculation.109 In the OCP 
countries, the literature review revealed that:
•		 In	the	UK,	according	to	Groom	and	Davies,	illegal	gambling’s	
value	added	amounted	0.8	billion	GB	GBP	(1.1	billion	euro)	in	
1996,	about	0.1%	of	GDP	(Groom	&	Davies,	1998).
•		 In	 the	 Netherlands,	 according	 to	 Unger	 (2007),	 illegal	
gambling generated 130 million euro proceeds for criminals 
in	2003,	about	0.8%	of	GDP	at	that	time	(UNODC,	2011a,	p.	
24).
•		 In	Italy, the illegal gambling market has been estimated by 
a	number	of	authors,	who	provided	highly	variable	figures.	
SOS	Impresa	(2010)	reported	illicit	profits	amounting	to	3.6	
billion euro in 2009,110 which 2.5 billion could be attributable 
to	OCGs	 (SOS	 Impresa,	2010),	but	no	 information	on	 the	
methodology employed was given. Later, Transcrime 
estimated revenues between 326 and 522 million euro 
in 2011, with almost 20% of them concentrated in Sicily 
(Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	55).	Other	estimates	carried	out	for	
Italy are mentioned in the Table 31.
4.6.3. Actors 
The role and structure of the OCGs engaged in illegal gambling 
in Europe are still largely unexplored by the academic 
literature. 
Italian	 mafias	 appear	 to	 be	 active	 in	 illegal	 as	 well	 as	 legal	
gambling	 activities,	 both	 in	 Italy	 (Transcrime,	 2013a;	 DIA,	
2013b;	DNA,	2012,	2014;	Calderoni	et	al.,	2014b)	and	abroad,	
e.g. in Canada	(DNA,	2011).	It	is	reported	that	almost	41 groups 
(both	 Italian	 and	 foreign)	 are	 active	 in	 the	 Italian	 market	
(Libera,	 2012).	 Camorra,	 ‘Ndrangheta	 and	 Cosa	 Nostra,	 in	
particular, organise the supply and management of AWP 
and VLT game machines. They act as market regulators by 
establishing companies, issuing permits, extorting shops to 
rent their machines, and providing usury loans to pathological 
gamblers	who	 run	out	of	cash	 (Ferentzy	&	Turner,	2009,	pp.	
118-119;	Transcrime,	2013a;	Calderoni	et	al.,	2014b).	
There is evidence of similar practices by Chinese criminal 
organisations	 against	 Chinese	 nationals	 (Calderoni	 et	 al.,	
2014b), not only in Italy but also in other European countries, 
including	the	Netherlands	and	the	UK	(see	Table	32).
106.	There	is	growing	evidence	that	OCGs	have	infiltrated	companies	operating	
in the provision and management of AWP and VLT, in particular in Italy 
(Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Banca	 d’Italia-UIF,	 2014;	 Ministero	 dell’Economia	 e	 delle	
Finanze,	2014,	pp.	18-25).	 Involvement	 in	this	sector	makes	it	possible	not	only	
to	 launder	 the	proceeds	 from	other	 illicit	activities	but	also	 to	earn	significant	
profits,	 especially	 if	 AWP	 and	 VLT	 devices	 (which	 need	 state	 licensing)	 are	
disconnected from the central electronic network in order to avoid taxation 
(Calderoni	et	al.,	2014b).	There	are	several	laundering	techniques.	For	example	
VLT devices contain a technical fault because they draw a ticket with the cash-
out without distinction between ended and interrupted games. Thus, if the player 
inserts	100	euro	 in	the	VLT	device	and	 interrupts	the	game	before	 it	starts,	s/
he	gets	a	ticket	which	allows	him/her	to	cash	in	100	euro	as	if	s/he	has	won	that	
amount.
107.	Original	figure:	1.4	billion	US	dollars,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2008	
currency	rate	(source	ECB).
108.	Original	figure:	17	million	US	dollars,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2008	
currency	rate	(source	ECB).
109. Measurements of illegal gambling markets can be derived from statistics 
on	 the	 legal	 industry	 (e.g.	Transcrime,	2013a;	Calderoni	et	al.,	2014b).	Data	on	
the number of customers and licensed casinos, bingo halls and betting agencies 
have also been used for indirect assessment of the demand for gambling and 
gaming services, and hence the market-opportunities for illegal gambling and 
OCG	infiltration.
110.	Income	2.50	billion	euro	and	expenditure	1.75	billion	euro	(UNODC,	2011a).
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Country
Estimate #
(million euro)
Min (million 
euro)
Max (million 
euro)
Reference 
year
Source Notes
Italy
425 327 522 2011
Transcrime,	2013a;	
Calderoni et al., 2014b
Illegal gaming 
machines
4,000 2011 Sos Impresa, 2012 Whole market
3,600 2011 Sos Impresa, 2012 OCG share
2,500 2009 Sos Impresa, 2010 OCG share
23,000 2009 Eurispes, 2010
Netherlands 130 2003 Unger, 2007
United 
Kingdom
1,128a 1996 Groom	&	Davies,	1998
Value added 
of	consumers’	
expenditure
a Original	figure:	800	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	01/04/1999	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 31 - Estimates111 of the revenues from illegal gambling in OCP countries
OCGs European Countries Sources
Apulian OCGs Italy
Busa	&	La	Rocca,	2011;	DIA,	2011b,	2012a,	2013a;	DNA,	2012;	
Libera, 2012
Camorra Italy
DNA,	2010;	Busa	&	La	Rocca,	2011;	Libera,	2012;	DIA,	2013b,	
2014 
Chinese OCGs
Italy, Belgium, Spain, Germany, 
Austria, France, Netherlands, UK
Hill,	2008;	DIA	2012b,	2013a;	Iadeluca,	2012
Cosa Nostra Italy
Busa	&	La	Rocca,	2011;	Libera,	2012;	DIA	2012a;	2013a;	DNA,	
2011, 2012 
'Ndrangheta Italy, Romania, UK
Busa	&	La	Rocca,	2011;	DIA,	2012b;	2014;	DNA,	2011,	2012,	
2014;	Libera,	2012
Other Eastern 
European OCGs
Germany, Italy Ferentzy	&	Turner,	2009;	DIA,	2011b
Russian/Georgian	
OCGs
Italy DIA, 2012b
Table 32 - Main OCGs in the illegal gambling market
111. In the presence of an estimation range, estimate refers to the arithmetic 
mean	or,	only	when	specified,	to	an	adjusted	mean	(referred	to	as	best	estimate).	
For more details see the Methodological Annex.
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4.7.1. Introduction
Like other illegal activities, also extortion racketeering, i.e. 
the obtaining of cash or other utilities by means of intimidation 
and	 threats	 usually	 against	 businesses	 (Lisciandra,	 2014,	
p. 93), may be carried out by multiple criminal actors. 
As	 some	 scholars	 highlight	 (Sciarrone,	 2009;	 Lisciandra,	
2014, p. 94), extortion racketeering is perpetrated not only 
by OCGs but also by individual criminals or non-organised 
groups. Nevertheless, it is still a predatory activity typical of 
organised crime groups	(Albanese,	2004;	Lisciandra,	2014)	
and an important source of illegal proceeds, especially for 
Italian	mafias	(Transcrime,	2013a;	Lisciandra,	2014).
It is not easy to determine if and how extortion contributes 
to	the	‘portfolio’	of	organised	crime	groups	and,	hence,	how	it	
impacts in terms of money laundering and OCGs investments. 
The obstacles are numerous. 
First, it is difficult to assess the extent of this criminal 
phenomenon: police or judicial statistics are usually 
characterised by a high dark figures because the victims 
of extortion racketeering do not usually report it to law 
enforcement	(Silke,	1998;	Mugellini	&	Caneppele,	2012);112 and 
alternative direct or indirect measures are lacking.
Second,	 racketeers	 drain	 easy	 cash	 from	 the	 victims;	 but	
in many cases they have been found to extract other 
advantages, such as the provision of other facilities	 (like	
goods,	 services	 or	 manpower)	 (Transcrime,	 2009,	 p.	 31;	
Transcrime, 2013b, p. 62), which are very difficult to estimate 
in	 monetary	 values.	 Indirect	 benefits	 may	 also	 result	 from	
control	 of	 the	 territory	 (Transcrime,	 2013a)	 and	 from	 the	
distortion	of	the	market	competition	(Daniele	&	Marani,	2011).	
Through extortion, criminal groups act as both regulatory 
and	enforcement	 ‘agencies’	 in	 illicit	markets,	where	disputes	
can	be	 resolved	only	by	 informal	means	 (Sung,	2004,	p.	 115;	
Transcrime,	2009,	p.	23;	Gounev	&	Ruggiero,	2012).	Extortion	
thus impacts on OCGs investments not only because it is a 
source of illegal funds that will eventually be laundered, but 
also because it shapes the market where OCG infiltration 
will then occur. 
Third, it is difficult to assess the level of profitability of 
extortion	 for	 racketeers.	According	to	scholars,	profitability	
varies according to numerous factors: for example, there is 
evidence that, in recessions, the amount of money extorted 
from businesses decreases. In general, it depends on the 
possibility of OCGs to exercise effective and extensive control 
over a given area, because extortion can be casual or systemic 
(Transcrime,	2009)	depending	on	the	extent	to	which	OCGs	
act sporadically or are rooted in the territory. 
Profitability	 also	 depends	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	
victims	 and	perpetrators	 (for	 a	 review	 see	Sciarrone,	 2009,	
Transcrime, 2009): in the case of ‘predatory’ extortion, 
less systematic cash flows are generated because victims 
are	 requested	 to	 pay	 only	 once;	 in	 the	 case	 of	 ‘parasitic’ 
or ‘symbiotic’ racketeering, in which the victims may be 
willing to pay in order to obtain protection for their businesses, 
regular payments in cash or physical goods are made, so that 
the racketeers can obtain larger proceeds, which can then be 
laundered	through	reinvestment	in	the	legal	economy	(Baker,	
2005;	Transcrime,	2009).
It can be consequently hypothesised that, especially in areas 
where control by OCGs is extensive or where both legal and 
physical persons seek protection from illegal actors because 
“state	protection	is	not	regarded	as	adequate	or	reliable”	(Paoli,	
2003, p. 165), extortion racketeering is a significant source of 
profits for the criminal groups involved, also considering the 
low risks and the low costs necessary to perform this activity 
(Paoli,	2003).	
4.7.2. Estimates of the revenues from 
extortion racketeering 
Despite the crucial role played by extortion in the portfolios 
of OCGs, only a few studies have attempted to estimate the 
extent of its proceeds. 
At global level, the only result available is the one illustrated by 
Baker	(2005,	p.	172),	who	estimated	the	global	financial	flows	
generated by racketeering at between a minimum of 50 billion 
and a maximum of 100 billion US dollars over the 2000-
2005	period.	The	extent	to	which	this	figure	is	attributable	to	
revenues	generated	by	OCGs	is	not	specified.
The most comprehensive study on extortion racketeering at 
European	level	is	Transcrime	(2009),	which	does	not	provide	
estimates of the proceeds from extortion but instead provides 
a detailed overview on the extent of this criminal activity 
across Europe. In particular, by differentiating between casual 
and	systemic	extortion	 in	each	member	state	 (see	Table	33	
reporting the results for the seven OCP countries), it yields 
understanding of the countries in which extortion racketeering 
may contribute most to the portfolio of OCGs, since, as 
mentioned above, proceeds are larger where racketeering is 
systemic.
Country-level studies on extortion racketeering are equally 
rare. Most of them focus on Italy, where, as anticipated, 
extortion	plays	a	pivotal	role	in	the	economy	of	Italian	mafias.	
•		 Lisciandra (2014),	 drawing	 on	 Transcrime	 (2013a)	
and using data on extortion episodes combined with 
information gathered by the Italian business victimisation 
survey	 (Mugellini	 &	 Caneppele,	 2012),	 estimates	 the	
total revenues from extortion racketeering at between a 
minimum of 2.8 billion and a maximum of 7.7 billion euro, 
with	the	Campania	region	(dominated	by	Camorra	groups)	
accounting for 30% of the money earned from extortion 
racketeering in the country as a whole.
•		 Transcrime (2013a), drawing on a survey conducted 
by	 Fondazione	 Chinnici,	 estimates	 that,	 in	 2011,	 criminal	
cash flows obtained through coercion by local OCG were 
112.  In a business victimisation survey of Italian companies, Mugellini and 
Caneppele	(2012)	showed	that	only	6.6%	of	the	surveyed	companies	victims	of	
extortion racketeering reported the episode to the police. 
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equivalent to 4.8 billion euro. It also emerges from this 
study that extortion racketeering is one of the largest illicit 
markets	in	Italy	(Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	65).
•		 A	 larger	 estimate	 has	 been	 produced	 by	 SOS Impresa 
(2010), which calculated at 9 billion euro the proceeds 
generated in 2010 by protection racketeering. However, no 
details were provided about the methodology and the data 
sources used.
4.7.3. Actors 
As mentioned in the introduction, extortion racketeering can 
also be carried out by very small groups and even single 
offenders	 (Transcrime,	 2009;	 Lisciandra,	 2014),	 who	 may	
sometimes pretend to belong to a criminal group in order to 
be	more	credible	(examples	are	provided	by	Gambetta,	1993;	
Chu,	2002;	Sciarrone,	2009).
However, the international literature agrees that extortion 
is more systemic, stable over time, and able to generate 
large proceeds only when it is carried out by well-rooted 
OCGs able to exert extensive control over the local territory 
and economy. Criminal groups may be local or transnational 
because OCGs may also be active in racketeering in foreign 
countries. But in this latter case, extortion is usually conducted 
in	 a	 ‘predatory’	 style,	 in	 particular	 against	 businesses	 or	
persons of the same ethnic group, and it is often associated 
with the exploitation of victims of human trafficking or the 
control	of	trafficking	routes	(Transcrime,	2009).	
In the European Union, transnational racketeering groups 
have	been	 identified	by	Transcrime	(2009)	 in	almost all EU 
MS except Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania and Sweden. 
Local gangs engaged in extortion racketeering were found in 
Austria,	Belgium,	Czech	Republic,	Denmark,	France,	Germany,	
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the 
UK	(Transcrime,	2009,	p.	263).	
There follows a brief overview on the main OCGs engaged in 
extortion racketeering across Europe.
•		 Italian Mafia OCGs have a complex and structured system 
of	extortion	racketeering	(Transcrime,	2009),	and	they	are	
apparently the ones that gain most illegal proceeds from 
this	 activity	 (Transcrime,	 2013a,	 Lisciandra,	 2014).	 They	
act mainly nationally, especially in the southern regions of 
Italy, where institutional and local community responses 
are weak and criminal control of the territory is stronger 
(Sciarrone,	 2009;	 Transcrime,	 2013a).	 In	 particular,	
Camorra OCGs appear to be the ones most involved in 
extortion	 and	 earning	 the	 highest	 proceeds	 (Transcrime,	
2013a). However, their presence in the protection markets 
in	foreign	counties	seems	not	to	be	significant.	Only	a	few	
cases	of	extortion	activities	by	Italian	mafias	abroad	have	
been	reported	(see	the	case	of	the	‘Ndrangheta	in	Germany	
reported	by	DNA	(2001,	p.	56)).
•		 Russian-speaking OCGs have been associated with 
racketeering in Spain, Finland, and many other European 
MS	 (Transcrime,	 2008,	 pp.	 8-10).	 In	 Spain,	 Russian	 and	
other foreign groups extort money from enterprises in the 
construction sector, real estate and the entertainment 
industry	 (Transcrime,	 2009,	 pp.	 217–218).	 Threats	 of	
violence against businesses have been made by Russian 
gangs	 also	 in	 Finland,	 according	 to	 Dunn	 (1997).	 In	 the	
countries of Eastern Europe, these groups instead operate 
mainly	 as	 private	 protection	 organisations	 (Savona,	 2011;	
Gounev	&	Ruggiero,	2012).
OCP country
Extortion Organised crime groups Seriousness 
of extortion 
racketeeringType Relationship Type Nationality
Finland CASUAL Predatory Local OC National Low
France SYSTEMIC
Predatory, 
Parasitic, 
Symbiotic
Local OC, Foreign OC, 
Terrorist groups, Local 
gangs
National;	Foreign	(Turkish,	
Chinese, Albanian) High
Ireland CASUAL n.a. Local	OC;	Local	gangs National Low
Italy SYSTEMIC
Parasitic, 
Symbiotic
Local OC, Foreign OC, 
Local and foreign gangs
National;	Foreign	(Eastern	
European, Chinese, Other 
Asian)
High
Netherlands CASUAL
Predatory, 
Parasitic
Local OC, Foreign OC, 
Local gangs
National;	Foreign	(Chinese,	
Turkish)
Medium
Spain SYSTEMIC
Predatory, 
Parasitic, 
Symbiotic
Terrorist groups, Local 
gangs, Foreign OC
National;	Foreign	(Russian,	
Romanian, Colombian, 
Chinese)
High
United Kingdom SYSTEMIC
Predatory, 
Parasitic, 
Symbiotic
Local OC, Foreign OC, 
Local gangs, Terrorist 
groups
National;	Foreign	(Turkish,	
Middle Eastern, Chinese)
High
Table 33 - Type of extortion racketeering in the 7 OCP countries – excerpt from Transcrime (2009)
Source:  Transcrime, 2009, pp. 8-10
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•		 Among	 Chinese groups, extortion racketeering seems 
to be persistent and widespread in many European 
countries	 (Gounev	 &	 Ruggiero,	 2012).	 In	 France,	 Faligot	
(2001)	reported	cases	of	Chinese	merchants	being	forced	
to	pay	 so-called	 ‘tea-money’	 (ranging	 from	500	 to	2,500	
US dollars) to buy protection for their businesses. As in 
the case of Turkish groups, the victims are often their co-
nationals. In the UK, Chinese gangs were found extorting 
money	 from	 the	 families	 of	Chinese	 immigrants	 (Savona,	
2011).
•		 Turkish-speaking OCGs are particularly active in 
extortion in some EU Member States, including OCP 
countries such as France, Netherlands, and the UK 
(Transcrime,	 2009,	 pp.	 8–10).	 In	 this	 case	 as	 well,	 the	
victims are often other Turkish groups or businesses.
•		 To	be	noted	is	that,	in	the	past	few	years,	racketeering	has	
often been associated with Europe-based terrorist and 
separatist groups, which raise money through extortion 
to fund their activities. The ETA in Spain, paramilitary 
groups in Northern Ireland, and the Corsican Separatist 
Movement in France once forced people to pay the 
so-called	 ‘revolutionary	 tax’,	 theoretically	 to	 support	
movements for local freedom. Today, with the evolution 
of	 terrorist	 groups	 into	 criminal	 or	 “terrorist	 enterprises”	
active	 in	 the	“market	of	violent	products”	 (Myres,	2012,	p.	
698), the protection racket is used more ‘mafia-fashion’ 
to strengthen control of the territory, impose monopolies, 
or discourage businesses attracting tourists, as in Corsica 
(Transcrime,	2009,	p.	103).	
OCGs EU MS Sources
Albanian OCGs Bulgaria,	Czech	Republic,	France,	Greece,	
Slovakia
Europol,	2005;	Transcrime,	2009;	DIA,	2011b,	2012b,	
2013a
Chinese OCGs France, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, 
Netherlands, UK
Transcrime,	2009;	DNA,	2010,	2011;	DIA,	2011a,	
2011b,	2013a;	Savona,	2011;	Gounev	&	Ruggiero,	2012;	
Iadeluca, 2012
Other Asian OCGs Czech	Republic,	Greece,	Romania,	Italy,	Poland Transcrime,	2009;	DNA,	2010,	2011
Other Eastern 
European OCGs 
Czech	Republic,	Estonia,	Hungary,	Italy,	Latvia	
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
Transcrime,	2009;	DIA,	2011a,	2012a;	DNA,	2011;	
OSAC, 2014c
Other Western 
European OCGs
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Germany, 
Poland, Portugal, Sweden
Transcrime, 2009
Russian/Georgian	
OCGs
Austria,	Belgium,	Bulgaria,	Cyprus,	Czech	
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain
Transcrime,	2009;	DNA,	2011
Turkish OCGs Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Romania, 
Netherlands, UK
Transcrime, 2009
Table 34 - Main OCGs active in extortion racketeering in the EU MS
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Usury, often referred to as ‘illegal lending’ or ‘loan sharking’, 
is the lending of funds through illegal channels at a high interest 
rate to a person or a company usually in economic difficulties 
(Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	60;	Scaglione,	2014,	p.	78)113. OCGs are 
increasingly involved in this illegal market, although the role of 
criminal groups has often been deemed minor compared to 
that of other actors. 
For example, until the early 1980s usury was generally 
ethically unacceptable	within	Mafia	groups	in	Italy,	especially	
for	the	Sicilian	group	Cosa	Nostra,	which	considered	it	(along	
with prostitution and gambling) to be prohibited - although 
some	other	Mafia	OCGs,	such	as	Camorra,	have	never	shown	
prejudice	 against	 this	 type	 of	 crime	 (DIA,	 2011b;	 DNA,	 2011;	
Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Scaglione,	 2014).	 Some	 studies	 have	
highlighted the role that individuals and relatives play in 
illegal lending: in the UK, for example, a study conducted by 
Ellison,	Collard	and	Forster	(2006)	showed	that	around	40%	
of payments are collected by the lenders themselves, which 
implies that the market is not necessarily controlled by large 
OCGs	(Ellison,	Collard,	&	Forster,	2006,	p.	57).	
Nevertheless, the share of OCGs in the usury market 
is increasing. This may be explained by several factors. 
First, some level of management is needed to establish a 
system of illegal lending, at least in terms of cash availability, 
and most OCGs possess these organisational banking skills. 
Second, usury appears to be increasingly connected with 
other illegal markets	 (Scaglione,	 2014,	 p.	 77).	 The	 money	
provided as loans often stems from the proceeds of other 
illegal	 activities	 (e.g.	 drug	 trafficking,	 firearms	 trafficking,	
sexual exploitation) conducted by OCGs. OCGs thus launder 
their ‘dirty’ money by lending it to borrowers who invest 
it in the legal economy. Lenders can also use the money to 
invest in the illegal economy, because cash is often needed for 
illegal	activities	such	as	drug	trafficking	(Shanty,	2008,	p.	203).	
Another example is the link between usury and gambling. 
The sources provide evidence of players of VLT and slot-
machines, casino gamblers, and sports-betters, in both legal 
and illegal settings, who run short of cash and resort to usurers 
to	finance	their	bets	(Shanty,	2008,	p.	203;	Scaglione,	2014).
Third, individuals who are not backed by criminal groups may 
be	less	persuasive	towards	borrowers	failing	to	repay	his/her	
loan, whilst OCG lenders can threaten physical violence to 
secure repayment	 (Ellison,	Collard,	&	Forster,	2006,	p.	53).	
OCGs not only have more money to lend, they have more ways 
to	ensure	re-collection	(Shanty,	2008,	p.	202).	
Fourth, OCGs can see usury as a first step towards 
infiltrating legal businesses and eventually taking them 
over	 (Scaglione,	2014,	p.	82):	 companies	 in	financial	distress	
that are refused bank loans may ask for illegal credit provided 
by OCGs. If the loan is not repaid, OCGs may extort a share 
(or	 the	 whole	 share	 capital)	 of	 the	 company	 as	 repayment,	
thereby acquiring ownership of the business. This form of 
‘convertible bond’ was used, for example, by ‹Ndrangheta 
OCGs to take control of the Perego construction company in 
Italy	(Za,	2012;	Tornago,	2014).
The instrumental use of usury by OCGs appears to be 
more frequent during economic recessions. Desperate 
companies or families turn to criminal groups, which are among 
the few operators with disposable cash and liquid assets 
and are willing to extend loans. Indeed, generally speaking, 
financial	crises,	 increased	unemployment,	 loss	of	purchasing	
power, and low wages induce businesses and families to take 
out	 loans	 at	 usurious	 rates	 (Scaglione,	 2014).	 According	 to	
Ellison,	Collard	and	Forster	(2006),	82%	of	those	using	illegal	
loans in the United Kingdom in 2006 did so because they had 
no	other	credit	options	(Ellison,	Collard,	&	Forster,	2006,	p.	20).	
However, it should be noted that an economic crisis may 
also deflate the usury market, because an increase in 
bankruptcy rates can reduce the number of companies asking 
for	(either	legal	or	illegal)	loans	(Scaglione,	2014;	Guiso,	1993)	
Usury has also been used in connection with corruption. In 
Bulgaria,	usury	seems	widespread	in	the	political	sphere	(CSD,	
2012, p. 56).  
Hence,	 although	 usury	 is	 not	 an	 OCG	 ‘core	 business’,	 it	
is becoming an important activity for some criminal 
groups,	 especially	 Italian	mafias	 (Transcrime,	2013a),	and	 in	
particular	in	the	current	situation	of	financial	crisis	and	credit	
crunch. It may accordingly play a crucial role in the portfolios 
of OC groups and be an increasing source of proceeds that 
can be invested in the legitimate economy. For this reason it 
is important to review the available estimates on this market.
4.8.2. Estimates of the revenues from 
usury
Estimating	the	size	of	the	usury	market	is	challenging.	First,	it	
is not easy to assess the number of victims and the amount 
of	profit	gained	by	lenders.	Police	and	judicial	statistics	are	not	
reliable, because usury is usually characterised by high dark 
numbers,	given	the	‘cooperative’	relationship	between	usurer	
and	borrowers	(Mugellini	&	Caneppele,	2012).	
Indirect methods have been adopted, such as calculating 
the number of victims of loan sharking by using the number 
of legal companies which have had their requests for legal 
loans rejected. The assumption is that those companies will 
have	to	find	other	ways	to	finance	their	activities	(Guiso,	1995;	
Scaglione,	 2014).	 Other	 studies	 (such	 as	 Ellison,	 Collard,	 &	
Forster, 2006, in UK) have conducted surveys on businesses 
or households in order to assess their vulnerability and 
predisposition towards loan sharking, and hence make 
estimations. 
Most estimates focus only on a limited number of countries. 
In Italy,	the	most	updated	figures	are	provided	by	Transcrime	
113. From a legal point of view, usury is distinguished from legal credit by the 
application of interest rates above a certain legal threshold. However, the 
interest rate is not the only discriminant since, as highlighted by some scholars, 
usury	is	characterized	by	a	specific	relation	between	the	borrower	and	the	illegal	
lender which makes it different from the traditional relationship between banks 
and	their	clients	(Masciandaro	&	Battaglini,	2000;	Transcrime,	2013a).
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114.	To	compare	SOS	Impresa’s	results	in	different	years	see	also	UNODC	(2011a).
115.	 Converted	 from	 GBP	 using	 http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/curConverter.do	 (ref	
date	30/12/2005).
(2013a),	 Scaglione	 (2014),	 and	 SOS	 Impresa	 (2010).114 
According	 to	 Transcrime’s	 estimates,	 the	 size	 of	 the	 usury	
market in Italy, in terms of revenues, amounts to around 2.2 
billion	 euro	 (Transcrime,	 2013a,	 p.	 61).	 SOS	 Impresa	 (2010)	
reports an income for OCGs of 15 billion euro in Italy in 2010, 
almost 20% of the total revenues of Italian organised crime. If 
compared to previous reports by SOS Impresa, the proceeds 
from	usury	grew	in	comparison	to	2008	(12.6	billion	euro).	The	
increase may be due to the 2009 economic crisis, suggesting 
that	 organised	 crime	 groups	 have	benefited	 from	 the	 credit	
crunch in the legal lending channels. The most updated 
empirical studies include Scaglione (2014), which estimates 
that usury in 2012 generated revenues of between 3.1 and 
6.2	billion	euro,	and	affected	372,000	companies	(Scaglione,	
2014, p. 87). 
Ellison,	 Collard,	 and	 Forster	 (2006)	 estimate	 that	 almost	
165,000 households in the UK used illegal loans in 2005. 
Illegal lenders loan an amount of 58.4 million euro115 yearly, and 
collect	a	profit	of	 175.1	million	euro	 from	those	 loans	 (Ellison,	
Collard,	&	Forster,	2006,	p.	38).
4.8.3. Actors 
The structure of the usury market in Europe and the role of 
usury actors, including OCGs, remain largely unexplored by 
the academic literature. As already noted, OCGs are not the 
only	players	in	the	usury	market.	Drawing	on	Scaglione	(2014),	
two	different	categories	of	lenders	can	be	identified:
•		 The	first	comprises	actors	that	usually	lend	to	households	
and small-medium enterprises to generate an income 
(unstructured usury). These	 actors	 (often	 individuals 
or small, not necessarily organised, groups) belong to 
a structure traditionally based on authority. They do not 
use	 significant	 violence	 but	 rely	 on	homogenous social 
environments	and	common	relationships	(often	parental).	
This	is	often	referred	to	as	‘neighbourhood	usury’,	 ‘district	
usury’	or	‘family	usury’.
•		 The	 second	 category	 comprises	 actors	 that	 lend	money	
with	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	 absorbing	 the	 victim’s	 wealth	
(structured usury) and, in the case of lending to companies, 
eventually	 taking	over	 the	business.	 It	 is	characterized	by	
higher levels of violence to secure the repayment of 
loans, and it is usually conducted by local crime groups or 
transnational OCGs,	including	mafia-type	associations.	
Illegal lender operations are mostly small-scale and domestic. 
In the UK, usury is reported to lie largely outside the realm 
of organised crime and to be a business built on social 
networks and family ties	(Ellison,	Collard,	&	Forster,	2006).	
However,	 there	 is	 ample	 evidence	 of	 Italian	mafias	 involved	
in usury in Italy, suggesting that the involvement of OCGs in 
usury	 is	 not	 uniform	across	Europe.	UNODC	 (2011a)	 reports	
that OCGs controlled 38% of the 40 billion euro Italian usury 
market in 2009, but it does not provide usury data on any 
other	European	country	(UNODC,	2011a).
As	regards	OCGs	(see	Table	36),	the	evidence	on	Italian	mafias	
has	already	been	mentioned.	Cosa	Nostra,	‘Ndrangheta	and,	in	
particular, Camorra are increasingly associated with usury in 
Italy	(Lo	Forte,	2008;	DNA,	2011;	Transcrime,	2013a;	Scaglione,	
2014). In particular, Camorra makes widespread use of loan 
sharking	in	Campania	(Lo	Forte,	2008;	Scaglione,	2014).	
Country
Estimate #
(million euro)
Min (million 
euro)
Max (million 
euro)
Reference 
year
Source
Italy
2,243 2013 Transcrime, 2013a
4,634 3,090 6,178 2012 Scaglione, 2014
15,000 2009 SOS Impresa, 2010
United 
Kingdom
175a 2005 Ellison,	Collard,	&	Forster,	2006
a Original	figure:	120	million	GBP.	Converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2005	exchange	rate	(Source	ECB).
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 35 - Estimates of the revenues from usury in OCP countries
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OCGs European Countries Sources
Albanian OCGs Italy DIA 2012
Apulian OCGs Italy
SOS	Impresa,	2010;	DIA	2011a,	2011b,	2012b;	DNA,	
2010, 2011, 2012
Camorra Italy
SOS	Impresa,	2010;	DIA,	2012b,	2013a,	2014;	DNA,	
2011,	2012;	Transcrime,	2013a;	Scaglione,	2014
Chinese OCGs Italy DIA	2010;	2011a;	2013a;	DNA,	2011
Cosa Nostra Italy
SOS	Impresa,	2010;	DIA,	2012a,	2012b,	2013a;	DNA,	
2011,	2012;	Transcrime,	2013a;	Scaglione,	2014
‘Ndrangheta Italy, Netherlands
SOS	Impresa,	2010;	DNA,	2010,	2011;	KLPD-DNR,	
2011;	DIA,	2012b,	2013a,	2014;	Scaglione,	2014
Other	Italian/Italian	
not	specified	OCGs
Italy, France Allum	&	Sands,	2004;	SOS	Impresa,	2010
Table 36 - Main OCGs involved in usury in Europe
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4.9.1. Introduction
Fraud	is	one	of	the	illicit	activities	most	difficult	to	define.	It	may	
include several types of criminal conducts and may involve 
different types of actors which are not always labelled as 
criminals and which may not be necessarily organised crime 
groups. However, there is general consensus that fraud, in its 
various forms, is becoming one of the most lucrative illegal 
activities for criminal organisations in Europe (PwC,	2011;	
Europol,	2013a;	OLAF,	2013).116
Types of frauds
As	 defined	 by	 the	 United	 Nations	 (2003),	 fraud	 may	 be	
understood	 as	 “the acquisition of another person’s 
property by deception”	(UN,	2003,	p.	91).	According	to	the	
ACFE	 -	 Association	 of	 Certified	 Fraud	 Examiners	 (2014),	 it	
“includes	any	intentional	or	deliberate	act	to	deprive	another	
of property or money by guile, deception, or other unfair 
means	 to	 it”.	 It	 is	 characterised	 by	 four	 elements	 (Golden,	
Skalak,	&	Clayton,	2006):	 false	representation,	 intentionality,	
confidentiality	and	financial	damage.
Many different forms of fraud exist. They can be carried 
out in a wide range of ways;	 they	can	be	committed	either	
by	 individuals	 or	 more	 structured	 organisations;	 they	 can	
concern numerous economic sectors, such as hotels and 
catering	(INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012,	p.	238),	health	care	(Adamoli	
et al.,1998, p. 25), trade in mobile phones, computer parts, 
fuel	or	cars	 (Europol,	 2009b),	 aid	and	cooperation	 (Adamoli	
et	 al.,1998,	 p.	 43),	 renewable	 energy	 (Caneppele,	Riccardi,	&	
Standridge,	2013),	and	oil	and	gas	supply	(Transcrime,	2013a).	
They may be undertaken systematically or occasionally, 
and	 they	 can	 be	 linked	 to	 other	 illicit	 activities	 (NFA,	 2013,	
p. 3). Moreover, fraud may involve a wide range of victims, 
including individuals, governments, and the private sector 
(Grant	Thornton	Ireland,	2013).	Described	below	are	some	of	
the frauds that can generate the highest proceeds, and which 
are commonly related to OCGs. 
VAT fraud
Value	 Added	 Tax	 (VAT)	 fraud	 constitute	 one	 of	 the	 most	
widespread types of tax fraud in Europe. Differences in 
taxation across different countries are exploited by OCGs 
in different ways. Most common are cross-border VAT 
frauds, usually known as Missing Trader Intra-Community 
(MTIC) fraud when only EU MS are involved, or Missing 
Trader Extra-Community (MTEC) fraud when perpetrated 
also	 through	 non-EU	 countries	 (Borselli,	 2011).	 Typically,	 a	
company buys goods free of VAT from a supplier located in 
another EU MS117 and sells it domestically, including the VAT 
in the price. Eventually, the company fails to remit the VAT to 
the	government,	which	as	a	consequence	suffers	a	loss	(FATF,	
2007). Carousel fraud is a more complex and organised form 
of MTIC. It involves numerous shell companies operating in 
different MSs which repeat the MTIC scheme systematically 
until	 the	 ‘carousel’	ends	with	 the	goods	being	re-exported	to	
the country of origin, where they are often sold at a lower price 
(FATF,	2007;	PwC,	2011).	
Card and bank account fraud 
Bank account and payment card fraud, often referred to as 
plastic fraud, is related to the fraudulent use of payment 
cards	(both	debit	and	credit)	or	the	unauthorized	use	of	funds	
from a bank account. The EU is the world’s largest market 
for payment card transactions:118 this creates numerous 
opportunities	 for	 OCGs	 (Europol,	 2011a).	 In	 some	 cases,	
the	 payment	 card	 itself	 is	 stolen;	 in	 other	 cases,	 access	 to	
an account is obtained through skimming, pharming and 
phishing techniques	(Europol,	2009a;	Europol,	2011a;	OCTF,	
2012a;	Levi	et	al.,	2013),	which	makes	 this	 fraud	 type	closely	
bound	up	with	identity	theft	(see	below).	Also	bank	accounts	
that do not foresee payment cards, such as savings accounts, 
may	be	targeted	(Pascual	&	Miller,	2013).	
Public funds fraud
Public funds frauds directly victimise governments at 
local, regional, national and EU level. OCGs misuse public 
procurements and subsidies, or acquire them in fraudulent 
manner.	These	frauds	can	generate	high	proceeds:	PwC	(2011)	
reported that single cases of fraud with EU funds ranged 
between	 5.5	 thousand	 and	 1	 billion	 euro	 (PwC,	 2011,	 p.	 46).	
The modus operandi include using falsified documents 
(Waterfield,	 2012;	 Caneppele,	 Riccardi,	 &	 Standridge,	 2013),	
corrupting public officials	(Europol,	2009a,	p.	21),	exploiting	
conflict of interests	 between	 the	 parties	 involved	 (e.g.	
kinship	between	a	public	official	and	the	bidder)	(OLAF,	2013,	
p.	10),	and	unauthorized	use	of	the	funds	granted.	EU	structural	
funds and external aids appear to be the most misused type of 
public	subsidies	(OLAF,	2013).
Mortgage fraud, insurance fraud and benefits fraud
Mortgage fraud is a crime in which the fraudster omits or 
falsifies	information	in	order	to	obtain	a	loan	from	a	bank	or	a	
financial	institution,	or	to	obtain	an	amount	larger	than	would	
otherwise have been approved. Other types of fraud cited in 
connection to OCGs include insurance fraud	(Levi,	Innes,	et	
al.,	2013,	p.	38;	OCTF,	2012a,	p.	27),	especially	‘crash-for-cash’ 
scams, and benefits fraud	(Grant	Thornton,	2013;	NFA,	2013).	
There is evidence that these types of fraudulent schemes 
are common in the UK and Ireland, and often reported in 
connection	to	OCGs	(see	Sections	5.3	and	5.7).
116.	 The	 European	 Anti-Fraud	 Office	 (OLAF)	 received	 1,294	 reports	 of	 fraud	
in 2013, more than they ever received before, and opened 253 investigations 
in	 that	 year	 (OLAF,	 2013,	 p.	 12);	 Eurojust	 registered	 382	 fraud	 cases	 in	 2012	
(Eurojust,	2013,	p.	28).	These	numbers	of	course	 represent	only	 the	 tip	of	 the	
iceberg. In fact, the risk of apprehension is quite low in fraud schemes because 
they	often	cross	national	and	EU	borders	(Europol,	2013a).
117. In fact, in intra-EU transactions, VAT is not debited by the supplier but self-
assessed by the buyer.
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Frauds and other illicit activities
Frauds are often closely linked to other illicit activities that are 
not usually described as types of fraud but often appear in 
connection with fraud and can facilitate it. 
Cybercrime, mass-marketing, identity theft
Technological developments and the non-regulation and 
anonymity of the Internet have facilitated fraudulent activities 
like payment card frauds, VAT carousels, and mass-marketing 
scams	 (Europol,	 2011a).	 In	 particular,	 fraudsters	 can	 use	
modern	 communication	 methods	 (e.g.	 emails,	 phone	 calls,	
text messages) in order to steal financial data, identity 
information, or simply money from the victims. Victims are 
lured	 into	scams	by	 false	promises	of	having	won	a	prize,	or	
they are invited to participate in a game with the promise of 
wealth	(NFA,	2013,	p.	40).119
Organised property crime 
The	organised	theft	of	credit	cards	or	financial	details,	either	
using cybercrime or by stealing physical credit or debit cards, 
is	a	precondition	for	the	commission	of	plastic	frauds	(FATF,	
2007;	OCTF,	2012a).	Another	example	is	the	theft	of	vehicles	
which can then be used to carry out frauds against car 
insurances	(Levi	&	Maguire,	2004)	(see	also	Section	5.7).	
Corruption
In frauds related to public funds or public procurements, 
criminals	 may	 use	 corruption,	 bribery	 and	 embezzlement	
in order to obtain grants, donations, funds or procurements 
(Europol,	2009a;	Gounev	&	Bezlov,	2010;	OLAF,	2010).	
Money laundering
Certain types of fraud may be committed either to launder 
the proceeds of criminal activities or to fund criminal activities 
themselves. For example, as will be discussed also in Section 
12.4, mortgage fraud can be used to launder illicit proceeds 
(OCTF,	2012a),	make	profits,	and	acquire	real	estate	property	
illegally	(FINCEN,	2006).	
There is also increasing evidence that fraud is used to raise 
funds for other illicit activities	 (Europol,	 2009a;	 Borselli,	
2011;	 Eurojust,	 2011a;	 NFA,	 2013),	 including	 drug	 trafficking	
(Aronowitz	 et	 al.,1996;	 FATF,	 2007;	 Europol,	 2011),	 human	
trafficking	 (FATF,	 2007),	 tobacco	 and	 alcohol	 smuggling,	
(Adamoli	 et	 al.,	 1998;	 OLAF,	 2010;	 Europol,	 2011a),	 fuel	
smuggling,	 counterfeiting	 (OCTF,	 2012a;	 Grant	 Thornton	
Ireland,	2013),	and	terrorism	(Europol,	2011a).
4.9.2. Estimates of the revenues from fraud 
Because of the complexity of some fraud schemes and the 
overlap between legal and illegal activities, it is virtually 
impossible to estimate the proceeds of frauds accurately 
(PwC,	 2011).	 A	 limited	 number	 of	 estimates	 exist,	 and	 the	
available	figures	present	multiple	problems.	
•		 First,	as	in	many	other	illicit	markets,	the	available	estimates	
lack a clear indication of the methodology	adopted;
•		 Second,	 most	 of	 available	 measures	 refer	 only	 to	
recovered amounts120 or to the loss suffered by victims 
(such	 as	 the	 loss	 to	 the	 state	 budget	 resulting	 from	VAT	
frauds), but not to the actual proceeds of the criminals 
involved. 
Nevertheless,	 empirical	methods	 to	 quantify	 the	 size	 of	 the	
fraud market have been devised, and the existing estimates 
are	presented	below.	Thereafter,	a	new	estimate,	specifically	
made by Transcrime for the purpose of Project OCP, of the 
revenues of MTIC frauds in all the EU 28 countries will be 
presented.
Available estimates at EU level
As said, the available studies on, and estimates of, the fraud 
market at EU level address a wide variety of fraud-types, 
and	mainly	provide	figures	on	 losses	(e.g.	 to	 the	government	
budget). However, most of these studies do not focus on how 
much OCGs earn from these activities.
Levi	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 put	 the	 direct	 economic	 costs	 of	 fraud 
against EU individuals at a minimum of 97 billion euro, and 
measured fraud against structural and agricultural EU 
funds	at	3	billion	euro	(Levi	et	al.,	2013).	The	EU	Commission	
(2006)	estimated	that	fiscal fraud cost the EU between 200 
and 250 billion euro in 2006, 60 billion of which losses were 
due to VAT fraud. In regard to the growing carbon fraud 
market,	fraud	with	ETS	(Emission	Trading	System)	allowances	
caused losses of more than 5 billion euro in tax revenues in 
2009	 (Europol,	 2009c).	 As	 far	 as	 payment	 card	 frauds	 are	
concerned, estimates for the EU as a whole range from 1.16 
billion	 (Levi	 et	 al.,	 2013)	 to	 1.5	 billion	 euro	 (Europol,	 2011a,	 p.	
30). See Table 37 for a more complete overview of previous 
estimates.
Estimates at the national level
Estimates for OCP countries are discussed below and 
presented in Table 38.
•		 Ireland. In Ireland fuel fraud is prevalent, and is estimated 
at	 between	 143	 and	 238	 million	 euro	 annually	 (Grant	
Thornton Ireland, 2013). Online payment card fraud is 
valued	at	around	20	million	euro	(Grant	Thornton	 Ireland,	
2014, on data on Irish Payment Service Organisation).
120.	The	European	Anti-Fraud	Office	(OLAF)	investigates	frauds	against	the	EU	
based	on	 information	received	from	public	(EU	institutions	and	Member	State	
authorities), and recommends which amounts the EU and member states can 
recover to their budgets. OLAF recommended 402.8 million euro be recovered 
in 2013, but a total of 117.05 million euro was actually recovered in 2013 EU-
wide	(OLAF,	2014).	These	figures	are	biased	by	the	focus	of	investigations	and	
available incoming information, and only represent a very small proportion of the 
fraud market.
119. According to a Eurobarometer survey, 12% of internet users across the EU 
have experienced online frauds and 8% have been exposed to identity theft 
(Eurobarometer,	2012a,	p.	5).
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Type of 
Fraud
Estimate #
(million euro)
Min (million 
euro)
Max (million 
euro)
Reference 
year
Source Notes
Payment 
card fraud
1,160 2012 Levi et al., 2013
Direct economic cost 
of payment cards fraud
1,500 2009 Europol, 2011a
Organised crime 
groups revenues 
derived from payment 
card fraud
EU funds 
fraud
3,000 2012 Levi et al., 2013
Direct economic cost 
of frauds against 
EU	(agricultural	and	
structural funds)
5,000 2009 Europol, 2009c
Frauds using ETS 
allowances
Fiscal fraud 225,000 200,000 250,000 2006 EU Commission, 2006
Overall tax losses due 
to	fiscal	fraud
VAT fraud
100,000 2013 Europol, 2013a
EU annual losses from 
MTIC
20,000 2012 Levi et al., 2013
Direct economic cost 
of fraud against EU 
(VAT/MTIC	fraud)
18,000 13,000 23,000 2009 Borselli, 2011
Annual amount of 
MTIC frauds in EU-27
27,500 20,000 35,000 2009 Borselli, 2011
Overall volume of VAT 
frauds	(MTIC,	MTEC,	
fraud on tradable 
services and under-
billing of imports)
60,000 2006 EU Commission, 2006 Losses from VAT fraud
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 37 - Estimates of the revenues from frauds at EU aggregate level121
121.  In the presence of an estimation range, estimate refers to the arithmetic 
mean	or,	only	when	specified,	to	an	adjusted	mean	(referred	to	as	best	estimate).	
For more details see the Methodological Annex.
122. SOS Impresa estimates that 100 percent of fraud in Italy is attributable to 
organised crime. According to their annual estimates, the amount of 4.6 billion 
euro	 was	 stable	 between	 2006	 and	 2010	 (for	 time	 trends	 see	 also	 UNODC,	
2011a, p. 28).
•		 Italy can be considered one of the largest markets for the 
misuse of EU funds, but no estimates are available. Available 
estimates	(e.g.	SOS	Impresa)	do	not	state	the	methodology	
employed and make questionable assumptions. 122
•		 Netherlands: Unger	(2007)	reported	that	financial,	social	
security and tax fraud amounted to between 7.7 and 15.5 
billion euro in 2003 in the Netherlands. A more recent 
report	 by	 PwC	 (2013)	 puts	 fraud	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 at	
a	 minimum	 of	 11	 billion	 euro,	 a	 figure	 which	 includes	 an	
estimated	4,238	million	euro	for	fiscal	frauds,	23	million	for	
excise	frauds,	and	39	million	for	VAT	frauds	(PwC,	2013).
•		 United Kingdom: As mentioned above, the National 
Fraud Authority issues annual reports on fraud in the UK. 
It estimated a loss of 62.4 billion euro due to fraud for 
2012-2013	 (NFA,	 2013).	 OCGs	 are	 estimated	 to	 generate	
between	10.9	and	23.3	billion	euro	of	the	fraud	market	(NFA,	
2013, p.32). Other reports on the UK estimate that 15 percent 
of the fraud market is controlled by OCGs, making up a 10.3 
billion	euro	market	(Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013,	p.	9).123
An estimate of MTIC fraud in EU countries
Given the very limited number of available estimates of frauds 
in Europe, and in primis the lack of estimates which could allow 
comparisons across EU countries, for the purpose of this study 
it was decided to measure the potential revenues from MTIC 
frauds in all EU MS. The result is one of the first estimates 
of frauds covering the whole of Europe allowing cross-
country comparison.
123.	As	for	Northern	 Ireland,	 fuel	 frauds	are	prevalent	(see	also	Section	5.3	on	
Ireland). In the years 2011-2012, 363,000 litres of illegal laundered or mixed fuel 
were	seized	by	HM	Revenue	&	Customs	officers,	accounting	for	1.6	million	euro	
(OCTF,	2012a,	p.	13).	The	UK	is	also	considered	the	largest	insurance	market	in	
Europe	and	the	world’s	third	largest	after	the	USA	and	Japan	(NFA,	2013).	Levi	et	
al.	(2013)	estimated	a	direct	economic	cost	of	1	billion	euro	for	insurance	frauds	
in	the	UK	alone,	of	which	482	million	euro	concerned	motor	vehicle	fraud	(Levi,	
et al. 2013, p. 38).
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Country
Estimate# 
(million 
euro)
Min 
(million 
euro)
Max 
(million 
euro)
Reference 
year
Source Notes
Ireland
190 143 238 2012
Grant Thornton 
Ireland, 2013
Fuel	fraud	(Government	loss	to	
Exchequer)
20 2012
Grant Thornton 
Ireland, 2014
Online payment card fraud
Italy 4,600 2009
SOS Impresa, 
2010
Organised	crime	proceeds	(type	of	
fraud	not	specified)
Netherlands
11,593 7,735 15,450 2003 Unger, 2007
Financial, social security and tax 
fraud
11,000 2013 PwC, 2013 All fraud - Minimum estimate
United 
Kingdom
17,100 10,950a 23,250a 2012 NFA, 2013
Fraud perpetrated by organised 
crime groups
2,583b 2012 NFA, 2013
Insurance	(whole	market	-	total	
estimated fraud loss in the private 
sector)
1,000 2012 Levi et al., 2013
Direct economic cost of insurance 
fraud	(OCG	share)
1,230c 2012 NFA, 2013
Mortgage	fraud	(whole	market	-	
total estimated fraud loss in the 
private sector)
477d 2012 NFA, 2013
Plastic	card	fraud	(whole	market	
- total estimated fraud loss in the 
private sector)
2,829e 2012 NFA, 2013
Procurement	fraud	(whole	market	
- total estimated fraud loss by local 
and central government)
16,800f 2011 NFA, 2013
Tax fraud and vehicle excise fraud 
(whole	market	-	total	estimated	
fraud loss of the Tax system)
10,324g 2010
Mills,	Skodbo,	&	
Blyth, 2013
a	Original	figures:	8.9	and	18.9	billion	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2012	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
b	Original	figure:	2.1	billion	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2012	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
c	Original	figure:	1	billion	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2012	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
d	Original	figure:	388	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2012	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
e	Original	figure:	2.3	billion	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2012	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
f	Original	figure:	14	billion	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
g	Original	figure:	8.9	billion	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 38 - Available estimates of the revenues from fraud in the OCP countries124
124.  In the presence of an estimation range, estimate refers to the arithmetic 
mean	or,	only	when	specified,	to	an	adjusted	mean	(referred	to	as	best	estimate).	
For more details, see the Methodological Annex.
125.	 	 VAT	 gap	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 theoretical	 tax	
liability	according	to	the	tax	law	and	the	actual	revenue	collected	(CASE	&	CPB,	
2013, p. 18).
It was decided to focus on MTIC frauds because of the high 
amount of illicit proceeds that they can generate, the large 
losses to EU governments, their highly organised nature, 
and in particular the important role that they have started to 
play	in	the	OCG	economy	in	Europe	(see	above).
The proceeds from MTIC frauds were calculated as 
percentages of the VAT gap125 estimated in each EU MS by 
CASE	and	CPB	(2013).	The	portion	of	the	VAT	gap	attributable	
to MTIC frauds was taken from previous studies and in 
particular	from	the	review	conducted	by	Borselli	 (2011,	p.	16).	
This percentage varies between 11% and 19.4%.
It was believed that this estimate was a better proxy for 
organised VAT fraud than the VAT gap itself, because the 
latter	 includes	 all	 causes	 of	 tax	 loss	 (both	 with	 and	 without	
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Country
VAT gap attributable to MTIC frauds (million euro)
Average (15.2%) Min (11%) Max (19.40%)
Austria 527 381 673
Belgium 755 547 964
Bulgaria 92 66 117
Czech	Republic 645 467 823
Denmark 390 282 498
Estonia 46 33 58
Finland 430 311 549
France 4,899 3,546 6,253
Germany 4,090 2,960 5,221
Greece 1,484 1,074 1,894
Hungary 562 407 718
Ireland 168 122 215
Italy 5,492 3,975 7,010
Latvia 145 105 185
Lithuania 206 149 262
Luxembourg 84 61 107
Malta 3 2 4
Netherlands 610 441 778
Poland 822 595 1,050
Portugal 420 304 536
Romania 1,573 1,138 2,008
Slovakia 421 305 538
Slovenia 50 36 63
Spain 2,310 1,672 2,948
Sweden 142 103 181
United Kingdom 2,962 2,144 3,780
Total OCP Countries 16,872 12,210 21,534
Total EU 26 29,329 21,225 37,433
Table 39 - Estimates of the revenues from MTIC frauds (EU 26) (2011)
Source:Transcrime elaboration on CASE & CPB (2013) data
criminal	intentions)	and	all	actors	(including	both	unorganised	
and organised crime). The use of the VAT gap would therefore 
have led to a large overestimation of the OCG share in this 
type	of	fraud	(see	the	Methodological	Annex	for	details).
The results of the estimates are set out in Table 39. From these 
calculations, it appears that Italy exhibits the highest proceeds 
from	 MTIC	 fraud	 (i.e.	 organised	 VAT	 frauds),	 followed	 by	
France and Germany. The results are quite consistent with 
those	in	the	previous	literature	(see	e.g.	Borselli,	2011).
4.9.3. Actors 
The nature and the type of actors involved in fraud schemes 
may vary widely, ranging from individuals	 (Aronowitz,	
Laagland,	 &	 Paulides,	 1996,	 p.	 94)	 to	 extremely	 structured 
criminal organisations. Actors often overlap or cooperate126 
(e.g.	 organised	 crime	 groups	 may	 establish	 fraud	 schemes	
with the support of professionals or IT experts). Moreover, the 
126. This is particularly true given the nature of certain fraud schemes. For 
example, the scheme behind MTIC or carousel VAT fraud is to circulate the 
goods	as	much	as	possible	in	order	to	steal	the	VAT	each	time	(FATF,	2007,	p.	
3).	This	is	a	crucial	inducement	for	OCGs	to	cooperate,	on	a	‘international	trade	
basis’	rather	than	compete	(FATF,	2007,	p.	17).
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Internet, which is increasingly used in certain fraud schemes 
(see	 above),	 makes	 it	 more	 difficult to determine which 
groups operate in which locations	(Adamoli	et	al.,	1998,	p.	
20;	Europol,	2009a,	p.	54).
Although scholars acknowledge that gain is possible 
and serious damage may be inflicted by small individual 
operations, large revenues are mainly generated by highly 
organised fraud schemes	(Aronowitz	et	al.,	1996,	pp.	87-90;	
NFA, 2013, p. 3). Usually, the more complex the scheme, and 
the more transnational the operations, the greater the gain 
of	the	criminals	involved	(OLAF,	2011;	Levi,	2014,	p.	12).	This	is	
certainly true of VAT or other excise frauds.127 
Some fraud schemes require a level of organisation and 
international connections that individual fraudsters are 
unlikely	 to	 possess	 (Adamoli	 et	 al.,	 1998,	 p.	 11).	 Complex	
schemes require a specialised workforce and a strict 
division of labour	 (Adamoli	et	al.,	 1998,	p.	22;	Van	Duyne	et	
al., 2007, p. 94). Each member involved in the operation has a 
specific	task,	and	is	often	highly	specialised.	This	may	induce	
OCGs to resort to freelancers and specialists hired on 
OCGs
European 
Countries
Type of fraud Sources
African OCGs
France, Germany, 
Italy
Mass	marketing	fraud;	
Credit	card	fraud;	Insurance	
fraud;	Cyberfraud
Adamoli	et	al.,	1998;	Europol,	2009a;	DNA,	2011,	2012;	
BKA,	2012;	Le	Figaro,	2012;	OCTF,	2012a
Balkan OCGs
Belgium, Germany, 
Sweden
Product	fraud	(electronics);	
Financial fraud schemes
Adamoli	et	al.,	1998;	BKA,	2010,	2011,	2012;	OSAC,	
2014c
British OCGs
Ireland, Sweden, 
UK
VAT	carousel;	Mortage	
fraud,	Insurance	frauds	(e.g.	
‘crash-for-cash’)
FATF,	2007;	An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a;	Daily	
Record, 2013
Bulgarian OCGs France, Italy Cyberfraud
DIA,	2011a,	2011b;	Europol,	2009a;	Iadeluca,	2012;	
INHESJ - ONDRP, 2012
Camorra Italy
EU funds and other public 
funds Fraud
DNA,	2012;	Transcrime,	2013a
Chinese OCGs Germany, Italy, UK
Payment card fraud, VAT 
fraud
Adamoli	et	al.,	1998;	BKA,	2006;	DIA,	2013a;	DNA,	
2011,	2012;	Europol,	2009a,	2011a;	Wang,	2013
Cosa Nostra Italy
EU funds and other public 
funds	fraud;	Carbon	credit	
fraud;	VAT	fraud
Adamoli	et	al.,	1998;	DIA,	2013a;	DNA,	2011,	2012;	
Europol, 2013a 
Dutch OCGs Belgium, Germany Tax fraud
Adamoli	et	al.,	1998;	BKA,	2006,	2007,	2008,	2009,	
2010
Irish OCGs France, Ireland, UK Fuel frauds
An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a;	INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	
2012;	Grant	Thornton	Ireland,	2013
‘Ndrangheta Italy
EU funds and other public 
funds	fraud;	Carbon	credit	
fraud;	VAT	fraud
DNA,	2011,	2012;	DIA,	2012b,	2014;	Europol,	2013a;	
Transcrime,2013a
Other Asian OCGs
Belgium, Germany, 
Italy
Credit	card	fraud;	Insurance	
fraud;	Product	fraud	(oil);	
Cyber	fraud;	Tax	fraud
Adamoli	et	al.,	1998;	BKA,	2008,	2009,	2010;	DNA,	
2010,	2011,	2012;	Europol,	2009a,	2011a
Other Eastern 
European OCGs
Germany, France, 
Sweden
Payment	card	fraud;	VAT	
fraud;	Tax	fraud
Adamoli	et	al.,	1998;	BKA,	2010,	2011,	2012;	Europol,	
2011a;	INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012;	OSAC,	2014d
Other	Italian/Italian	
not	specified	OCGs
Belgium, Germany
Fraud	(not	specified);	VAT	
fraud
Adamoli	et	al.,	1998;	BKA,	2012;	Eurojust,	2012
Other Western 
European OCGs
Germany VAT	fraud;	Tax	fraud Europol,	2009a;	BKA,	2010,	2011,	2012
Romanian OCGs
Italy, Romania, 
France
Cyberfraud
Europol,	2009a;	DIA,	2010b,	2011a,	2011b;	BKA,	2012;	
INHESJ - ONDRP, 2012
Russian/Georgian	
OCGs
Finland, Germany, 
Sweden, 
Switzerland,	UK
VAT	fraud;	Payment	card	
fraud;	Insurance	fraud
Adamoli	et	al.,	1998;	Helsingin	Sanomat,	2007;	
Europol,	2009a;	BKA,	2010,	2011,	2012;	Cheloukhine	
&	Haberfeld,	2011;	Kegö	&	Molcean,	2011;	FEDPOL,	
2011,	2013;	Interpol,	2014a;	OSAC,	2014c
Spanish OCGs UK VAT carousel FATF, 2007
Turkish OCGs Germany Tax fraud BKA, 2010, 2011, 2012
Table 40 - OCGs involved in fraud activities across Europe
127. For example, a successful VAT carousel fraud or excise fraud scheme can 
be	 internationalised	 via	 off-shore	 banks	 (FATF,	 2007),	 which	may	 be	 located	
in	 the	UAE	or	 the	Dutch	Antilles	 (Europol,	 2011a,	p.	29),	 and	may	 involve	shell	
companies	 (Aronowitz	 et	 al.,1996;	 Adamoli	 et	 al.,1998,	 p.	 44)	 established	 in	
offshore	or	tax	havens	to	hide	the	ownership	of	the	assets	(Eurojust,	2011a,	p.	27).
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Figure 16 - Estimates of the scale of MTIC frauds for the available EU MS. Absolute values (left) and percentages of GDP 
(right)
Revenues - Mn euro
< 351
351 - 1,900
1,901 - 3,450
> 3,450
Not available
% of GDP 2010
< 0.17 %
0.17 - 0.24 %
0.25 - 0.43 %
> 0.43 %
Not available
Source: Transcrime elaboration on estimates reported in Table 39
the legal market. For example, there are frequent reports of 
OCGs hiring unemployed IT experts to commit cybercrime 
(INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012,	p.	229).	
Similarly, the overlap between illegal activities and the 
legitimate sphere, which has become wider in many illicit 
markets	(see	Sections	4.3,	4.5	and	4.6),	is	particularly	apparent	
in the case of fraud. The use of legitimate companies has 
now become crucial for the establishment of fraud schemes, 
especially ones like VAT carousels, excise frauds related to 
the importation and supply of oil and gas, etc. The frequent 
involvement of companies by OCGs in the commission of 
frauds has further complicated detection of which criminal 
groups	are	involved	(Europol,	2011a,	p.	31).
Bearing these features in mind, it is possible to identify 
some	 broad	 categories	 of	 OCGs	 classified	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
the	 main	 area	 or	 country	 of	 origin	 (see	 Chapter	 2	 and	 the	
Methodological Annex) and the types of fraud in which they 
are most frequently involved. 
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4.10.1. Introduction
Property crimes, such as thefts or robberies, can be offences 
committed by common criminals, but they may also be 
part of the activities of OCGs	 (Europol,	 2014b).	 Organised	
property	 crime	 (OPC)	 is	 attractive	 to	OCGs.	 First,	 it	 can	 be	
considered	safer	than	other	criminal	activities.	 Indeed,	LEA’s	
often treat incidents of theft as isolated events, investigating 
them	only	 locally	 (Europol,	 2009b,	 2013a).	 This	 reduces	 the	
likelihood of efficient countermeasures. Furthermore, the 
growth of global infrastructure for moving people and goods 
and the rapid development of e-commerce facilitate the 
transport and sale of stolen products. 
Organised crime networks can exploit these new opportunities 
to	relocate	(physically	or	digitally)	easily	when	under	pressure	
or	 to	 make	 the	 LEAs’	 interventions	 more	 difficult	 (Europol,	
2013a). Finally, OCGs usually target products that are 
valuable and characterized by broad and stable demand, 
which	ensures	 large	profits.	These	 factors	combine	 to	make	
OPC a lucrative activity. Moreover, considering the high level of 
law enforcement against the more traditional activities carried 
out by OCGs, OPC may be viewed in terms of displacement 
as OCGs shift from riskier activities to these safer but equally 
profitable	crimes	(Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014).	
Staring from the consideration above, the targets of OPC are 
often determined by what is in demand, what is valuable, and 
what is easily transportable or hidden. Demand for stolen and 
cheaper products may arise when the legal supply of goods 
is	insufficient	or	expensive	(Gounev	&	Bezlov,	2008;	Riccardi,	
Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014).	In	regard	to	value,	the	few	studies	
on this topic have found that product price is correlated with 
the	 number	 of	 thefts	 of	 certain	 products	 (Bowman,	 2008;	
Sidebottom,	Ashby,	&	Johnson,	2011;	Sidebottom	et	al.,	2014).	
Finally, further determinants of targeted products are ease 
of theft, ease of transport, and ease of resale	 (Europol,	
2009b;	 Riccardi,	 Dugato,	 &	 Polizzotti,	 2014).	 Among	 the	
products most frequently targeted are: motor vehicles, art and 
antiques,	pharmaceuticals,	and	metal	(see	below).	
Finally, it must be noted that OPC is often linked to other illicit 
markets. It may be the main enterprise of a group, or a side 
activity	undertaken	to	finance	the	OCG	(An	Garda	Síochána	
&	 PSNI,	 2012a).	 The	 counterfeiting	 of	 car	 papers	 in	 order	
to transport stolen cars, the use of stolen pharmaceuticals 
as illicit drugs, the use of stolen vehicles for trafficking, the 
corruption of employees, police-officers or guards in order 
to	 commit	 a	 robbery,	 insurance	 fraud	 scams,	 and	finally	 the	
use of stolen products to launder money are examples of 
the interactions between OPC and other organised criminal 
activities	 (Gouney	&	 Bezlov,	 2008;	 Interpol,	 2014c;	 Riccardi,	
Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014).
Motor vehicle theft
Although some cars are stolen for recreational purposes, a 
substantial amount of cars are stolen by professional thieves 
(Gounev	 &	 Bezlov,	 2008).	 Those	 stolen	 by	 professional	
organised	 thieves	 serve	 often	 to	 committ	 other	 crimes	 (e.g.	
robberies	or	drug	trafficking)	or	to	make	profit	(Interpol,	2014b,	
2014d).	 Cars	 that	 are	 stolen	 for	 profit	 are	 usually	 treated	 in	
one of four ways: returned for a ransom, smuggled abroad, 
stripped	 for	parts,	 or	 cloned	and	 sold	domestically	 (Gounev	
&	Bezlov,	2008).	Therefore,	 a	certain	 level	of	organisation	 is	
need expecially for storing, moving and eventually reselling 
the	 stolen	vehichles,	whole	or	dismanteled	 in	parts	 (Hignett,	
2004). The vehicles principally targeted by transnational 
OCGs are car models which are widely used	 (e.g.	Toyota)	
and luxury cars	(Interpol,	2014b).	There	has	recently	been	an	
increase in the theft of catalytic converters, which are stolen 
for	 the	 metals	 that	 they	 contain	 (Europol,	 2013a;	 Europol,	
2014d;	 NCA,	 2014).	 Beside	 cars	 and	 car	 parts,	 agricultural	
and	building	machines	(plant)	are	also	the	target	of	thefts	(An	
Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a,	Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013).	
Metal theft
A worldwide shortage has created an incentive for the theft 
of	 metals	 such	 as	 aluminium,	 brass,	 zinc,	 nickel,	 platinum,	
lead	 and	 bronze	 (Bennett,	 2008;	 Europol,	 2009b;	 Bond,	
Hainsworth,	&	Lau,	2013).	Prices	 for	 lead and copper have 
doubled in the past decade,128 and metal theft has risen 
together	with	 those	prices	 (Bennet,	2008;	Sidebottom	et	al.,	
2014). Copper is one of the metals most stolen since it is widely 
used, e.g. in railways, telecommunications and construction, 
and	healthcare	estate	 (Sidebottom,	Ashby,	&	Johnson,	 2011;	
Baillie,	 2012;	 Mills,	 Skodbo,	 &	 Blyth,	 2013;	 Sidebottom	 et	 al.,	
2014). Metals are relatively easy to access and are stolen both 
‘live’	(in	use)	and	from	storage	spaces	(Sidebottom,	Ashby,	&	
Johnson, 2011). Recent studies also highlight the emergence 
of lead thefts from old churches or other historical buildings 
(Bond,	Hainsworth,	&	Lau,	2013).	Stolen	metals	do	not	require	
laundering before resale, and they are resold on the legal 
market	 via	 scrap	 yards	 (Bennet,	 2008).	 However,	 stealing	
metal	 could	 be	 very	 dangerous	 (Curinga	 et	 al.,	 2010)	 and	 it	
usually requires that large amounts of metal have to be stolen 
for	 being	 profitable.	 This	 suggest	 a	 medium-high	 level	 of	
organisation and the involvement of several actors. 
Pharmaceuticals theft
Although the counterfeiting of medicine is prevalent, also the 
theft of medicine is a substantial source of income for OCGs 
as	well	(Interpol,	2014c).	The	demand	for	medicine	is	large	and	
stable. Areas where reimbursement is low and the legal supply 
is	insufficient	(e.g.	Eastern	Europe)	are	preferable	destinations	
of stolen pharmaceuticals, although it cannot be excluded 
that these medicines are re-used on the internal illegal market 
or	re-entered	in	the	legal	trade	through	fictitious	wholesalers	
(Riccardi,	 Dugato,	 &	 Polizzotti,	 2014).	 The	 most	 popular	
targets of pharmaceutical theft include high-priced medicine, 
(such	 as	 cancer treatment) and lifestyle medicine (to 
treat erectile dysfunction). Besides being small, light, high 
in demand and valuable, pharmaceuticals are easy to sell via 
the Internet, features which make them an important target for 
OCGs	(Interpol,	2014c).	Research	confirms	the	important	role	
128.	 Retrieved	 September	 10	 from	 http://www.infomine.com/chartsanddata/
chartbuilder.aspx?g=127681&cd=1.
4.10. Organised property crime                                                                                                                             
Jeltsje Cusveller and Marco Dugato (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
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played	by	organized	crime	 for	 this	 type	of	 theft.	Specialized	
individuals and a high organisation	are	required	to	infiltrate	
or corrupt medical personnel and wholesalers and to identify, 
store,	transport	and	resell	stolen	medicines	(Riccardi,	Dugato,	
&	Polizzotti,	2014).	
Cargo theft
OPCs are often grouped by type of product stolen, with the 
exception of cargo theft. The hijacking or stealing of goods 
while in transport is a major problem in Europe, and it causes 
billions	of	euro	in	losses	to	companies	(Europol,	2009b;	BKA,	
2013). Cargo thefts occur in storage areas and on the road 
(Europol,	 2009b).	 The	 products	 taken	 from	 lorries	 include	
electronics, clothes, medicine, oil, vehicles and tobacco 
(Jane’s	Information	Group,	2013).
Other targets of OPC include: art and antiques, jewellery, 
optical instruments, electronics, smartphones, boat engines, 
oil,	 wildlife	 and	 plants	 (Moffatt	 &	 Fitzgerald,	 2006;	 Bowman,	
2011;	Europol,	2013a;	Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013).
4.10.2. Estimates of the revenues from 
organised property crime
Important sources of estimates of this illegal market are the 
losses	 reported	 by	 insurance	 companies	 (e.g.	 Swiftcover,	
2012;	BKA,	2013).	However,	 these	estimates	are	problematic	
because	the	figures	do	not	 include	an	estimate	of	 the	share 
caused by OCGs in the losses. Moreover, a proportion of 
thefts	is	not	reported	(e.g.	out	of	fear	of	reputation	loss),	and	
a number of reported thefts are in fact insurance frauds 
and	 not	 actual	 thefts	 (Nayler,	 2008).	 Police	 data	 are	 not	
Country
Estimate 
(million euro)
Reference 
year Source Notes
Finland
0.34 2007 Europol, 2009b Cargo theft
182 2004 Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	2007 Cargo theft
France
48 2007 Europol, 2009b Cargo theft
1,022 2004 Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	2007 Cargo theft
Ireland
97 N/A McMahon, 2013
4 N/A McMahon, 2013
0.77 2007 Europol, 2009b Cargo theft
148 2004 Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	2007 Cargo theft
Italy
0.33 2013 Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014
Theft	of	medicine	from	hospitals	(per	
episode of theft)
11 2007 Europol, 2009b Cargo theft
619 2004 Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	2007 Cargo theft
90 2001-2012 Jane's	Information	Group,	2013 Cargo theft
Netherlands
47 2004 Europol, 2009b Cargo theft
329 2007 Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	2007 Cargo theft
Spain
21 2007 Europol, 2009b Cargo theft
968 2004 Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	2007 Cargo theft
United 
Kingdom
359a 2011 Swiftcover, 2012 Car theft
383b 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013 Car theft
28c 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013 Metal theft
60d 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013 Road freight
233 2007 Europol, 2009b Cargo theft
1,311 2004 Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	2007 Cargo theft
EU 26 8,256 2007 Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	2007 Cargo theft
a	Original	figure:	300	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	currency	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
b Original	figure:	330	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	currency	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
c Original	figure:	24	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	currency	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
d	Original	figure:	52	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	currency	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
Table 41 - Estimates of the proceeds from organised property crime in the OCP countries and EU as a whole
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Figure 17 - Estimates of the scale of cargo theft for the available EU MS. Monetary values (left) and percentages of GDP (right)
Revenues - Mn euro
< 1
1  - 25
26 - 90
> 90
Not available
% of  GDP 2010
< 0.0003 %
0.0003 - 0.0007 %
0.0008 - 0.002 %
> 0.002 %
Not available
Source: Transcrime elaboration on estimates reported in Table 42 and Eurostat data
always useful for the construction of estimates because they 
often report the type of offence and not the type of product 
stolen	(Bowman,	2011;	 Interpol,	2014b).	Table	41	presents	the	
estimates	of	the	size	of	the	OPC	market	for	available	subtypes	
and countries. 
4.10.3. Actors 
Both mafia-type groups and smaller, highly mobile 
networks	are	reported	to	be	involved	in	OPC	(Europol,	2013a,	
Riccardi,	 Dugato,	 &	 Polizzotti,	 2014).	 Given	 the	 high	 level	 of	
expertise	 that	 is	 needed	 for	 some	OPCs	 (i.e.	 for	 counterfeit	
car	papers,	infiltrating	a	hospital)	specialization is common 
among	 OCGs	 (Europol,	 2014c;	 Interpol,	 2014b;	 Riccardi,	
Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014).	However,	groups	 that	steal	many	
different	 types	 of	 goods	 are	 also	 present	 (Europol,	 2014b).	
Actors include both foreign and local OCGs.
Eastern European OCGs operate throughout Europe. 
Almost all South-Eastern European countries129 were 
reported to be sites of organised car theft by Savona and 
Curtol	(2004),	and	all	but	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	were	found	
to	 be	 transit	 countries	 for	 stolen	 vehicles	 (Savona	&	Curtol,	
2004). Romania, Poland and Hungary are the countries in 
which the largest number of European cargo thefts take place 
(Europol,	2009b).	Bulgarian	networks	steal	cars,	mainly	from	
Spain,	 in	 order	 to	 traffic	 them	 back	 to	 Bulgaria	 (Gounev	 &	
Bezlov,	2008).	Polish	and	Turkish	are	respectively	the	second	
and third main nationalities of car theft suspects in Germany 
(BKA,	2013).	Recently,	 a	Hungarian	group	was	apprehended	
for	stealing	antique	maps	throughout	Europe	(Europol,	2014c).	
Romanian OCGs are active in the theft of cargo from France 
(Europol,	2009b)	and	Italy.	Albanian	groups	steal	cargo	in	Italy	
(Section	 5.4).	 Finland	 reports	 an	 increase	 in	 foreign	 Eastern	
129.	 Albania,	 Bosnia	 and	 Herzegovina,	 Bulgaria,	 Croatia,	 Hungary,	 Moldova,	
Poland,	 Romania,	 Serbia,	 Montenegro,	 Slovakia,	 Slovenia,	 Czech	 Republic,	
Macedonia, Turkey.
Country
Estimate 
(million 
euro)
Country
Estimate 
(million 
euro)
Austria 1.9 Lithuania 0.2
Belgium 11.5 Luxembourg 1.9
Bulgaria 0.03 Malta 0.004
Cyprus 0 Netherlands 46.8
Czech	Republic 1.1 Poland 1.2
Denmark 2.7 Portugal 0.2
Estonia 0.01 Romania 0.3
Finland 0.3 Slovakia 0.5
France 47.7 Slovenia 0
Germany 32.3 Spain 21.2
Greece 1.6 Sweden 5.8
Hungary 1.7
United 
Kingdom
232.8
Ireland 0.8
Total OCP 
countries
361.0
Italy 11.4 Total EU 27 424.4
Latvia 0.5
Table 42 - Estimates of the revenues of cargo theft (EU 27 
MS)
Source: Europol 2009b, pp. 5-6
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European/Baltic	OCGs	involved	in	property	crimes	targeting	
electronics,	 jewellery,	 vehicles	 and	 construction	 sites	 (NBI,	
2013. See also Section 5.1). Romanian, Albanian and Georgian 
specialized	 OCGs	 are	 active	 in	 burglaries	 and	 thefts	 from	
residential	houses	in	Italy	(Polizia	di	Stato,	2014).
A characteristic of transnational property crime is the use 
of	 diaspora	 communities;	 many	 OCGs	 work	 with	 locals of 
shared ethnicity	(Europol,	2013a;	Interpol,	2014b).	Bulgarian	
communities in Spain, north-African groups in France, and 
Chinese in the United Kingdom are among the immigrant 
communities	 involved	 in	 OPC	 (Gounev	 &	 Bezlov,	 2008;	
Europol,	2009b;	Wang,	2013).
Western Europe is mainly a source of targeted products. 
Besides Eastern European actors, local groups may also play 
a role. In Italy, the Camorra and Apulian mafias are involved 
in	 pharmaceutical	 theft,	 and	 Camorra	 and	 ‘Ndrangheta	 are	
involved	in	robberies	(Jane’s	Information	Group,	2013;	Riccardi,	
Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014).	French	groups	are	involved	in	the	
commission	of	cargo	theft	in	France	(Europol,	2009b),	British	
local groups are involved in organised robberies in the UK 
(NCA,	2014).	Germans	are	 the	main	of	car	 theft	 suspects	 in	
Germany	(BKA,	2013),	and	Irish	groups	are	reported	to	operate	
in	 Ireland	and	 the	UK,	 in	both	metal	 theft	and	car	 theft	 (see	
also 5.3.2.8). Stolen cars are sold domestically or transported 
to	Eastern	Europe	(An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a).	
OCGs European Countries Type of theft Sources
Albanian OCGs Italy
Theft	of	medicines;	
trafficking in stolen vehicles
DIA,	2012b;	Iadeluca,	2012;	Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	
Polizzotti,	2014
Apulian OCGs Italy
Theft	of	medicines;	theft	of	
vehicles;	organised	robbery
DIA,	2014;	Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014
Bulgarian OCGs Italy, Bulgaria, Spain
Theft	of	medicines;	
trafficking in stolen vehicles
Gounev	&	Bezlov,	2008;	Iadeluca,	2012;	
Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014
Other Eastern 
European OCGs
France, Italy, Germany, 
Sweden, Portugal, South 
East Europe, Finland
Theft	of	medicines;	car	theft;	
burglaries;	art	theft
Europol,	2009b;	BKA,	2013;	NBI,	2013;	OSAC,	
2014b,	2014c;	Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	
2014
Romanian OCGs Italy, France Theft	of	medicines;	car	theft
Savona	&	Curtol,	2004;	Europol,	2009b;	DIA,	
2012a;	Iadeluca,	2012;	Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	
Polizzotti,	2014;
Russian/Georgian	
OCGs
Poland, Italy, Sweden
Theft	of	medicines;	car	theft;	
art theft
Cheloukhine	&	Haberfeld,	2011;	OSAC,	2014d;	
Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014
Table 43 - Main OCGs active in organised property crime across Europe
95 | Part 1
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of illicit markets in the 
seven OCP countries: Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
For each country, the analysis will focus on:
•		 the	available	estimates	on	the	scale of the revenues from 
illicit	markets	in	the	country;	
•		 the	criminal actors involved and among whom these illicit 
revenues are shared.
5.1.1. Introduction
Despite the lack of information on activity by criminal groups 
in Finland, it is evident that illicit markets play a crucial role in 
the	country’s organised crime economy. In particular, drug 
trafficking and fraud	 (especially	 in	 the	 form	of	 tax	evasion	
and	black	market	labour)	appear	to	be	the	two	most	profitable	
illegal businesses in Finland and the main areas of organised 
crime	activity.	This	Section	provides	one	of	the	first	analyses	
of	illicit	markets	in	the	country,	focusing	on	(a)	the	amount	of	
proceeds that are generated and available for laundering and 
(b)	what	criminal	actors	are	involved.	
Data, sources and methodology
There are few studies on organised crime in Finland, and 
especially on OCG involvement in illegal markets. Information 
on the prices of illicit goods and the market share attributable 
to criminal groups is inadequate or non-existent, so that any 
kind of estimation is speculative or even unreliable. Moreover, it 
is difficult to analyse the roles of each criminal group, because 
illicit markets cannot be clearly divided among different 
actors, and because OCGs constantly evolve in their pursuit of 
profit	and	adjust	to	the	changing	situations	of	illegal	markets.	
Given the lack of literature and of data, the main sources used 
in	this	country	profile	of	Finland	are:
130.	NBI’s	main	task	is	to	combat	serious,	international	and	organised	crime	and	
produce up-to-date and reliable situational awareness on these crime areas. 
NBI has the most extensive updated information on OC in Finland. Its surveys 
are based on criminal intelligence gathered in cooperation between police 
authorities, Finnish Customs and Finnish Border Guard Service. The reports 
also	 include	 police	 and	 other	 agencies'	 reports,	 judicial	 evidence,	 crime	 and	
administrative statistics and open sources.
131. Most of the NBI reports are not publicly available because they contain 
confidential	information.
5. Focus on seven 
European countries                   
5.1. Finland                                                                                                                             
Sarianna Petrell and Jarmo Houtsonen (Police University College, Finland)
•		 Reports	of	the	National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),130 
and in particular NBI crime situation reports, threat 
assessments and annual reports.131
•		 Media reports	(e.g.	the	Helsingin	Sanomat	newspaper).
Organised crime groups in Finland
Organised crime - as today understood as consisting of 
organised	crime	groups	 (OCGs)	and	other	criminal	alliances	
cooperating with extensive partner networks - is a relatively 
new phenomenon in Finland	 (NBI,	 2012).	 Professional	 and	
organised forms of crime were apparent at least from the 
1920s onwards, but it was not until the 1970s that the effects 
of organised crime became evident. The establishment of 
criminal gangs accelerated at the end of 1980s, and the 
first international outlaw Motorcycle gangs (OMCG), 
Hells Angels and Bandidos, entered Finland during the 
1990s. The number of criminal groups has grown substantially 
during the 2000s, and the sphere of organised crime has 
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acquired more serious and professional features in the form of 
skilled criminal alliances	that	infiltrate	both	illegal	and	legal	
structures	of	society	(NBI,	2012,	2013).	
Organised crime is committed mostly by flexible networks 
in Finland. As elsewhere in Europe, network-style criminal 
groups based on the capacity to operate on an international 
basis with multiple partners and in multiple crime areas and 
countries	are	on	the	rise	(see	e.g.	Bruinsma	&	Bernasco,	2004).	
For example, members of hierarchically structured OCGs like 
the Outlaw Motorcycle gangs cooperate in appropriate roles 
with other actors in both the criminal and the legal sphere 
(NBI,	 2013).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Junninen,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 his	
interviews with criminals, argues that at least in the 1990s 
Finnish	organised	"crimes	do	not	comprise	 large,	permanent	
or hierarchical criminal organisations. Instead, they are carried 
out in flexible and opportunistic project groups with 
variable compositions"	(Junninen,	2009,	p.	507).
Members of OCGs annually commit around 2,500 crimes, 
80	 percent	 of	 which	 are	 so-called	 ‘habitual’	 crimes.	 The	
remaining 20 percent are aggravated offences in the 
fields of narcotics, violence, extortion, and the economy 
(Nevala	 &	 Ranta,	 2006).	 As	 regards	 aggravated	 offences,	
OCGs in Finland are mainly involved in the drugs business, but 
they seem increasingly to favour financial crime in the form 
The number of criminal groups has progressively 
increased in Finland: in 2000, the criminal underground 
comprised eight outlaw gang chapters, which in autumn 
2013	 had	 increased	 to	 more	 than	 60	 (see	 Figure	 18).	 At	
present, OCGs are reported to have approximately 1,000 
members	 in	 total	 (NBI,	 2013).	 Outlaw	 Motorcycle	 gangs	
wearing badges or tattoos as symbols are the most visible 
layer of organised crime in Finland, even though most OCGs 
are not outlaw Motorcycle gangs. 
The largest, most active, and most notorious outlaw 
Motorcycle gangs in Finland are Hells Angels MC (HAMC), 
Bandidos MC (BMC), Cannonball MC (CMC), and United 
Brotherhood (UB). The Finnish HAMC and BMC belong to 
the international organisations of Hells Angels and Bandidos, 
whereas Cannonball and United Brotherhood are indigenous 
groups. Finnish outlaw gangs cooperate, so that there are two 
larger	‘camps’	of	gangs,	one	concentrated	around	the	HAMC	
and	the	other	around	the	BMC	(NBI,	2013).	
The main OCGs in Finland are constantly growing in strength, 
and they constitute an increasing threat to society. Although 
they are mostly present in densely populated regions with 
active economies, potential markets for illegal goods, and 
opportunities for cross-border crime, they are spreading 
throughout the country and expanding their operations 
into new geographic areas, particularly in regions logistically 
significant	from	the	point	of	view	of	illegal	activity,	like	South-
East Finland close to the routes leading to Russia and to 
the sea, Northern Finland close to the land border between 
Finland and Sweden, and South-West Finland close to the sea 
routes	to	Sweden	and	other	Baltic	Sea	ports	(NBI,	2013).	
Organised crime in Finland is heavily domestic. Only a 
few OCGs comprise solely non-Finnish members. Finnish 
OCGs have some foreign members, who mainly come from 
the neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, organised crime 
operations of non-Finnish origin still extend to Finland, because 
non-Finnish crime groups supply illicit goods and services 
to Finnish groups, commit crimes in Finland, and route their 
activities through Finland. The Finnish OCGs engaged in drug 
crime have good contacts and cooperation partners abroad, 
especially in Estonia, Russia, Lithuania and Sweden	 (NBI,	
2013).
Structure of criminal groups and role of members
According	 to	 Mölsä	 (2008),	 the	 structures	 of	 the	 Finnish 
Motorcycle gangs are hierarchic, consisting of various 
positions such as the president, vice-president, treasurer, 
secretary, arms sergeant, members, prospective members, 
and	 ‘hangarounds’.	Formal	rules	defining	authority,	 tasks	and	
duties together with official symbols are important features of 
OMCGs.132 
Certain members or cooperating gangs are also 
specialised in particular criminal activities, such as contract 
violence, extortion, violent debt collection, economic crime 
and money laundering. Prospective members, hangarounds, 
or even wannabes often carry out the dirtiest tasks or take 
responsibility for criminal action.
Figure 18 - Distribution of the main criminal groups in Fin-
land (2000-2013)
Source: Yle, 2013.
of frauds, tax evasion and black market labour because of the 
higher	profits,	 lower	 risks	and	shorter	 sentences	 (Huhtanen,	
2010). 
For example, members of the OMCGs, or persons closely 
cooperating with, them have recently been convicted of 
narcotics	 and	 doping	 offences,	 money	 laundering,	 firearms	
offences	(Kerkelä,	2013),	economic	crime,	extortion,	violence,	
and	property	 crime	 (Nevala	&	Ranta,	 2006).	Also	 the	 illegal	
serving of alcohol in order to gain economic revenues 
is a common activity among the members of the OCGs 
(Salovaara,	2013).	 132. The executive level makes decisions and organises the activities. The 
middle level has a certain degree of independence and takes part in decision-
making	and	distributes	the	tasks	to	the	rank-and-file	members	and	street	gangs.
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Illicit market
Estimate# 
(million 
euro)
Min 
(million 
euro)
Max 
(million 
euro)
Reference 
year
Source Notes
Heroina
102 81 136 2005 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
49 33 99 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
Cocaine 17 13 19 2010 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
Cannabis
21 2010
Caulkins,	Kilmer,	&	Graf,	
2013b
137 61 286 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
Other illicit 
drugs
47 10 83 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 Ecstasy 
41 16 66 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 Amphetamines
ITTP 146 133 159 2013 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
Counterfeiting
280 2009 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
Demand	side;	Whole	
marketb
162c 2011 BSA, 2012 Unlicensed PC software
Fraud 430 311 549 2011 Transcrime-OCP, 2014 MTIC fraud
Organised 
property crime
0.3 2007 Europol, 2009b Cargo theft
182 2004
Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	
2007
Cargo theft
a	Several	indicators	suggest	that,	during	the	past	ten	years	or	so,	buprenorphine	and	other	medical	opioids	have	replaced	heroin	in	Finland	(see	Varjonen,	Tanhua,	&	
Forsell, 2013).
b Counterfeit ICT equipment, electric appliances, CDs, DVDs, cassettes, clothing and accessories, jewellery, watches, games, toys, perfumes, body care articles.
c Original	figure:	210	million	USD,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 44 - Estimates of the revenues of illicit markets in Finland133
Illicit market OCGs Sources
Illicit	drugs	(not	
specified)
African OCGs, Finnish OCGs, Lithuanian OCGs, 
Other Eastern European OCGs, Russian OCGs
NBI, 2012, 2013, 2014
THB
Finnish OCGs, Other Eastern European OCGs, 
Romanian OCGs, Russian OCGs
Viuhko	&	Jokinen,	2009;	NBI,	2011,	2014
ITF Finnish OCGs, Motorcycle gangs Passi,	2013;	Passi,	Vähäsarja,	&	Pelli,	2013
ITTP Finnish OCGs, Russian OCGs Transcrime, 2015 
Illegal gambling Foreign OCGs Ikonen, 2013
Extortion 
racketeering
Finnish OCGs, Motorcycle gangs Transcrime,	2009;	NBI,	2013
Fraud
Bulgarian OCGs, Finnish OCGs, Other Eastern 
European OCGs, Romanian OCGs
NBI, 2012, 2013
Organised property 
crime
Finnish OCGs, Other Eastern European OCGs NBI, 2013, 2014
Table 45 - Criminal groups involved in illicit markets in Finland
Underworld financiers, who have built their wealth in 
both legal and illegal business, operate close to the top 
criminal	authorities.	A	significant	role	is	also	played	by	other 
professionals, mainly in law and business. The lowest layer 
of the criminal community consists of habitual criminals, who 
commit crimes in order to satisfy their daily needs, which often 
relate	to	addictions	(Perälä,	2011;	NBI,	2013).	
133. In the presence of an estimation range, estimate refers to the arithmetic 
mean	or	to	an	adjusted	mean	(referred	to	as	best	estimate).
Palovaara	 (2011)	 argued	 that	 organised crime groups are 
rather small in Finland. The top-ranking members of the 
groups know each other and cooperate on major issues 
concerning e.g. criminal projects and territories. OCGs have 
had good and peaceful relationships with each other in recent 
years. They avoid disputes in order to ensure the smooth 
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operation of criminal activities. Nevertheless, there were 
occasional violent confrontations and shootings between 
groups	 in	 the	 1990s	 and	 early	 2000s	 (Yle,	 2013).	 Palovaara	
(2011)	 also	 found	 that,	 since	 the	 HAMC	 is	 very	 effective	 in	
shielding its activities, its members are seldom caught in the 
commission of crimes. The HAMC mainly acts on a strategic 
level	as	the	organiser	and	financier	of	crime,	and	it	exploits	its	
support gangs and other cooperative OCGs. Bandidos is the 
largest outlaw MC gang organisation in Finland, with eight full 
chapters	and	more	than	200	members	(NBI,	2013).
5.1.2. Illicit markets in Finland
This Section provides a review of the main illegal markets in 
Finland. It focuses on the one hand on the amount of the illicit 
proceeds generated by these markets at national level, and 
on the other, on the criminal actors involved. Table 44 and 
Table	45	summarize	the	main	results.	The	following	Sections	
will focus on each of the markets analysed.
5.1.2.1. Drug trafficking 
Drug trafficking is the main source of income for OCGs in 
Finland. As highlighted by Varjonen, Tanhua, Forsell and Perälä 
(2012),	 cannabis	 products	 (i.e.	 cannabis	 resin	 and	 mostly	
domestic-grown marijuana), amphetamine, ecstasy and 
pharmaceutical preparations	 containing	 benzodiazepines	
or	opiates	(such	as	subutex)134 remain the most popular illegal 
drugs. Cocaine and heroin occupy only a marginal position 
on	 the	Finnish	 illegal	 drug	 scene.	Data	on	drug	 seizures	and	
narcotics offences indicate that the situation is rather stable. 
There	 are	 only	 few	 estimates	 of	 the	 size	 of	 Finland’s	 illegal	
drug market, and they are not very updated. According to 
recent estimates made by Transcrime for the purpose of the 
OCP project, the retail value of the heroin market in Finland in 
2010 was 102 million euro, and the retail value of the cocaine 
market was 17 million euro. These are relatively small figures 
if compared to central and western Europe.135 Kilmer 
and	Pacula	 (2009)	 estimated	 the	 size	 of	 the	 retail	 cannabis	
market in Finland at 137 million euro in 2005. Retail spending 
on amphetamines was estimated to be 41 million euro and 
on	ecstasy	47	million	euro,	 in	2005	(Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009).	
However, it is difficult to determine how these proceeds are 
split among all the actors involved in drug trafficking in the 
country. 
The involvement of organised crime in drug trafficking 
has strongly increased during the past decade, and almost 
all Finnish OCGs known to the authorities are at least to some 
extent active in drug trafficking. Foreign OCGs are mainly 
involved in the acquisition, manufacturing, transporting and 
smuggling of drugs to Finland, while in most cases Finnish 
OMCGs organise the retail distribution. Money illegally earned 
from drug trafficking is laundered into business activities, e.g. 
by paying unreported wages, making investments and buying 
legal	companies	(see	Section	8.1;	NBI,	2012,	2013).	
Most of the illegal narcotics are brought to the Finnish market 
via various routes from the South or West. Estonian OCGs 
often have a primary role in smuggling drugs to Finland, 
where their Finnish partners take responsibility for distribution 
and	the	collection	of	payments	(see	Box	2).	Criminals	of	other	
nationalities are increasingly involved: for example, Lithuanian 
OCGs	 have	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 trafficking	 of	 drugs,	 in	
particular amphetamines and methamphetamines. Moreover, 
Russian criminal groups, and also members of Nigerian and 
Latvian OCGs, have been arrested for aggravated narcotics 
offences	in	Finland	(NBI,	2013).
134. Subutex or Suboxone are medications approved for the treatment of opiate 
dependence	(Food	and	Drug	Administration,	2014).	
135. Several indicators suggest that, during the past ten years or so, 
buprenorphine	and	other	medical	opioids	have	replaced	heroin	in	Finland	(see	
Varjonen,	Tanhua,	&	Forsell,	2013).
The cultivation of cannabis has been on the increase in Finland 
for several years. The great majority of cases are small-scale 
plantations with fewer than 50 plants grown in apartments or 
houses;	but	the	organised	and	professional	nature	of	cultivation	
is increasing, with cannabis plantations containing several 
hundreds	 of	 plants	 (NBI,	 2013).	 According	 to	 Kerkelä	 (2011),	
also OMCGs have started to cultivate cannabis in Finland. In 
2009, more than 500 plants and tens of thousands of euro 
were	seized	 from	a	 large	cannabis	cultivation	maintained	by	
the Finnish HAMC. 
Sippola	(2010)	found	that	also	the	doping market in Finland 
is dominated by organised crime. In order to obtain substantial 
proceeds, OCGs smuggle doping substances to Finland 
and other Nordic countries. The police estimate that doping 
trafficking is a business that amounts to at least 10 million euro.
5.1.2.2. Trafficking in human beings
Reliable estimates of the economic size of human 
trafficking in Finland are not available. The only available 
figure	 focuses	 on	 sexual	 exploitation	 and	 estimates	 an	
annual turnover in Finland in 2001 of tens of millions of euro 
(Transcrime,	 2004).	 Other	 figures	 refer	 only	 to	 individual	
cases	(see	e.g.	Box	3	below).	According	to	Passi	(2011a),	during	
the 2000s there were a some larger-scale THB cases in which 
Romanian	organised	criminals	exploited	their	fellow	citizens	in	
Finland. In one of these cases, it emerged that the Romanian 
organisation transferred illegal proceeds amounting to 72,000 
euro back to Romania. 
Box 2 - Hells Angels’ drug trafficking in Finland 
In 2009–2011 police investigated a large-scale case 
of international trafficking of amphetamines and co-
caine.	For	the	first	time,	some	of	the	perpetrators	were	
high-ranking members of the Finnish Hells Angels Mo-
torcycle	 gang	 (HAMC).	 The	 substances	 were	 smug-
gled by car from Central Europe to Finland. The street 
value	 of	 the	 seized	 amphetamine	 and	 cocaine	would	
have	been	around	800,000	euro	(Kerkelä,	2011).	Small	
amounts of drugs together with 90,000 euro and over 
50,000	 Swedish	 crowns	 were	 confiscated	 from	 the	
leader	of	the	Finnish	HAMC	(STT,	2011).
In	2013,	five	members	of	the	Finnish	BMC	together	with	
20 Estonian criminals were suspected of smuggling 
amphetamines and ecstasy from the Netherlands to 
Finland. The operation was organised from a Finnish 
prison, and the substances were trafficked with the 
help of transport companies. A total of 76 kilograms 
of	amphetamine	were	seized,	with	a	street	value	in	Fin-
land	estimated	at	2	million	euro	(NBI	2014).
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However, most of the THB cases in Finland seem related to 
labour exploitation, especially in small-scale companies and 
shops run by foreign countrymen or relatives of the victims 
(NBI,	 2013).	 According	 to	 Jokinen,	 Ollus	 and	Aromaa	 (2011),	
the sectors with the most labour exploitation are construction, 
catering, cleaning and horticulture. THB for labour exploitation 
combined with grey economy has been found in Chinese and 
Turkish	 restaurants	 and	 pizza-kebab	 shops	 in	 Finland	 (NBI,	
2014), in the construction business, and in street begging 
operated	by	Romanian	criminal	groups	(Passi,	2011b).
Also in the case of THB for sexual exploitation, as in many 
other	EU	MS	the	perpetrators’	nationality	often	corresponds	
to	 that	 of	 the	 victim	 (see	 also	 Section	 4.2).	 The	 impact	 of	
Estonian, Russian, and Romanian OC	 in	the	field	of	sexual	
exploitation	 is	 remarkable	 (NBI,	 2011,	 2014).	 In	 general,	 the	
criminal networks involved in the pandering business in Finland 
are not very large, and the division of labour, the duration of the 
activity, and the use of violence and other control measures 
vary considerably. The criminal networks often consist of both 
foreign	and	Finnish	actors	(Viuhko	&	Jokinen,	2009).	
5.1.2.3. Illicit trafficking in firearms
No estimates of the value of the illicit trafficking in firearms 
are available in Finland.	However,	as	noted	by	Passi	(2013),	
the	increase	in	the	violent	nature	of	criminal	groups’	activities	
is directly related to the increase in the quality and number of 
firearms	possessed	by	criminal	 groups,	 and	 this	 in	 turn	may	
lead to a growth of the proceeds from the illicit trafficking in 
firearms.
The	police	have	recently	seized at least 5-10 weapons from 
all of the four central OCGs in Finland. In 2012, a total of 175 
weapons	were	seized	from	them.	According	to	Passi,	Vähäsarja	
and	 Pelli	 (2013),	 when	 investigating	 a	 large	 amphetamine	
case in 2013, police found 40 guns in the possession of the 
members	of	the	Cannonball	MC.	Passi	et	al.	(2013)	also	report	
that, in the summer of 2012, a Finnish couple who had contacts 
with OCGs were arrested while trying to smuggle 16 weapons 
and thousands of munitions in a car from the USA to Finland. 
Their intention was to sell them to the OCGs in the illegal gun 
market. 136
5.1.2.4. Illicit trade in tobacco products
The large-scale smuggling of cigarettes has continued in 
Finland	during	recent	years	(NBI,	2014).	The	lack	of	domestic	
production and high taxes may have increased the demand for 
low-priced smuggled cigarettes. According to the estimates 
carried out for this report, the annual turnover from ITTP 
in Finland ranged between 132.9 and 159 million euro in 
2013	(see	Section	4.4).	In	regard	to	losses	of	tax	revenue,	it	is	
difficult to assess their precise extent, but they are estimated 
at	between	10	and	100	million	euro	(NBI,	2014).	
Almost all tobacco smuggling seems to be attributable to 
organised crime, mainly Russian OCGs cooperating with 
Finnish partners, which distribute and sell the cigarettes to 
consumers	(NBI,	2014).	Owing	to	a	large	volume	of	transport,	
Finland also serves as a transit country for Russian criminal 
groups. The smuggling of cigarettes is becoming more 
systematic and professional. Most of the smuggling takes 
place via land transport,	cigarettes	being	hidden	in	cars	(NBI,	
2014). 
5.1.2.5. Illegal gambling and match-fixing
One growing crime area is international match manipulation 
and gambling, which has already affected Finland in regard 
to	 football	matches	 (see	Peurala,	2013).	 Ikonen	 (2013)	 found	
that the foreign OCG organising match-fixing in Finland in 
2008–2011 was led and financed from Singapore, and that 
the players involved in the Finnish leagues were from Zambia 
and Georgia. Millions of euro were transferred in the illegal 
gambling markets of Asia. According to the Finnish court, the 
crime group was able to earn between 0.5 and 1.5 million euro 
from	each	successfully	fixed	match.
5.1.2.6. Fraud
Because	 of	 high	 profits	 and	 low	 risks,	 financial	 crime	 in	 the	
form of frauds, tax evasion and black market labour has 
become increasingly preferred by Finnish OCGs. 
Financial crimes, particularly various types of frauds, are being 
committed within the framework of foreign trade transiting 
Finland	to	Russia	(NBI,	2013).	Intra-community VAT frauds 
arrived	in	Finland	somewhat	later	than	their	first	appearance	
elsewhere in Europe. From the Finnish point of view, a much 
more	 significant	 phenomenon	 –	 related	 to	 non-payment	 of	
wages and evasion of social security contributions – is the 
use of black market cheap labour from Estonia and other 
Baltic countries, Poland, and also to some extent other 
Eastern European countries. This occurs particularly in the 
construction sector and involves both OMCG and other OCG 
actors and their partners from abroad, particularly Estonia. 
Apart from aggravated tax offences, the criminal cases 
include	 other	 financial	 crimes	 such	 as	 accounting crimes 
(e.g.	use	of	false	receipts),	debtors	crimes,	and	fraud	related	to	
the	purchase	of	materials	(NBI,	2013).	Payment card frauds 
are	mainly	committed	by	Bulgarian	and	Romanian	OCGs	(NBI,	
2012, 2013). 
136. Also edged tools, gas weapons, electroshock weapons and explosives 
have	been	seized	 in	growing	numbers	from	the	OCGs.	Besides	trafficking	and	
stealing, the acquisition of guns, gun parts and deactivated guns can today be 
done	via	online	shopping	(Passi,	Vähäsarja,	&	Pelli,	2013).
Box 3 - The profits of the Red House of Kotka and 
of other prostitution rings
An example of the volume of a pandering operation in 
Finland is provided by the case of the Red House broth-
el in the city of Kotka, where an Armenian man and a 
Russian	woman	earned	a	profit	of	over	1.3	million	euro	
from their pandering business in 1996–2002. It has 
also been reported that an Estonian-based procur-
ing organisation earned around 430 thousand euro in 
Finland in 2001-2002 and that a Russian OCG made a 
profit	of	70,000–100,000	euro	per	month	in	2007	(Viu-
hko	&	Jokinen,	2009).	In	2012-2013	the	NBI	investigat-
ed a pandering case in which two Finnish men earned 
a	profit	of	over	300,000	euro	from	pandering	Estonian	
and	Russian	women	around	Finland	(NBI,	2014).
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5.1.2.7. Other illicit markets
In	the	field	of	property	crime,	members	of	the	Finnish	OCGs	are	
mainly active in aggravated thefts and debt collection. These 
crimes are usually committed by the lowest-ranking members 
of the criminal community, who operate in order to satisfy daily 
needs often related to addictions. The stolen goods are items 
that	can	be	easily	changed	into	money	(NBI,	2013).	
The share of foreign nationals among suspects of property 
offences has increased substantially in recent years. The 
mobility of members, a large number of single crimes 
committed in a series, and the dispersion of criminal activities 
among several countries are characteristic of these foreign 
OCGs. Migrant criminals typically originate from Estonia, 
Lithuania, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Belorussia, Poland, 
and Latvia. Members of foreign OCGs especially commit 
burglaries in private homes and shops selling electronic 
equipment or jewellery, thefts from construction sites, and 
thefts of vehicles. They may also use Finland as a route to 
transport stolen goods	to	the	market	areas	(NBI,	2013).	
Box 5 - Foreign criminal groups and organised 
robbery in Kuopio 
An	 impudent	 robbery	 of	 a	 jeweller’s	 shop	 in	 the	 city	
centre of Kuopio, one early evening in spring 2013, is 
an	example	of	a	 ‘hit-and-run’	operation	committed	by	
mobile criminals from Estonia. The rapidly executed 
aggravated robbery was planned and prepared well in 
advance. The criminals stole jewellery worth 500,000 
euro	from	the	shop	(NBI,	2014).
137. In fact, on average only 6.5% of consumers declared that they were willing to 
accept counterfeit products in Finland, whereas this percentage was 10% in the 
EU	as	a	whole	(data	source:	Eurobarometer,	2011).
5.1.3. Concluding remarks
There is scant research literature on organised crime in Finland 
and its proceeds from illegal markets. A variety of sources, 
including the degree of OCG involvement in aggravated crime 
and	 the	amount	of	assets	confiscated	 from	organised	crime	
members, show that drug trafficking and fraud are the two 
most profitable illegal activities in Finland, and that they are 
crucial for the economy of organised crime. 
Organised crime is a relatively new phenomenon in Finland. 
The establishment of criminal gangs accelerated at the end 
of	 1980s,	 and	 the	 first	 international	 outlaw	Motorcycle	 gang	
entered Finland during the 1990s. The number of criminal 
groups grew substantially during the 2000s. Today, OC 
has more serious and professional features taking the form 
of	skilled	criminal	alliances	that	infiltrate	both	illegal	and	legal	
structures of society. At present, OCGs have approximately 
1,000 members in total. Outlaw Motorcycle gangs are the 
most visible layer of organised crime in Finland, although 
most	criminal	groups	are	not	‘bikers’.	The	largest,	most	active,	
and most notorious outlaw gangs in Finland are Hells Angels 
MC, Bandidos MC, Cannonball MC, and United Brotherhood 
(NBI,	2012,	2013).
Criminal groups in Finland have been mainly engaged in the 
illicit drugs business. However, they seem to increasingly 
favour fraud and other financial crimes because of 
the	 higher	 profits,	 lower	 risks,	 and	 shorter	 sentences.	 As	
regards other illicit markets, especially foreign OCGs 
operating in Finland are also involved in human trafficking, 
firearms trafficking, illicit trade in tobacco products, 
illegal gambling and organised property crime, but the 
importance of these illegal activities seems lower for the 
scope of the economy of organised crime. 
The roles of groups operating in illicit markets vary because 
they opportunistically exploit the markets that are the 
most profitable at a certain time and place. Consequently, 
the Finnish criminal groups create new flexible networks and 
alliances for different criminal projects, and they cooperate 
with	 foreign	OCGs	and	other	partners	when	necessary	 (NBI,	
2013).
Box 4 - An investigation of organised crime, 
frauds, tax evasion and black labour 
In 2012, the police started preliminary investigations 
into the activity of three limited companies supplying 
labour to third parties in metropolitan areas. Aggravat-
ed tax and accounting frauds, together with frauds re-
garding	retirement	contributions,	were	identified	during	
the	investigations.	Profits	from	the	frauds	amounted	to	
hundreds of thousands of euro. The persons in charge 
of the companies were strawmen and the three per-
sons arrested belonged to Cannonball MC, one of the 
most	notorious	OMCGs	in	Finland	(NBI,	2014).
Counterfeiting	 is	 not	 a	 significant	 illegal	market	 in	 Finland.	
According to the Eurobarometer survey analysed in the 
counterfeiting	 Section	 (see	 the	 Methodological	 Annex	 and	
Eurobarometer	 (2011)),	 the	 percentage	 of	 consumers	 in	
Finland	willing	 to	accept	counterfeit	products	 is	 significantly	
below the European average.137 On the basis of calculations 
by the Transcrime-OCP research team, in 2009 potential 
demand for fakes in Finland amounted to around 280 million 
euro. 
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5.2.1. Introduction
Despite the lack of studies on organised crime in France 
(Gendarmerie	 Nationale-STRJD,	 2013)	 and	 the	 relatively	
low and decreasing levels of crimes, corruption and informal 
economy	 (UNODC,	 2012c;	 INHESJ	 -	 ONDRP,	 2013),	 illicit	
markets are important sources of proceeds for criminal 
groups in France. 
Drug trafficking is still the most important criminal market 
in	the	country,	and	one	of	the	largest	in	Europe	(see	Table	46	
and Chapter 4.1). Now emerging as major sources of criminal 
revenues are other illicit activities, in particular frauds	(INHES	
-	OND,	2009,	p.	 194;	FATF,	2011b;	 INHESJ	 -	ONDRP,	2012,	p.	
232) and organised theft	 (Gendarmerie	 Nationale-STRJD,	
2013).
This Section provides a description of illicit markets in France, 
presenting, where possible, estimates of the magnitude of 
illicit proceeds and descriptions of the main criminal actors 
involved. 
Organised crime groups in France
France’s	 strategic	 geographical	 position	 in	 the	 middle	 of	
Europe makes it an important transit country for a range 
of illegal trafficking activities in Europe. For example, France 
is located midway along the illicit drug route connecting 
North Africa and Spain to Northern Europe	 (in	 particular	
for cannabis and cocaine), and along the route from the 
Netherlands	 to	 southern	 Europe	 (cannabis,	 cocaine,	 heroin	
and	synthetic	drugs)	(OSCE,	2010;	Europol,	2011a;	Charpenel,	
2012;	 Gendarmerie	 Nationale-SJRTD,	 2013,	 p.	 2).	 Moreover,	
since the 1930s, France has performed a crucial role in the 
processing	and	trafficking	of	heroin	 (in	 the	so-called	 ‘French	
Connection’).138
However, there is evidence that traditional drug routes have 
been used for other forms of illicit trafficking, such as ITTP 
(Transcrime,	2015),	or	for	human trafficking	purposes	(FATF,	
2011b, p. 22). Moreover, itineraries linked to new criminal 
activities	(such	as	the	organised	theft	of	metals,	vehicles,	car	
spare parts, etc.) are emerging.
Identifying what actors are active in these markets and along 
these routes is not easy, both because of a lack of systematic 
studies	on	criminal	groups	in	France	(Gendarmerie	Nationale-
STRJD, 2013) and because of difficulties in finding a widely-
accepted definition and classification of organised crime, 
a	 term	 that	 first	 appeared	 in	 the	 public	 debate	 only	 in	 the	
1990s	 (Lalam,	 2004).	 According	 to	 available	 evidence,	 a	
plurality	 of	 actors	 are	 active	 in	 the	 country’s	 illicit	 economy	
(see	Table	47	below)	and	France	appears,	together	with	Spain,	
to be one of the European countries attracting the widest 
range of OCGs. Criminal groups are numerous, more or less 
hierarchical,	 and	often	 linked	 to	 foreign	groups;	but	 they	are	
not always ascribable to international criminal organisations 
and	are	therefore	often	not	clearly	 identifiable	(Gendarmerie	
Nationale-STRJD, 2013). 
The plurality and diversity of criminal groups not only affect 
the distribution of OCGs across illegal markets but also have 
an	 impact	 in	 terms	 of	 infiltration	 of	 the	 legitimate	 economy,	
because different OCGs usually opt for different investment 
and	 money	 laundering	 strategies	 (for	 a	 detailed	 discussion	
see Section 8.2). 
Generally speaking, two broad categories of criminal actors 
can	be	identified:	
•		 Indigenous criminal groups, including either:
- The French ‘grand banditry’	 (grand banditisme 
traditionnel) well rooted in southern France - Marseille, 
Nice, Toulon, etc. - and in Corsica, and involved in a wide 
range of illegal activities including drugs and extortion 
racketeering	 (Montel,	 2008;	 Gounev	 &	 Bezlov,	 2010;	
Gendarmerie Nationale-STRJD, 2013). In Corsica, 
these criminal organisations may be linked with former 
clandestine independence groups that have gradually 
moved from purely political action to borderline activities 
in	the	criminal	markets	(CSD,	2010).
- Gangs from the ‘difficult suburbs’	 (quartiers 
sensibles) of large urban areas, often of North African 
origin or linked with North African OCGs, and mainly 
involved	 in	 drug	 trafficking	 (both	 on	 the	 Netherlands-
France and on the Morocco-Spain-France trafficking 
routes).
•		 Foreign criminal groups, constituted mainly by people 
of foreign nationality and occasionally living in France 
(Gendarmerie	 Nationale-STRJD,	 2013).	 They	 may	 be	
either	 mafia-type	 criminal	 organisations	 (such	 as	 Italian	
‘Ndrangheta	or	Camorra),	or	more	structured	groups	(such	
as	 Chinese	 or	 Russian/Georgian	 OCGs)	 or	 smaller	 and	
extremely mobile groups. 
The	 ethnicity	 of	 these	 groups	 often	 depends	 on	 the	 origin/
destination country of the goods trafficked, and it is at the same 
time influenced by migration flows and by geographical 
and cultural links	 with	 neighbouring	 countries	 (Bouvier,	
2012). For example, Moroccan groups are active in the 
distribution	of	cannabis	smuggled	from	North	Africa	(Europol,	
2011a,	p.	18;	Gendarmerie	Nationale-STRJD,	2013,	p.	3),	Dutch 
ones	 operate	 on	 the	 route	 to	 the	 Netherlands	 (EMCDDA	 &	
Europol, 2013, p. 64), and Turkish-speaking OCGs engage 
in	 the	 trafficking	of	 heroin	 (EMCDDA	&	Europol,	 2013,	 p.	 33;	
Gendarmerie National-STRJD, 2013). Bulgarian-speaking 
OCGs may operate in human trafficking from south-eastern 
Europe	 (OSCE,	2010,	p.	90)	while	other Eastern European 
groups	 (e.g.	 Lithuanian,	 Moldovan,	 Polish,	 etc.)	 are	 often	
involved in the trafficking of the proceeds of organised theft to 
eastern	Europe	(Gendarmerie	Nationale-STRJD,	2013).
138.	 The	 “French	Connection”	 of	 the	 1930s	 organised	 the	 purchase	 of	 opium	
in Turkey, processed it into heroin in laboratories operated by Corsicans in 
Marseille,	 and	 then	 smuggled	 the	 final	 product	 into	 the	 United	 States.	 It	 is	
estimated that, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the French Connection 
supplied	a	large	amount	of	the	heroin	used	in	the	United	States	(UNODC	2012c,	
p. 67). 
5.2. France                                                                                                                                                      
Michele Riccardi and Alexandre Salha (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
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5.2.2. Illicit markets in France
Given the plurality and diversity of actors and the lack of data, 
it almost impossible to determine how the revenues produced 
by illicit markets are shared among the various criminal groups. 
However, providing an estimate of the illegal proceeds is 
crucial for assessing the amount of money that these groups 
may launder in the legal economy.
Table 46 reports, for each main illicit market, the available 
estimates	and	those	specifically	calculated	by	Transcrime	for	
the	purpose	of	the	Project	OCP	(see	also	Chapter	4).	Table	47	
instead sets out, for each market, the main OCGs involved in 
them	as	identified	by	the	literature.	
5.2.2.1. Drug trafficking
France in an important transit and destination country for 
drug trafficking. As said, France is located along drug routes 
connecting North Africa to northern Europe, and northern 
Europe	 to	 other	 countries	 (EMCDDA	 &	 Europol,	 2013).	 As	
a destination country, it does not record extremely high 
prevalence rates among western European countries, with 
the	exception	of	opioids	(UNODC	2011b,	p.	51).	
According	to	the	literature	(see	Table	46	above	and	Caulkins,	
Kilmer,	&	Graf,	2013),	the	revenues	from	the	main	drug	markets	
(heroin,	 cocaine,	 cannabis)	 amount	 to	 about	 3	 billion	 euro	
yearly. How much of this amount can be attributed to OCGs is 
difficult to determine, although the media have reported that 
organised crime groups have an annual turnover of 2 billion 
euro	(Leclerc,	2012).	
Heroin
In the 1930s, during the ‘French Connection’ period, the 
country was a crucial hub for heroin trafficking. Today France 
plays a less central role, although it is still an important transit 
country. In terms of consumption, the number of heroin 
consumers may amount to around 165 thousand users 
(UNODC,	2010a,	p.	125)	–	although	this	figure	is	 lower	than	in	
the UK, Italy and Germany. 
According	 to	 Transcrime-OCP	 estimates,	 France’s	 heroin	
market	generates	between	0.8	and	1.3	billion	euro	yearly	(Table	
Illicit market
Estimate# 
(million 
euro)
Min 
(million 
euro)
Max 
(million 
euro)
Refrence 
year
Source Notes
Heroin
957 766 1,276 1999 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
577 430 1,031 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
Cocaine
755 563 845 2010 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
1,450a 2005 UNODC, 2011a
488 129 1,257 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
Cannabis
1,277 2010
Caulkins,	Kilmer,	&	Graf,	
2013
2,233 997 4,647 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
789 746 832 2005
Legleye,	Lakhdar,	&	Spilka,	
2008
Other illicit 
drugs
190 41 338 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 Ecstasy
55 21 88 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 Amphetamines
THB 3,000 unknown INHESJ - ONDRP, 2012 Sexual exploitation
ITTP 2,083 2,004 2,163 2013 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
Counterfeiting
5,746 2010 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
Demand	side;	Whole	
marketc
2,121b 2011 BSA, 2012 Unlicensed PC software
Fraud 4,899 3,546 6,253 2011 Transcrime-OCP, 2014 MTIC fraud
Organised 
property crime
48 2007 Europol, 2009b Cargo theft
1,022 2004
Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	
2007
Cargo theft
a Original	figure:	1,710	million	USD,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2005	exchange	rate	(source	ECB)
b	Original	figure:	2,754	million	USD,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
c Counterfeit ICT equipment, electric appliances, CDs, DVDs, cassettes, clothing and accessories, jewellery, watches, games, toys, perfumes, body care articles.
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 46 - Estimates of the revenues of illicit markets in France139
139. In the presence of an estimation range, estimate refers to the arithmetic 
mean	or	to	an	adjusted	mean	(referred	to	as	best	estimate).
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9), ranking third among European countries.	 This	 figure	
is slightly higher than previous estimates, which valued the 
market	at	576.5	million	euro	in	2005	(Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009).	
Cocaine
Differently from cannabis, France does not appear to be 
a large consumer of cocaine. Despite a rapid increase in 
consumption,	 especially	 among	 young	 adults	 (from	 0.5%	 in	
2000 to 1.9% in 2010), the percentage of users remains below 
the	European	average	of	 2.1%	 (EMCDDA	&	Europol,	 2013,	 p.	
42).140 
According to Transcrime-OCP estimates, cocaine revenues 
range between 563 and 845 million euro	per	year	(see	Table	
11).	This	figure	is	midway	between	Kilmer	and	Pacula’s	(2009)	
estimate	 (an	average	of	487.7	million	euro	 in	2005,	0.03%	of	
GDP)	 and	 UNODC’s	 (2011a)	 estimate,	 which	 took	 both	 the	
retail and wholesale market into account, of about 1,710 million 
US	dollars	(1,450	million	euro)141	in	2005	(UNODC,	2011a,	p.	85).
The nature of France as a transit country is even more evident 
in	 the	 case	 of	 cocaine.	 According	 to	 the	 UNODC	 (2010a),	
only 5% of the cocaine available in Europe was distributed 
in	 France	 in	 2007-2008	 (UNODC,	2010a,	 p.	 5)	while	a large 
amount was intercepted, which puts France in third place 
between	2009	and	2011	(EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013,	p.	46)	 in	
terms	of	seizures.
Cannabis
Cannabis is the most widely consumed drug at national 
level	 (UNODC,	 2011b,	 2012c).	 France	 ranks	 third	 among	 the	
three biggest consumers of cannabis in Europe, according to a 
survey	conducted	for	the	EU	Commission	(Caulkins,	Kilmer,	&	
Graf, 2013, p. 304), and ranks highest in terms of consumption 
among young people	(OFDT,	2009,	p.	3).	
Estimates	by	Caulkins,	Kilmer	and	Graf	(2013,	p.	312)	calculated	
the cannabis market in France at about 1.3 billion euro, the 
third	 biggest	 in	 Europe	 after	 Spain	 and	 Italy	 (see	 Table	 13).	
As reported in Section 4.1.4, however, there is a wide variance 
in	 terms	of	previous	estimates	 (see	Table	46)	which	may	be	
attributed mainly to methodological differences.
Also be noted is that France ranks second, after Spain, 
in terms of amounts of cannabis seized in Europe, with a 
quantity estimated at about 20% of the domestic consumption 
(EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013,	p.	62).	This	high	value	is	due	to	the	
nature	of	France	(as	well	as	Spain)	as	a	transit	country	for	illicit	
drugs.
Amphetamine-type drugs
In France ecstasy and amphetamines are markets smaller 
than those for other substances, with respectively around 160 
thousand	 and	 41	 thousand	 users	 estimated	 in	 2005	 (Kilmer	
&	 Pacula,	 2009,	 pp.	 45-47).	 In	 2010,	 cocaine	 consumption	
overtook that of ecstasy and amphetamines, with a 1.9% 
consumption rate among young adults, against 0.4% and 
0.5%	respectively	(EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013,	p.	99).	However,	
France is an important transit country on the route connecting 
the Netherlands, the traditional origin of synthetic drugs, to 
southern	Europe	or	the	UK.	This	 is	confirmed	by	the	amount	
of substances intercepted, which, on average, is the largest 
seized	amount	of	synthetic	drugs	(EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013,	
p. 74).
Illicit market OCGs Sources
Drug trafficking
African OCGs, Albanian OCGs, Dutch OCGs, French OCGs, 
Motorcycle	gangs,	‘Ndrangheta,	North	African	OCGs,	Other	Asian	
OCGs, Turkish OCGs
UNODC,	2010a;	Europol,	2011a;	
REITOX,	&	EMCDDA,	2012a;	DIA,	
2013a;	Europol,	2013a
THB
African OCGs, Albanian OCGs, Bulgarian OCGs, Chinese OCGs, 
Other Eastern European, North African, Other Asian OCGs, 
Romanian	OCGs,	Russian/Georgian	OCGs,	South	American	OCGs
	INHES	-	OND,	2007,	2009;	INHESJ	
-	ONDRP,	2010;	OSCE,	2010;	INHESJ	-	
ONDRP, 2012
ITF Albanian OCGs, Balkan OCGs, Other Eastern European OCGs Spapens, 2007
ITTP
Balkan	OCGs,	French	OCGs,	North	African	OCGs,	Russian/
Georgian OCGs
Le Monde du Tabac, 2012a, 2012b
Counterfeiting
Chinese	OCGs,	Camorra,	Other	Italian/Italian	not	specified	OCGs,	
Turkish OCGs
DGDDI,	2011b;	UNICRI	&	ICC	BASCAP,	
2013
Extortion 
racketeering
Albanian OCGs, Corsican OCGs, Chinese OCGs, Cosa Nostra, 
French	OCGs,	Other	Italian/Italian	not	specified	OCGs,	Turkish	
OCGs
Transcrime,	2009;	West	Sands	
Advisory, 2012
Fraud
African OCGs, Bulgarian OCGs, Romanian OCGs, Irish OCGs, 
Lithuanian OCGs, Other Eastern European OCGs, Turkish OCGs, 
Middle Eastern OCGs
INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012;	Leclerc,	2012;	
Gendarmerie Nationale-STRJD, 2013
Organised 
property crime
French	OCGs,	Other	Italian/Italian	not	specified	OCGs,	Georgian	
OCGs, Romanian OCGs, Albanian OCGs, Lithuanian OCGs, Other 
Eastern European OCGs, South American OCGs 
Gendarmerie Nationale-STRJD, 2013
Table 47 - Criminal actors active in France, by type of illicit market/activity
140.	242,600	users	were	estimated	 in	2009	 in	France,	behind	 Italy	 (824,500),	
UK	(813,000),	Spain	(795,400),	and	Germany	(489,900)	(UNODC,	2011a,	p.	75).
141.	http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/curConverter.do
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In terms of revenues, considering all the methodological 
problems discussed in Section 4.1, the ecstasy retail market 
may have generated between 41 and 338 million euro in 
revenues, and the amphetamines market between 21 and 88 
million	euro	in	2005	(Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009).	
Criminal actors and drug trafficking in France
Although data on the presence and the activity of OCGs in 
France	 are	 scant	 (Gendarmerie	 Nationale-SJTRD,	 2013),	
there is evidence of a plurality of groups involved in drug 
trafficking in the country. Local and foreign criminal actors 
seem	to	participate	equally	in	the	market	(among	the	arrests	
reported	by	UNODC	(2010a))	in	2006,	53%	of	traffickers	were	
French and 47% were foreigners), albeit with different roles.
Groups are active both on the route connecting North Africa, 
through	Spain,	to	France	and	northern	Europe	(cannabis	and	
cocaine) and on the route heading south from the Netherlands 
(synthetic	 drugs,	 cocaine,	 heroin,	 cannabis).	 These	 groups	
may move across France or have contacts within local 
communities. In order to transport drugs across the country, 
especially from Morocco to Northern Europe, they may make 
use of go-fast convoys.142
As regards nationality, the main groups involved in the 
trafficking of cocaine and cannabis are Turkish OCGs 
(EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013,	p.	33),	Albanian-speaking OCGs 
(Caulkins,	 Kilmer,	 &	 Graf,	 2013),	 Nigerian OCGs	 (UNODC,	
2010a, p. 101), Dutch OCGs	(UNODC,	2010a,	101;	EMCDDA	&	
Europol,	2013,	p.	64)	but,	more	recently,	also	Italian	mafias,	in	
particular ‘Ndrangheta (DIA,	2013a).	
However the main groups, especially for cannabis, are North 
African and in particular Moroccan	 (UNODC,	 2010a,	 p.	
98) groups whose contacts with well-established gangs from 
quartiers sensibles	 (i.e.	dodgy	areas),	enable	them	to	control	
the	distribution	of	cannabis	 inland	 (Europol,	2011a,	p.	 18)	and	
its	 transportation	 from	 North	 Africa	 through	 Spain	 (Paoli	 &	
Reuter,	2008,	p.	21;	Gendarmerie	Nationale-STJRD,	2013).	
The	French	police	have	identified	what	they	call	a	secondary	
network, i.e. small organisations of user-resellers, within the 
cocaine and heroin markets. They maintain that this kind of 
structure	has	enabled	these	two	markets	to	flourish	(REITOX	
&	EMCDDA,	2012a,	p.	163).	As	pointed	out	by	Europol,	in	some	
European countries including France, also Vietnamese groups 
are becoming more active in the indoor cultivation of cannabis 
(EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013,	p.	64). 
5.2.2.2. Trafficking in human beings
Together	with	Germany,	 Italy,	Spain	and	the	UK	(FATF,	2011b,	
p. 22), France is one of the main destination countries for 
trafficked persons. The literature shows that OCGs operate 
in human trafficking in France for sexual exploitation and 
forced labour. According to estimates, the turnover of sexual 
exploitation in France reaches almost 3 billion euro and 
20,000	victims	per	year	(INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012,	p.	227).
On the basis of the available evidence, also in France criminals 
and victims of THB for sexual exploitation mostly belong to the 
same ethnic group or originate from the same country 
(INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012,	226).	Evidence	shows	the	presence	
of victims from Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone,	Cameroon	and	Malaysia	 (Département	d’Etat,	2009)	
and	from	Central	America	and	the	Caribbean	(Baker,	2005,	p.	
104).
OCGs appear to originate mostly from Eastern Europe, West 
Africa, Asia, South America	(INHES	-	OND,	2009,	p.	192)	and	
the Maghreb	 (INHESJ	 -	ONDRP,	 2010).	Also	French	groups	
are	 active	 in	 prostitution	 (INHESJ	 -	 ONDRP,	 2012,	 p.	 227).	
There is also evidence of Albanian OCGs operating in southern 
France, particularly in the towns of Nîmes, Montpellier, Nantes, 
Toulouse	and	Nice,	in	contact	with	international	OCGs	(OSCE,	
2010, p. 90). 
France is also a strategic transit country	 (FATF,	 2011b;	
Ministère	 des	 droits	 des	 femmes,	 de	 la	 ville,	 de	 la	 jeunesse	
et des sports, 2014) for victims destined for neighbouring 
countries such as Belgium, UK, Netherlands, Germany and 
Italy	(OSCE,	2010;	Marsh	et	al.,	2012).	Organised	groups	have	
been found transferring girls from Albania and Moldova to 
Belgium	 via	 France	 (Fondation	 Scelles,	 2012).	 In	 one	 case,	
Russian, Moldovan and Israeli OCGs used France as a transit 
country for young women trafficked from Eastern Europe to 
Greece, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Israel and the UAE 
(OSCE,	2010).	
5.2.2.3. Illicit trafficking in firearms
According	 to	 Weidacher	 (2005),	 in	 2002	 France	 was	 the	
second largest European country for the legal arms industry 
with 13.8 billion euro turnover and 4.4 billion euro of exports 
(Weidacher,	2005,	p.	37).	The	UNODC	estimated	the	number	
of	civilian	firearm	holdings	at	19	million	in	2007,	which	placed	
France	fifth	in	the	world	(UNODC,	2010a,	p.	8),	and	as	one	of	
the European countries with the highest rates of legally-held 
civilian	 firearms	 per	 100	 population	 units	 (EU	 Commission,	
2013, p. 22).
Nevertheless, there are only few references to illegal 
firearms trafficking. As already mentioned in Section 4.3, 
for the purpose of OCP it was not possible to disaggregate 
the	 estimated	 figure	 of	 the	 size	 of	 the	 pan-European	 ITF	
market into country-level estimates. However there are signs 
that this trafficking is growing. According to a French report 
on arms trafficking in the Western Balkans cited by the EU 
Commission,	3,910	firearms	were	seized	in	France	in	2011,	with	
a	40%	increase	with	respect	to	2010	(EU	Commission,	2012).	
According to the available evidence, weapons shipped to or 
through France mainly originate from the former Yugoslavia 
(Soccoja,	 2009).	 Spapens	 (2007)	 reported	 a	 case	 between	
1998 and 2000 where 3,700 pistols supposedly sold by a 
Croatian	 company	 were	 found	 and	 confiscated	 in	 some	
western	 European	 countries,	 including	 France	 (Spapens,	
2007, p. 366). 
As said in Section 4.3, former Yugoslavian and Albanian 
OCGs	 are	 among	 the	 main	 actors	 involved	 (Ministère	 de	
l’Intérieur,	 2013).	 It	 is	 therefore	 likely	 that	 the	 same	 groups	
operate in France, although, as mentioned in 4.3, the role of 
freelance	brokers	and	smaller	groups	is	increasing	in	this	field	
(Soccoja,	2009).	
142. These are organised convoys of cars driven at high speed. They have been 
widely used, especially in France and Spain, for the transportation of hashish and 
cocaine	(see	e.g.	Eurojust,	2013b).
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5.2.2.4. Illicit trade in tobacco products
There are several reasons that explain why France may be 
exposed to the illicit trade in tobacco products: 
•		 First,	 its	 geographical position as a transit country, 
especially	to	the	UK	(DGDDI,	2011a,	p.	5)
•		 Second,	the	high taxation	on	tobacco	products	(DGDDI,	
2011a)
•		 Third,	 the	 fact	 that	 five bordering countries have 
cheaper cigarettes	 (Andorra,	 Spain,	 Italy,	 Luxembourg	
and	Belgium)	(OFDT,	2011)
This report estimates the turnover of ITTP in France at 
between 2 and 2.2 billion euro in 2013	(Section	4.4),	which	
was	the	highest	turnover	recorded	in	the	EU	(on	the	basis	of	the	
methodology adopted). Some other attempts to quantify the 
size	of	this	market	in	France	are	also	available	in	the	literature.	
According	 to	 KPMG	 (2013),	 the	 amount	 of	 counterfeit	 and	
smuggled cigarettes consumed in France was 10.3 billion in 
2012,	 around	 15%	 of	 total	 cigarettes	 consumption	 (KPMG,	
2013,	p.	88),	mainly	originating	from	duty	free	areas	(2.6	billion),	
Algeria	(1.1	billion)	and	Spain	(0.9	billion)	(KPMG,	2013,	p.	91).	
The Direction générale des douanes et droits indirects 
(DGDDI)	 reported	 an	 overall	 5%	 penetration	 of	 the	 legal	
market, whereas Euromonitor assessed it at 15.7%. However, 
the sources do not evaluate the weight of organised 
crime groups in this market. As previously highlighted, the 
role of smaller groups and individuals is important in this traffic, 
although	 well-organised	 groups	 also	 seem	 to	 be	 significant	
(DGDDI,	2011c).
In particular, some case studies have revealed the activity 
of various criminal groups, most of them foreign and mainly 
at the borders. Illegal tobacco trade by go-fast convoys 
from Andorra was managed by Georgian and Chechen 
groups	(Le	Monde	du	Tabac,	2012b).	 In	2012,	an	organisation	
led by a young Serbian and importing tobacco from Andorra 
was	 dismantled;	 according	 to	 the	 DGDDI,	 its	 profit	 reached	
300,000	euro	in	three	months	(La	Dépêche,	2012).	
5.2.2.5. Counterfeiting
According to the World Customs Organisation, France was 
among	 the	 main	 locations	 of	 seized	 counterfeits	 in	 2010	
(WCO,	2011,	p.	8).	
The	 data	 presented	 in	 Eurobarometer	 (2011)	 reveal	 that,	
on average, 10% of consumers interviewed in France were 
willing to accept counterfeit products. Using this information, 
estimates	carried	out	for	the	present	study	(see	Section	4.5)	
have calculated that the counterfeit market in France 
would have yielded around 5.7 billion euro in 2010 if the 
demand	had	been	fully	satisfied.	Using	older	methodologies143 
this market is estimated to range between 2.9 and 5.7 billion 
euro.
The literature on counterfeiting reports that the market of 
unlicensed PC software in France alone in 2011 was likely to 
have	reached	2.1	billion	euro	(BSA,	2012).	BSA	ranked	France	
highest among the European countries and sixth worldwide in 
terms	of	 the	commercial	value	of	unlicensed	software	 (BSA,	
2012, p. 6).
As regards actors, investigations reveal the presence in France 
of Turkish and Italian criminal networks, especially in the 
field	of	counterfeit	clothes	(UNICRI	&	ICC	BASCAP,	2013).	 In	
particular, the Camorra is a historical Italian OCG exporting 
counterfeit	clothes	around	Europe	and	France	(Section	4.5.3),	
while, as in many other EU MS, Chinese criminals are active 
in the counterfeiting of commodities. 
5.2.2.6. Extortion racketeering
According	 to	Transcrime	 (2009),	 extortion	 racketeering	 is	 a	
widespread problem in France. More than 7,900 cases were 
reported	in	2008	by	the	authorities	(Transcrime,	2009,	p.	102).	
The diffusion of extortion may be linked with loopholes in the 
regulations and the weak protection of victims, witnesses, 
and	justice	collaborators	(Transcrime,	2009,	p.	101).	Although	
regulatory and policy developments have been introduced, the 
phenomenon	is	still	significant,	especially in the South	(e.g.	
Marseilles and Nice) and in Corsica, where the penetration 
of grand banditisme	 and	 local	OCGs	 is	more	 significant.	As	
regards business sectors, construction and entertainment 
are	those	most	affected	(Transcrime,	2009,	pp.	103-105).	
Besides local OCGs, there is evidence of French, Italian, 
Turkish, Chinese and Albanian groups perpetrating 
extortion	within	their	community	(Section	4.7.3)	to	extort	funds	
from businesses. Evidence is available that Italian Cosa Nostra 
and some French criminal groups	 finance	 themselves	
with	 extortion	 (Transcrime,	 2009,	 p.	 105).	 Also	 (former) 
paramilitary groups in Corsica are involved in extortion in 
order	to	control	their	territory	(West	Sands	Advisory,	2012,	p.	
22;	see	also	Section	4.7.3).
5.2.2.7. Fraud
France is witnessing the development of a wide range of 
fraudulent activities. According to INHESJ - ONDRP, 2012, 
and the French Gendarmerie, fraud are, together with drug 
trafficking, the illicit activities that produce the highest amount 
of illicit proceeds. 
Estimates of this illicit market are lacking. For the purpose of 
this project, Transcrime has estimated that the proceeds from 
MTIC frauds in France range between 3.5 and 6.3 billion 
euro	(see	Section	4.9	and	the	Methodological	Annex),	so	that	
this type of fraud is one of the main sources of income for 
organised criminal groups. 
As regards the criminal groups involved, the few results in the 
literature indicate, also in France, the presence of Eastern 
European OCGs, especially from Bulgaria and Romania, 
engaged	in	cybercrime	(FATF,	2011a;	INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012,	
p.	230;	Gendarmerie	Nationale-STRJD,	2013).	Online	fraud	is	
widespread	 in	 France,	 and	 victims’	 losses	 amounted	 to	 190	
million	euro	 in	2011,	according	 to	 INHESJ	(INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	
2012, p. 230). 
5.2.2.8. Organised property crime
According to the French Gendarmerie, property crimes 
exhibit high levels of organised crime involvement in 
France	 (Gendarmerie	 Nationale	 –	 STRJD,	 2013).	 Traffic	 of	
stolen property is a very common crime tackled by the public 
authorities	 (INHESJ	 -	ONDRP,	 2012),	 but	 studies	 attempting	
to quantify the amount of proceeds generated by this illicit 
activity are lacking.143. For a complete review of the methodologies used and the product 
categories included see the Methodological Annex and Section 4.5.
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Crimes are usually committed on French territory and then, 
according to the criminals involved, the stolen goods are sold 
offshore. For example, African and North African groups are 
active	in	France,	especially	in	car	theft;	they	export	stolen	cars	
back to their country of origin. Similarly, Bulgarian car thieves 
have moved from France to Spain but use the French territory 
as	a	transit	to	Eastern	Europe	(Gounev	&	Bezlov,	2008).
The	 French	 Gendarmerie	 have	 identified	 various	 groups	
operating on French territory. In particular, there is evidence 
of Russian/Georgian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Lithuanian, 
other Eastern European, Italian, Albanian, and Balkan 
groups all involved in organised property crime in France 
(Gendarmerie	Nationale	–	STRJD,	2013).
The available literature addresses three particular sectors 
of organised theft: armed robbery, cargo theft and car 
theft. However very few estimates are available to quantify 
the weight of organised crime in this market. However, the 
literature reveals that:
•		 In	2011,	the	overall	number	of	armed robberies decreased, 
as	 reported	 by	 INHESJ	 -	 ONDRP	 (2012),	 but	 there	 is	
substantial evidence of robberies committed by organised 
groups. The available literature does not evaluate the 
weight of armed robbery in terms of proceeds.
•		 Cargo theft is one of the most important organised theft 
activities. Although non-comparable given the different 
methodologies	adopted,	 significant	organised	crime	 theft	
proceeds in France were estimated by Europol at about 
48	million	euro	 in	2007	 (Europol,	2009b),	compared	with	
1	 billion	 euro	 in	 2004	 (Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	 2007).	
These activities are reported to be mainly concentrated in 
Paris,	Lyon,	Bordeaux	and	Marseilles	(Europol,	2009b).
•		 In	regard	to	car theft, France was, after the UK, the second 
most affected European country between 2003 and 
2006	(Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	2007,	p.	22).	According	
to	 the	 same	 source,	 Paris	 ranked	 fifth	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
number of cases in Europe. OCGs operating in France 
usually export the cars beyond the French borders: African, 
North African, Balkan and Eastern European countries are 
preferred destinations, but sometimes are only transit 
countries	towards	Arab	countries	(INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012).	
OCGs are often active in border areas, e.g. in north-eastern 
France	on	the	route	to	Belgium	(INHESJ-ONDERP,	2012,	p.	
221). 
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5.3.1. Introduction
According to the literature, illicit markets are essential 
sources of money for OCGs operating in Ireland. The most 
important markets, in terms of both revenues produced and 
functionality	 in	OCGs’	strategies,	seem	to	be	the	trafficking 
of illicit drugs, ITTP, fuel laundering and frauds. However, 
the extent to which the OCGs control illicit markets is in many 
cases unknown, also because it is not always easy to identify 
well-distinguished groups which control different shares of 
illicit	markets	(see	also	Section	8.3).
As reported also in Section 5.3.2, the Irish context is 
characterized	 by	 different types of criminal actors, i.e. 
well-established OCGs involved in multiple criminal activities, 
loosely connected local networks, occasional criminal 
enterprises, and groups linked with foreign OCGs or with 
former	 local	paramilitary	groups	(Council	of	Europe,	2001,	p.	
13;	Transcrime,	2009,	p.	136).
Van	 Dijk’s	 country-level	 Composite	 Organised	 Crime	 Index	
(Van	 Dijk,	 2008)	 reveals	 a	 sizeable	 presence	 of	 organised	
crime groups in Ireland, but statistics on the number of OCGs 
in	 the	 country	 are	 not	 homogeneous.	 In	 line	 with	 Europol’s	
SOCTA	 definition,	 the	 Irish	 Police	 (An	 Garda	 Síochána)	
identified	9 different OCGs active in Ireland in September 
2013. Europol itself, in 2009, reported about 40 Irish gangs 
(including	 9	 ‘primary’	 gangs)	 operating	 in	 Europe	 at	 that	
time	 (O’Keeffe,	 2009),	with	Netherlands, Spain and Great 
Britain being the “key locations for foreign criminal 
liaisons”	(Grant	Thornton	Ireland,	2013,	p.	15).	
These	 figures	 reveal	 the	 international profile of these 
groups.	 Irish	 OCGs’	 internationalization	 appears	 to	 occur	
in two ways. First, in terms of links with foreign criminal 
groups: connections can be highlighted between OCGs 
operating	 in	 Ireland	and	Russian-speaking	OCGs	 (An	Garda	
Síochána	 &	 PSNI,	 2012a),	 but	 also	 with	 Chinese	 OCGs	 and	
other	Eastern	European	criminal	groups	(An	Garda	Síochána	
&	PSNI,	2012a).	Also	important	is	cross-border cooperation 
between OCGs based in Ireland	and	Northern	 Ireland	 (An	
Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a),	particularly	on	illicit	activities	
such	as	smuggling	and	excise	 frauds	 (ITTP,	VAT	 frauds,	 fuel	
frauds), counterfeiting and piracy, as well as human trafficking 
(OCTF,	2012b,	p.	4).	
Second, Irelands records also a non-negligible presence of 
foreign OCGs active in criminal markets/activities such 
as	 human	 trafficking,	 drug	 dealing,	 firearms	 trafficking,	 illicit	
trade	in	tobacco	products	(ITTP)	and	vehicle	theft	(see	Table	
49).
Finally, to be noted is that today, after the decommissioning of 
many paramilitary dissident groups, terrorist actions driven by 
political beliefs have substantially diminished, and terrorists 
are increasingly involved in illicit markets, in some cases 
evolving	 into	OCGs	engaged	only	 in	criminal	activities	 (West	
Sands Advisory, 2012). The links between OCGs and local 
terrorist groups are evident in many illicit trade markets, 
including	counterfeiting	(Grant	Thornton	Ireland,	2013).	
As	described	in	more	detail	below	(Section	8.3),	OCGs	operate	
mainly in large urban areas, and mostly around the city of 
Dublin. Large cities like Dublin and Cork are the main target 
areas	for	drug	smuggling	and	vehicle	thefts	(McMahon,	2013).	
Moreover, also the land border region shows high vulnerability 
to	OCGs’	activities	(An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a).
5.3.2. Illicit markets in Ireland
The	 following	 table	 summarizes	 the	 size of the local illicit 
markets144 according to the literature and to the Transcrime-
OCP	 research	 team’s	 estimates.	A	 table	 on	 the	main	 actors	
involved is also provided. To be pointed out is that not all of the 
markets covered in Chapter 4 are treated here, due to either a 
lack of information or to a negligible illicit market scale. 
5.3.2.1. Drug trafficking
Most OCGs in Ireland are involved in illicit drug trafficking. 
Ireland is not only a destination but also a strategic transit 
country for illicit drugs destined for the UK and other EU 
countries	(REITOX	&	EMCDDA,	2014,	p.	 143).	 If	compared	to	
the average consumption of illicit drugs in the rest of the EU, 
Ireland records a relatively high illicit drug use, especially of 
opioids and cocaine	 (UNODC,	 2014b,	 see	 annex	 tables).	
However,	 cannabis	 ranks	 first	 in	 terms	 of	 consumption	
prevalence, with cocaine and opioids in second and third place 
respectively	(An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a,	p.	8).	All	three	
of these markets are important in terms of the illicit revenues 
produced.
The most consumed cannabis product is herbal cannabis, 
which is either imported by OCGs or domestically produced. 
As	 regards	 imported	cannabis,	 Ireland’s	 remote	west	coasts	
provide strategic access for sea shipments, sometimes 
coming	 directly	 from	 Morocco	 (EMCDDA	 &	 Europol,	 2013,	
p. 62). The groups involved in this market are generally local 
Irish criminals. They often operate in connection with Russian 
OCGs based in Spain, which is commonly used as transit 
country	for	trafficking	to	Ireland	(McDonald,	2008;	An	Garda	
Síochána	 &	 PSNI,	 2012a).	 However,	 the	 large-scale	 indoor	
cultivation of cannabis, in particular conducted by Chinese 
and Vietnamese OCGs,	 is	 increasing	 (An	 Garda	 Síochána	
&	PSNI,	2012a,	p.	8;	REITOX	&	EMCDDA,	2014).	According	to	
recent	calculations	(Caulkins,	Kilmer,	&	Graf,	2013),	the	value	
of the local cannabis market is 47 million euro.
As	 revealed	 by	 UNODC	 data	 (2014b),	 Ireland	 also	 records	
a high prevalence of cocaine consumption. According to 
Transcrime	 estimates	 carried	 out	 for	 the	 OCP	 project	 (see	
Section 4.1) the Irish market ranges between 67.3 and 100.9 
million	euro	(2006-2008	data).	Despite	a	lower	consumption	
prevalence, the Irish heroin market appears to yield 
significant	criminal	proceeds	owing	to	the	high	price	of	heroin	
in the country. According to Transcrime-OCP estimates, 
the	size	of	 this	market	 is	622.5	million	euro,	with	a	minimum	
bound of 498 million and a maximum one of 830 million euro 
(2011	 data).	 Heroin	 seems	mostly	 to	 arrive	 in	 Ireland	 by	 sea	
(Connolly,	2005,	p.	79).	
144. Northern Ireland is excluded from the analysis
5.3. Ireland                                                                                                                                                      
Diana Camerini (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
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The groups most involved are reported to be Irish nationals 
based in Ireland and the UK	 (Connolly,	2005).	However,	 in	
the past decade, together with Irish OCGs, foreign groups have 
increasingly	engaged	in	heroin	smuggling	(Corless,	2003).
5.3.2.2. Trafficking in human beings 
As	 reported	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 (2013a),	 Ireland	
is mainly a destination country for people trafficked for 
sexual exploitation and forced labour. Typically, victims are 
foreign nationals originating mainly from Nigeria, Albania, 
Eastern Europe, China and Southeast Asia	 (Ward	 &	
Wylie,	 2007;	 Fondation	 Scelles,	 2012),	 and	 they	 are	 often	
exploited	by	individuals	or	groups	of	their	same	ethnicity	(An	
Garda	Síochána	&	Department	of	Justice,	Equality	and	Law	
Reform,	 2006;	 Ward	 &	Wylie,	 2007).	 Irish-based	 OCGs	 are	
also involved, given the evidence of links between human 
trafficking	and	 local	 terrorism	financing	 that	has	emerged	 in	
recent	years	(FATF,	2011b,	p.	40;	West	Sands	Advisory,	2012).146 
The most common purpose of THB in Ireland is sexual 
exploitation.	 Indeed,	 a	 “number	 of	 OCGs	 are	 currently	
involved in organised prostitution brothel keeping throughout 
Illicit market
Estimate# 
(million 
euro)
Min 
(million 
euro)
Max 
(million 
euro)
Reference 
year
Source Notes
Heroin
623 498 830 2006 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
213 142 427 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
54 Connolly, 2005
Cocaine
90 67 101 2011 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
75 2003 Connolly, 2005
Cannabis
47 2010 Caulkins,	Kilmer,	&	Graf,	2013 Cannabis expenditure
49 22 101 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
379 2003 Connolly, 2005
Other illicit 
drugs
30 7 54 2009 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 Ecstasy
16 6 26 2009 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 Amphetamines
129 2003 Connolly, 2005 Ecstasy
10 2003 Connolly, 2005 Amphetamines 
ITTP
277 255 299 2013 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
156a 2010
EPS	Consulting	&	Retail	Ireland,	
2012
Counterfeiting
456 2010 Transcrime-OCP, 2014 Demand sidec
111b 2011 BSA, 2012
Unlicensed PC 
software
86 2010 Nunwood	&	Pfizer,	2010 Counterfeit medicines
Fraud
190 143 239 2012 Grant Thornton Ireland, 2013
Fuel fraud 
(Government	loss	to	
Exchequer)
168 142 215 2011 Transcrime-OCP, 2014 MTIC fraud
Organised 
property 
crime
0.77 2007 Europol, 2009b Cargo theft
148 2004
Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	
2007
Cargo theft
97 N/A McMahon, 2013
4 N/A McMahon, 2013
a Original	figure:	3	million	euro	per	week.	
b Original	figure:	144	million	USD,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
c Counterfeit ICT equipment, electric appliances, CDs, DVDs, cassettes, clothing and accessories, jewellery, watches, games, toys, perfumes, body care articles.
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 48 - Estimates of the revenues from illicit markets in Ireland145 
145. In the presence of an estimation range, estimate refers to the arithmetic 
mean	or	to	an	adjusted	mean	(referred	to	as	best	estimate).
146. Investigative evidence reveals some cases of the laundering of proceeds 
generated	 from	 sexual	 exploitation.	 In	 the	 Quest	 Operation,	 five	 persons	
were arrested for exploiting people in illegal brothels and for organising illegal 
prostitution, and they were also accused of money laundering.
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the	Island	of	Ireland”	(An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a,	p.	20)	
with most of them engaging in other illicit activities. In some 
cases, foreign OCGs establish links with local criminals to run 
indoor prostitution in brothels or apartments. The number 
of brothels run by foreign OCGs is reported to be increasing 
(Bohan,	 2014).	 As	 described	 in	 Reynolds	 (2003),	 the	 Irish	
prostitution	 racket	seems	 to	generate/produce	a	substantial	
amount	of	money,	which	in	some	cases	is	laundered	(An	Garda	
Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012b).	
Forced labour in Ireland seems less widespread than 
sexual exploitation, but the upturn in migration inflows and 
the economic downturn have increased the number of 
vulnerable	 people	 (An	 Garda	 Síochána	 &	 PSNI,	 2012a,	 p.	
20). Notwithstanding a lack of reporting and the low number 
of cases detected, it can be hypothesised that criminals 
proceeds from forced labour account only for a small share of 
the total revenues generated by criminals in Ireland.
5.3.2.3. Illicit trafficking in firearms
Although Ireland is reported to have low levels of illicit 
possession of civilian firearms	(Small	Arms	Survey,	2007),	
the	 illicit	 firearms	 market	 is	 a	 major	 issue	 for	 this	 country,	
especially in relation to the terrorist activities of (former) 
paramilitary groups. These groups, located in Ireland and 
Northern Ireland, act as both recipients of and traffickers 
in arms. As their military activity has diminished, they have 
become increasingly involved in weapons trafficking. In 
particular,	 they	are	 reported	 to	 sell	 firearms	 in	 exchange	 for	
drugs	 to	 Colombian	 (paramilitary)	 groups	 (including	 FARC	
groups), and to Croatia, where the narcotics received from 
Colombia	 are	 trafficked	 in	 exchange	 for	 firearms	 (Curtis	 &	
Karacan,	 2002,	 pp.	 6–8;	West	 Sands	Advisory,	 2012).	Other	
countries from which illicit weapons may originate are Iraq and 
Kosovo	 (Hales,	Lewis,	&	Silverstone,	2006,	p.	43).	Moreover,	
Ireland	may	act	as	transit	country	 for	 illicit	firearms	supplied	
to British criminals. 
Firearms are mainly sourced from abroad, for two reasons: 
first,	Ireland	is	no	longer	a	producer	of	firearms,	so	that	leakage	
from	 licit	 manufactures	 is	 hardly	 likely	 (Spapens,	 2007);	
second, Ireland has one of the least permissive legislations on 
the	possession	of	firearms	in	Europe,	so	that	opportunities	for	
OCGs to drain arms from their official owners are very limited.
5.3.2.4. Illicit trade in tobacco products
For OCGs operating in Ireland, the illicit trade in tobacco 
products (ITTP) is one of the most important illicit 
markets	 (Calderoni,	Rotondi,	&	Favarin,	2013).	According	 to	
some sources, it has recently replaced the cocaine market 
in	 terms	 of	 income	 (Grant	 Thornton	 Ireland,	 2013,	 p.	 31).	
Organised criminal groups, terrorists, and individual criminals 
in Ireland have long exploited this market to fund their illicit 
activities. Criminals are attracted by the high profitability of 
the ITTP market in Ireland, which is associated with different 
factors:	 first,	 the	 strong	 demand	 due	 to	 the	 high	 tax	 rates	
on tobacco products in Ireland feeding illegal consumption 
(Maguire,	2012;	Calderoni,	Rotondi,	&	Favarin,	2013);	 second,	
Illicit market OCGs Sources
Illicit	drugs	(not	
specified)
Irish	OCGs,	Paramilitary	groups	(Irish	&	British)
Curtis	&	Karacan,	2002;	West	Sands	
Advisory, 2012
Heroin Irish OCGs Connolly, 2005
Cocaine Chinese OCGs, Irish OCGs REITOX	&	EMCDDA,	2012b
Cannabis Chinese OCGs, Irish OCGs, Other Asian OCGs
McDonald,	2008;	An	Garda	Síochána	
&	PSNI,	2012a;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	
2013
Other illicit 
drugs
Lithuanian OCGs, Other Western European OCGs EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2011
THB
African	OCGs,	Chinese	OCGs,	Other	Eastern	European,	Russian/
Georgian OCGs
Corless,	2003;	An	Garda	Síochána	
&	PSNI,	2012a;	West	Sands	Advisory,	
2012
ITF Paramilitary	groups	(Irish	&	British) West Sands Advisory, 2012
ITTP
Chinese OCGs, Irish OCGs, Other Eastern European OCGs, 
Paramilitary	groups	(Irish	&	British),	Russian/Georgian	OCGs
West	Sands	Advisory,	2012;	Calderoni,	
Rotondi,	&	Favarin,	2013;	Interpol,	
2014a
Counterfeiting Irish OCGs O’Riordan,	2013
Extortion 
racketeering
Irish OCGs
Transcrime, 2009, West Sands 
Advisory, 2012 
Fraud Irish OCGs, British OCGs An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a
Organised 
property crime
British OCGs, Irish OCGs An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a
Illicit fuel 
trafficking
Irish	OCGs,	Paramilitary	groups	(Irish	&	British) Interpol, 2014a
Table 49 - Organised crime groups’ involvement by illicit market in Ireland
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the	 very	 low	 penalties	 imposed	 for	 this	 crime	 (Calderoni,	
Rotondi,	&	Favarin,	2013).	
Estimates	reveal	the	large	size	of	this	market	compared	with	
others.	 According	 to	 EPS	 Consulting	 &	 Retail	 Ireland	 (2012,	
p. 14), the ITTP may generate 3 million euro each week. 
The estimates produced for the purpose of this study reveal 
(slightly)	 higher	 figures	quantifying	 the	 size	of	 this	market	at	
between 255 and 299 million euro	(2013	data)	(see	Section	
4.4.2).
Irish organised criminals are the main actors in this market, 
but foreign groups such as Eastern European and Chinese 
OCGs often play a crucial role, especially in the importing of 
raw materials and the counterfeiting of cigarettes brands 
(Calderoni,	 Rotondi,	 &	 Favarin,	 2013,	 p.	 61).	 Cigarettes	
smuggled into Ireland, in fact, have been traditionally 
linked with source countries like China and Malaysia, and 
connections with Vietnam and Cambodia are also emerging 
(An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a,	p.	22).	Close	cross-border	
cooperation between OCGs of Ireland and Northern Ireland is 
also	reported	(An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a).
Cigarettes smuggling is also one of the main sources of 
funding for (former) paramilitary groups in Northern 
Ireland	 (Interpol,	 2014a,	 p.	 120)	 and	 Ireland,	 the	 latter	 with	
different	 roles:	 the	 Provisional	 IRA	 (PIRA)	 and	 the	 Real	 IRA	
(RIRA)	 were	 reported	 to	 be	 engaged	 in	 overseas	 trafficking	
of tobacco through containers. Trafficking conducted by the 
Loyalists	takes	place	more	as	‘ant	trade’,	since	they	have	often	
been found to pay overseas journeys to single individuals who 
buy	and	illicitly	import	small	quantities	of	tobacco	(Calderoni,	
Rotondi,	&	Favarin,	2013,	p.	88).	
However, cigarette smuggling is not exclusively controlled of 
OCGs	 alone	 (Maguire,	 2012;	 Calderoni,	 Rotondi,	 &	 Favarin,	
2013, p. 63) because single individuals can introduce illicit 
cigarettes into the country without being involved in OCGs. 
In fact, individual thieves and foreign organised groups are 
reported to account jointly for 25% of the cigarettes smuggled 
into	Ireland	(Calderoni,	Rotondi,	&	Favarin,	2013,	p.	61).
5.3.2.5. Counterfeiting
Although the extent to which OCGs are involved in product 
counterfeiting and digital piracy in Ireland is little investigated 
by the literature,	 according	 to	 some	 sources	 “crime	gangs	
are	 behind	 the	 significant	 trade	 in	 counterfeit	 goods”	 (EPS	
Consulting	 &	 Retail	 Ireland,	 2012;	 Grant	 Thornton	 Ireland,	
2013). 
According	 to	 Transcrime-OCP	 estimates	 (see	 Section	 4.5),	
the potential demand for counterfeit products in Ireland 
may	produce,	if	fully	satisfied,	revenues	amounting	to	around 
456 million euro	 (using	 2010-2011	 data).	 On	 using	 another	
methodology	 of	 estimate	 (specified	 in	 the	 Methodological	
Annex), this market is likely to yield between 268.3 and 536.6 
million euro. How much of these proceeds can relate to OCGs 
is difficult to determine.
In this regard, it should be emphasised that Ireland is 
probably the most developed country in Europe in terms of 
e-commerce	 (see	 the	 chart	 in	 Figure	 19	 below).	Not	 only	 is	
the turnover from internet-based trade by Irish companies 
much higher than the EU average, but it is also increasing. This 
may facilitate the sale and distribution of fake products on the 
Internet. 
The Irish authorities are increasingly concerned about 
counterfeiting sub-markets like digital piracy, medicine 
counterfeiting, and food counterfeiting	 (An	 Garda	
Síochána	 &	 PSNI,	 2012a).	 As	 regards	 digital	 piracy,	 the	
commercial value of pirated software in Ireland was estimated 
at	 144	million	US	dollars	 (i.e.	 around	 110	million	 euro)	 in	 2011	
(BSA,	 2012).	 Counterfeit	 clothing	 and	 clothing	 accessories	
are	also	common	(O’Riordan,	2013).	Another	important	issue	
for Ireland is the counterfeiting of pharmaceutical products: 
according	 to	 research	 commissioned	 by	 Pfizer,	 the	 value	
of the counterfeit medicines market in Ireland is 86 million 
euro	each	year	 (Nunwood	&	Pfizer,	 2010).	Again,	 the	 spread	
of e-commerce in Ireland may facilitate the purchase of fake 
medicines on the Internet.
To be noted is that probably the most important type of 
counterfeiting in Ireland concerns fake cigarettes, but this 
issue is discussed in the Section on ITTP.
5.3.2.6. Extortion racketeering
The seriousness of extortion racketeering in Ireland seems 
to be low,	according	to	Transcrime	(2009,	p.	135).	Among	the	
few	 cases	 identified,	 organised	 criminal	 groups	 involved	 in	
extortion racketeering in Ireland seem to be mainly structured 
as networks. This crime appears to be committed by local 
OCGs and local gangs which engage in mainly casual147 
extortion racketeering. The majority of cases concern 
extortion	racketeering	perpetrated	by	terrorist	groups	(West	
Sands Advisory, 2012), also ones based in Northern Ireland.
5.3.2.7. Fraud
Despite the lack of statistics and data, fraud appears to be 
an emerging illegal activity and a relevant source of 
proceeds for OCGs in Ireland. Among the EU MS, Ireland 
Figure 19 - Share (%) of e-commerce in enterprises' 
turnover 
Source: Transcrime elaboration on Eurostat data
147.	 For	 the	 definition	 of	 casual	 extortion	 episodes	 refer	 to	 Section	 4.7	 on	
extortion racketeering.
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records the highest number of payment card frauds148 
(Levi	 et	 al.,	 2013,	 p.	 39).	 Payment	 card	 frauds	 are	 typically	
“dominated	by	well-structured	and	globally	active	organised	
crime	groups”	(Europol,	2012,	p.	3).
The increase of fraud in Ireland is also related to exploitation 
of the border with Northern Ireland and the different tax 
regimes.	 Missing	 Trader	 Intra-Community	 (MTIC)	 and	 VAT	
frauds,	which	concern	movable	goods	that	cross	the	country’s	
borders,	 are	 quite	 significant	 (for	 a	 general	 description	
of MTIC and VAT frauds see Section 4.9). Cases of VAT 
carousels	have	also	been	reported	by	the	Irish	police	(Palomo	
et	al.,	 2009,	p.	63;	An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a,	p.	 16).	
According to Transcrime-OCP estimates, this type of fraud 
may yield around 168 million euro	in	Ireland	(using	2011	data).
Mortgage fraud is a frequent type of fraud, as reported by 
the	police	(Breaking	News,	2006;	CAB,	2012,	p.	13;	O’Riordan,	
2013). It may be related to the growth of the Irish real estate 
market in the 2000s, and to the interest of OCGs in investing 
in	properties	(see	Section	8.3).	Mortgages	can	also	be	used	to	
launder money, and they are associated with intimidation by 
criminals	 against	 bank	 officials	 (in	 order	 to	 avoid	 mortgage	
repayments)	(Sheenan,	2012).	
5.3.2.8. Organised vehicle theft
Organised vehicle theft is a widespread crime in Ireland, 
and	it	appears	to	be	a	major	source	of	proceeds	for	OCGs	(An	
Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a,	p.	23).	Open	data	report	that	
this	 business	 is	 worth	 97	million	 euro	 each	 year	 (McMahon,	
2013), but no description of the methodology of estimate is 
available. 
Stolen vehicles are either resold entirely or dismantled to sell 
the pieces as spare parts. Car theft usually takes place on 
demand originating from abroad, but also the importing 
of stolen cars is reported.149	 The	 stolen	 vehicles	 (mostly	
commercial vehicles or tractors) are transferred overseas, 
either being transported to Northern Ireland or shipped to 
other	European	countries	(usually	 in	the	UK,	the	Middle	East	
and	Africa)	(An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a).	Cars	are	also	
stolen to commit crimes or for the removal and resale of their 
parts	(Interpol,	2014b).	
Strictly related to vehicle theft is cargo theft.	Europol	(2009b),	
in a study on cargo theft, estimated that the losses associated 
with this crime amount to around 765 thousand euro. The 
groups engaged in organised vehicle theft are Irish ones, which 
have	been	 found	 to	cooperate	with	British	OCGs	 (An	Garda	
Síochána	 &	 PSNI,	 2012a).	 However,	 it	 cannot	 be	 excluded	
that small-scale gangs or individual criminals engage in this 
trafficking in Ireland. In some cases, the trafficking is indirectly 
tied to drug trafficking: it has been reported that crime gangs 
engaged in drug trafficking often force, or give small payments 
to,	drug	addicts	to	steal	cars	for	the	gangs	(McMahon,	2013).150
5.3.2.9. Illicit fuel trafficking 
Fuel	laundering	has	long	been	a	source	of	financing	for	illegal	
paramilitary	 organisations	 and	 for	 OCGs	 (often	 associated	
with	 paramilitary/terrorist	 groups,	 Interpol,	 2014a,	 p.	 116)	 in	
Northern Ireland and Ireland. These groups may exploit the 
differentials in prices and tax regimes between the two 
countries and among different products.151
Fuel laundering has emerged as the most common type of fuel 
fraud	recorded	in	Ireland	(Grant	Thornton	Ireland,	2013).	Fuel	
laundering, which often takes place cross-border, usually 
entails the illegal trade of agri-diesel fuel with the dyes removed 
to	make	 it	 look	 like	vehicle	 fuel	 (An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	
2012a). Once the dyes are removed, the laundered fuel is sold 
at	a	higher	price	as	vehicle	fuel,	causing	significant	damage	to	
road vehicle engines. Another widespread type of fuel crime is 
fuel smuggling,	from	which	OCGs	earn	significant	proceeds	
by exploiting the price differential between Northern Ireland 
and	 Ireland	 (Grant	 Thornton	 Ireland,	 2013).	 Fuel	 laundering	
in Ireland has also been associated with money laundering 
activities, in particular committed through money business 
services	(see	An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a,	p.	16;	Sections	
8.3 and 12.4 for details).
148. According to the EU Fraud Prevention Expert Group, card frauds can occur 
in	different	ways.	“There	are	many	different	typologies	for	card	fraud.	 Industry	
generally	groups	them	in	four	main	categories:	mail-non-receipt	fraud	(e.g.	the	
physical	card	sent	by	the	bank	through	the	mail	is	intercepted);	lost-and-stolen	
card	 fraud	 (e.g.	 you	 lose	 your	 card	 or	 your	 card	 is	 stolen);	 counterfeit	 card	
fraud	(e.g.	skimming	of	your	card	to	produce	a	counterfeit	one);	and	card-not-
present	 fraud	(e.g.	 remote	payments	such	as	phone	or	mail	orders	or	 internet	
transactions).”	http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fpeg/card-fraud_en.htm.
149.	 See	 An	 Garda	 Síochána	 website	 http://www.garda.ie/controller.
aspx?page=1645	.
150.	The	‘coke-for-cars’	system	is	reported	in	Ireland,	as	well	as	in	other	countries	
of	 the	 world.	 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-
Monitor/2012/1023/Bolivia-plans-crackdown-on-cars-for-cocaine-trade
151. For example, the price differential between agri-diesel fuel and road vehicle 
fuel	 is	 reported	to	be	equivalent	 to	38	cents	per	 litre	 (Grant	Thornton	 Ireland,	
2013, p. 19), the latter being more expensive. As reported below, OCGs cheat 
their customers by reselling un-dyed agricultural fuel as vehicle fuel.
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5.4.1. Introduction
There	 is	a	vast	body	of	 literature	on	 the	nature	and	 the	size	
of illicit markets in Italy. A large number of estimates are also 
available, but they often fail to disclose the methodology 
adopted	 (for	 a	 review	 see	 Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Calderoni,	
2014c;	Savona,	2014).
According to the available studies, illicit markets in Italy 
are huge in scale, especially if compared with those of other 
OCP	countries	(see	Table	4	and	Table	50).	This	may	be	due	
to various factors, including the relative size of the Italian 
legitimate economy	(third	GDP	among	EU	MS	after	Germany	
and	 France),	 the	 country’s	strategic position on important 
illicit	trafficking	routes	(e.g.	as	a	transit	point	from	North	Africa	
and the western Balkans for illicit drugs, trafficked persons, 
tobacco	 products,	 firearms,	 counterfeit	 products),	 and	 the	
historical presence of permanent and well-rooted OCGs, 
especially	Italian	mafias,	particularly	in	southern	regions	(see	
below).152
On	the	basis	of	the	available	estimates	(see	Table	50)	and	LEA	
reports and judicial evidence, illicit drug trafficking, fraud 
and extortion racketeering are the largest illicit markets 
in Italy. Also usury, counterfeiting and human trafficking for 
sexual	 exploitation	 purposes	 play	 significant	 roles	 in	 the	
economies of OCGs.
Organised crime groups in Italy
As in many other EU MS, a wide range of criminal actors 
participate	 in	 Italy’s	 illicit	 markets.	 Besides	 the	 traditional 
Italian mafias153 (in	 particular	 OCGs	 connected	 with	 the	
Camorra,	Cosa	Nostra,	‘Ndrangheta	and	to	the	Sacra	Corona	
Unita - Apulian OCGs), on which most of the academic 
research	has	focused	to	date,	a	significant	number	of	foreign 
groups operate in Italy. 
Chinese OCGs, Eastern European OCGs	 (in	 particular	
of Albanian, Romanian, Moldovan and Bulgarian origin), 
Russian/Georgian, Western Balkan, North African and 
Nigerian OCGs play a crucial role in certain illicit activities 
such as counterfeiting, sexual exploitation, drug trafficking 
and	 organised	 property	 crime	 (DNA,	 2011,	 p.	 200;	Ministero	
dell'Interno,	2013,	pp.	18-24;	DIA,	2014;	DNA,	2014).
Besides structured OCGs, occasional and loose criminal 
networks of individual criminals, freelance entrepreneurs 
and brokers are	also	active	in,	e.g.,	the	trafficking	in	firearms,	
counterfeit goods, tobacco products, or in providing facilities 
and services for other criminal activities. These latter include, 
for	example,	the	‘laundering’	of	stolen	goods,154 the setting up 
of business schemes to commit excise and VAT frauds, or the 
provision	of	money	laundering	services	themselves	(see	also	
Section 8.4). 
The role and type of OCGs vary largely according to the 
geographical area:
•		 In	southern regions,	 Italian	mafias	maintain	 a	 dominant	
role	(with	Camorra	 in	Campania,	 ‘Ndrangheta	in	Calabria,	
and Cosa Nostra in Sicily) and they occasionally operate 
with	 foreign	 OCGs	 (Ministero	 dell’Interno,	 2013,	 p.	 18;	
Transcrime,	2013a;	DNA,	2014).	
•		 Central Italy	 is	the	area	preferred	by	foreign	OCGs	(also	
in terms of investments, see Section 8.4), although Italian 
mafias	are	also	active	 (for	 instance,	Camorra	 in	Tuscany,	
Umbria,	Molise	and	Abruzzo	–	see	Transcrime	(2013a)	and	
Calderoni	(2014c,	p.	147).	The	Lazio	region	(and	in	particular	
the area of Rome) records intense activities by both Italian 
mafias	(especially	Camorra	and	‘Ndrangheta)	and	foreign	
OCGs, while in Tuscany the presence of Chinese OCGs 
is	 significant	 in	 the	 counterfeiting,	 sexual	 and	 labour	
exploitation	markets	(Becucci,	2013,	2014).
•		 Northern Italy has a large number of different organised 
crime	 groups.	 The	 transplantation	 of	 Italian	 mafias	 has	
produced	 significant	 levels	 of	 infiltration,	 which	 in	 some	
cases has assumed the nature of systematic rooting in 
the	 social	 and	economic	 fabric	 (e.g.	Cassinelli	&	Garzillo,	
2014).	A	large	presence	of	‘Ndrangheta	OCGs	is	registered	
in	 the	 North-West	 (Lombardy,	 Piedmont,	 Liguria)	 and	 in	
Emilia-Romagna.	 In	 these	 regions	 'Ndrangheta	 is	 active	
both	in	illicit	markets	and	in	the	infiltration	of	the	legitimate	
economy	 (see	 also	 Section	 8.4).	 Among	 foreign	 OCGs,	
Russian groups, Albanian, Romanian, Bulgarian and other 
eastern European OCGs are active in the trafficking of illicit 
drugs, sexual exploitation, and organised property crime. 
North	 African	 OCGs	 (drug	 trafficking)	 and	 Chinese	 and	
South	East	Asian	OCGs	(prostitution,	especially	indoor	or	
in	massage	parlours)	have	also	been	reported	(DNA,	2014).	
5.4.2. Illicit markets in Italy
Table 50 presents a summary of some of the available 
estimates of the proceeds of criminal markets in Italy. Table 51 
provides a review of the main OCGs active per illicit market in 
the country. The following Sections focus on the main criminal 
markets, commenting on estimates and the main active 
groups.
152. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that illicit markets may have 
often	been	overestimated	with	 exaggerated	mythical	 numbers	 (as	 suggested	
also	 by	 UNODC,	 2011a;	 see	 Transcrime,	 2013a	 and	 Calderoni,	 2014c,	 for	 a	
review).
153.	 The	 term	 “Italian	mafias”	 refers	 here	 to	 the	 criminal	 groups	 belonging	 to	
the main Italian criminal organisations, namely Cosa Nostra, Camorra and 
‘Ndrangheta,	and	to	other	smaller	criminal	organisations	(Sacra	Corona	Unita,	
etc.)	 (Transcrime	 2013a).	 This	 category	 is	 widely	 accepted	 by	 the	 academic	
literature	(see	Calderoni,	2014b,	for	a	review),	and	it	is	referred	to	by	the	Italian	
Criminal	Code	with	the	specific	offence	of	mafia-type	association	(Art.	416-bis):	
“the	 provisions	 above	 apply	 also	 to	 the	Camorra,	 the	 ‘Ndrangheta	 and	 other	
associations, however known or called, even foreign, which use the intimidatory 
power	 of	 the	 group	 to	 achieve	 the	 goals	 typical	 of	 a	mafia-type	 association”	
(Transcrime,	2013a).
154. For example by setting up fake wholesale companies to trade stolen 
medicines	on	the	parallel	trade	(Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014).
5.4. Italy                                                                                                                                                      
Diana Camerini and Michele Riccardi (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
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Illicit market
Estimate 
#(million 
euro)
Min 
(million 
euro)
Max 
(million 
euro)
Reference 
year Source Notes
Heroin
1,370 1,096 1,826 2012 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
1,153 2011 Giommoni, 2014
1,842 2009 Transcrime, 2013a
2,453 2010 Fabi,	Ricci,	&	Rossi,	2011
3,340 2009 Rossi, 2013
1,980 2008 Di Censi et al., 2010
1,623 1,326 2,649 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
1,467 887 2,046 2005 Baldassarrini	&	Corea,	2009
862 855 868 2005 Canzonetti,	2009
Cocaine
1,699 1,268 1,902 2008 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
1,171 2011 Giommoni, 2014
1,711 772 2,649 2008 Transcrime, 2013a
10,226 2010 Sallusti, 2013
9,771 2010 Fabi,	Ricci,	&	Rossi,	2011
12,590 2009 Rossi, 2013
5,413 2008 Di Censi et al., 2010
2,489 658 6,415 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
3,231 2,774 3,688 2005 Baldassarrini	&	Corea,	2009
4,030 3,963 4,096 2005 Canzonetti,	2009
Cannabis
1,356 2008 Caulkins,	Kilmer,	&	Graf,	2013
547 2012 Giommoni, 2014
3,141 1,649 4,632 2008 Transcrime, 2013a
9,511 2010 Fabi,	Ricci,	&	Rossi,	2011
7,030 2009 Rossi, 2013
3,579 2008 Di Censi et al., 2010
2,956 1,320 6,154 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
1,155 793 1,516 2005 Baldassarrini	&	Corea,	2009
4,319 4,248 4,390 2005 Canzonetti,	2009
Synthetic 
drugs
242 2008 Giommoni, 2014 Ecstasy
199 2012 Giommoni, 2014 Amphetamines
667 180 1,153 2008 Transcrime, 2013a Ecstasy
367 99 636 2008 Transcrime, 2013a Amphetamines
639 139 1,140 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 Ecstasy
284 111 457 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 Amphetamines
THB
3,082 1,134 5,029 2004-2009 Mancuso, 2014a
Sexual	exploitation	(both	
indoor and outdoor) of 
foreign women
4,660 1,778 7,541 2004-2009 Transcrime, 2013a Sexual	exploitation	(both	
indoor and outdoor) of 
foreign women
600 2009 SOS Impresa, 2010 Sexual	exploitation	only;	
Mafia	revenues
870 2009 SOS Impresa, 2010 Human	trafficking;	Mafia	
revenues
Table 50 - Estimates of the revenues of illicit markets in Italy155 
155.		In	the	presence	of	an	estimation	range,	estimate	refers	to	the	arithmetic	mean	or	to	an	adjusted	mean	(referred	to	as	best	estimate).	For	more	details,	see	Chapter	
3 and Methodological Annex.
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Illicit market
Estimate# 
(million 
euro)
Min 
(million 
euro)
Max 
(million 
euro)
Reference 
year
Source Notes
ITF
93 46 141 2010 Calderoni et al., 2014b
111 74 149 2010 Transcrime, 2013a Demand side
5,800 2009 SOS Impresa, 2010
ITTP
546 485 607 2013 Transcrime- OCP, 2014
1,139 1,002 1,276 2012 Calderoni, 2014a
752 661 842 2011 Transcrime, 2013a
Counterfeiting
4,596 2010 Transcrime - OCP, 2014 Demand sideb
4,541 3,028 6,055 2008
Calderoni	et	al.,	2014b;	
Transcrime, 2013a
Demand side
1,498a 2011 BSA, 2012 Unlicensed PC software
7,800 2009 SOS Impresa, 2010 Miscellaneous productsc
7,107 2008 CENSIS, 2009 Miscellaneous productsd
Illegal 
gambling
425 326 522 2011
Calderoni	et	al.,	2014b;	
Transcrime, 2013a
Gaming machines
10,000 unknown Libera, 2012
23,000 2009 Eurispes, 2010
2,500 2009 SOS Impresa, 2010 OCGs share
Extortion 
racketeering
5,253 2,762 7,743 2012 Lisciandra, 2014
4,763 2011 Transcrime, 2013a
Usury
4,634 3,090 6,178 2012 Scaglione, 2014
2,243 2010 Transcrime, 2013a
15,000 2009 SOS Impresa, 2010
Fraud
5,492 3,975 7,010 2011 Transcrime - OCP, 2014 MTIC fraud
4,600 2009 SOS Impresa, 2010
OCG	share	(type	of	
fraud	not	specified)
Organised 
property 
crime
330 2013
Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	
2014
Theft of medicines from 
hospitals	(per	episode	
of theft)
0.33 2007 Europol, 2009b Cargo theft
619 2004
Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	
2007
Cargo theft
90 2001-2012
Jane's	Information	Group,	
2013
Cargo theft
Illicit waste 
management
405 304 507 2007-2010 Calderoni et al., 2014b
Special waste 
management
567 378 756 2007-2009 Transcrime, 2013a
Special waste 
management
a	Original	figure:	1,945	million	USD,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
b Counterfeit ICT equipment, electric appliances, CDs, DVDs, cassettes, clothing and accessories, jewellery, watches, games, toys, perfumes, body care articles.
c Fashion wear, consumers electronics, toys, perfumes and cosmetics, medicines, foodstuff, other consumption goods.
d Food products, tobacco, alcohol, perfumes, cosmetics, clothing and accessories, electric appliances, ICT equipment, CDs, DVDs, software, watches, jewellery, 
spare parts of vehicles, games, toys, medicines.
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 50 - Estimates of the revenues of illicit markets in Italy155  (continues)
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5.4.2.1. Drug trafficking
Italy is mainly a destination country for illicit drugs, especially 
cocaine and cannabis, but it is also a strategic transit 
country. According to the most recent drug prevalence data 
(UNODC,	 2014b),	 the	 illicit	 substance	 most	 consumed	 in	
Italy is cannabis, followed in order by cocaine, heroin and 
amphetamine-type stimulants.156 Many OCGs in Italy, of both 
Italian and foreign origin, are involved in drugs markets.
Heroin
Despite a low consumption prevalence, the heroin market is 
estimated to produce very high revenues for traffickers in 
Italy.	According	to	Transcrime	estimates	for	Project	OCP	(see	
Table 9 and Table 50), annual revenues from heroin market are 
likely to amount to between 1.1 and 1.8 billion euro. Estimates 
provided by previous studies are rather heterogeneous 
because of differences among the methodologies used.
Like cocaine, the heroin circulating in Italy is entirely 
imported. The heroin shipped to Italy arrives mainly along the 
Illicit market Higher evidence OCGs Lower evidence OCGs
Heroin Albanian OCGs, Other Eastern European OCGs
Apulian OCGs, Camorra, Cosa Nostra, North 
African OCGs
Cocaine
Albanian	OCGs,	Camorra,	‘Ndrangheta,	North	African	
OCGs
African OCGs, Balkan OCGs, Bulgarian OCGs, 
French OCGs, South American OCGs, Spanish 
OCGs
Cannabis
Albanian	OCGs,	Camorra,	‘Ndrangheta,	North	African	
OCGs
Apulian OCGs, Cosa Nostra, French OCGs, 
Spanish OCGs
THB
African OCGs, Apulian OCGs, Albanian OCGs, Camorra, 
Chinese	OCGs,	Cosa	Nostra,	‘Ndrangheta,	Other	Asian	
OCGs, Romanian OCGs
Balkan OCGs, Bulgarian OCGs, Dutch OCGs, 
North African OCGs, Other Eastern European 
OCGs,	Other	Italian/Italian	not	specified	OCGs,	
Russian OCGs, South American OCGs
ITF
Albanian OCGs, Apulian OCGs, Balkan OCGs, Bulgarian 
OCGs,	Camorra,	Cosa	Nostra,	‘Ndrangheta,	Other	
Eastern	European	OCGs,	Russian/Georgian	OCGs
African OCGs, Chinese OCGs, North African 
OCGs,	Other	Italian/Italian	not	specified	OCGs,	
Romanian OCGs, South American OCGs, 
Turkish OCGs
ITTP
Albanian OCGs, Apulian OCGs, Balkan OCGs, Bulgarian 
OCGs, Camorra, Chinese OCGs, Other Eastern European 
OCGs, Romanian OCGs, Russian OCGs
Cosa	Nostra,	Lithuanian	OCGs,	‘Ndrangheta,	
Other	Italian/Italian	not	specified	OCGs,	Other	
Asian
Counterfeiting Camorra, Chinese OCGs 
African OCGs, Apulian OCGs, Balkan OCGs, 
Bulgarian OCGs, Cosa Nostra, Japanese OCGs, 
Other	Italian/Italian	not	specified	OCGs
Illegal gambling 
and match-
fixing
Apulian	OCGs,	Camorra,	Cosa	Nostra,	‘Ndrangheta,	
Other	Italian/Italian	not	specified	OCGs
Chinese OCGs, Other Eastern European OCGs, 
Russian/Georgian	OCGs
Extortion 
racketeering
Apulian OCGs, Camorra, Chinese OCGs, Cosa Nostra, 
‘Ndrangheta
Albanian OCGs, Balkan OCGs, Other Asian 
OCGs, Other Eastern European OCGs, Other 
Italian/Italian	not	specified	OCGs,	Romanian	
OCGs, Russian OCGs, South American OCGs
Usury Apulian	OCGs,	Camorra,	Cosa	Nostra,	‘Ndrangheta
Albanian OCGs, Balkan OCGs, Chinese OCGs, 
Other	Italian/Italian	not	specified	OCGs,	Other	
Asian OCGs
Fraud
Bulgarian OCGs, Camorra, Chinese OCGs, Cosa Nostra, 
Other	Italian/Italian	not	specified	OCGs,	Romanian	OCGs
African	OCGs,	Apulian	OCGs,	‘Ndrangheta,	
Other Asian OCGs
Organised 
property crime
Albanian OCGs, Apulian OCGs, Camorra, Romanian 
OCGs, Eastern European OCGs
Bulgarian	OCGs,	‘Ndrangheta,	North	African	
OCGs,	Russian/Georgian	OCGs
Table 51 - Organised crime groups in illicit markets in Italy
Sources: Ministero dell’Interno, 2013; DIA, 2011a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014; DNA, 2010, 2010b, 2011b, 2011c, 2012, 2012b, 2014; Europol, 2011b; Eurojust, 2011a; Interpol, 
2014a; Transcrime, 2009; 2013a; UNODC, 2010a; 2013a, 2013b; Antoliš, 2007; Calderoni et al., 2013b; Calderoni et al., 2014b; FATF, 2011b; Lisciandra, 2014; Riccardi, Dugato, 
& Polizzotti, 2014; Scaglione, 2014
156.	Drug	prevalence	for	cannabis	is	4.0	(data	2012).	For	cocaine	it	is	reported	to	
be	0.6	(data	2012),	whereas	for	opioids	(heroin)	the	reported	prevalence	is	0.48.	
Finally,	 for	 ATS	 (Amphetamine-Type	 Stimulants)	 the	 prevalence	 is	measured	
at	0.09,	with	 a	prevalence	 for	 ecstasy	of	0.06	 (data	2012).	Data	on	 the	 same	
substances	for	previous	years	are	significantly	different	due	to	modifications	of	
survey methodologies.
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Balkan route	 starting	 in	 Afghanistan	 (UNODC,	 2014c).	 The	
second most important source countries are those belonging 
to the Golden Triangle	 (Myanmar,	 Laos,	 Thailand,	 and	 now	
Vietnam).	As	recently	reported	by	UNODC,	also	“East	Africa	
appears to be emerging and enhancing as a heroin route to 
Italy”	(UNODC,	2014c,	p.	82).	
Although highly competitive, the heroin market involves 
several	OCGs	deriving	from	a	few	groups	of	origin	(see	Table	
51). Among foreign OCGs, Albanian and Eastern European 
OCGs play the leading role, often in cooperation with Italian 
mafia	groups.	
Cocaine
Italy is one of the most lucrative markets for cocaine in 
the EU. It is mostly a destination country, while transit occurs 
less frequently. According to Transcrime-OCP estimates, the 
Italian cocaine market has a monetary value ranging from 1.3 
to 1.9 billion euro.	With	the	United	Kingdom	(see	Table	4	and	
Section 5.7), Italy accounts for almost 60% of the revenues 
produced	 in	 the	7	OCP	countries.	Previous	estimates	 (Table	
50) vary widely due to differences in data and methodologies. 
The cocaine circulating in Italy is imported mainly from South 
America, in particular Colombia and Mexico. As in many 
other EU MS, the cocaine trafficked in Italy usually crosses the 
Atlantic	to	reach	Spain	(sometimes	through	African	countries)	
(UNODC,	2013b,	p.	9)	or	the	Netherlands.	The	high	number	of	
seizures	at	the	Italian port of Gioia Tauro	(Calabria)	suggest	
the presence of important direct connections with South 
America	and	a	crucial	role	of	the	‘Ndrangheta	(DNA,	2014,	p.	
420).
Evidence of involvement of all Italian mafia groups has been 
found to different extents: 
•		 Camorra is highly dynamic in cocaine trafficking at 
international level, with frequent connections with other 
transnational groups such as Dutch, Spanish and Eastern 
European	traffickers	(DIA,	2014,	p.	98;	DNA,	2014,	p.	902).
•		 ‘Ndrangheta is one of the leaders in European cocaine 
trafficking	 (DNA,	 2011,	 p.	 653).	 It	 can	 rely	 on	 a	 large	
number of brokers operating worldwide, and it is able to 
establish direct contacts with traffickers in South America 
and	Spain,	Netherlands	or	Germany	(DNA,	2014).
•		 Although	 less	 involved	 in	 recent	 years,	 Cosa Nostra 
affiliates	 are	 frequently	 cited	 in	 LEA	 reports	 as	 ‘qualified’	
actors	 in	 cocaine	 markets	 (DNA,	 2014,	 p.	 420),	 often	 in	
connection with other Italian or Albanian OCGs.
Among foreign OC groups to be mentioned in particular are 
the following: 
•		 Albanian OCGs, especially active in the importing of 
cocaine from the Netherlands or the Benelux area, where 
many	Albanian-origin	 criminals	 are	 based	 (DNA,	 2014,	 p.	
201). 
•		 Nigerian OCGs	 occupy	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 cocaine	
trafficking	 (UNODC,	 2008),	 especially	 in	 the	 retail	 phase,	
where	 they	 can	 rely	 on	 drug	mules	 of	 Nigerian	 (but	 also	
European)	origin	(DNA,	2014).
•		 Bulgarian OCGs are reported to import cocaine from 
Spain, but also from other European sources, and often 
cooperate with Italian OCGs to smuggle the drug into 
Lombardy	or	other	northern	regions	(DNA,	2014,	p.	256).
As	 revealed	 by	 reports	 on	 drug	 seizures,	 cocaine	 is	 often	
smuggled in exchange for heroin or other illicit commodities, 
such	as	firearms	(see	5.4.2.3).
Cannabis 
As reported above, cannabis is the illicit drug most commonly 
consumed	in	Italy	(UNODC,	2014b).	As	in	other	EU	countries,	
competition among actors in the cannabis market is very 
strong,	which	may	explain	its	relatively	low	profitability.	
Many scholars have attempted to quantify the market of 
cannabis products in Italy, obtaining rather different results 
(Table	 50).	 Among	 the	 most	 recent	 estimates,	 Caulkins,	
Kilmer	and	Graf	(2013)	rate	Italy	as	the	second	largest	market	
of cannabis products after Spain, with 1,356 million euro of 
revenues	 per	 year,	 while	 Giommoni	 (2014),	 who	 used	 the	
GPS157 2012, valued the market at around 550 million euro. 
The market for cannabis products is dominated by resin 
cannabis	 (EMCDDA,	 2012)	 arriving	 from	 Morocco	 through	
Spain	 (EMCDDA,	2012;	DNA,	2014,	p.	413),	 from	Afghanistan	
through	 Turkey	 (DNA,	 2014,	 p.	 413)	 and	 from	 Albania.	 The	
most frequently reported traffickers are Albanian OCGs, 
Moroccan OCGs, Spanish OCGs and several Italian OCGs. 
Herbal cannabis is imported into Italy from Mexico and Albania 
(DNA,	2014),	and	it	is	increasingly home-grown cultivated 
both by	very	small	groups	and	important	OCGs	(e.g.	Camorra	
in	Campania	(DIA,	2014)).
Amphetamine-type drugs
Synthetic drugs are not very widespread in Italy.	The	size	of	
this illicit market is rather small compared with those for other 
illicit drugs. 
The available estimates are quite recent. As regards ecstasy, 
the	most	recent	study	has	quantified	its	magnitude	at	around	
242 million euro	 (Giommoni,	 2014).	 Previous	 research	
provided rather heterogeneous estimates, providing ranges 
between	139	and	1,140	million	euro	in	2005	(Kilmer	&	Pacula,	
2009), and between 180 and 1,153 million euro for 2008 
(Transcrime,	 2013a).	 Amphetamines seem to generate 
lower returns. In Italy this market is believed to yield about 
199 million euro	 of	 revenues	 to	 traffickers	 (Giommoni,	
2014).	 In	other	studies,	Kilmer	and	Pacula	 (2009)	calculated	
a	 likely	market	 size	of	between	 111	 and	457	million	euro,	 and	
Transcrime	(2013a)	came	up	with	a	similar	range	between	99	
and 636 million euro in 2008.
Since these drugs can be synthesised almost everywhere and 
with low organisational barriers and entry costs, trafficking 
routes are not well identifiable and the criminals involved 
are not necessarily linked to OCGs. Among foreign OCGs, 
the criminal groups most cited consist of Philippines and 
Chinese	nationals	(DNA,	2010).	In	particular,	Philippine	OCGs	
are often associated with drugs called shaboo or ice	(a	type	of	
methamphetamine) trafficked from Southeast Asia to Europe 
(DNA,	2010;	2014,	pp.	866;	883).	
157. General Population Survey.
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5.4.2.2. Trafficking in human beings
As in many other EU countries, most of the traffickers and 
reported victims of THB in Italy are of foreign origin 
(Mancuso,	 2014a).	 Domestic	 human	 trafficking	 is	 less	
frequently reported, and Italian exploiters are more common 
than Italian victims.158
As regards human trafficking for sexual exploitation, according 
to	 Europol	 (2011b)	 Italy	 is	 both	 a	 destination and a very 
important transit country. Forced labour is also common, and 
takes place as the exploitation of workers in small factories 
(e.g.	 Di	 Vico,	 2014b)	 or	 in	 farming,	 usually	 run	 directly	 or	
facilitated by groups or individuals of the same ethnic origin as 
the	labourers	(e.g.	Chinese).
Sexual exploitation
In Italy, sexual exploitation is the most commonly reported 
purpose	of	THB.	Mancuso	(2014a)	quantified	the	revenues	of	
the sexual exploitation market in Italy as ranging between 1.1 
billion and 5.0 billion euro, including both the proceeds from 
outdoor	 sexual	 exploitation	 (between	 432	 and	 3,255	million	
euro,	 on	 2008/2009	 data)	 and	 indoor	 forced	 prostitution	
(between	 701	 and	 1,774	 million	 euro	 in	 2004/2005)	 (see	
Section 4.2). 
As far as organised criminal actors are concerned, both 
domestic and foreign exploiters are present in different 
proportions, and seem to perform different roles. Italian mafia 
groups are only indirectly involved, due to their cultural 
refusal to perpetrate this crime directly159	 (Mancuso,	 2014a,	
p. 12), but they allow foreign criminal gangs to organise 
outdoor sexual exploitation in their home regions, often in 
exchange for other illicit commodities	(DIA,	2014).160
Foreign OCGs operate directly on several routes and often 
exploit	victims	of	 the	same	ethnic	origin	 (Mancuso,	2014a,	p.	
12). The most common routes are those from Eastern Europe 
(mainly	 from	 Ukraine,	 Moldova,	 Romania	 to	 Italy	 through	
Albania: see Vreja, 2007), Africa	 (especially	of	Nigerian	girls	
exploited by Nigerian OCGs or mixed Italian-North African 
groups,	as	 illustrated	 in	Europol	(2011b)	and	DNA	(2011))	and 
China and Southeast Asia	 (with	Chinese	 and	 south	Asian	
victims exploited mostly indoors in massage parlours or 
apartments	(DNA,	2014,	p.	219)).
Forced labour 
No estimates are available on the revenues from the 
exploitation of forced labour by OCGs in Italy, also because 
the overlaps with irregular work, which in Italy records 
one	of	the	highest	levels	among	EU	MS	(Savona,	Di	Nicola,	&	
Vettori, 2008).
The most common examples of forced labour relate to people 
trafficked from Africa and forced to retail drugs, counterfeit 
products, tobacco, and gadgets on the streets, or to Chinese 
nationals smuggled into Italy and forced to work in the 
manufacturing	of	(often	counterfeit)	clothing	and	accessories.	
Cases	of	 immigrants	 (e.g.	 of	African or Eastern European 
origin), exploited in the agricultural sector are frequent, and 
they	evidence	increasing	cooperation	between	Italian	mafias	
and	OCGs	formed	by	co-nationals	(see	e.g.	OSCE,	2010;	DNA,	
2011). In some cases, labour and sexual exploitation often 
overlap, as in massage parlours managed by Chinese OCGs 
or in farms with Romanian workers, especially in southern Italy 
(Di	Vico,	2014a).
5.4.2.3. Illicit trafficking in firearms
The few available estimates on the scale of ITF suggest that 
the turnover generated in Italy is rather small if compared 
to other illicit activities: 
•		 Calderoni	 et	 al.	 (2014b,	 p.	 121)	 estimate	 this	 market	 as	
ranging between 46 and 140 million euro in 2010.
•		 Transcrime	 (2013a,	 p.	 46)	 values	 the	 ITF	 at	 between	 74	
and	 148	 million	 euro	 of	 annual	 revenues	 (demand	 side),	
whereas	in	terms	of	supply	the	market’s	size	is	estimated	at	
46	million	euro	(2010	data).
•		 SOS	 Impresa	 (2010)	 measured	mafia	 revenues	 from	 ITF	
at 5.8 billion euro in 2009, but, as highlighted by UNODC 
(2011a),	this	figure	is	likely	to	have	been	overestimated.
As reported in Section 4.3, Italy is both a destination country 
(to	 fulfil	 the	 demand	 originating	 from	 local	 OCGs)161 and a 
transit country	for	small	arms	and	light	weapons	(Calderoni	
et al., 2014b, p. 109). Italy has been reported to serve as a 
platform for the transfer of weapons and ammunition from the 
Western Balkans to Northern Europe or North Africa. Firearms 
transiting through Italy are also destined for paramilitary 
groups in South America or warlords in Africa and the Middle 
East	(Antoliš,	2007,	pp.	81–82).	
Illicit	firearms	follow	different	routes:	 they	are	often	shipped 
from Albania directly to Apulia and other southern regions of 
Italy	(Vreja,	2007,	p.	36),	or	they	are	smuggled from Croatia 
and other Balkan countries through Slovenia to Northern 
Italy. Weapons are then diverted to southern Italy regions, 
where they are sold to local criminals or shipped from southern 
ports	 (e.g.	 Naples,	 Gioia	 Tauro)	 to	 Africa	 or	 South	 America	
(Antoliš,	2007,	pp.	81–82;	Black,	2009).	
Both	 Italian	 mafias	 and	 foreign	 OCGs	 are	 reported	 to	 be	
involved	in	this	market	(Calderoni	et	al.,	2014b,	p.	110).	Among	
foreign organised crime groups, the most involved criminals 
are reported to belong to Russian OCGs, Bulgarian OCGs, 
Balkan OCGs and other Eastern European OCGs	 (DNA,	
2012). 
5.4.2.4. Illicit trade in tobacco products
In the past few years, a surge in ITTP cases in Italy has been 
recorded	 (DIA,	 2014).	 The	 literature	 confirms	 an	 increasing	
trend between 2008 and 2012, in terms of both revenues 
(Calderoni,	 2014a)	 and	 of	 the	 volume of illicit tobacco 
products trafficked	 (KPMG,	 2013,	 p.	 28,	 2014b,	 p.	 166;	
Calderoni, 2014a). 
158.	The	statistics	published	by	Eurostat	report	no	victims	of	Italian	citizenship	
exploited	for	sexual	or	other	labour	purposes	(Eurostat,	2013,	p.	52).
159. Italian OCGs are also reported among the groups least involved in THB in 
Europe	(Eurostat,	2013,	p.	11).
160.	 Italian	mafias	and	other	Italian	OCGs	have	been	found	to	 invest	money	in	
nightclubs	and	venues	where	the	victims	are	exploited	(Mancuso,	2014a)	 (see	
also Section 8.4).
161.	Mainly	mafia	groups,	which,	according	to	the	circumstances,	may	be	either	
traffickers or end users.
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According to the latest estimate of the ITTP market in Italy, 
in 2013 revenues amounted to between 485 and 607 
million euro (Table	50	and	Section	4.4).	Despite	 the	similar	
methodology	 adopted,	 this	 figure	 is	 lower	 than	 the	 one	
provided	 in	 Calderoni	 (2014a)	 for	 2012	 estimates	 (between	
1.0 and 1.3 billion euro) owing to a decrease in the estimated 
consumption of illicit tobacco products.
As regards actors, both Italian and foreign groups participate in 
this	market	but	with	different	roles	(smuggling,	counterfeiting,	
production of tobacco, and so on), and they cooperate on 
different trafficking routes. Apulia is a commonly reported 
entry point for cigarettes produced in Montenegro and 
the Western Balkans and shipped across the Adriatic Sea 
(Calderoni,	 2014a,	 p.	 56;	DIA,	 2014,	 p.	 156).	Along	 this	 route,	
connections between Albanian OCGs, Balkan OCGs and 
Apulian OCGs have emerged. Camorra is active in terms of 
imports	from	Eastern	Europe	(e.g.	Romania	and	the	Western	
Balkans)	 (Calderoni	et	al.,	2013b),	while	Russian	and	Eastern	
European	 (mostly	 Ukrainian)	 OCGs	 are	 mostly	 involved	 in	
north-eastern	routes	(DNA,	2014,	p.	209).	Close	connections	
between these groups and Chinese tobacco producers have 
been	identified	(Calderoni	et	al.,	2013b).
Besides OCGs, smaller groups and individual actors 
(often	 travellers),	 crossing	 the	 borders	 via	 land	 routes	 or	
air routes, are reported. Typically, land routes are used by 
importers of Eastern European origin transporting small 
batches of cigarettes in their vehicles. On the other hand, ITTP 
is facilitated by the opportunities furnished by small-scale 
air routes connecting Italy to Eastern European and African 
countries	(Calderoni	et	al.,	2013b).
5.4.2.5. Counterfeiting
Despite the overall declining trend recorded in the last decade, 
the number of cases of counterfeiting has increased in the 
past	few	years	(DNA,	2011,	p.	184;	2014,	p.	214;	DIA,	2014,	p.	88).	
In terms of revenues, several estimates have been carried out 
in the past decade, producing a rather heterogeneous picture 
of	this	market’s	monetary	value.
Transcrime-OCP	research	team	has	quantified	the	size	of	the	
pontential demand of counterfeit products in Italy at around 
4.6 billion euro	 in	2010	 (see	also	Section	4.5.2).	This	figure	
is	quite	close	to	those	provided	by	Calderoni	et	al.	 (2014b,	p.	
121)	and	Transcrime	(2013a),	on	similar	product	baskets,	with	
a range between 3.0 and 6.1 billion euro in 2008. Previous 
studies	 report	 higher	 figures,	 but	 their	 methodologies	 are	
rarely disclosed. 
The role of organised crime groups in counterfeiting seems to 
be central in Italy. The two major OC players are the Camorra 
and Chinese groups, who often cooperate in the production 
and	 distribution	 of	 counterfeit	 products	 (DNA,	 2011,	 p.	 182;	
2012, p. 191). In particular, Camorra seems specialised in the 
counterfeiting	 of	 top-brand	 clothing	 and	 accessories	 (DNA,	
2014, pp. 349–366), often investing illicit proceeds from the 
drug	markets	 in	 retail	shops	selling	those	products	 (see	also	
Section	8.4).	Chinese	OCGs	(DNA,	2012,	2014)	are	traditionally	
involved in the importing of fakes from East Asia and in the 
production of low-quality counterfeit goods in factories 
located across Italy. 
Counterfeiting in Italy is often connected with other 
serious crimes, including ITTP, labour exploitation and 
organised	theft	(e.g.	theft	and	adulteration	of	medicines).	
5.4.2.6. Illegal gambling and match-fixing
The	introduction	of	new	gaming	machines	(such	as	VLT, slot 
machines) and the diffusion of uncontrolled gambling games 
via the Internet have created numerous opportunities for local 
and foreign criminals operating in Italy. 
Illegal	gambling	 in	 Italy	 is	estimated	to	produce	(with	gaming	
machines only) revenues amounting to between 327 and 522 
million euro	(Calderoni	et	al.,	2014b,	p.	121).	Similar	estimates	
have	been	previously	reported	by	Transcrime	(2013a,	p.	55).162 
As in other countries, also in Italy illegal gambling is 
often (but not only) associated with organised crime. 
As	 reported	 by	 Calderoni	 et	 al.	 (2014b,	 p.	 112)	 around	 30	
law enforcement operations were concluded on gambling 
operations involving OCGs in 2010. In terms of the actors 
involved,	mainly	 Italian	mafias	 (in particular the Camorra) 
play a role in the establishment and management of both 
traditional betting halls and in new lucrative markets such as 
slot machines and VLT	(Banca	d’Italia-UIF,	2014;	Calderoni	et	
al.,	2014b,	p.	112;	Ministero	dell’Economia	e	delle	Finanze,	2014).	
Italian	OCGs	(apparently	not	related	to	mafias)	emerged	in	a	
large-scale	investigation	of	match-fixing	in	2007	(Baroncelli	&	
Caruso, 2011). 
5.4.2.7. Extortion racketeering
Extortion racketeering, besides its strategic role in the 
control of the territory, has historically been a major source 
of income for Italian mafias in Italy, and one of the most 
lucrative illicit markets in the country, especially in its southern 
regions	 (Transcrime,	 2009;	 Transcrime,	 2013a).	 Lisciandra	
(2014)	estimated	the	proceeds	from	racketeering	at	between	
2.8 and 7.7 billion euro. This range is not distant from 
the	 estimate	 previously	 provided	 by	 Transcrime	 (2013a),	
suggesting that extortion may have enabled OCGs to produce 
around 4.8 billion euro revenues in 2011. 
As illustrated above, the main perpetrators are traditional 
mafia groups, which are also interested in using this crime to 
exercise control over their territory. However, a likely role of 
single	criminal	 individuals	and	other	OCGs	can	be	 identified.	
Among these actors, foreign criminal groups	 (in	particular	
Chinese and other East Asian) are emerging as perpetrators 
of racketeering in their communities of co-nationals resident 
in	Italy	(Transcrime,	2009).
5.4.2.8. Usury
Usury is a crime widespread throughout Italy and, according 
to the available evidence, it is more common than in other 
OCP countries. Scaglione, using information on rationed 
entrepreneurs and number of victims, has estimated that loan 
sharking produced revenues between 3.1 and 6.2 billion 
euro in	 2012	 (Scaglione,	 2014,	 p.	 86).	 Similar	 revenues	 from	
usury	were	reported	at	2.2	billion	euro	by	Transcrime	(2013a).	
162. Previous studies indicated a greater monetary turnover of illegal gambling. 
For	 example,	 Libera	 (2012)	measured	 its	 turnover	 at	 10	 billion	 euro,	 of	 which	
2.5 generated by football betting. Previous research conducted by Eurispes 
(2010)	 quantified	 the	 total	 volume	 of	 illicit	 gambling	 at	 23	 billion	 euro.	 SOS	
Impresa	(2010)	evaluates	illegal	betting	and	gaming	at	3	billion	euro,	of	which	2.5	
billion	are	controlled	by	the	mafia	groups.	However, the methodology of these 
estimates is unclear.
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Italian mafia groups	may	play	a	significant	role	in	this	market,	
with marginal participation by foreign groups, such as Chinese 
and	Other	Asian	OCGs	(DIA,	2013b;	DNA,	2010,	2014),	which	
mostly victimise their co-nationals. In particular, the lending 
of cash at high interest rates through ‘informal banks’ is a 
strategic activity for OCGs, because it can be used by Italian 
mafias	 to launder money and also to obtain, indirectly, 
control over legal businesses	 (see	 Section	 8.4.3	 and	 in	
particular the ‘Ndrangheta bank case). The link between loan 
sharking and illegal gambling activities is also very strong, as 
highlighted	by	many	reports	of	Italian	LEAs	(DIA,	2012a;	DNA,	
2010, 2011, 2012, 2014). 
5.4.2.9. Fraud
According to Transcrime-OCP estimates, fraud activities in 
Italy generate between 4.0 and 7.0 billion euro only from 
missing traders (MTIC) fraud. It is likely that the amount is 
much higher if other types of scams are considered. 
The role of OCGs is growing, and also mafia organisations 
are increasingly attracted by the possibility to exploit the 
optimal combination between returns and risks offered by 
these	illicit	activities.	This	fact	seems	confirmed	by	evidence	
of	 the	 growing	 involvement	 of	 Italian	 mafias	 (in	 particular	
‘Ndrangheta	and	Camorra)	in	VAT frauds, tax evasion and 
false invoicing, often carried out through complex schemes 
involving	the	use	of	shell	companies	(see	e.g.	Tornago,	2014).	
Ongoing	research	by	Transcrime	has	identified	more	than	50	
investigations against companies involved in frauds in the oil 
& gas sector,	 (e.g.	 excise	 frauds,	 VAT	 frauds,	 manipulation	
of fuel counters, product frauds, etc.), mostly related to the 
supply of fuel products. In most of these cases, the companies 
were	 indirectly	 linked	 to	 Italian	 mafias	 (especially	 Camorra	
and Cosa Nostra). 
More traditional is the involvement of Italian OCGs in fraud 
related to the misuse of public funds, for example in renewable 
energy	 (e.g.	 Caneppele,	 Riccardi,	 &	 Standridge,	 2013),	 and	
related to the manipulation of public procurements	 (see	
e.g. Caneppele, 2014). 
The role of legitimate businesses is becoming increasingly 
crucial for the commission of these crimes, and consequently 
also the role of professionals and brokers providing company 
services	to	OCGs	(see	Section	8.4	for	details).
5.4.2.10. Organised property crime
In	recent	years,	Italy	has	seen	a	significant	increase	in	episodes	
of organised theft. As far as organised vehicle thefts are 
concerned,	Italy	is	classified	as	being	at	‘high	risk’	of	the	theft	
of	 road	commercial	vehicles	and	 their	 loads	 (Van	Den	Engel	
&	 Prummel,	 2007).	 The	 southern	 regions	 of	 Italy	 (especially	
Apulia Region) record the highest prevalence of robberies of 
cargoes and truck hijackings. 
The organised theft of medicines is also increasing. 
According	to	Riccardi,	Dugato	and	Polizzotti	(2014),	between	
2006 and 2013 one Italian hospital in every ten registered a 
theft, suffering on average a loss of medicines for a value of 
330 thousand euro	 per	 theft	 episode	 (Riccardi,	 Dugato,	 &	
Polizzotti,	 2014,	 p.	 3).	 Hospitals	 in	Campania	 and	Apulia	 are	
those most frequently victimised, while anti-cancer drugs are 
the most frequently targeted pharmaceuticals.
A recent investigation by Italian LEAs discovered that after 
these	medicines	are	‘laundered’	through	fictitious	wholesalers,	
and often adulterated, they are resold on the legal market, 
either in Italy or abroad. The involvement of Camorra, Apulian 
OCGs,	Russian/Georgian	OCGs	and	other	Eastern	European	
groups	is	likely	(Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014).
Eastern European OCGs are also involved in organised metal 
theft: according to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, about 
40% of reported of copper theft offences are committed by 
Romanian	 individuals	 (Ministero	 dell’Interno,	 2013).	 On	 the	
other hand, Romanian, Albanian and Georgian OCGs are 
frequently involved in house burglaries and robberies, and 
may	set	up	import/export	companies	to	conceal	the	transfer	
of	stolen	property	abroad	(see	Section	8.4).
5.4.2.11. Illicit waste management
Illicit waste management is a lucrative crime, which, according 
to	investigations,	is	conducted	in	Italy	mostly	by	Italian	mafias.	
There are often synergies between waste management and 
investments in the construction and mining sector: after sand 
has been removed, quarries become ideal illicit landfills 
in which to dump toxic waste	 (DNA,	2014,	p.	334).	For	this	
reason,	 OCGs	 involved	 in	 illicit	 waste	management	 (e.g.	 the	
Camorra) are also highly active in the construction and mining 
sector	 (Transcrime,	2013a;	Riccardi,	2014a;	 see	also	Section	
8.4). However, it should be pointed out that the waste illicitly 
managed	by	 Italian	mafia	groups	can	be	also	disposed	of	 in	
illegal	 landfill	 sites	 in	 developing	 countries	 (Calderoni	 et	 al.,	
2014b, p. 113).
Estimates by Sarno, based on the differentials between waste 
production and legal waste management, reveal that the 
special waste market may generate revenues of between 
304 and 507 million euro	annually	(in	Calderoni	et	al.,	2014b,	
p. 121). This estimate is close to the range of 378 and 756 million 
euro	calculated	by	Transcrime	(2013a,	p.	57).
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5.5.1. Introduction
The main criminal groups in the Netherlands engage in 
international smuggling activities	 (drug	 trafficking,	
smuggling of illegal immigrants, human trafficking for 
sexual	 exploitation,	 firearms	 trafficking,	 trafficking	 in	 stolen	
vehicles) and other transnational illegal activities, such as 
money	 laundering	 and	 tax	 evasion	 (like	 cigarette	 smuggling	
and European Community fraud). The crimes committed 
are mostly of a transit nature;	 OCGs	 are	 involved	 in	
international illegal trade using the same opportunity 
structure that facilitates other Dutch economic activities. The 
Netherlands	is	not	only	a	destination	or	transit	country;	it	may	
also be a production country, especially for synthetic drugs 
(Kruisbergen	et	al.,	2012,	pp.	288-9).
Most of the research on organised crime in the Netherlands is 
conducted through the so-called Organised Crime Monitors. 
The Dutch Scientific Research and Documentation 
Centre (WODC) documents a cross-section of concluded 
large-scale	 police	 investigations	 (Kruisbergen	 et	 al.,	 2012).163 
This research, covering about two decades, concludes, 
among	 other	 things,	 that	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 ‘mafia-type’	
organisations like those in Italy and the United States have not 
been	identified.	
This chapter explores what criminal groups are active in the 
Netherlands, in what illegal markets they operate, and how 
large these illegal markets are. This has been done by analysing 
the database of the Dutch PPO (Public Prosecution 
Office). For the purpose of the OCP Project, access was 
granted to the complete PPO database, which was used to 
obtain an overview of organised crime in the Netherlands. 
Only the most serious and relevant cases were selected 
from	the	dataset	 (see	the	Methodological	Annex	for	details).	
The	PPO	database,	after	filtering,	consists	of	12,946	suspects	
in 4,397 cases. 
Organised crime groups in the Netherlands
To provide an idea of what OCGs are active in illegal markets in 
the Netherlands, this Section reports the frequency with which 
the various OCGs show up in the PPO database.
After	 classifying	 all	 suspects	 in	 the	 PPO	 database	 (see	 the	
Methodological Annex), 27 different categories of criminal 
groups	 were	 identified	 according	 to	 the	 nationality	 of	 their	
members.164 
The majority of crimes are committed by domestic OCGs 
(68%),	 but	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 nationalities	 can	 be	 identified,	
which	 may	 confirm	 the	 transnational	 nature	 of	 organised	
crime	in	the	Netherlands	(Table	52).
Apart	 from	 the	 (expected)	 high	 frequency	 of	 Dutch	 OCGs	
in the cases, Turkish OCGs seem to be relatively active. 
Note, however, that Turks are the largest foreign community 
in the Netherlands, with approximately 400,000 people 
(Dutch	 Central	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics).165 Note also that the 
high ranking of South Americans is probably due to the fact 
that the category includes the Dutch former colonies of 
Suriname and the Dutch Antilles, which used to be part of 
the Netherlands until 2010. 
The Italian mafias rank relatively low, despite the fact that 
the cases discussed in the literature more frequently mention 
them	in	relation	to	the	Netherlands.	The	KLPD	(Dutch	police)	
report	 on	 ‘Ndrangheta	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 concludes	 that	
there is at least one cell of the ‘Ndrangheta operating in the 
country	(with	at	least	12	members)	involved	in	the	drugs	trade	
and	smuggling,	illicit	trafficking	in	firearms,	money	laundering,	
and	swindle	companies	(KLPD	-	DNR,	2011).166
Chinese criminals also rank relatively low on these lists and 
are hardly ever mentioned by the media in the Netherlands. 
Although between 1992 and 2007 48 Chinese were killed 
(almost	all	of	them	in	the	criminal	circuit),	they	seem	to	hardly	
ever show up in the statistics. The main crimes committed 
by Chinese OCGs in the Netherlands are drugs trafficking 
(via	 Rotterdam	 harbour),	 extortion	 (of	 other	 Chinese),	
human	 trafficking,	exploitation	 (of	other	Chinese),	and	 illegal	
Chinese	 gambling	 houses	 (ACB	 Knowledge	 Centre,	 2011).	
Since Chinese are the main victims of the Chinese OCGs 
and	the	Chinese	hardly	ever	report	crimes	to	the	police	(ACB	
Knowledge Centre, 2011), this may explain their relatively low 
presence in our PPO database.
Motorcycle gangs	are	usually	more	emphasized	by	the	media	
than they appear on the list compiled from the database of the 
Dutch	PPO.	But	it	should	be	considered	that	the	classification	
of Motorcycle gangs is relatively difficult in the PPO database, 
which may mean that some cases have been misattributed to 
other criminal groups, while Motorcycle gangs are the actual 
suspects. 
5.5.2. Illicit markets in the Netherlands
This Section provides an analysis of illicit markets in the 
Netherlands, focusing on the amount of revenues generated 
and who the actors involved are. Besides the analyses provided 
as	 in	 the	 other	 country	 profiles	 (i.e.	 a	 review	 of	 the	 existing	
literature	on	illicit	markets,	with	a	collection	of	estimates;	see	
Table 53), this Section also provides an exploratory analysis 
based on PPO estimates of the amount of illicit proceeds 
generated per each suspect involved.
163.	This	documentation	began	in	1996,	when	in	the	first	sweep	40	cases	were	
documented. Thereafter, three more sweeps of respectively 40, 40 and 30 
cases were carried out. The WODC now has a wide cross-section of 150 cases.
164.	Each	case	was	 identified	by	the	nationality	of	 the	suspects	related	to	the	
case	(companies	have	no	nationality).	When	multiple	nationalities	were	present	
in	a	case,	the	most	frequent	one	was	chosen	(in	the	case	of	equality,	the	foreign	
one was chosen). Cases where all suspects were companies could not be 
classified.
165.	http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/
166.	 It	 has	 to	 be	 noted,	 however,	 that	 concerning	 the	 use	 of	 police	 and/or	
PPO	data,	there	is	also	a	bias	in	the	sense	that	suspects	end	up	in	police	and/
or PPO statistics based on where they are prosecuted. For example, the 
media	reported	that	an	 important	figure	of	the	 ‘Ndrangheta	was	caught	 in	the	
Netherlands, but this does not end up in the PPO database in the Netherlands, 
because this suspect was directly sent to Italy where he was already prosecuted. 
5.5. Netherlands                                                                                                                                                     
Joras Ferwerda and Brigitte Unger (Utrecht University, Netherlands)
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OCG classification Number of cases % of total Number of suspects % of total
Dutch OCGs 2,670 68.0% 7,486 67.5%
Turkish OCGs 326 8.3% 766 6.9%
South American OCGs 181 4.6% 841 7.6%
Middle Eastern OCGs 141 3.6% 356 3.2%
African OCGs 108 2.8% 302 2.7%
Other Asian OCGs 105 2.7% 289 2.6%
North African OCGs 84 2.1% 239 2.2%
Other Western European 
OCGs
67 1.7% 116 1.0%
Other Eastern European 
OCGs
38 1.0% 95 0.9%
British OCGs 33 0.8% 97 0.9%
Chinese OCGs 30 0.8% 89 0.8%
Colombian OCGs 27 0.7% 125 1.1%
Russian/Georgian	OCGs 26 0.7% 48 0.4%
Balkan OCGs 23 0.6% 49 0.4%
Bulgarian OCGs 14 0.4% 28 0.3%
North American OCGs 12 0.3% 36 0.3%
Romanian OCGs 9 0.2% 38 0.3%
Italian OCGsa 8 0.2% 20 0.2%
Lithuanian OCGs 6 0.2% 11 0.1%
Albanian OCGs 4 0.1% 16 0.1%
Motorcycle gangs 4 0.1% 27 0.2%
Irish OCGs 3 0.1% 11 0.1%
French OCGs 2 0.1% 2 0.02%
Japanese OCGs 1 0.003% 4 0.04%
Mexican OCGs 1 0.003% 3 0.03%
Spanish OCGs 1 0.003% 3 0.03%
Total 3,924 100% 11,097 100%
a Since	only	information	on	nationality	was	made	available,	it	was	not	possible	to	determine	whether	these	can	be	referred	to	as	Italian	mafias	or	as	other	Italian	
OCGs.
Table 52 - Frequency of involvement in Dutch PPO cases per OCG (2003-2014)
Source: UU-OCP elaboration on PPO data
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Illicit market
Estimate# 
(million 
euro)
Min 
(million 
euro)
Max 
(million 
euro)
Reference 
year
Source Notes
Heroin
54 43 72 2012 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
79 52 157 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
Cocaine
85 63 95 2005 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
102 27 262 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
Cannabis
305 2009
Caulkins,	Kilmer,	&	Graf,	
2013
387 173 805 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
Other illicit 
drugs
73 16 130 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 Ecstasy
19 7 30 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 Amphetamines
THB 460 2003 Unger, 2007 Sexual exploitation
ITTP 249 225 273 2013 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
Counterfeiting
1,986 2010 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
Demand	side;	Whole	
marketb
496 2011 BSA, 2012 Unlicensed PC software
Illegal gambling 130 2003 Unger, 2007
Fraud
610 441 778 2011 Transcrime - OCP, 2014 MTIC frauds
11,000 2013 PwC, 2013
All	frauds;	Minimum	
estimatec
11,593 7,735 15,450 2003 Unger, 2007
Financial, social security 
and tax fraud
Organised 
property crime
47 2007 Europol, 2009b Cargo theft
329 2004
Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	
2007
Cargo theft
a	Original	figure:	644	million	USD,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
b Counterfeit ICT equipment, electric appliances, CDs, DVDs, cassettes, clothing and accessories, jewellery, watches, games, toys, perfumes, body care articles.
c ‘Minimum	estimate’	because	it	refers	to	the	lower	bound	estimate	of	the	size	of	frauds.	
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 53 - Estimates of the revenues of illicit markets in the Netherlands167
167. In the presence of an estimation range, estimate refers to the arithmetic 
mean	or	to	an	adjusted	mean	(referred	to	as	best	estimate).
.
Illegal market 
Number of suspects for whom 
the illegally obtained benefit 
was estimated
Total amount of estimated 
illegally obtained benefit (million 
euro)
Average illegally obtained 
benefit per suspect (million 
euro)
Drugs 95 300 3.2
THB 45 18 0.41
ITF 1 0.091 0.091
ITTP 0 - -
Counterfeiting 49 7.6 0.16
Illegal gambling 4 71 17.8
Fraud 251 284 1.1
Table 54 - Estimate of illegally obtained benefit per illegal market in the PPO database (2003 – 2014)169
Source: UU-OCP elaboration on PPO data
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An analysis of the profitability of illegal activities on the 
basis of PPO estimations
In the Netherlands a judge may impose, in a separate 
judgement,	 the	 obligation	 to	 pay	 benefits	 illegally	 obtained	
(wederrechtelijk verkregen voordeel) from criminal actions 
to	the	state	(Art.	36	and	section	1	Dutch	Criminal	Code).	For	
this to happen, the illegally obtained benefits of criminal 
actions must be estimated	 (or	 made	 reasonable).	 These	
estimates furnish interesting insights into – at least the lower 
bound – how much is made in the various illegal markets in the 
Netherlands.168 The Table 54 reports for the various crimes a) 
how	often	 the	 illegally	 obtained	benefit	 is	 estimated,	 b)	 how	
much is estimated in total, and c) how much is estimated on 
average per suspect.
According to the Table 54, drugs and fraud are the most 
profitable illegal markets in the Netherlands. This is in line 
with	 the	 findings	 on	 other	 OCP	 countries	 and	 at	 European	
level	 (see	Chapters	3	and	4)	and	with	previous	 international	
research	on	the	relative	size	of	 illegal	markets	(e.g.	Reuter	&	
Truman,	2004;	Walker	&	Unger,	2009).	Whilst	the	profitability	
of drug crimes is higher, the greater frequency of fraud means 
that each market adds up to a total of about 285 million euro 
of estimated criminal proceeds.170 
It	can	be	also	seen	(when	comparing	the	above	table	with	the	
frequency of crimes reported in the Methodological Annex) 
that the illegally obtained benefit is relatively more often 
estimated for drugs than for fraud. The estimates for illegal 
gambling instead seem to be outliers.171 
As regards criminal actors, to gain an idea of the involvement 
of criminal groups in Dutch illegal markets, the PPO database 
was analysed to determine what OCGs are linked with the 
different crimes and how often. Table 55 shows, for the 
OCGs	classified	according	to	their	main	nationality,	how	often	
they	are	linked	with	OCP	illicit	markets	as	defined	in	Chapters	
2 and 3.172 
The previous section showed that in 68% of cases the 
category of Dutch OCGs were the suspects. This relative 
dominance of Dutch criminal groups is also evidenced by 
the illegal markets of frauds (72%) and counterfeiting 
(67%), but much less so by crimes of an international nature, 
such as drug trafficking (54%), firearms trafficking (52%) 
and human trafficking (21%). ITTP and illegal gambling do 
not have enough observations for a conclusion to be drawn. 
Colombian and British OCGs are involved in drug crimes 
relatively more often. This may be related to the drug route 
where Colombia is a source country and the UK is one of the 
destination countries. 
Even though this gives an idea of the involvement of OCGs 
in the various illegal markets in the Netherlands, the relative 
importance of these illegal markets is still unknown. Therefore 
the next Section provides an in-depth analysis of their 
profitability, with a review of available estimates. 
5.5.2.1. Drug trafficking
The analysis of the PPO database shows that drugs are 
the	 most	 profitable	 illegal	 market	 in	 the	 Netherlands	
(measured	 by	 the	 estimated	 illegally	 obtained	 benefit	 per	
suspect). Unfortunately, the PPO database does not allow 
differentiation among drugs, although it is known that these 
have rather distinctive markets. 
Heroin
Heroin is relatively cheap in the Netherlands if compared 
with other EU countries. The street price of 1 gram of heroin 
is between 20 and 40 euro. The wholesale price is estimated 
at 14,000 euro per kilo. The massively increased demand for 
heroin of the last decade in the EU has not occurred in the 
Netherlands	(Boerman	et	al.,	2013).	The	number	of	consumers	
in	2011	was	estimated	at	between	 17,300	and	 18,100	 (Trimbos	
Institute). The Transcrime-OCP estimation conducted for the 
OCP Project calculated the annual revenues from heroin in 2012 
at about 54 million euro, which was slightly lower than Kilmer 
and	Pacula’s	(2009)	estimate	for	2005	(78.6	million	euro).	
Cocaine
Cocaine is very popular in the Netherlands, with 55,000 
users and a total consumption estimated at 1,660 kilos per 
year	 (UNODC,	 2010c).	 Consumption	 increased	 strongly	
from	1998	to	2006,	but	stabilized	thereafter	(Boerman	et	al.,	
2013).	The	profits	in	this	illegal	market	are	very	high.	One	kilo	
of	cocaine	can	be	bought	 for	about	3,600	US	dollars	 (about	
2,775 euro) in the source country and sold in the Netherlands 
for	about	20,000	US	dollars	(about	15,420	euro)	(Boerman	et	
al., 2013).173 According to the latest Transcrime-OCP estimate, 
the annual revenues of the cocaine market in the country 
(2005)	amount	 to	about	85 million euro, slightly lower than 
the	estimate	by	Kilmer	and	Pacula	(2009),	who	evaluated	the	
total	size	of	the	Dutch	cocaine	market	at	101.7	million	euro.	
Also to be considered is that Rotterdam in the Netherlands 
and Antwerp in Belgium are the main import harbours 
for cocaine in Europe	 (see	 Section	 4.1),	 which	 may	 imply	
that OCGs active in the Netherlands and exporting to other 
countries make larger proceeds than those estimated above, 
which are calculated only on the basis of internal consumption 
at the retail level.
168. Note that the data are only on caught criminals, which may not be 
representative	and	lead	by	definition	to	underestimation	of	the	size	of	the	illegal	
market. Moreover, note that a selection in the database of the Dutch PPO was 
made to focus on organised crime, which means that not all cases in each illegal 
market were per se included. 
169.	Note:	The	illegally	obtained	benefit	is	not	estimated	for	all	suspects,	so	that	
the totals reported in this table can only be interpreted as the lower bound of 
the	 actual	 illegally	 obtained	 benefit.	 The	 reported	 average	 benefit	 is	 not	 the	
actual	 average	 benefit	 of	 this	 crime,	 because	 the	 database	 comprises	 only	
the	most	 serious	 and	 large-scale	 cases	 of	 the	 PPO	 (see	 the	 Methodological	
Annex). Including all cases of the PPO would reduce this average. See the 
Methodological Annex for our selection procedure. Moreover, the estimation of 
the	illegally	obtained	profits	could	be	done	more	often	in	bigger	cases,	affecting	
the	representability	of	these	figures.
170. Note that this is not a yearly total, but the total over the complete data period 
2003-2014.
171.	All	four	suspects	for	which	the	illegally	obtained	benefit	was	estimated	were	
part	of	the	same	case	file.	All	four	suspects	were	eventually	offered	a	settlement	
totalling 23 million euro.
172. Note that the suspects in our PPO database are not always convicted.
173.	This	means	 that	a	 rough	estimate	of	 the	 total	 size	of	 the	cocaine	market	
would	 be	 33.2	million	 US	 dollars	 (about	 25.6	million	 euro),	 resulting	 from	 the	
multiplication	of	annual	consumption	(1,660	kilos)	by	retail	price	(20,000	euro).	
And this may be a conservative estimate: using the estimated price of 55 euro 
per	gram	of	cocaine	in	the	Netherlands	(Trimbos	Institute,	2013),	the	total	size	
of the cocaine market would be 91.3 million euro, which is close to both the 
Transcrime-OCP	and	Kilmer	and	Pacula	(2009)	estimates	cited	in	the	main	text.
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Cannabis
The personal production and use of cannabis are tolerated in 
the Netherlands. However, the production of more cannabis 
than for personal usage is illegal and prosecuted. 
According to the literature, the probability of being caught is 
relatively	high,	with	estimates	between	30%	and	50%	(van	der	
Heijden,	2006).	Europol	(2013a)	states	that	the	Netherlands	is	
probably the most important source country for seeds and 
cuttings, as well as growing technologies and knowledge. 
The Dutch cannabis market is estimated to have been 480 
tons	 in	2011	 (Jansen,	2012).	Caulkins,	Kilmer	and	Graf	 (2013)	
estimate	the	size	of	the	Dutch	cannabis	market	at	305 million 
euro.
OCG classification Drugs Human trafficking ITF ITTP Counterfeiting
Illegal 
gambling
Fraud
Dutch OCGs 166 26 11 3 147 4 1,815
Turkish OCGs 29 7 4 18 241
South American 
OCGs
22 9 1 15 106
Middle Eastern 
OCGs
6 13 2 1 8 91
African OCGs 8 15 9 51
Other Asian OCGs 7 16 6 54
North African OCGs 9 4 1 5 43
Other Western 
European OCGs
4 2 2 2 43
Other Eastern 
European OCGs
3 7 2 6 14
British OCGs 12 19
Chinese OCGs 1 12 2 6
Colombian OCGs 17 1 4
Russian Georgian 
OCGs
2 3 16
Balkan OCGs 6 1 1 9
Bulgarian OCGs 4 8
North American 
OCGs
2 2 1 4
Romanian OCGs 3 1 4
Italian OCGs 2 4
Lithuanian OCGs 2 1 2
Albanian OCGs 3 1
Motorcycle gangs 3
Irish OCGs 1 2
French OCGs 1
Japanese OCGs 1
Mexican OCGs
Spanish OCGs 1
Table 55 - Frequency of OCG involvement in the various illicit markets in the PPO database. Number of cases (2003 - 2014)
Source: UU-OCP elaboration on PPO data
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Amphetamine-type drugs
The synthetic drugs most widely consumed in the Netherlands 
are ecstasy	 (about	 1.4%	 of	 the	 population	 in	 2009)	 and	
amphetamine (used	 by	 0.4%	 of	 the	 population	 in	 2009)	
(Boerman	et	al.,	2013).	OCGs	in	the	Netherlands	and	Belgium	
are the key producers and distributors of synthetic drugs 
according	to	Europol	(2013a).	Estimates	of	the	production	of	
synthetic drugs in the Netherlands vary widely, between 66 
and	 1,343	 million	 tablets	 (Boerman	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Therefore,	
when	multiplying	 the	price	of	 3	 euro	per	 tablet	 (Boerman	et	
al., 2013) by the estimated amount consumed, the result is 
between 198 million and more than 4 billion euro per year. 
Kilmer	 and	 Pacula’s	 (2009)	 estimate	 of	 the	 Dutch	 ecstasy	
market at between 16 and 130 million euro therefore seems a 
conservative one.
The	 total	 estimated	 illegally	 obtained	 benefit	 in	 the	 drugs	
market in the PPO database is almost 300 million euro 
between	2003	and	2014.	The	 total	 size	of	 the	drugs	market	
in the Netherlands has been estimated by Kilmer and Pacula 
(2009)	at	around	600	million	euro	per	year.	This	would	mean	
that on average about 5% of the total market is estimated 
in	 court.	 This	 is	 not	 an	 unrealistic	 figure,	 given	 a)	 that	 only	
a portion of the drug trafficking and trade is intercepted, b) 
that only the crimes linked with organised crime in the PPO 
database are selected and c) that in only some of the drugs 
cases is estimation made.
5.5.2.2. Trafficking in human beings
Prostitution is not illegal in the Netherlands, but it is illegal to 
exploit prostitutes. The exploitation of prostitutes is penalised 
in the Netherlands under trafficking in human beings in article 
273f	of	the	Dutch	Criminal	Code	(Bottenberg,	2012,	p.	14).	The	
estimated number of victims of human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation	in	2010	was	10,917	(Bottenberg,	2012).	Trafficking	
is predominantly undertaken by small criminal partnerships 
(3	to	5	persons).	An	estimated	average	profit	per	prostitute	of	
about	4,100	euro	yields	an	estimation	of	 the	 total	size	of	 the	
(prostitution-linked)	 human	 trafficking	 as	 around	45 million 
euro per year	(Bottenberg,	2012).	
The PPO database indicates that, between 2003 and 2014, 
45	times	the	illegally	obtained	benefit	was	estimated	in	court	
cases related to human trafficking, for a total of almost 18 
million euro. This means that on average about 4% of total 
market is estimated in court. This proportion is in line with the 
one	identified	for	the	drugs	market.
5.5.2.3. Other illicit markets
According to the literature, fraud is the biggest illicit market 
in the Netherlands	with	an	estimated	size	of	7.7	to	15.5	billion	
euro	 (Unger,	 2007),	which	 amounts	 to	 about	 1	 to	 2	%	 of	 the	
GDP of the Netherlands. According to the Transcrime-OCP 
estimate, MTIC fraud alone can annually produce more than 
600 million euro of revenues for fraudsters. The large extent 
and	profitability	of	fraud	is	confirmed	by	the	estimated	illegally	
obtained	benefits	found	in	the	PPO	database.
Also illicit trafficking in firearms may impact on the 
economy	of	OCGs	in	the	Netherlands.	Spapens	(2007,	p.	381)	
concludes that the EU Member States which restrict private 
firearm	 possession	 the	 most	 stringently	 may	 constitute	 the	
most	 important	markets	for	 illicit	firearms;	but,	although	“the	
Netherlands have, since long, one of the most restrictive 
weapon	 laws	 in	 Europe”	 (Spapens,	 2007,	 p.	 360),	 a	 limited	
number	of	cases	can	be	identified	in	the	PPO	data.
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5.6.1. Introduction
Illegal markets in Spain are important sources of proceeds 
for the economy of the organised crime groups	(OCGs)174 
active	 in	 the	country,	and	a	significant	matter	of	concern	 for	
Spanish	society	(Lopez,	2012).	
The presence of organised crime in Spain is not limited to 
recent decades, since gangs and organised smugglers have 
operated	 in	 the	 country	 throughout	 history	 (Resa	 Nestares,	
2001). But Spanish OCGs are now able to create alliances 
with foreign criminal groups, and this has enabled them 
to	 increase	 their	 activities	 in	 diverse	 illegal	markets	 (Castro	
Moral	&	Jiménez,	2010).	
This	situation	requires	the	application	of	specialized	measures	
in order to reduce the extent of illegal activities involving 
organised	 crime	 (Gimenez-Salinas,	 2010).	 During	 2010,	 the	
Spanish Presidency promoted a series of measures in the 
short to medium term to develop effective strategies against 
organised	 crime	 (Ministerio	 del	 Interior	&	CICO,	 2013),	while	
a wide array of agencies and legal instruments have been 
introduced	(see	below).
However, despite the importance of this phenomenon, it has 
not been extensively addressed by academic research 
in Spain, which in most cases is restricted to theoretical 
explanations rather than the conduct of empirical studies 
(see	Section	8.6	for	a	literature	review).	The	lack of data and 
restrictions on access to official statistics on organised 
crime cases may explain the lack of empirical studies and 
impede research on organised crime in Spain. 
Organised crime groups in Spain
Europol has included Spain among the five organised crime 
hubs stabilised in Europe	 (Europol,	 2011a).	 Various	 OCGs	
can	 be	 identified	 operating	 in	 the	 country	 in	 terms	 of	 illicit	
activities, but Spain may not have large weight as country of 
origin of major transnational OCGs. However, smaller native 
organised crime groups, operating as small independent 
cells	(Jiménez,	2005),	may	work	together	with	foreign groups 
like	Colombian	cartels,	Russian	or	Italian	mafias	(see	Table	58).	
Since 2012, the Spanish Centre of Intelligence against the 
Organized	 Crime	 (CICO)175	 has	 classified	 OCGs	 into	 three	
different subtypes:
•		 High-intensity	criminal	groups	(grupos de alta intensidad): 
transnational OCGs with a complex and extensive 
infrastructure that have the potential to create large 
company networks and are able to generate important 
economic	profits.	Moreover,	 they	exhibit	an	extraordinary	
capacity	 to	 infiltrate	 social,	 economic	 and	 political	
institutions mainly to destabilise basic governmental 
structures.
•		 Medium-intensity	 criminal	 groups	 (grupos típicos): 
national and international OCGs with an important 
organisational structure and the potential, if they are able 
to	 stay	 active	 long	 enough,	 to	 ‘upgrade’	 to	 high-intensity	
groups.
•		 Low-intensity	criminal	groups	(grupos de baja intensidad): 
low economic capacity groups that operate at national 
level with few complex structures and are likely to become 
typical organised groups if not controlled in time.
According to the latest CICO report, a total of 497 criminal 
groups	 were	 detected	 during	 2013	 (Table	 56).	 About	 73%	
of them involved individuals of different nationalities. Only 
18% of the groups detected were composed only of Spanish 
individuals	(Ministerio	del	Interior	&	CICO,	2014a).	
Compared with previous years, the number of criminal groups 
detected has increased at national level. In 2012, 482 groups 
were	 identified,	 69%	 of	 them	were	 composed	 of	more	 than	
one nationality. Moreover, a large number of these groups 
(67%)	 were	 involved	 in	 some	 kind	 of	 international	 activity	
(Ministerio	del	 Interior	&	CICO,	2013).	These	data	 reveal	 the	
transnational nature of the OCGs operating in Spain, 
since Spanish groups are the least frequent in the official 
data.176 
174.	The	definition	of	‘criminal	group’	is	provided	by	Art.	570	ter	of	the	Spanish	
criminal	 code	 (art.	 570	bis	 defined	 it	 as	 a	 stable	 group	 formed	of	 one	or	 two	
persons	for	an	indefinite	term.).	For	the	operational	definition	of	organised	crime	
group used in this report, see
175.	 Law	 991/2006	 of	 8	 September	 2006	 created	 the	 Centre	 of	 Intelligence	
against	 the	 Organized	 Crime	 (CICO),	 whose	 mission	 is	 the	 development	 of	
strategic	 intelligence	 in	 the	 fight	 against	 all	 forms	 of	 organised	 crime,	 as	well	
as the establishment of criteria for the operational coordination of services in 
cases of coincidence or concurrence in investigations. The general tasks of the 
CICO include gathering and analysing information related to organised crime 
in order to develop strategic intelligence against OCGs. It also determines 
the criteria for coordination of the operational units of the Law Enforcement 
Agencies. Moreover, the CICO issues annual reports with relevant statistics 
on the situation of organised crime in Spain. Note that CICO has recently been 
renamed	CITCO	(Centre	of	Intelligence	against	Terrorism	and	Organised	Crime)	
(BOE,	2014).
176. As for investigations carried out by police forces, 16,642 individuals were 
investigated	in	2012,	with	a	total	of	6,292	finally	arrested.	During	2013,	a	total	of	
17,358 persons were under investigation and 6,460 were arrested, following the 
pattern of previous years.
Types
No. of groups 
detected
2012 2013
High-intensity criminal groups 37 29
Medium-intensity criminal groups 363 383
Low-intensity criminal groups 82 85
Total number of OCGs 482 497
Table 56 - Classification and number of OCGs active in 
Spain
Source: URJC elaboration on Ministerio del Interior & CICO (2013-2014) data
5.6. Spain                                                                                                                                                    
Jesús Palomo, Jerónimo Márquez and Pilar Laguna (Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Spain)
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It	emerges	from	the	case	studies	collected	(see	Section	8.6)	
that when transnational OCGs establish in Spain, they seek to 
influence institutions and society as they do in their country of 
origin. In this regard, corruption, which is expanding in Spain 
at	the	political	and	business	levels	(Díez	&	Gómez-Céspedes,	
2010), and which is perceived by the Spanish population as 
widespread	 in	 the	 country	 (European	 Commission,	 2014c),	
may play a crucial role. Moreover, as highlighted by some 
experts, when native Spanish crime groups come into contact 
with outsiders they may adopt their modus operandi and 
organisational	patterns	(Sands,	2007).	
OCGs in Spain are mainly active in the trafficking of illicit 
drugs, illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings, 
frauds and money laundering	 (Ministerio	 del	 Interior	 &	
CICO,	 2014a).	 In	 particular,	 more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 identified	
OCGs	in	Spain	are	active	in	the	illicit	drugs	market	(Figure	20).
Organised Crime).179 As regards international cooperation, 
since 2009 CICO and the Special Anti-Drug Prosecution 
Office have been designated as the Spanish contact points 
for	 Asset	 Recovery	 Offices	 (Ministerio	 del	 Interior	 &	 CICO,	
2013). Moreover, in order to coordinate and promote police 
cooperation	with	other	countries	in	the	fight	against	organised	
crime, the Ministry of the Interior has established the Office 
of International Police Cooperation. Finally, Spain is member 
of	several	 international	agencies	 involved	 in	 the	fight	against	
organised crime.180
5.6.2. Illicit markets in Spain
The following Sections provide a review of the estimates of 
the revenues from the main illicit markets in Spain. The 
estimates	 have	been	 calculated	 specifically	 for	 the	purpose	
of the OCP Project or, where not possible, collected from the 
literature	 (see	Chapter	 4	 and	 the	Methodological	 Annex	 for	
details). Estimates refer either to the whole market or, where 
available, to the share attributable to criminal groups. A brief 
review of the main criminal actors involved in each market is 
also provided.
As regards the actors involved, native OCGs often cooperate 
with foreign ones. According to the literature, the main role in 
the trafficking of illicit drugs is played, besides Spanish OCGs, 
by North African OCGs	 (cannabis)	 and	 Colombian ones 
(cocaine)	 but	 there	 is	 also	 evidence	 of	 Albanian, Turkish 
OCGs, Italian mafias	 (such	 as	 Camorra	 and	 ‘Ndrangheta),	
British and Dutch OCGs. Eastern European organised 
groups have a notable presence in crimes against property, 
while Chinese OCGs are mainly involved in counterfeiting 
activities	 (Europol,	 2013a).	 Moreover,	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	
Russian OCGs operate in Spain together with Irish criminal 
groups	(An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a;	see	also	Sections	
5.3 and 5.7). 
5.6.2.1. Illicit drugs market
During the 1980s, drug trafficking was a large component of 
OCGs activities in Spain. Foreign organised groups, such as 
Colombian criminal groups, started to develop important 
alliances with native groups (e.g. Galician) in order to 
expand and control their activities. During that period, Sinti 
and	Roma	family	clans	monopolized	the	supply	of	heroin	in	the	
suburbs	 of	 various	 Spanish	 cities	 (Giménez-Salinas	 Framis,	
2010). 
Figure 20 - Main criminal activities of OCGs in Spain177
Source: URJC elaboration on Ministerio del Interior & CICO (2014) data
Organised crime groups in Spain are generally based in major 
cities and touristic locations, mainly on the Mediterranean and 
southern coast. The main cities include Madrid, Barcelona, 
Alicante,	 Malaga,	 Valencia,	 Cadiz,	 Murcia	 and	 Seville	
(Ministerio	 del	 Interior	 &	 CICO,	 2013;	 Diario	 de	 León,	 2014).	
Other areas where OCGs are present include the south-west 
and the Balearic Islands.
Authorities and platforms combating organised crime in 
Spain
A large number of authorities and agencies, at both the 
national	and	international	level,	are	involved	in	the	fight	against	
organised crime and illicit markets.
Since criminal activities have increased in recent years, new 
police	units	have	been	created	to	fight	this	phenomenon.	These	
include,	for	example,	the	GRECO	(Group	of	Special	Response	
to Organised Crime)178	 and	 the	PACCO	(Action	Plan	Against	
177.	Percentages	of	the	497	criminal	groups	identified	by	the	Spanish	authorities.	
Some of the groups are involved in different criminal activities, for which reason 
the total sum exceeds 100%.
178.	 Within	 the	 Spanish	 National	 Police,	 the	 special	 unit	 GRECO	 (Group	 of	
Special Response to Organised Crime) has been created with the main purpose 
of data gathering and combating organised crime groups and their illicit activities 
(Ministerio	 del	 Interior,	 2013).	 The	 GRECO	 unit	 is	 present	 in	 locations	 with	
significant	OC	activity,	such	as	Andalusia	(Costa	del	Sol),	Madrid	and	Barcelona.	
The GRECO unit is present in the following locations: Pontevedra, Las Palmas, 
Cádiz,	Marbella,	Málaga,	Benidorm,	Orihuela,	Ibiza,	Barcelona	and	Madrid.
179. The Civil Guard, following the example of the Spanish National Police, has 
created	 the	 Action	 Plan	 Against	 Organised	 Crime	 (PACCO).	 Within	 PACCO	
there has been an important reorganisation with the creation of new teams 
with	 the	main	 purpose	 of	 centralizing	 information	 on	 organised	 crime.	 These	
new teams are in charge of collecting and analysing all the information that they 
report	to	Central	Operative	Unit	(UCO)	(Barras,	2014).
180.	 These	 include,	 among	 others,	 the	 Bogotá	 Platform	 (Centre	 for	 the	 fight	
against	trafficking	in	cocaine);	the	JIATFS	(Force	Joint	Interagency	operations	
South):	based	in	Key	West,	Florida	(USA)	and	coordinating	actions	against	drug	
trafficking	 from	South	America	 to	North	America;	MAOC-N	 (Centre	Maritime	
Analysis	and	operations	against	drug	trafficking):	 located	 in	Lisbon	(Portugal),	
it provides support to eliminate illicit drug trafficking by air and sea across the 
Atlantic	to	Europe	or	West	Africa;	CECLAD-M	(Centre	for	Combat	Drugs	in	the	
Mediterranean):	located	in	Toulon	(France),	it	fights	organised	crime	by	air	and	
sea	around	the	Mediterranean	area;	ANTENNE	OCRTIS:	located	in	Martinique	
Island	 (France),	 its	 mission	 is	 to	 coordinate	 and	 centralize	 the	 information	
provided	by	the	French	police	in	the	Caribbean	area;	ILU	(International	Liaison	
Officers	 Units)	 African	 Platforms:	 established	 in	 Accra	 (Ghana)	 and	 Dakar	
(Senegal),	 it	 fights	 organised	 crime	 especially	 associated	 with	 the	 African	
cocaine route.
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Ever since, drug trafficking has been the most important 
organised crime activity in the country, and in most cases 
it	is	exclusive	to	OCGs	(Töttel	&	Büchler,	2011).	Its	importance	
for	the	economy	of	OCGs	is	increasing	(Ministerio	de	Sanidad	
y	Política	Social,	2009),	and	this	is	confirmed	by	the	number	of	
arrests,	which	has	remained	stable	(Public	Prosecution	Office,	
2013).182
Because	 of	 its	 geographic	 location	 (Europol,	 2013a),	 Spain	
is a key transit point to the entire EU for drug trafficking 
originating in Latin America and North Africa. The 
Spanish territory is considered to be the main entry point of 
cocaine for the continent from South American countries like 
Colombia,	Peru	and	Bolivia	 (Castro	Moral	&	Jiménez,	2010).	
On the other hand, Spain imports cannabis loads, originating 
in	Morocco	and	controlled	by	North	African	OCGs	(Giménez-
Salinas Framis, 2012, p. 27), although there is recent evidence 
that Spain is becoming a producer of cannabis in order to 
increase	 profits	 by	 reducing	 the	 intermediary	 cost	 (Gómez,	
2014). 
Given its nature as a transit country, Spain is also one of the 
countries with highest amount of seizures, which account 
for	 3.12%	 of	 world	 seizures	 of	 cocaine	 and	 44.4% within 
the EU	 (Europol,	2013a,	p.	41;	Ministerio	del	 Interior	&	CICO,	
2014a;	 UNODC,	 2014b).183 Table 59 presents the amounts 
seized	in	2011-2013	for	the	main	types	of	illicit	substances,	with	
indications	of	the	shares	seized	from	OC	groups	(Ministerio	del	
Interior	&	CICO,	2013;	Ministerio	del	Interior	&	CICO,	2014a).
Illicit market
Estimate# 
(million 
euro)
Min 
(million 
euro)
Max 
(million 
euro)
Reference 
year
Source Notes
Heroin
271 216 361 2011 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
140 2011-2013 URJC-OCP, 2014 OCGs share
360 240 721 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
Cocaine
1,199 895 1,343 2011 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
768 2011-2013 URJC-OCP, 2014 OCGs share
1,963 519 5,059 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
Cannabis
572 2011-2013 URJC-OCP, 2014 Hashish;	OCGs	share
1,575 2009
Caulkins,	Kilmer,	&	Graf,	
2013
1,600 716 3,324 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
Other illicit 
drugs
49 2011-2013 URJC-OCP, 2014 Ecstasy;	OCGs	share
558 121 995 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 Ecstasy
338 132 544 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 Amphetamines
ITTP 635 577 694 2013 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
Counterfeiting
3,928 2010 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
Demand	side;	Whole	
marketb
992 2011 ANDEMA, 2013
936a 2012 BSA, 2012 Unlicensed PC software
Fraud 2,310 1,672 2,948 2011 Transcrime - OCP, 2014 MTIC frauds
Organised 
property crime
21 2007 Europol, 2009b Cargo theft
968 2004
Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	
2007
Cargo theft
a Original	figure:	1,216	million	USD,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
b Counterfeit ICT equipment, electric appliances, CDs, DVDs, cassettes, clothing and accessories, jewellery, watches, games, toys, perfumes, body care articles.
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 57 - Estimates of Illicit markets and activities in Spain176
183. In recent years, a large number of illegal cocaine production facilities have 
been found operating in Spain. A total of 25 cocaine laboratories were discovered 
in 2008 alone. In 2011 a cocaine processing laboratory was discovered near 
Madrid,	and	the	national	authorities	confiscated	33	tons	of	basic	chemicals	for	
cocaine	refinement.
181. In the presence of an estimation range, estimate refers to the arithmetic 
mean	or	to	an	adjusted	mean	(referred	to	as	best	estimate).
182. In the presence of an estimation range, estimate refers to the arithmetic 
mean	or	to	an	adjusted	mean	(referred	to	as	best	estimate).
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Heroin
The annual revenues from the Spanish heroin market have 
been estimated by Transcrime-OCP at around 271 million 
euro,	a	figure	slightly	lower	than	previous	estimates	by	Kilmer	
and	Pacula	(2009)	(360	million	euro).	Marine transportation 
seems to be the preferred method to introduce heroin into 
Spain for subsequent distribution in the EU. Turkish OCGs 
use small vessels, such as sailing boats or speedboats, to 
transport	 drugs	 from	Turkey	 to	 the	Spanish	 coast	 (UNODC,	
2014c).	 Heroin	 seizures	 in	 Spain	 represent	 less	 than	 1%	 of	
world	seizures	and	almost	4%	in	the	EU	(Ministerio	del	Interior	
&	CICO,	2014a).
Cocaine
As regards cocaine, the Spanish market was valued at 1,963 
million	euro	 in	 2005	by	Kilmer	and	Pacula	 (2009),	while	 the	
latest estimates carried out for the purpose of this study 
amount at about 1,200 million euro	(see	Section	4.1	and	Table	
57). Although this may suggest a slight decrease, the Spanish 
cocaine market remains one of the biggest in Europe	(see	
Section 4.1). 
Colombian OCGs are mainly responsible for the introduction 
of cocaine into the EU through Spanish territory. It is estimated 
that around half a million Colombians live in Europe, and half 
of them are resident in Spain, which may help Colombian 
criminal	 groups	 to	 infiltrate	 the	 country	 (Paoli	 &	 Reuter,	
2008).	Moreover,	 there	 is	evidence	of	 Italian	mafias,	such	as	
Illicit market OCGs Sources
Heroin
Albanian OCGs, Turkish OCGs, Other Asian 
OCGs
Paoli	&	Reuter,	2008;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013;	
Transcrime,	2013a;	DNA,	2014;	UNODC,	2014c
Cocaine
Colombian	OCGs,	Camorra,	‘Ndrangheta,	
North African OCGs
Paoli	&	Reuter,	2008;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013	
Cannabis
North African OCGs, Spanish OCGs British 
OCGs, Dutch OCGs
Sands,	2007;	Paoli	&	Reuter,	2008;	Giménez-Salinas	
Framis,	2010;	DNA,	2010,	2011;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2013
Other illicit 
drugs
South American OCGs, British OCGs Paoli	&	Reuter,	2008
THB
African OCGs, Bulgarian OCGs, Chinese OCGs, 
Romanian	OCGs,	Russian/Georgian	OCGs	
South American OCGs, Spanish OCGs
UNODC,	2010a;	Public	Prosecution	Office,	2013;	Ministerio	
del	Interior	&	CICO,	2014
ITF Balkan	OCGs,	ETA,	Russian/Georgian	OCGs
Davis,	Hirst,	&	Mariani,	2001;	Cheloukhine	&	Haberfeld,	
2011
ITTP
Chinese	OCGs,	Irish	OCGs,	Russian/Georgian	
OCGs
An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a;	Spanish	Tax	Agency,	
2012
Counterfeiting
Camorra OCGs, Chinese OCGs, Other Eastern 
European OCGs
Union	des	Fabricants,	2003;	Treverton	et	al.,	2009;	BBC	
News,	2013a;	Transcrime,	2013a;	UNODC,	2013a
Extortion 
racketeering
Chinese OCGs, Colombian OCGs, ETA, 
Motorcycle gangs, Romanian OCGs, Russian 
OCGs, Spanish OCGs
Transcrime,	2009;	Savona,	2011;	West	Sands	Advisory,	
2012
Organised 
property crime
Bulgarian OCGs, Cosa Nostra Gounev	&	Bezlov,	2008;	Transcrime,	2013a
Table 58 - Organised crime groups in illicit markets in Spain
Type of illicit 
drug
Amount seized
Average % 
seized from 
OCGs 2011-
2013
2011 2012 2013
Total 
Amount
Organised 
Crime
Total 
Amount
Organised 
Crime
Total 
Amount
Organised 
Crime
Cocaine	(kg)	 16,609 8,097 20,754 14,509 26,701 19,599 64.0%
Hashish	(kg) 355,904 94,174 327,198 119,187 319,257 146,708 36.3%
Heroin	(kg) 413 140 282 224 291 103 49.6%
Ecstasy	(MDMA)	
(units)
182,973 30,623 279,652 7,912 154,732 10,055 8.7%
Table 59 - Illicit drug amounts seized in Spain (Total and share attributable to OCGs)
Source: URJC elaboration on Ministerio del Interior & CICO (2013-2014) data
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´Ndrangheta, being involved in cocaine cases on Spanish 
territory	 (DNA,	 2010,	 p.	 106;	Bakowski,	 2013).	 The	Camorra 
has also set up logistical and operational bases for cocaine 
trafficking	 from	South	America	 via	 Spain	 and	 Italy	 (Töttel	 &	
Büchler, 2011).
Cannabis
Spain is the largest cannabis market	in	Europe	(see	Section	
4.1).	 According	 to	 Kilmer	 and	 Pacula	 (2009),	 the	 Spanish	
cannabis market amounts to approximately 1,600 million 
euro	 (see	 Table	 57).	 Spain	 also	 ranks first in the number 
of seizures of	this	specific	type	of	drug	(EMCDDA,	2014).	 In	
this	regard,	the	country	represents	23.3%	of	world	seizures	of	
hashish	and	over	73%	in	the	EU	(Ministerio	del	Interior,	2014a;	
UNODC, 2014b).
Although the consumption of drugs, such as cannabis or 
cocaine, by Spaniards has in the past been ranked among the 
highest	in	Europe	(UNODC,	2012c),	the	latest	report	from	the	
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(EMCDDA)	 shows	 a	 change	 in	 tendency towards lower 
levels	(EMCDDA,	2014,	p.	35).	
In regard to organised crime related to drug trafficking, groups 
and gangs from various countries have been found active in 
Spain. Moroccan and other North African OCGs introduce 
large	amounts	of	cannabis	(mainly	hashish)	into	Spain.	
Other illicit drugs
Finally to be mentioned is the presence of smaller, but 
important, illegal drug markets such as those for ecstasy 
and amphetamines. Among the various illegal psychoactive 
substances, ecstasy is ranked next in importance after 
cannabis and cocaine. Although Spain is not an ecstasy 
producing country, it is considered an important gateway for 
ecstasy to America. Moreover, it represents 0.4% of total world 
seizures	and	almost	15%	of	them	in	the	EU.
According to the Ministry of the Interior, during 2013 Spanish 
police	 forces	 seized	 over	 10	 thousand	 individual	 doses	 of	
ecstasy	 (MDMA)	 from	 diverse	 organised	 groups	 (see	 Table	
59)	(Ministerio	del	Interior,	2014a).	On	the	other	hand,	British 
traffickers resident in Spain seem to control movements of 
large	 shipments	 of	 amphetamines	 in	 the	 country	 (EMCDDA	
&	 Europol,	 2011).	 Spain	 is	 considered	 to	 have	 a	 middling	
consumer market for amphetamines. which is valued at 338 
million euro, and for ecstasy at 558 million euro	(Kilmer	&	
Pacula, 2009). 
An estimate of the revenues of OCGs
Most of the estimates presented above represent revenues 
at the retail level which cannot be attributed solely to OCGs 
(see	Section	4.1).	On	merging	these	estimates	with	statistics	on	
seizures,	it	is	possible	to	produce	an estimate of the share of 
the revenues from this market which can be attributed to 
criminal	groups	(Table	60).
The	results	align	with	the	findings	in	the	literature,	in	the	sense	
that a weaker role and weight in terms of revenues of OC 
groups	 can	 be	 identified	 in	 the	 trafficking	 of	 ecstasy and 
hashish, whereas they are stronger in the cases of cocaine 
and heroin. However, to interpret these results it should be 
borne in mind that Spain is a transit country for cocaine, 
heroin, and hashish, but for not ecstasy. 
5.6.2.2. Trafficking in human beings
Trafficking in human beings is a serious and growing concern 
for the Spanish authorities. The Ministry of the Interior has 
included	the	fight	against	criminal	groups	engaged	 in	human	
trafficking	among	its	priority	objectives	(Ministra	de	Sanidad	y	
Política	Social,	2009).
According to Europol, Spain is an important hub in Europe 
for THB. Together with Portugal, it is a main receiver of human 
trafficking victims, and it also redistributes them throughout 
Europe	 according	 to	 market	 demand	 (Europol,	 2011b).	
However, no estimates on the volume of human trafficking 
in Spain are available from the academic literature and 
institutional reports. 
Spain is considered to be a main destination, as well as transit 
country,	 for	 victims	 of	 sexual	 exploitation	 (Europol,	 2011b).	
There is evidence of Nigerian victims being trafficked into 
Spain and forced to pay back their inflated smuggling fees. 
Also routes starting in South America often arrive in countries 
like	Spain	(Shelley,	2014).	The	organised	crime	component	is	
often	large	(Defensor	del	pueblo	de	España,	2012).	Clubs	and	
hostess bars are the main destinations for victims trafficked 
for	 the	purpose	of	sexual	exploitation	 (Ministerio	del	 Interior,	
2014a). 
Criminal groups may often manipulate their victims through 
their religion beliefs or by threatening their family members. 
Besides these methods, they also use niños-ancla (anchor-
infants) in order to easily introduce their future victims into 
the country. The traffickers transport infants with their future 
victims	in	small	boats	(pateras) through the Strait of Gibraltar, 
knowing that infants and their mothers will be received instead 
of	being	repatriated	(Public	Prosecutions	Office,	2013,	p.	342).
Type of drug
Illicit drug estimate 
(million euro)
Source
Average % seized 
from OC
Annual revenues 
attributable to 
OCGs (mn euro)
Heroin 270.5 Transcrime-OCP 2014 49.6% 134.1
Cocaine 1,199.5 Transcrime-OCP 2014 64.0% 767.6
Hashish/
Cannabisa
1,575 Caulkins,	Kilmer,	&	Graf,	2013 36.3% 571.7
Ecstasy	(MDMA)	 558.3 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 8.7% 48.6
aThe	OC	share	of	the	hashish	market	is	based	on	the	calculation	by	Caulkins,	Kilmer	and	Graf	(2013)	for	the	cannabis	market.
Table 60 - Estimate of the shares of the illicit drugs market attributable to OCGs
Source: URJC elaboration based on Transcrime-OCP estimates, Ministerio del Interior (2013; 2014), Kilmer & Pacula (2009) and Caulkins, Kilmer, & Graf (2013)
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Actors
Romanian OCGs have an important role in this type of 
criminal	 activity;	 in	 some	 cases,	 they	 work	 together	 with	
Moldovan	individuals	(Public	Prosecutions	Office,	2013).	Other	
groups found operating in this illegal market are Nigerian 
ones. There is also evidence of Russian groups cooperating 
with	other	organised	groups	(UNODC,	2010a,	p.	49).	
The latest report released by the Ministry of the Interior shows 
that a total of 96 OCGs were dismantled by the Spanish 
police	forces	in	2013	in	the	field	of	human	trafficking	(Ministerio	
del	Interior	&	CICO,	2014b).	The	previous	year,	408	individuals	
(mainly	 Spanish,	 Chinese	 and	 Romanian)	 were	 arrested	 for	
offences regarding human trafficking for sexual exploitation 
purposes,	 and	 345	 individuals	 (mainly	 Spanish,	 Romanian	
and Nigerian) were detained on charges of human trafficking, 
revealing a 33% increase in arrested individuals and OCGs 
involved	(Ministerio	del	Interior	&	CICO,	2014b).	
Figure 21 gives a breakdown of the nationalities of the 
criminals, not necessarily members of organised crime 
groups, involved in sexual exploitation cases in 2012 and 
2013	 (Public	 Prosecutions	 Office,	 2013,	 p.	 342).	 Most	 of	 the	
nationalities	 involved	 are	 Nigerian	 and	 Romanian	 (25%	 and	
30% of the total, respectively), followed, to a lesser extent, 
by Spanish and Chinese OCGs.184 As for 2013, it seems that 
Spanish, Chinese and Romanians continued to be the largest 
national groups involved in cases related to human trafficking 
(Public	Prosecutions	Office,	2014,	p.	381).
5.6.2.3. Illicit trade in tobacco products
Another illegal market in which OCGs are active in Spain 
is	 the	 illicit	 trade	 in	 tobacco	products	 (ITTP).	The	 regions	of	
Andalusia, Galicia and Catalonia are key locations for the 
illicit tobacco trade. Around 57% of ITTP is concentrated in 
Andalusia: this may be due to its proximity with Gibraltar, 
where taxes on tobacco products are substantially lower than 
in Spain and which may be often used by criminals to satisfy 
the	demand	for	cheaper	tobacco	(Altadis,	2014b,	p.	1).
Estimates
The Spanish illicit tobacco trade is estimated to have 
generated revenues of between 577 and 694 million euro 
in	 2013	 (Transcrime-OCP,	 2014).	 According	 to	 Euromonitor,	
the illegal sales of cigarettes in the country have grown by 
500%	 since	 2011	 (Euromonitor	 International,	 2012,	 p.	 7).	 It	 is	
likely that the tax increase introduced in 2010 by the Spanish 
Government	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 fiscal	 income	 has	 had	 a	
direct	impact	on	consumers’	propensity	to	buy	tobacco	from	
illegal	sources	(Altadis,	2014b).	
The relatively low prices in Spain, as well as the street selling 
of tobacco products, contribute to high levels of illicit trade 
(European	Commission,	2014b).	During	the	first	six	months	of	
2013, 256.6 million illegal packs of cigarettes were introduced, 
representing	a	fiscal	fraud	of	over	903	million	euro	(Fernandez,	
2013).	The	European	Anti-Fraud	Office	(OLAF)	has	intervened	
in order to facilitate judicial investigations on the illicit tobacco 
trade	in	Spain	(González,	2014).
Actors
Organised groups, together with smaller groups with low 
levels of organisation	 (see	 Section	 4.4),	 have	 been	 able	
to exploit the demand for lower-priced tobacco products 
and	 make	 remarkable	 profits	 from	 counterfeit	 cigarettes	
(Bořkovec,	 2012).	 As	 an	 example,	 the	 recent	 Unicornio 
operation	 dismantled	 a	 criminal	 group	 (composed	 of	
Lithuanian, Latvians and Spanish individuals) which was 
able to produce over 1.5 million packs of cigarettes a week. The 
fiscal	fraud	resulting	from	this	illegal	production	was	estimated	
at	4.5	million	euro	(El	País,	2014).
With particular reference to tobacco smuggling from Gibraltar, 
the public authorities have reported the presence of Spanish 
OCGs	 operating	 exclusively	 in	 this	 illegal	 market	 (HM	
Government, 2014b). According to the Spanish authorities, 
the increase in tobacco imported by Gibraltar in recent years 
does	not	match	its	population’s	consumption,	which	supports	
the idea that large amounts of the tobacco are destined for 
the	 illicit	 trade	 (Kassam,	 2014).	 There	 is	 also	 evidence	 that	
Chinese OCGs operate in this market by shipping overseas 
containers of counterfeit tobacco products sent from Chinese 
sea	ports	(see	Box	6).	
Figure 21 - Nationalities of the criminals involved in sexual exploitation cases in Spain (2012-2013)
Source: URJC elaboration on data from Public Prosecution Office (2013, 2014)
184. In terms of the nationality of victims of human trafficking, most of them 
are Romanian, Nigerian and Paraguayan. As for sexual exploitation, Romanian, 
Chinese	and	Spanish	victims	are	thosee	most	frequently	mentioned	(Ministerio	
del	Interior	&	CICO,	2014b).
Spanish
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25.4%
Romanian
29.9%
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10.4%
Bulgarian
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9.0%
N = 67
Romanian
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Chinese
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5.6.2.4. Counterfeiting 
Counterfeiting is also an attractive market for OCGs in Spain. 
During	2012,	over	3	million	counterfeited	products	were	seized	
by Spanish customs for intellectual property right violations 
(EU	TAXUD,	2013).185
Estimates
Box 6 - ITTP, counterfeiting and Chinese criminal 
groups: the operation Aguijón
One of the largest operations regarding the illicit 
tobacco trade on the Spanish Mediterranean coast 
was mounted in 2012. The Aguijón	 operation	 seized	
a total of 35 tons of illegal tobacco with an estimated 
market value of over 4.2 million euro. The tobacco, 
intercepted by the Spanish customs police in Valencia, 
had	originally	been	shipped	 from	Shenzhen,	 in	China.	
The intention was to introduce this large amount 
of tobacco illegally into Spain and then distribute it 
throughout Europe as rolling or pipe tobacco. The 
modus operandi used by the traffickers was to ship the 
tobacco in containers and officially declare the load as 
items	for	sale	in	bazaar	stores.	The	tobacco	was	found	
concealed within marble tile pallets in seven containers 
sent	 between	 the	months	 of	May	 and	 June	 (Spanish	
Tax Agency, 2012).
Estimates of the Spanish counterfeiting market have been 
reported in various studies and in regard to different areas. 
First, according to the estimates carried out for the purpose 
of this study, counterfeiting in Spain could potentially yield 
about 3.9 billion euro in revenues if the potential demand 
for	 counterfeit	 products	 were	 fully	 satisfied	 (see	 Section	
4.5). From a different consumer perspective, it has been 
estimated that overall spending on counterfeited products in 
Spain amounts to more than 992 million euro, with an average 
expenditure of 30.2 euro186	per	person	(ANDEMA,	2013)	(Table	
61). Regarding the specific market of software piracy, it 
has been estimated that the commercial value of unlicensed 
software products may reach a total amount of 936 million 
euro187	(BSA,	2012,	p.	9).
Following the trend of previous illicit markets, Madrid, 
Andalusia, Valencia and Catalonia have recorded a higher 
number	 of	 cases	 than	 the	 other	 regions	 (Ministerio	 De	
Industria,	 Energía	 y	 Turismo,	 2014).	 Even	 though	 there	 are	
numerous places in which these counterfeited goods can 
be	purchased,	 local	 ‘swap	meet	markets’	 seem	 to	be	of	 key	
importance	 for	 disposal	 of	 products	 of	 this	 kind	 (ANDEMA,	
2013).188 
185.	Moreover,	in	2013	the	Spanish	police	forces	detected	and	seized	a	total	of	
240,598	assets	that	did	not	fulfil	intellectual	patent	rights.	Seized	assets	violating	
industrial patent rights amounted to more than 5 million items with an estimated 
value	of	812	million	euro	(Ministerio	De	Industria,	Energía	y	Turismo,	2014).
186. The study is based on the frequency, reasons for, and amount spent by 
consumers on counterfeit products. The survey covered a sample of 1,000 
interviewees aged 18-84 in Madrid, Catalonia, Valencia, Andalusia and the 
Canary Islands. The study also provides estimates of the share of respondents 
willing to purchase fake products and their spending patterns, and estimates of 
involuntary purchases of fake products.
Products
Euro/
person
% of consumed 
items by persons
Home Appliances 204.9 3.7%
Tobacco 163.3 7.5%
Apparel 108.8 68.5%
Food and non- alcoholic 
drinks
105.4 6.9%
Audio-visual and 
photography equipment, 
computers and 
accessories
89.4 10.5%
Telephone equipment 85 7.4%
Car accessories 74.2 3.1%
Sports clothes 64.7 34.0%
Alcoholic beverages 64.4 4.9%
Perfume and cosmetics 62.7 35.8%
Watches and jewellery 59.7 24.7%
Footwear 51 26.5%
Toys 46 7.2%
Cleaning products 44 8.6%
Leather accessories and 
complements
42 35.2%
Medicines and 
pharmaceutical products
36 0.9%
Table 61 - Average spending per person per year on 
counterfeited products
Source: URJC based on ANDEMA (2013) data
187.	 The	 BSA	 Study	 quantifies	 the	 volume	 and	 value	 of	 unlicensed	 software	
installed in the previous year. Estimates of the market for PC software piracy 
are based on user surveys. The piracy rate given is obtained from the installed 
unlicensed software divided by the total software units installed. The commercial 
value of the software is obtained from the product of unlicensed software units 
* average software unit price.
188. Other consumable products like alcohol beverages are also counterfeited. 
In regard to products of this type, it seems that counterfeited tags and seals 
are difficult to detect because of poor tracking systems. This factor is one of 
the	major	facilitators	of	the	 increasing	volume	of	 illegal	alcohol	sales	(Cambra	
Cuesta, 2012, p. 10).
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Actors
In regard to criminal groups, there is evidence that Chinese 
OCGs have counterfeiting, mainly digital piracy, as their 
primary source of revenue in the Spanish market, together 
with	 THB	 and	 human	 smuggling	 (Treverton	 et	 al.,	 2009).	
The Katana189 and Sudoku190 police operations discovered a 
sophisticated piracy ring operating among 23 locations in the 
Autonomous Community of Madrid. The biggest operation 
against counterfeiting in Spain, Talgo, took place in 2008, 
and	led	to	the	confiscation	of	over	300,000	units	of	film	and	
music	copies	(see	Box	7).
In	the	academic	field,	it	seems	that	this	topic	is	not	sufficiently	
covered in relation to its social and economic impact on the 
country.	 Measuring	 criminal	 groups’	 revenues	 and	 activities	
is a difficult task that cannot be performed satisfactorily with 
the data available. Therefore, although it is clear that further 
research is needed, data accessibility restrictions impede 
deeper	qualitative	and	quantitative	analysis	(Giménez-Salinas	
Framis et al., 2009).
In regard to illicit trade, in the past decade Spain has become 
one of the most important transit countries and distribution 
centres for trafficked cocaine and cannabis products. ITTP 
is expected to grow, while legal sales continue to decline owing 
to the economic recession and increasing legal prices. In these 
circumstances,	it	is	necessary	to	fight	organised	crime	in	order	
both to protect public and social health and to mitigate the 
negative	impact	on	the	country’s	economy.	The	large	amounts	
defrauded through the illegal trade, in fact, are affecting the 
stability of businesses operating in legal markets via unfair 
low-price competition.
Spain’s	 attractiveness	 to	 organised	 crime	 groups	 can	 be	
explained by various factors: for example, its geographical 
location and cultural affinities. Spanish authorities should 
develop targeted polices in order to decrease the activity 
of OCGs in the illegal markets. Further research is needed 
to determine why organised crime has established itself 
permanently in Spain and flourishes.
5.6.2.5. Extortion racketeering
Although the level of extortion racketeering in Spain can be 
considered	 high	 (Giménez-Salinas	 Framis	 et	 al.,	 2009),	 the	
Spanish authorities seem to have adequate measures in 
place to tackle the phenomenon. Extortion can be carried 
out by national and foreign OCG operating at local and 
transnational level. Moreover, terrorist groups like ETA or 
Motorcycle	gangs	like	Hells	Angels	engage	in	extortion	(West	
Sands	 Advisory,	 2012;	 Pérez,	 2013).	 Italian	 mafias,	 together	
with Russian and Colombian OCGs, have also been found to 
be	active	in	this	illegal	activity	(Transcrime,	2009).	
5.6.3. Concluding remarks
The picture provided by this Section has shown the 
importance of illicit markets for the economy and the 
activity of criminal groups in Spain. A variety of illegal 
markets	and	criminal	actors	(from	smaller	domestic	gangs	to	
transnational OCGs) can be highlighted. Regardless of scant 
attention from the academic world, given the illegal revenues 
and the number of victims involved, illegal markets directly 
affect Spain’s society and its economy	(Barras,	2014).
189. In 2005, Spanish police forces dismantled a major Chinese OCG operating 
in Spain. Although the OCG operated at national level, its headquarters were in 
Madrid and Alicante. A total of 69 people were arrested during the operation 
and	their	main	activity	was	copying	film	DVDs	and	music	CDs.	Their	production	
capacity	reached	over	1	million	copies	per	month,	which	produced	a	fiscal	fraud	
of 17 million euro.
190. During the Soduku Operation a total of 15 people were arrested within the 
autonomous community of Madrid. Their main illicit activity was the copying 
and	duplicating,	on	a	 large	scale,	of	film	DVDs	and	music	CDs.	Several	copies	
were found in warehouses and apartments, with a production capacity of up 
to 34,720 units per day. Moreover, this particular OCGs consisted entirely of 
Chinese nationals.
Box 7 - Counterfeiting and Chinese criminal 
groups: Operation Talgo
In 2008, during Operation Talgo, the Spanish LEAs 
captured the members of a Chinese organised group 
producing and selling illegal copies of CDs and DVDs in 
Madrid. After four months of investigations, 32 Chinese 
citizens	were	arrested	and	total	of	162,000	DVDs	and	
144,000	 CDs	 illegal	 copies	 were	 seized.	 This	 OCG	
was also involved in the human trafficking of Chinese 
citizens,	who	had	to	work	in	slavery	conditions	in	order	
to repay their travel debts over a long period of time. 
The	 group’s	 productive	 capacity	 was	 over	 150,000	
copies per day, which can be translated into a total of 
600,000	euro	per	day	on	the	illegal	market	(Ministerio	
del Interior, 2008).
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5.7.1. Introduction
The 2010 National Security Strategy and the 2013 Serious 
and	 Organised	 Crime	 Strategy	 identified	 organised	 crime	
as a significant risk to the UK’s national security	 (HM	
Government, 2010, 2013). 
Overall annual costs to the UK economy are currently 
estimated to be at least 24 billion GB pounds (HM	
Government, 2013). Drug supply, organised fraud, and 
organised immigration crime are all thought to have major 
impacts	 on	 the	 UK	 (Mills,	 Skodbo,	 &	 Blyth,	 2013);	 but	 also	
child	sexual	exploitation	and	abuse,	criminal	use	of	firearms,	
cybercrime, economic crime, and organised acquisitive crime 
are	identified	as	key	threats	by	the	national	authorities	(NCA,	
2014b). 
In regard to geographical impact, organised criminal activity 
seems to be concentrated in London and the South-East, the 
North-West and West Midlands, but other areas of the country 
are	also	affected	(HM	Government,	2011,	p.	9).
Organised crime groups in the United Kingdom
As of December 2013, the number of OCGs operating in 
the UK was estimated by the NCA to be at least 5,300, 
comprising approximately 36,600 organised criminals 
(NCA,	2014b).191	A	Home	Office	study	on	the	criminal	profiles	of	
organised	criminals	in	the	UK	(Francis	et	al.,	2013)	has	shown	
that	the	vast	majority	(87%)	were	UK	nationals.	Although	the	
majority	were	convicted	for	drug-related	offences	(73%),	only	
12% of them specialised in a particular crime type.192
As	in	most	other	EU	countries	(see	Chapter	3.2),	OCGs	in	the	
UK can be characterised as: 
•		 polymorphous,	 adaptable,	 loose,	 flexible	 and	 fluid 
criminal networks	 (Ianni,	 1972;	 Hobbs,	 1998;	 McIllwain,	
1999;	Abadinsky,	2003,	Hornsby	&	Hobbs,	2007;	Morselli,	
2009;	Rubin	et	al.,	2013;	von	Lampe,	2013;	Levi,	2014);
•		 a	continuum of criminal organisations, from small and 
ephemeral	 to	 more	 reputed	 and	 formal	 (Morselli,	 Gabor,	
&	 Kiedrowski,	 2010),	 local	 (Hobbs,	 1998)	 and	 socially 
embedded	(Kleemans,	2012);
•		 kinship	 and	 ethnicity	 remain	 important	 factors	 for	 group	
cohesion, but multiple cross-ethnic networks also play 
a	 role	 (Akhtar	 &	 South,	 2000;	 Pearson	 &	 Hobbs,	 2001;	
Kirby	&	Nailer,	2013)	and	may	be	more	viable,	successful,	
continuous,	and	reputed	(Ruggiero	&	Khan,	2006).193
The following Sections provide an in-depth analysis of illicit 
markets in the United Kingdom, with a review of available 
estimates	 of	 their	 size	 and	 of	 the	 actors	 involved	 in	 each	
market.
5.7.2. Illicit markets in the United Kingdom
Owing to the nature of organised crime, reliable evidence 
is limited and estimates of scale inevitably rely, at least to 
some	extent,	on	informed	assumptions	(Dubourg	&	Prichard,	
2008).194 
The	 estimates	 presented	 here	 (Table	 62)	 are	 taken from 
several sources.	 A	 recent	 study	by	 the	Home	Office	 (Mills,	
Skodbo,	 &	 Blyth,	 2013)	 provides	 the	most	 wide-ranging	 and	
comprehensive estimate of illicit market revenues in the UK, 
and	updates	earlier	Home	Office	studies	(Dubourg	&	Prichard,	
2008). Among the others, for the purposes of this study, 
estimates of heroin, cocaine, counterfeiting, ITTP and MTIC 
frauds are provided, while fraud estimates are taken also from 
the	Annual	Fraud	Indicator	(NFA,	2013).	195
Two	types	of	estimates	are	included	in	Table	62:	(a)	estimates	
of revenues earned by OCGs	 in	 each	 market;	 and	 (b)	
estimates that refer to the whole market	(where	no	estimate	
of the OCG share has been available).196 Different sources 
191.	This	figure	is	an	estimate	and	higher	than	some	other	estimates	for	OCGs	
in the UK. For example, according to Europol, there are an estimated 3,600 
organised	 crime	 groups	 (OCGs)	 active	 in	 the	 EU,	 and	 around	 1,500	 OCGs	
are	targeting	the	UK	(Moon,	2013).	The	difference	may	be	due	to	the	different	
models of OC operating in the UK.
192.	 The	 study	 has	 also	 established	 that	most	 of	 them	were	male	 (95%);	 the	
average	age	was	32	years;	just	over	half	of	them	were	white	Europeans	(56%).
193. As already widely discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, some scholars question 
the	 use	 of	 ethnicity/race	 to	 describe	 organised	 criminal	 groups,	 arguing	 that	
such	descriptions	are	often	meaningless;	a	more	refined	approach	is	needed	to	
understand	the	role	of	ethnicity	in	criminal	networks	(Murji,	2007).	As	illustrated	
above, one of the challenges in this study has been the use of ethnicity as 
a descriptor of the type of OCG. Limited information in LEA reports and 
newspaper articles often makes it impossible to provide meaningful descriptions 
on the basis of this criterion. The sources often use the same words to describe 
nationality and ethnic origin, but do not always indicate to what they refer. In this 
chapter, ethnicity is used as a descriptor where more detailed information is 
available	and	when	this	factor	appears	to	be	significant.	Other	descriptors	are	
also	used	where	possible	to	provide	a	more	specific	identification:	for	example,	
‘British	of	South-Asian	origin’.	‘British’	is	used	to	refer	to	a	group	which	consists,	
according	to	the	source,	of	UK	nationals	and/or	UK	residents	and	when	ethnic	
origin	does	not	appear	to	be	significant	in	the	description	of	the	group,	or	when	
it	was	not	possible	to	establish	whether	it	was	a	significant	factor	–	for	example,	
when	 the	 source	 only	 provided	 limited	 information	 (for	 example,	 only	 names	
were	available)	or	when	information	about	ethnicity/race	was	ambiguous	(i.e.	it	
was not clear to what it referred).
194.  For many types of organised crime the data are insufficient or absent 
and	 in	 some	 areas	 only	 partial	 estimates	 are	 possible	 at	 best	 (Mills,	 Skodbo,	
&	Blyth,	2013).	Relatively	more	reliable	 information	exists	on	the	scale	of	drug	
markets. It is important to note that the latest Home Office study used in this 
report is likely to have underestimated the scale of illicit markets, because the 
authors	only	provided	estimates	when	they	were	confident	that	the	estimates	
were reasonably accurate. For this reason, and because of the risk of double 
counting in some areas, many markets such as money laundering, identity fraud, 
corruption, extortion, blackmail, kidnapping, violence and organised cybercrime 
are excluded from the estimates.
195.	 Earlier	 estimates	 of	 drug	markets	 are	 drawn	 from	 (Pudney	 et	 al.,	 2006).	
Estimates of heroin and cannabis markets for 2006 and 2010 respectively are 
taken	from	the	report	by	the	Trimbos	Institute,	Rand	Europe	and	ICPR	(van	Laar	
et	al.,	2013;	Kilmer	et	al.,	2013).
196. Most estimates in this table refer to the organised crime share of the illicit 
markets,	 not	 to	 the	 overall	 size	 of	 the	 markets.	 For	 drugs,	 the	 Home	 Office	
assumes that all drug markets have an organised crime element, and while there 
will	 be	exceptions	 (e.g.	 a	drug	produced	and	used	by	 the	 same	person),	 they	
will	not	have	a	significant	effect	on	estimates	of	scale.	For	other	markets,	Mills,	
Skodbo	and	Blyth	(2013)	and	Dubourgh	and	Prichard	(2008)	estimate	the	share	
of	organised	crime	in	the	market;	Transcrime	(2014)	provides	estimates	of	the	
retail value of the overall heroin and cocaine markets and counterfeiting market 
(not	 the	 organised	 crime	 share),	 and	 Trautmann,	 Kilmer	 and	 Turnbull	 (2013)	
provide an estimate of the overall heroin market.
5.7. United Kingdom                                                                                                                                                    
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use different methodologies to estimate the revenues of 
illicit markets and the OCG share, and they rely on different 
definitions	of	organised	crime.197 
As can be seen from Table 62, the revenues generated 
by organised crime are substantial. Fraud, drugs, 
counterfeiting and ITTP appear to be the largest organised 
criminal	activities	in	the	UK.	Other	profitable	markets	appear	
to be trafficking for sexual exploitation and organised vehicle 
crime. As noted earlier, the actual scale of the markets, 
because of the conservative nature of the estimates, is likely 
to be higher. 
As a result of the different methodologies used in different 
studies, there are discrepancies among estimates, for 
example in the case of the heroin and crack cocaine market198 
and in the counterfeit market.199
Whilst in general organised criminals in the UK are 
opportunistic and diversify their criminal activities when 
market opportunities present themselves, it is possible to 
identify certain specialisation patterns across OCGs: for 
example, Vietnamese OCGs are specialised in the cultivation 
of	 cannabis;	 Chinese OCGs in counterfeit DVDs, cigarette 
smuggling	and	sex	trafficking;	British OCGs are dominant in 
the	cocaine	market	and	compete	(especially	the	Merseyside	
groups) with London-based Turkish groups in the heroin 
market. Organised robberies are typically performed by 
British OCGs. There is also evidence of Eastern European 
OCGs involved in sex trafficking and frauds. Table 63 provides 
a summary of an attempt to identify, based on this research, 
typical markets for each of the groups. 
5.7.2.1. Illicit drugs
Heroin
Crack cocaine and heroin combined is, according to the 
available estimates, the largest UK drug market. According 
to the estimates carried out for the purpose of this study, the 
size	of	the	market	in	the	UK	in	2010-11	was	between	1,857 and 
3,094 million euro of revenues per year. The 2004 estimate 
of the heroin and crack cocaine market by Pudney et al. 
(2006)	was	1,714	million	euro.	However	it	was	re-estimated	in	
2013	by	Mills,	Skodbo	and	Blyth	(2013)	to	be	lower,	1,508	million	
euro, which is close enough to, although somewhat less than, 
the lower Transcrime estimate.201 
NCA	 reports	 that	 “the	 amount	 of	 heroin	 estimated	 to	 be	
imported	 annually	 into	 the	 UK	 is	 between	 18-23	 tonnes”.	
Pakistan and Iran are major trafficking routes for Afghan 
opiates, and ethnic and familial links play an important role. 
The Netherlands is also strategically important for organising 
trafficking	to	the	UK	(National	Crime	Agency,	n.d.-a).
In	 regard	 to	 the	 actors	 involved,	 in	 Europe	 “Turkish and 
Albanian ethnic groups largely control the importation, 
high-level	 trafficking	 and	 open-air	 retailing	 of	 heroin”	 (Paoli	
&	 Reuter,	 2008,	 p.	 13);	 in	 particular,	 Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	
traffickers	 “continue	 to	dominate	 the	supply	of	heroin	 to	 the	
UK”	 (SOCA,	 2006,	 p.	 27).202 Merseyside crime groups are 
identified	 as	 major	 UK	 suppliers	 of	 heroin	 competing	 with	
the London-based Turkish traffickers and keeping other 
groups	(e.g.	Eastern	European	and	Russian)	out	of	the	market	
(Rossington,	2009).	Besides	Turks,	 there	 is	also	evidence	of	
the	involvement	of	British	OCGs	(in	particular	of	South-Asian	
origin), and Colombian, Mexican, Lithuanian ones, also with 
links to the Netherlands and Pakistan.203 
In 2010, the Home Office and UK Border agency reported 
a drop in trafficking via Turkey, an increase in the supply of 
heroin from Pakistan, and the use of new methods such as 
shipping containers (especially	 of	 food	 products, see also 
Section 8.7) and the postal system.204 
197.	 The	 latest	 Home	 Office	 study	 uses	 the	 definition	 from	 Local	 to	 Global:	
Reducing	 the	Risk	 from	Organised	Crime	 (HM	Government,	 2011,	 p.	 4)	which	
defines	organised	crime	as	a	crime	that	“involves	individuals,	normally	working	
with others, with the capacity and capability to commit serious crime on a 
continuing	 basis.	 The	motivation	 is	 often,	 but	 not	 always,	 financial	 gain”.	 The	
Home	Office	estimates	are	based	on	‘the	average	value	of	the	item	associated	
with	 the	particular	offence	multiplied	by	 the	annual	volume	of	 those	offences’	
(Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013,	p.	17).	The	earlier	study	(Dubourg	&	Prichard,	2008,	
p.	4)	adopted	a	definition	that	specified	an	organised	crime	group	(OCG)	as:	“a	
group	of	 two	or	more	persons,	 jointly	 engaged	 in	continuing	 ‘significant	 illegal	
activitie”’,	 irrespective	 of	 national	 or	 other	 boundaries.	 The	 group’s	 primary	
purpose is to generate “significant	profits	or	other	gains’’.
198.	The	earlier	estimate	is	based	on	Pudney	et	al.	(2006).	The	later	Home	Office	
study	(Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013)	considers	the	amount	spent	on	illicit	drugs	
separately for adults arrested in the last year and all other groups, and uses a 
different	type	of	survey	for	11	to	15	year	olds	(OCJS	instead	of	the	schools	survey	
used in the previous study) and drops some of the assumptions about patterns 
of use, purity and price used in the previous estimate. The data for England and 
Wales	have	been	scaled	up	to	obtain	the	final	data	for	the	UK	using	population	
and	 arrest	 statistics.	 The	 EU	 study	 (Kilmer	 et	 al.,	 2013)	 employs	 a	 different	
methodology using its own interviews as well as other sources to estimate 
consumption;	 the	 expenditure	 figure	 is	 based	 on	 a	 group	 that	 had	 recently	
entered treatment and it likely to be a high estimate.
199.	The	2003/4	estimate	 is	 for	 “non-excise	 intellectual	property	theft”	based	
on	“street	values	of	counterfeit	goods”	(Dubourg	&	Prichard,	2008).	The	2010/11	
estimate	is	for	“organised	intellectual	property	crime	and	counterfeiting”	and	only	
includes	 seizures	 of	 physical	 goods.	No	 estimate	 of	 cyber-crime	 involvement	
is	provided	 (Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013).	The	“counterfeit	currency”	estimate	
has been added to the estimate of organised intellectual property crime and 
counterfeiting.	 Transcrime-OCP	 (2014)	 provides	 an	 estimate	 of	 the	 potential	
demand	for	specific	counterfeit	products	(see	Section	4.5).
201. To be reiterated is that the Home Office study assumes that there is no 
significant	difference	between	the	entire	heroin,	cocaine	and	cannabis	markets	
and	their	organised	crime	share;	therefore,	it	uses	its	estimate	of	the	size	of	these	
markets as a proxy for the organised crime share of them. Transcrime, on the 
other hand, assumes that organised crime does not monopolise the entire drugs 
market, especially since estimations are made at the retail level, which involves 
a	plurality	of	actors	(see	Section	4.1).	The	second	study	uses	a	new	methodology	
sourcing youth data from the OCJS. This is still higher than its estimate of the 
current market, suggesting a reduction in the heroin and crack cocaine market 
between 2004 and 2010. In addition, an estimate of the heroin market for 2006 – 
2,500	million	euro	–	is	provided	by	Kilmer	et	al.	(2013).	Crack	cocaine	and	heroin	
were	combined	in	Mills,	Skodbo	and	Blyth	(2013)	because	of	the	low	number	of	
non-arrestee users in their study.
202. It also states that heroin is sourced from Turkey by groups based in the 
Netherlands and is then supplied to UK OCGs. UNODC reports that in the UK 
heroin	arrest	statistics	“British	citizens	predominate	but	a	considerable	number	
of	Dutch	citizens	also	show	up	in	arrest	statistics”	(UNODC,	2010a,	p.	125).
203.	Locations	 identified	 in	 the	reports	 included	Merseyside,	South	Yorkshire,	
Sheffield, London, Hull, Birmingham, Manchester, Renfrewshire, Lanarkshire and 
Dunbartonshire. A network in London used a courier to import heroin and crack 
cocaine from Jamaica and then supplied the drugs to middle-level dealers in the 
boroughs	of	Croydon	and	Lambeth	(Metropolitan	Police,	2013).
204.	Food	shipments	(red	chilli	powder)	were	used	in	one	case	to	conceal	the	
drug	(see	also	Section	8.7);	in	another	case,	baby	powder	bottles	were	used	to	
ship	heroin	from	Pakistan	(Home	Office	&	UK	Border	Agency,	2011).	In	one	case	
heroin was sent to the UK by Fedex in parcels claiming to contain dried food and 
dried	fish,	with	heroin	hidden	inside	bars	of	soap	(Bennett,	2013).	
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Illicit market
Estimate# 
(million 
euro)
Min 
(million 
euro)
Max 
(million 
euro)
Reference 
year
Source Notes
Heroin
2,321 1,857 3,094 2010-2011 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
1,508a 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013
Crack cocaine and 
heroin;	Whole	UK;	OCG	
share
1,360b 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013
Crack cocaine and her-
oin;	England	and	Wales;	
OCG share
2,500 2006 Kilmer et al., 2013
2,303 1,536 4,607 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
1,714c 1,390c 2,037c 2003-2004 Pudney et al., 2006
Cocaine
1,452 1,084 1,625 2012 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
1,067d 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013
Powder	cocaine;	Whole	
UK;	OCG	share
944e 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013
Powder	cocaine;	
England	and	Wales;	
OCG share
3,133 828 8,073 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009
1,382f 1,003f 1,762f 2003-2004 Pudney et al., 2006
Powder	cocaine;	Whole	
market
2,102g 1,542g 2,662g 2003-2004 Pudney et al., 2006
Crack	cocaine;	Whole	
market
Cannabis
787 2010-2011
Caulkins,	Kilmer,	&	Graf,	
2013
OCG share
1,392h 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013 Whole	UK;	OCG	share
1,228i 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013
England	and	Wales;	
OCG share
1,464l 850l 2,078l 2003-2004 Pudney et al., 2006
Other illicit 
drugs
702 152 1,251 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 Ecstasy
811 317 1,305 2005 Kilmer	&	Pacula,	2009 Amphetamines
380m 258m 502m 2003-2004 Pudney et al., 2006 Ecstasy
443n 327n 559n 2003-2004 Pudney et al., 2006 Amphetamines
THB
151o 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013
Sexual exploitation - 
OCG share
393p 2003 Dubourg	&	Prichard,	2008 Sexual exploitation
ITTP
1,304 1,154 1,453 2013 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
3,596 2012-2013
Tobacco Manufacturers 
Association, 2013
Whole market
Counterfeiting
4,569 2010 Transcrime-OCP, 2014
Demand	side;	Whole	
marketb
104q 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013
1,496r 2011 BSA, 2012 Unlicensed PC software
4,483s 2007 Ledbury Research, 2007 Clothing and footwear
1,125t 2005 Dubourg	&	Prichard,	2008 OCG share
Illegal gambling 1,128u 1996 Groom	&	Davies,	1998
Usury 175v 2005
Ellison,	Collard,	&	Forster,	
2006
Table 62 - Estimates of the revenues of illicit markets in the UK 200
200. In the presence of an estimation range, estimate refers to the arithmetic mean	or	to	an	adjusted	mean	(referred	to	as	best	estimate).
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Illicit market
Estimate# 
(million 
euro)
Min 
(million 
euro)
Max 
(million 
euro)
Reference 
year
Source Notes
Fraud
2,962 2,144 3,780 2011 Transcrime-OCP, 2014 MTIC frauds
17,100 10,950w 23,250w 2012 NFA, 2013
Fraud perpetrated by 
organised crime groups
10,324x 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013
6,781y 2004 Dubourg	&	Prichard,	2008 OCG share
Organised 
property crime
116z 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013 Plant	theft;	OCG	share
28aa 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013 Metal	theft;	OCG	share
60ab 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013
Road	freight	crime;	OCG	
share
41ac 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013
OCG share - Distraction 
burglary
14ad 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013
OCG share - Cash and 
valuables in transit
383ae 2010 Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013
Organised	vehicle	crime;	
OCG share
233 2007 Europol, 2009b Cargo theft
1,311 2004
Van	Den	Engel	&	Prummel,	
2007
Cargo theft
a	Original	figure:	1,300	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
b	Original	figure:	1,172	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
c Original	figures:	1,207	(aver),	979	(min)	and	1,434	(max)	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2003	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
d Original	figure:	920	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
e Original	figure:	814	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
f Original	figures:	973	(ave),	706	(min)	and	1,241	(max)	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2003	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
g Original	figure:	1,480	(ave),	1,086	(min)	and	1,875	(max)	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2003	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
h Original	figure:	1,200	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
i Original	figure:	1,059	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
l Original	figures:	1,031	(ave),	599	(min)	and	1,463	(max)	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2003	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
m Original	figures:	268	(ave),	182	(min)	and	354	(max)	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2003	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
n	Original	figures:	312	(ave),	230	(min)	and	394	(max)	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2003	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
o Original	figure:	130	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
p Original	figure:	277	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
q Original	figure:	90	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
r Original	figure:	1,943	million	USD,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2011	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
s Original	figure:	3,009	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2007	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
t	Original	figure:	839	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2005	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
u	Original	figure:	800	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	01/04/1999	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
v	Original	figure:	120	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2005	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
w	Original	figures:	8.9	and	18.9	billion	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2012	exchange	rate	(Source	ECB).
x Original	figure:	8.9	billion	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
y Original	figure:	4,781	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2004	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
z	Original	figure:	100	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
aa Original	figure:	24	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
ab Original	figure:	52	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
ac Original	figure:	35	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
ad Original	figure:	12	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
ae Original	figure:	330	million	GBP,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	exchange	rate	(source	ECB).
* Counterfeit ICT equipment, electric appliances, CDs, DVDs, cassettes, clothing and accessories, jewellery, watches, games, toys, perfumes, body care articles.
# Estimates in italics are not present in the original study, but are instead the arithmetic mean of the minimum and maximum estimates calculated by the original 
authors.
Table 62 - Estimates of the revenues of illicit markets in the UK (continues)
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Cocaine
The	 size	 of	 the	 powder	 cocaine	 market	 according	 to	
Transcrime-OCP	 research	 team’s	 estimate	 for	 2012	 was	
between 1,084 and 1,625 million euro. A Home Office study 
provides a somewhat lower estimate of 944 million euro in 
2010 in England and Wales and of 1,067 in the UK as a whole 
(Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013).	According	to	the	estimates,	it	is	
currently the third largest drug market in the UK after heroin 
and cannabis.
The NCA reports that the amount of cocaine entering the UK 
annually is 25-30 tonnes, and a large proportion comes from 
Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador	(National	Crime	Agency,	
n.d.-a). Matrix Knowledge Group describes the drug market as 
fragmented, with high and stable demand, very large mark-ups 
Illicit market OCGs Sources
Heroin
Albanian OCGs, British OCGs, Dutch OCGs, 
Middle Eastern OCGs, Turkish OCGs
SOCA,	2006;	Matrix	Knowledge	Group,	2007;	Dubourg	&	
Prichard,	2008;	Rossington,	2009;	Home	Office	&	UK	Border	
Agency,	2011;	Leask,	2012;	Kilmer	et	al.,	2013
Cocaine
African	OCGs;	British	OCGs,	Colombian	
OCGs, Dutch OCGs, Middle Eastern OCGs, 
South American OCGs, Spanish OCGs, 
Turkish OCGs
Matrix	Knowledge	Group,	2007;	Dubourg	&	Prichard,	2008;	
McSweeney,	Turnbull,	&	Hough,	2008;	Robertson,	2009;	Home	
Office	&	UK	Border	Agency,	2011;	SOCA,	2012;	Engelbrecht,	
2013;	Jones,	2013;	Kennedy,	2013;	Siddle,	2013	
Cannabis
British OCGs, Chinese OCGs, Colombian 
OCGs, Dutch OCGs, Irish OCGs, Other 
Asian OCGs, Turkish OCGs
Matrix	Knowledge	Group,	2007;	Dubourg	&	Prichard,	2008;	
McSweeney,	Turnbull,	&	Hough,	2008;	Silverstone	&	Savage,	
2010;	EMCDDA	&	Europol,	2011;	Silverstone,	2011;	Stewart,	2011;	
An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a;	Bean,	2013;	Trautmann,	
Kilmer,	&	Turnbull,	2013;	Young,	2013
Other illicit 
drugs
British OCGs, Dutch OCGs, Other Western 
European OCGs
McSweeney,	Turnbull,	&	Hough,	2008;	Border	Force,	2013;	
Coleman, 2013
THB
British OCGs, Chinese OCGs, Cosa Nostra, 
Lithuanian OCGs, Middle Eastern OCGs, 
Nigerian OCGs, Other Asian OCGs, Other 
Eastern European OCGs, Russian OCGs
Lebov,	2010;	Jackson,	Jeffery,	&	Adamson,	2010;	Marsh	et	al.,	
2012;	OSCE,	2010;	Silverstone	&	Savage,	2010;	Silverstone,	2011;	
An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a;	Annison,	2013;	Davenport,	
2013;	House	of	Commons,	2013;	Rachel,	2013;	UKBA,	2013
ITF
British OCGs, Other Eastern European 
OCGs,Turkish OCGs
Davis,	Hirst,	&	Mariani,	2001;	Hales,	Lewis,	&	Silverstone,	2006;	
Siddle, 2013
ITTP
British OCGs, Chinese OCGs, Irish OCGs, 
Middle Eastern OCGs, Other Eastern 
European OCGs
Silverstone,	2011;	An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a;	Calderoni	
et	al.,	2013a;	HMRC,	2013b,	2013c;	Wang,	2013;	Interpol,	2014a
Counterfeiting
British OCGs, Chinese OCGs, Other Eastern 
European	OCGs,	Russian/Georgian	OCGs
Treverton	et	al.,	2009;	Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013;	IP	Crime	
Group,	2013;	Silverstone,	2011;	Wang,	2013
Extortion 
racketeering
British	OCGs,	Chinese	OCGs,	Russian/
Georgian OCGs
Transcrime,	2009;	Savona,	2011;	Wells,	2011;	Wang,	2013
Usury British OCGs, Turkish OCGs Leask, 2014
Fraud
British OCGs, Chinese OCGs, Italian OCGs, 
Lithuanian OCGs, Nigerian OCGs, Other 
Eastern European OCGs, Romanian OCGs, 
Russian OCGs
Dubourg	&	Prichard,	2008;	Silverstone,	2011;	An	Garda	
Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a;	Collins,	2013;	Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	
2013;	NFA,	2013;	Wang,	2013;	Levi,	2014
Organised 
property 
crime
British OCGs, Chinese OCGs, Irish OCGs, 
Romanian OCGs
Dubourg	&	Prichard,	2008;	An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a;	
Jarram,	2013;	Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013;	Wang,	2013
Environmental 
crime
British OCGs McKinney,	2013;	UTV	News,	2013
Table 63 - Organised crime groups in illicit markets in the United Kingdom
for cocaine and heroin, a decline in prices over time, and price 
variations	across	areas	(Matrix	Knowledge	Group,	2007).
There are a number of ways to smuggle cocaine into the 
UK, including couriers	 (usually	 of	 Asian, Caribbean and 
African origin) and the corruption of custom officials to 
transport cocaine into the UK on planes;	other	methods	are	
cars, ferries, trains, ‘bent’ lorry drivers, commercial air 
flights, DHL and boats	 (Caulkins,	 Burnett,	&	 Leslie,	 2009).	
Also	transportation	companies	play	a	significant	part	in	many	
large-scale	smuggling	operations	(of	cocaine	as	well	as	other	
drugs),	especially	with	large	shipments	(von	Lampe,	2013).
Local British groups	dominate	this	market	(UNODC,	2010a).	
Also local groups with links to Turkish, Colombian, Dutch, and 
Nigerian groups, as well as a local group of African origin, have 
been	identified.	Large	(even	thirty	or	more	people),	poly-drug 
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(i.e.	involved	in	the	distribution	of	more	than	one	drug)	criminal	
organisations and networks, often with transnational 
connections,	are	frequent	(see	box	below).205 
Third	 countries	 (in	 particular	 Spain and the Netherlands) 
have been used as transits point and transhipment countries, 
a	finding	that	is	supported	by	international	organisations	(see	
e.g. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, 2013) and highlighted by Sections 5.5 and 5.6. 
and	 in	 Chinatown	 (London),	 where	 they	 control	 cannabis	
cultivation	(Wang,	2013).206
Cannabis 
Cannabis is the second largest drug market in the UK, 
and it ranges from the 1,464 million euro of annual revenues 
estimated	 in	2004	 (Pudney,	et	al.,	 2006)	 to	 the	 1,392	million	
euro	according	to	the	Home	Office’s	updated	estimate	(Mills,	
Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013).	The	latest	Home	Office	study	suggests	
a reduction in the cannabis market between 2004 and 2010. 
In addition, an estimate of the cannabis market – 787 million 
euro – which was the annual spending on cannabis in the UK in 
2010	is	provided	by	Caulkins,	Kilmer	and	Graf	(2013).	
Although some cannabis is produced domestically, most of 
it is smuggled from Afghanistan and Morocco	 (cannabis	
resin) and South African countries, the Caribbean and 
the Netherlands	 (herbal	cannabis)	(National	Crime	Agency,	
n.d.-a).
The	 following	 groups	 have	 been	 identified	 as	 active	 in	 the	
cannabis	 market:	 Vietnamese,	 Chinese,	 British	 (especially	
of South-Asian origin), Turkish and Colombian OCGs. 
Vietnamese illegal immigrant communities have 
traditionally been involved in cannabis cultivation, mainly in 
London, and they apparently control around two thirds of 
cannabis	 cultivation	 in	 the	UK	 (Silverstone	&	Savage,	 2010).	
Chinese OCGs	 are	prevalent	 in	Scotland	 (Silverstone,	 2011)	
Box 8 - Operation Eaglewood: a poly-drug and 
money-laundering transnational network based 
in London
An extensive network of drug dealers and money 
launderers	 based	 in	 London	 (33	 people	 convicted	
in connection with this case) supplied cocaine and 
cannabis and laundered money using a high street 
bureau de change in Bayswater, West London. The 
group laundered money from drug dealers in the 
Midlands and South-East of England. It also operated a 
taxi network which was their front business and acted 
as	a	‘clearing	bank’.	The	network	consisted	of	people	of	
various ethnic origins and nationalities: white British, an 
Israeli-born Arab, an Egyptian, and an Iraqi, and it had 
links with Colombia, Spain, Israel, India, Dubai, Morocco 
and	other	North	African	states	(Davies	&	Dodd,	2011).
Box 9 - Cannabis and money laundering by a 
Vietnamese OCG in the West Midland
Five people, four of them involved in cultivation and 
one the head of money laundering, supplied cannabis 
to communities across the West Midlands. They 
had a number of factories set up in rented flats and 
established	 smurfing	 money-laundering	 schemes	
(making	 regular	 lump	sum	cash	payments	 to	multiple	
bank accounts). The group had eleven cultivation 
facilities and an estimated capacity to produce 
cannabis with a street value in excess of half a million 
GBP. They were also in possession of fake passports 
and	ID	cards	(West	Midlands	Police,	2013).
205.	 In	 one	 case	 a	 gang	 from	 Liverpool	 dealt	 in	 cocaine	 and	 heroin;	 a	West	
Yorkshire	 group	 trafficked	 cocaine,	 heroin	 and	 cannabis;	 a	 Glasgow-based	
network smuggled cocaine, amphetamines and cutting agents. In most cases, 
there was some evidence of transnational connections: for example, a London 
OCG	bought	cocaine	from	a	Colombian	gang	operating	in	Spain;	in	other	cases	
cocaine	was	 smuggled	 from	Venezuela	 and	Dominican	Republic.	 In	 one	 case	
police	 inquiries	uncovered	 links	with	 the	Turkish	heroin	mafia	and	Colombian	
cocaine	cartels	 (Davenport,	2011).	The	 latter	finding	 is	supported	by	Paoli	and	
Reuter,	 who	 stated	 that	 in	Western	 Europe	 “Colombian	 groups	 dominate	 the	
importation	of	cocaine”	(Paoli	&	Reuter,	2008,	p.	13).
206.	Other	identified	locations	include	Northamptonshire,	Bristol,	Staffordshire,	
Cambridge,	Hull,	Edgbaston,	Scotland	(cannabis	factories/farms),	Merseyside,	
South	 Yorkshire,	 Manchester	 (smuggling/distribution),	 Gatwick,	 Heathrow,	
Essex,	Suffolk	(attempted	importation/smuggling).
207. A Home Office study reports that the prices charged per victim of sexual 
exploitation were 500 GBP to 8,000 GBP, with an average of between 2,000 
GBP	and	3,000	GBP	 in	2008.	They	also	report	 that	 the	size	of	debt	bondage	
was 25,000 GBP and the facilitation of access to employment between 300 and 
18,000	GBP	(Marsh	et	al.,	2012)
Amphetamines, ecstasy, LSD and other drugs
The latest Home Office study suggests a significant 
reduction in this market between 2004 and 2010: a 
combined estimate for these markets for 2010 of 282 million 
euro	is	provided	by	Mills,	Skodbo	and	Blyth	(2013)	and	it	refers	
to England and Wales. This compares to 442 million euro in 
2004,	which	 is	 a	 figure	 lower	 than	 the	estimate	provided	by	
Pudney	et	al.	(2006)	of	823	million	euro.	
In terms of actors, British OCGs in Merseyside, Belfast and 
Scotland and Chinese Triads	in	Scotland	have	been	identified	
as	 distributing	 ecstasy/MDMA	 tablets.	 Home-synthesised	
amphetamine-type drugs have also been increasing. 
5.7.2.2. Trafficking in human beings
As	 in	 other	 countries	 (see	Section	4.2),	 also	 in	 the	UK	 there	
is currently a dearth of empirical data on the nature of 
trafficking	 in	human	beings	 (Lebov,	2010).	Human	 trafficking	
research has been traditionally victim-oriented and focused 
mainly on the sex industry. Other forms of THB have not been 
subject	to	sound	empirical	research	(Kleemans,	2011).	
Nevertheless, several estimates exist: THB for sexual 
exploitation was estimated to be worth 151 million euro 
in	 2010	 (Mills,	 Skodbo,	 &	 Blyth,	 2013);	 whereas	 organised 
people smuggling was 102 million euro for the same year 
(Mills,	 Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	 2013).	Dubourg	 and	Prichard	 (2008)	
estimated the market of trafficking for sexual exploitation to 
be worth around 393 million euro, but they used 2004 data. 
According	to	the	first	annual	report	of	the	inter-departmental	
ministerial group on human trafficking, there were at least 
2,600 female adult victims of sexual exploitation in 
England and Wales in 2010, a further 9,600 were considered 
to	be	vulnerable	(HM	Government,	2012).207	Lebov’s	research	
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on sex trade in major Scottish cities shows an increasing 
movement indoors	(from	street	locations	to	saunas,	massage	
parlours and private residences), and the increasing use of 
private flats and houses to operate brothels. 
Whilst the majority are victims of sexual exploitation, some 
are victims of debt bondage and of labour exploitation 
e.g.	 in	 restaurants	 and	 takeaways.	 Most	 are	 of	 Asian	 (in	
particular Chinese) or African origin, brought into the UK with 
fake documentation. Links with other organised and serious 
crimes	 (e.g.	 Chinese	 snakeheads,	 drug	 distribution,	 fraud,	
counterfeiting, money laundering and cigarette smuggling) 
have	also	been	identified	(Lebov,	2010).
The actors involved in THB in the UK are wide-ranging in 
terms of their ethnic origin and nationality, with many OCGs 
formed of people originating from Eastern Europe, former 
Soviet Union and South Asia, in particular Chinese, Russian, 
Lithuanians, Polish, Hungarian, Nigerian, Thai and Roma, 
Middle Eastern, Eastern-European, Pakistani, and Slovakian 
OCGs.208
5.7.2.3. Illicit trafficking in firearms
Although some statistics exist as regards prices for weapons, 
imitation	 firearms,	 ammunitions,	 bullets,	 there	 are	 no 
estimates on the size of the illegal market of firearms in 
UK. The estimated costs	 of	 firearms	 supply	 are	 138	 million	
euro	(Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013,	p.	11).209
The main organised criminal actors involved are Turkish and 
British OCGs	(Martin,	2009;	Rossington,	2009).	There	is	also	
evidence of involvement of legitimate companies: in 2009, 
“the	United	Kingdom	began	an	 investigation	 into	companies	
registered in the UK that were sourcing arms from Ukraine 
for	 states	 in	 Africa	 in	 violation	 of	 British	 controls”	 (UNODC,	
2010a,	 p.	 143).	 In	 one	 case,	 three	 security	 firms	 involved	 in	
both	legal	and	illegal	business	“employed	violence	to	prevent	
the encroachment of competitors and extort licensed 
businesses”;	the	other	goal	was	to	create	and	maintain	violent	
reputations	(Windle,	2013,	p.	382).	
Some evidence suggests that one way to smuggle illicit 
weapons,	firearm	components,	replicas	or	stun	guns	into	the	
UK	is	by	means	of	packages	sent	through	the	mail	(Spapens,	
2007). 
5.7.2.4. Illicit trade in tobacco products
The	size	of	 ITTP	has	been	estimated	by	Transcrime-OCP	at	
between 1,154 and 1,453 million euro of revenues in 2013, 
which is considerably lower than the estimate by the Tobacco 
Manufacturers	 Association	 in	 2010/11210	 (3,596	 million	 euro:	
see Tobacco Manufacturers Association, 2013). According 
to a recent Transcrime study on the illicit tobacco trade in 
the UK, there has been a recent shift in consumer demand 
to cheaper products, especially in the lower income socio-
economic groups, which may have had an impact on the 
illicit tobacco market	(Calderoni	et	al.,	2013a).	
As regards modus operandi, a variety of routes are used 
to smuggle and transport illicit tobacco products to and 
within	 the	UK,	 including	by	air,	 road	 (in	particular	 lorries),	 rail	
and sea and via the postal system. UK ports and airports are 
important entry points.211 Belgium and the Netherlands have 
also	been	identified	as	transit	countries	for	the	importation	of	
illicit	tobacco	into	the	UK	(L’Hoiry,	2013).212 Evidence of illegal 
cigarette factories	in	the	UK	has	also	been	found	(Calderoni	
et al., 2013a). 
As far as the actors are concerned, a number of groups have 
been	 identified,	 including	 British	 (in	 particular	 of	 South-
208.	In	terms	of	locations,	evidence	has	been	identified	in	Scotland	(Aberdeen),	
Northamptonshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, and Leeds. Cases of sexual 
exploitation	have	been	 identified	 in	London,	Oxford,	Cambridgeshire,	Norfolk,	
South	 Wales,	 Northern	 Ireland	 (Belfast),	 Glasgow,	 Falkirk,	 Polmont,	 Stirling,	
Ipswich, Cardiff, Gravesend, Manchester, Leeds, and Sussex.
209.	Original	estimate	was	£160	million,	converted	into	euro	using	the	31/12/2010	
exchange rate.
210.	The	Tobacco	Manufacturers	Association’s	estimate	was	calculated	using	
the	data	on	consumer	spending	on	cigarettes	and	handrolling	tobacco	(15.1	billion	
in total, 85% of which are cigarettes), and then calculating the proportion of non-
duty	paid	consumption	(16%	of	cigarette	and	48%	of	handrolling	tobacco).	This	
calculation gives the value of 3.1 billion GBP, which was then converted into Euro 
(3,596)	using	1.16	as	the	conversion	rate.
211.	Other	studies	support	the	Transcrime	finding	that	cigarettes	are	commonly	
imported	via	the	postal	system	(Silverstone,	2011).
212.	In	L’Hoiry’s	case	study	of	one	cigarette	bootlegger	in	the	UK,	the	individual	
started to import cigarettes himself via air travel from Tenerife, then used coach 
travel,	and	then	recruited	a	network	of	‘runners’	paying	them	a	fixed	fee,	and	later	
on let them sell some of the cigarettes. He then returned to air travel as a safer 
method	of	transport	(L’Hoiry,	2013).
Box 10 - Human trafficking by Polish and Chinese 
OCGs
Three Polish nationals smuggled prostitutes into 
the	 UK	 (South	 Wales).	 They	 arranged	 flights	 and	
accommodation and placed advertisements on 
websites.	 11,500	 GBP	 were	 seized	 along	 with	 a	 diary	
recording payments. The group was earning 3,000 
GBP	a	week	(Birmingham	Mail,	2013).
A Chinese criminal group in Londonderry recruited 
victims to brothels by placing advertisements in 
Chinese in English newspapers. The advertisements 
offered 220 GBP per week for nannying, cleaning and 
babysitting jobs. After the women arrived in Northern 
Ireland, they were coerced to have paid sex, while 
customers were charged 70 GBP for 20 to 30 minutes 
(Londonderry	Sentinel,	2012).
Box 11 - A modern slave trader
V.S.,	 described	 by	 the	 police	 as	 “a	modern	 day	 slave	
trader”,	 and	 his	 accomplices	 smuggled	 Eastern	
European nationals into the UK to work on farms in 
East	Anglia	and	fish	processing	 factories	 in	Scotland.	
They employed 700 workers who received as little 
as 2 GBP an hour. The businesses that employed the 
illegal	 immigrants	 were	 not	 aware	 of	 Solomka’s	 role.	
The smugglers provided their victims with fake IDs 
and shared accommodation for which they charged 
them.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 his	 arrest	 Solomka’s	 earnings	
were	 13,500	 GBP	 a	 week	 (BBC	 News,	 2005;	 Crown	
Prosecution Service, 2005).
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Asian origin), Polish, Iranian, Iraqi, Pakistani, and Chinese 
OCGs,213 although actors are often individuals operating on 
their	own	(Calderoni	et	al.,	2013a).	
In terms of the geographical distribution of illicit tobacco 
trade, the Transcrime report cites research indicating that the 
North-East has the biggest volume of illicit tobacco trading 
in	England	(16%),	followed	by	the	South-West	(11%),	Yorkshire	
and	Humberside	(9%),	the	North-West	and	West	Midlands	(7%	
each),	and	the	South-East	(3%)	(Calderoni	et	al.,	2013a).214
Asian origin	(Asian	Image	Reporter,	2013;	Churchill,	2013),	but	
also Chinese OCGs	 (IP	Crime	Group,	 2009;	HMRC,	 2013a)	
including	Chinese	triads	(Leask,	2009).216
5.7.2.6. Fraud
A large variety of types of fraud has	 been	 identified	 in	
the UK: customs and excise frauds, VAT and missing trader 
(MTIC),	pump and dump frauds, mortgage frauds or insurance 
frauds	(e.g.	cash for crash scams, see the box below).217
Up-to-date	 estimates	 of	 the	 size	 of	 organised	 fraud	 in	 the	
UK	 for	 2012	 are	 17,100	 million	 euro	 (NFA,	 2013)	 and	 10,324	
million	 euro	 in	 2010	 (Mills,	 Skodbo,	 &	 Blyth,	 2013).	 Dubourg	
&	 Prichard’s	 estimate	 for	 2004	 combining	 excise	 frauds	
and	 non-benefit	 frauds	 (missing	 trader,	 plastic,	 cheque,	
telecommunications,	vehicle	leasing),	was	lower	(6,781	million	
euro),218 thus suggesting that there may have been an increase 
in the extent of frauds between 2004 and 2010. On the 
other	hand,	OCP-Transcrime’s	estimate	of	the	percentage	of	
the UK VAT gap attributable to organised MTIC fraud is much 
higher, indicating a range between 2.1 and 3.8 billion euro 
using 2011 data. 
According to the National Fraud Authority, 1,365 OCGs in the 
UK	are	linked	to	some	form	of	fraudulent	activity	(NFA,	2013),	
being either transnational organised crime networks, 
mobile small groups, or individuals who can transplant 
fraudulent	 techniques	wherever	 they	 go;	 others	 still	 commit	
very large one-off frauds without the need for involvement in 
a	criminal	organisation	(Levi,	2008).
The	 identified	 cases	 involve	 a	 plurality	 of	 actors,	 such	 as	
Chinese	 OCGs,	 British	 OCGs	 (also	 operating	 abroad,	 and	
with connections in, for example, USA, Singapore, South Asia, 
Spain), Italian, African and Eastern European criminal groups 
(see	Table	64).
5.7.2.5. Counterfeiting
Owing	 to	 the	 different	methodologies	 adopted	 (see	 Section	
4.5), estimates of counterfeiting in the UK vary widely, 
ranging	from	1,225	million	euro	(in	2005,	Dubourg	&	Prichard,	
2008) to 4,569 million euro	 (in	 2010,	 according	 to	 the	
estimate produced by Transcrime for the purpose of Project 
OCP).215	At	 the	 same	 time,	UNODC	 reports	 that	 “counterfeit	
clothing and footwear consumption in the UK alone is 
estimated	 to	 be	 worth	 more	 than	 2	 billion	 euro”	 (UNODC,	
2010a, p. 181). Medicines are a growing problem, and in 2013 
MHRA netted UK record 12.2 million pound haul of counterfeit 
and	 unlicensed	medicines	 (MHRA	 Press	Office,	 2013).	 Anti-
cancer drugs stolen in Italy and then adulterated have been 
resold, through fake wholesalers, to UK pharmacies and 
hospitals	(Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014).
The actors involved are mostly British OCGs (CPS,	 2006;	
North-Wales	 Daily	 Post,	 2007;	 Crime	 and	 Justice,	 2013;	
HMRC,	 2013a;	 South-Wales	 Echo,	 2013),	 often	 of	 South-
Box 13 - A Cash for crash scam in Durham
A crime family organised a car insurance scam by 
staging car accidents and making false insurance 
claims. The main organiser P.W. was the director of 
PJ Auto Recovery limited, while his associate M.S. 
owned MJS Claims limited, situated next door. Both 
companies were acting as one enterprise, and were set 
up with the purpose of obtaining money through false 
insurance	claims.	The	 total	 profit	 from	 the	 scam	was	
estimated	to	be	around	3	million	GB	pounds	(Durham	
Constabulary,	2013;	Stewart,	2013).
213. In particular Chinese OCGs in London are traditionally involved in the 
smuggling of cigarettes from China, particularly from the province of Fujian.
214.	 Other	 locations	 identified	 in	 this	 report	 include	 Wales,	 Gloucester,	
Birmingham, Belfast, Cambridge, Manchester, West Suffolk, Reading, Swindon, 
Bath, Bristol, Chippenham, Taunton, Westbury and Trym, Rochdale, Essex, 
Liverpool,	Suffolk,	London,	Edinburgh,	West	Midlands,	Northern	Ireland	(see,	for	
example,	Birmingham	Mail,	2012;	Churchill,	2013;	South	Wales	Echo,	2013,	HM	
Revenues	&	Customs,	2013b;	HM	Revenues	& Customs, 2013d).
215.	This	estimates	the	market	size	of	the	piracy,	counterfeiting	and	bootlegging	
sector in the UK and is based on industry estimates of the scale of counterfeiting 
and	 ‘street	 values’	 of	 counterfeit	 goods.	 Their	 estimate	 includes	 such	 goods	
as	games	software,	films,	music,	business	software,	perfumes	and	cosmetics,	
sportswear, clothing and clothing accessories, toys and games, and counterfeit 
medicine. A different approach is applied to each sector, and it is noted that 
industry estimates are problematic because they are likely to overstate the 
problem.	Seizures	of	goods	(such	as,	for	example,	games	software)	are	scaled	up	
to	account	for	the	goods	that	have	not	been	seized,	and	assumptions	are	made	
about the proportion attributable to organised crime. The second estimate for 
2010	is	for	‘organised	intellectual	property	crime	and	counterfeiting’	and	it	only	
includes	seizures	of	physical	goods.	 It	 is	based	on	seizure	data	and	 therefore	
underestimates the overall scale of the market. It does not estimate cybercrime 
involvement,	 and	 the	 authors	 admit	 that	 their	 calculation	 ‘will	 underestimate	
scale’	(Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013).	Transcrime	instead	estimates	the	potential	
demand of counterfeit products using the methodology explained in Section 4.5 
and the Methodological Annex).
216. Counterfeit DVDs and cigarettes are among the businesses of Chinese 
OCGs	in	London	(Silverstone,	2011).	They	also	produce	and	supply	counterfeit	
credit	and	debit	cards	(Wang,	2013).	The	locations	of	counterfeiting	cases	are:	
South Wales, Nottingham, Glasgow, Bristol, Liverpool, Plymouth and Birmingham 
(counterfeit	 credit	 cards),	 Birmingham,	 London,	 Essex	 (counterfeit	 currency),	
Manchester,	Felixstowe,	York	(counterfeit	clothing),	Wales,	Glasgow,	Manchester,	
Southampton	(clothing	and	footwear),	London,	Gloucester,	Birmingham,	Cardiff,	
Dudley, Scotland, Reading, Swindon, Bath, Bristol, Chippenham, Taunton, 
Westbury	 and	 Trym,	 West	 Wales	 and	 The	 Valleys	 (counterfeit	 cigarettes),	
Scotland	(counterfeit	alcohol),	Scotland,	Felixstowe	(fake	medicines),	Heathrow,	
Southampton,	 South	 Yorkshire,	 Manchester	 (bags,	 cosmetics	 and	 watches,	
designer	goods),	Coventry,	Manchester	(counterfeit	DVDs).
217. Details of the case were received from the Durham police.
218. Calculated by the authors, and summing respectively 4,089 million euro 
from	excise	frauds	and	2,679	million	euro	of	non-benefit	frauds.
Box 12 - Cigarette smuggling between Ireland and 
UK
A local group from Northern Ireland attempted to 
smuggle 12.5 million non-duty paid cigarettes into the 
UK. They used false consignment information, a remote 
lock-up and 16 mobile phones to avoid detection. A van 
was hired to transport the cigarettes. The contents 
of	 the	 trailer	 were	 described	 as	 ‘foodstuffs’	 (HMRC,	
2013a)
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5.7.2.7. Organised property crime
The Home Office study provides estimates for several types 
of organised property crime:	organised	vehicle	crime	(383	
million	euro),	plant	 theft	 (116	million	euro),	 road	 freight	crime	
(60	million	euro),	distraction	burglary	(41	million	euro)	and	cash	
and	valuables	in	transit	(14	million	euro)	(Mills,	Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	
2013).
Organised metal theft	 is	estimated	at	28	million	euro	(Mills,	
Skodbo,	 &	 Blyth,	 2013).	 Prices	 of	metals	may	 be	 one	 of	 the	
factors affecting the volume of metal thefts. Sidebottom, 
Ashby and Johnson, for example, found that changes in the 
price of copper are positively associated with variations in 
the	volume	of	 ‘live’	copper	cable	theft	(Sidebottom,	Ashby,	&	
Johnson, 2014).
Actors involved in organised burglary include British groups 
(Birmingham	Post,	2008;	Masker,	2013;	Rogers,	2013;	Stewart,	
2013;	 Wakefield	 Express,	 2013),	 Romanian OCGs	 (The	
Sentinel, 2013) and Chinese OCGs	(Wang,	2013).
5.7.2.8. Other illicit markets
Illicit waste trafficking
Some sources suggest that waste crime, including illegal 
dumping, is a significant threat. The Environment Services 
Association	 Education	 Trust	 (ESAET)	 estimated	 the	 impact	
on	the	UK	economy	to	be	8.7	million	GBP	(Taylor	et	al.,	2014),	
but there are no estimates of the revenues produced by OCGs.
OCGs are attracted to illicit waste trafficking because of 
the high profits and low risks, ineffective regulation 
and lenient sentencing. Many of them are involved in 
other crimes: for example, criminal groups trafficking waste 
electrical	and	electronic	equipment	(WEEE)	are	also	involved	
in	 theft,	human	 trafficking,	 fraud,	drugs,	firearms	and	money	
laundering. According to Taylor, Jones, Ettlinger, and Hudson, 
“Illegal	 export	 therefore	 provides	 the	 clearest	 evidence	 of	
waste	 crime’s	 increasing	 role	 as	 part	 of	 a	 criminal	 gang’s	
portfolio	of	illegal	activity”	(Taylor	et	al.,	2014,	p.	20).
Fuel laundering
Evidence	of	criminal	groups	 (mainly	 Irish	and	Northern	 Irish)	
involved in fuel laundering has been found in Northern 
Ireland	(see	also	Section	5.3.2.9).	
Wildlife and minerals trafficking
Currently, no estimate of scale is possible. According to Mills, 
Skodbo	and	Blyth,	organised	wildlife	crime	“involves	the	illegal	
trade in endangered species and damage to protected UK 
species	 and	 habitats”	 (Mills,	 Skodbo,	 &	 Blyth,	 2013,	 p.	 44).	
However,	it	is	reported	to	be	a	highly	profitable	crime,	and	the	
National	 Wildlife	 Crime	 Unit	 (NWCU)	 has	 identified	 several 
UK-based OCGs involved in this type of crime	 (Mills,	
Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013).
Usury and Extortion racketeering
No estimates of revenues from usury produced by OCGs 
are currently available. Among actors, there are Turkish OCGs 
(Cohen,	2009),	British	OCGs	(Manchester	Evening	News,	2011,	
2013;	Slater,	 2013)	 and	OCGs	of	Sri	 Lankan	origin	 (Newham	
Recorder, 2011). 
Similarly, no estimates of the scale of extortion are available. 
As far as actors are concerned, some evidence points to 
Chinese triads and Russian OCGs. Chinese groups are also 
involved in illegal gambling	 activities	 (using	VLT	 and	 other	
betting machines to launder cash).
5.7.3. Concluding remarks
Relevance of illicit markets in the country for the OCGs 
economy
Research indicates that the scale of organised illicit 
economies	 in	 the	 UK	 is	 significant;	 illicit drug trafficking, 
frauds, ITTP and counterfeiting are the biggest markets. 
While	some	markets	appear	to	be	shrinking	(e.g.	heroin and 
cannabis),219 available evidence suggests that some others 
such as organised frauds, ITTP and new markets such as 
waste and recycling and food fraud may be expanding.220
These shifts in the OCG economy suggest that there has been 
a tendency to move to less risky, but very lucrative market 
niches, where detection of OCG activities is more difficult. 
Fraud are the most lucrative market for the OCGs operating 
in the UK. They include VAT and excise fraud, investment 
fraud, mortgage fraud, cash for crash fraud, tax credit 
and child benefit fraud, pension fraud and other types of 
OCG group Role
British OCGs
Customs and excise fraud, 
missing trader and VAT fraud, 
share	sale/’pump	and	dump’	
fraud,	mortgage	fraud,	‘cash	for	
crash’	scam
Chinese OCGs
Customs and excise and VAT 
fraud
Nigerian OCGs 419	‘advance	fee’	fraud
Russian/Georgian	
OCGs
Payment card fraud
Lithuanian OCGs Payment card fraud
Romanian OCGs Payment card fraud
Other Eastern European 
OCGs
Identity and VAT fraud, Tax 
credit	and	child	benefit	fraud
Table 64 - OCGs involved in fraud schemes in the United 
Kingdom
Source: Cheston, 2009; The Evening Standard, 2009; Manchester Evening 
News, 2011; Silverstone, 2011; HMRC, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d; Serious Fraud Office, 
2011, 2013; Findlay, 2013; the Northern Echo, 2013; McCarthy & Ivery, 2013; Hunter, 
2010; Western Daily Press, 2013; BBC News, 2013b; Collins, 2013; York Press, 2013; 
Wang, 2013; Hollingsworth, 2014.
219. Although such comparisons should be treated with caution because of the 
different methods used to produce different estimates.
220. Again this is a tentative conclusion based on the available data. The two 
fraud estimates cited in this report are based on different methodologies and 
may not be fully comparable, but they represent the best available estimates.
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fraud.	There	are	other	areas	of	significant	OCG	involvement,	
such as, for example, cybercrime221 which is a growing concern 
in the UK but has not been possible to analyse due to lack of 
data	and	the	high	probability	of	double	counting	(see	also	Mills,	
Skodbo,	&	Blyth,	2013,	p.	15).
OCGs and other criminal actors involved
A wide range of actors are involved, including British OCGs, 
groups with international links and ethnicity-based groups 
occupying certain market niches: Vietnamese in cannabis 
cultivation, Chinese in counterfeiting and ITTP, Turkish 
OCGs in drugs and loan sharking, Nigerians in THB and fraud 
and Eastern European OCGs in human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation. There is also some evidence of the presence of 
Italian mafias, although it does not suggest that this presence 
is	very	significant.	Generally,	there	is	little	evidence	of	narrow	
specialisation	of	particular	OCGs	on	specific	markets;	rather,	
most groups operate as opportunistic, adaptable and 
multi-commodity criminal networks.
221.	The	European	Commission	has	defined	cybercrime	as	consisting	of	three	
categories.	The	first	covers	traditional	forms	of	crime	such	as	fraud	or	forgery,	
although	 in	 a	 cybercrime	 context	 it	 relates	 specifically	 to	 crimes	 committed	
over	electronic	communication	networks	and	 information	systems	 (hereafter:	
electronic networks). The second concerns the publication of illegal content on 
electronic	media	(i.e.	child	sexual	abuse	material	or	incitement	to	racial	hatred).	
The third includes crimes unique to electronic networks, i.e. attacks against 
information	 systems,	 denial	 of	 service	 and	 hacking.	 (European	 Commission,	
2007, p. 2). While some of the frauds recorded in the database are cyber frauds 
in	 the	 first	 sense	 (for	 example,	 payment	 card	 frauds	 –	 devices	 to	 steal	 card	
information or use of cloned cards), cybercrimes in the second and third sense 
were outside the scope of this study.
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This Section aims to estimate the proportion of illicit 
proceeds, generated by illicit markets, available for 
investment in the legal economy. In particular, it analyses 
this proportion with respect to the revenues produced by the 
heroin market in the 7 OCP countries.
been considered to be the best proxy for determining the 
amount of money available to criminal organisations. 
Trying	to	fill	the	gap	between	the	amount	of	money	originated	
from	 illicit	 markets	 (Part	 1)	 and	 the	 investments	 made	 by	
criminal	 organisation	 in	 the	 legal	 economy	 (Part	 2),	 this	
Section estimates the net profits	originating	from	a	specific	
illicit market, heroin, in the 7 OCP countries. Given the novelty 
and exploratory nature of this approach, the Section focuses 
on the heroin market alone. Among the illicit markets analysed 
in this section, the heroin market is the one for which there is 
the most comprehensive data-set, as well as more detailed 
knowledge	about	the	market’s	structure.	
It	 has	 to	 be	 stressed	 also	 that	 the	 figures	 estimated	 in	 this	
Section do not indicate the actual amount of money reinvested 
in the legal economy. Instead they indicate the potential 
amount of money, originating from the trafficking of heroin, 
which may be invested in legal sectors. It is necessary to 
acknowledge,	 in	 fact,	 that	 traffickers	 may	 use	 the	 profits	
generated from heroin for several purposes and not only for 
spending in the legal economy: for example for buying further 
heroin shipments, investing in other illegal activities	 (e.g.	
trafficking	in	tobacco	products),	financing	group operational 
expenses. 
At the moment, there are no means to distinguish among 
these different options and consequently to evaluate 
the actual share of money invested in the legal economy. 
Therefore, the estimates provided in the following Section 
report the total amount of money that heroin suppliers may 
potentially invest in the legal economy in the awareness that 
they may use this money for other purposes as well.
As often mentioned, the actors involved in the supply 
of heroin are of different kinds. The supply of heroin 
may	 involve	 highly	 organised	 criminal	 groups	 (such	 as	 the	
mafias),	 ephemeral	 groups	 (formed	 according	 to	 business	
opportunities and dissolving once the shipment has been 
delivered), individual entrepreneurs acting individually or in 
collaboration with other groups, etc. For the above-mentioned 
reasons,	 it	 will	 be	 generally	 used	 the	 term	 ‘actor’	 to	 refer	 to	
any	subject	(dealers,	traffickers,	brokers,	etc.)	 involved	in	the	
supply of heroin.
6. From the generation 
of illicit proceeds to 
investments in the legal 
economy                                                      
Luca Giommoni (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
Introduction
The previous sections presented the estimates of the 
revenues for several illicit markets. As often mentioned, these 
values represent the total income generated from the sale 
of	 illicit	 goods/services.	 As	 such,	 they	 should	 be	 used	 only	
as proxies for the total possible income generated by OCGs. 
Firstly,	 several	 actors	 beside	 OCGs	 (such	 as	 independent	
entrepreneurs) may participate in these markets. Secondly, 
and more importantly, the estimates presented in the previous 
section are the gross revenues	generated	from	the	final	sale	
of illicit goods or services. 
In order to estimate the amount of money that may be 
available to OCGs for reinvestment in the legal economy, it 
is necessary to subtract the costs that suppliers incur in 
providing	these	goods/services.	The	provision	of	illicit	goods,	
like illicit drugs, from producer to consumer countries entails 
several costs, such as those necessary to buy or produce 
goods, transport costs, group operational expenses 
and living expenses.	 By	 definition,	 costs	 are	 ‘a	 negative	
component’	 in	 the	 accounting	 of	 what	 suppliers	 earn	 from	
supplying illicit goods. Indeed, what they spend in the provision 
of illicit goods cannot be registered as earnings. Hence, the net 
profits	earned	from	supplying	illicit	goods,	once	the	costs	have	
been subtracted, are much less than the estimates reported 
for illicit markets.
The previous sections have already shown the shortage of 
information with which to estimate the value of illicit markets. 
Even scarcer, and almost non-existent, are data with 
which to estimate costs	and	hence	profits	for	illicit	markets.	
Accordingly, estimates of the revenues for illicit markets have 
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The following Section describes the model applied and reports 
the	estimates	of	the	profits	originating	from	the	heroin	market,	
selected because the greater availability of data. However, 
in the future it will be possible to improve the model and 
apply it to several other illicit markets depending on the 
availability of data.
6.1. Estimating the proceeds 
from the heroin market available 
for investment in the legitimate 
economy
Estimating	 the	net	profits	originating	 from	the	heroin	market	
starts with estimation of the revenues reported in Section 
4.1. From the gross income received from the sales of heroin 
it	 is	 necessary	 to	 subtract	 the	 costs	 of	 supplying	 it	 at	 final	
consumption.	 This	 model	 directly	 quantifies	 two	 types	 of	
costs.	 The	 first	 are	 raw material costs, i.e. the amount of 
money necessary to buy heroin at each stage of the supply 
chain. The second are the expenditure on goods or services 
that actors supplying heroin make for the direct satisfaction 
of individual needs.222	 Hence,	 net	 profits	 (NP)	 are	 equal	
to	 revenues	 (R)	 minus	 raw	 material	 costs	 (RC)	 and	 living	
expenses	(E):
Subtracting only raw material costs from revenues it is 
possible to estimate the so-called ‘gross profits’	(GP).	
Beside raw material costs and living expenses there are other 
costs that heroin suppliers may incur and that are not directly 
estimated here. These are, for instance, costs of bribery, 
guard service, etc. These components are implicitly taken 
into account through the price mark-up but cannot be clearly 
identified.	Since	suppliers	are	in	the	business	to	make	profits,	
all the costs that they incur are charged to their buyers. The 
prices for bribery or guard service are implicitly included in the 
calculation process with the marginal value of the transaction 
between buyers and dealers. 
In	 order	 to	 estimate	 the	 net	 profits	 originating	 from	 the	
heroin market, it is necessary to reconstruct some specific 
features of the heroin supply chain in Europe. According 
to	 the	 literature	 (Matrix	 Knowledge	 Group,	 2007;	 Wilson	 &	
Stevens,	2008;	Reuter	et	al.,	2009;	UNODC	2011a),	the	heroin	
market can be structured into four layers: three pertaining 
to	the	supply	(respectively,	from	the	bottom	to	the	top)	retail	
(RT),	 middle	 market	 (MM)	 and	 wholesale	 (WS),	 plus	 a	 final	
level	 representing	 heroin	 users:	 consumption	 (CS).	 This	
scheme	does	not	mean	perfect	adherence	 to	 the	 reality	 (i.e.	
in	 some	 countries	 these	 layers	 can	 be	 integrated;	 in	 some	
others further layers may exist) but it approximates the supply 
chain	with	sufficient	confidence,	and	 indicates	the	economic	
transactions along it.
For each of the levels described above, it is possible to 
estimate revenues, raw material costs, living expenses and 
gross	 profits.	 In	 turn,	 the	 total net profit from the heroin 
market equals revenues minus raw material costs and living 
expenses for each level of the supply chain.223
As Section 4.1 outlines, estimation of the illicit drugs market 
applies	a	 ‘bottom-up’	approach	by	estimating	revenues	from	
consumption. Similarly, raw material costs, living expenses 
and number of actors involved in the supply of heroin are 
estimated	 starting	 from	 the	 ‘bottom’	 of	 the	 market,	 i.e.	 the	
consumption level.
Table 65 reports the estimates of the net profits generated 
from the supply of heroin according to the three levels of 
the	 chain	 (for	more	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 the	methodology	
employed see the Methodological Annex). The estimate does 
not	 report	 a	 ‘best’	 value,	 as	 presented	 for	 the	 revenues,	 but	
only the lower and upper bounds. 
On subtracting raw costs and living expenses, the net profits 
generated by heroin trafficking in the 7 OCP countries 
are between 1,158.6 and 3,160.7 million euro. As for 
revenues, Italy and the United Kingdom have the highest 
profits	from	the	sales	of	heroin,	quantified	between	257.1	and	
709.6 million euro for Italy and between 179.7 and 876.0 million 
euro for the UK. Despite some important differences between 
minimum and maximum, it seems that wholesalers are 
those that earn the highest profits from supplying heroin. 
This is somehow consistent with previous literature and in line 
with the functioning of other legal markets. The quantity of 
profits	that	arise	from	the	retail	selling	of	heroin	varies	widely,	
with the lower bound estimated at 78.1 and the maximum at 
1,276.7 million euro. This large difference between minimum 
and maximum is due to negative values reported for the 
minimum	bound	in	some	countries	(Italy,	Netherlands	and	UK).	
The negative values do not refer to the possibility that heroin 
dealing at retail may generate an economic loss, but that 
retail dealers cannot afford many of the living expenses 
accounted in the calculation relying solely on the income 
generated	by	drug	trafficking	(see	the	Methodological	Annex).	
This	 confirms	 the	 findings	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 drug retail 
dealers (e.g. ‘pushers’) may earn little from drug selling 
(Reuter,	MacCoun,	&	Murphy,	1990;	Levitt	&	Venkatesh,	1998;	
Caulkins,	Burnett,	&	Leslie,	2009).	To	use	Levitt	and	Dubner’s	
apt	 expression,	 this	 explains	 “why	drug	dealers	 still	 live	with	
their	moms”	(Levitt	&	Dubner,	2009).	
Figure 22 – Heroin market structure
Source: Transcrime elaboration
222. Living expenses are collected from the Eurostat and include 
accommodation, laundry, food, travel, clothing, personal expenses, sport and 
entertainement.
223. The only exception is the consumption level, for which only revenues are 
estimated.	 Logically,	 there	 are	 no	costs	 nor	profits	 for	 the	 consumption	 level,	
which comprises only those who consume heroin. Indeed, the consumption level 
is included solely as a starting point for the calculation.
Wholesale
Middle market
Retail
Consumption
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Table	 66	 reports	 revenues,	 gross	 and	 net	 profits,	 in	millions	
of euro, as well as the gross and net profit margins of the 
heroin market for the seven OCP countries. The total revenues 
for the heroin market are those reported in Section 4.1, i.e. the 
total expenditure by user on heroin, which, in turn, is equal to 
the total revenues at retail level. In fact, the quantity of money 
spent by users is equal to the quantity of money earned by 
retail dealers. Likewise, the total revenues for each level of 
the supply chain correspond to the raw costs borne by those 
at the following level of the supply chain. Hence, revenues at 
middle market are equal to raw material costs at retail, and 
revenues at wholesale correspond to costs at middle market.
As said, gross profits are calculated by subtracting raw 
costs but not living expenses. Accordingly, their value is 
lower	than	revenues	but	higher	than	net	profits	and	quantified	
at between 2,933.8 and 3,160.7 million euro. Gross margins, 
calculated	 as	 the	 ratio	 between	 gross	 profits	 and	 total	
revenues, are between 64% and 65%. As will be seen, despite 
the wide differences between the lower and upper bounds 
for	 revenues	 and	 profits,	 there	 are	 almost	 no	 differences	
between	minimum	and	maximum	profit	margins.	This	 is	due	
to the calculation procedure used to estimate revenues, costs, 
and	 then	 profits.	 Indeed,	 the	 difference	 between	 minimum	
and maximum is given by the quantity of heroin consumed. 
In turn, also the quantity of the drug sold and purchased at 
each level of the supply chain depends on the quantity of 
heroin consumed. However, the margin rate is calculated by 
comparing	minimum	gross	profits	with	minimum	revenues	and	
maximum	gross	profits	with	maximum	revenues.224 
To give an idea of the high margins that heroin suppliers may 
have, it is possible to compare the gross margin rate with a 
similar measure for legal markets. For instance the gross 
operating rate225 for the transportation and storage sector, 
which can be roughly compared with the concept of gross 
profits	adopted	here,	is	quantified	by	Eurostat	at	13.6%;	about	
50 percentage points less than the heroin market.
Inspection	 of	 gross	 profits	 across	 the	 different	 levels	 of	 the	
supply chain shows that gross margin profits are higher 
at retail than at the middle-market and wholesale level. 
This reflects the high increase that illicit drugs have at retail 
– to compensate for the greater risk of violence and 
incarceration – but it does not indicate that retail dealers are 
richer than middle-market and wholesale dealers. Although 
the quantity of heroin at retail is equal to that trafficked at the 
middle-market and wholesale levels, the actors dealing with 
it are much more numerous. Indeed, the pro-capita gross 
profits	 for	each	actor	are	much	higher	at	 the	middle-market	
and wholesale levels than at retail. 
The	 last	 row	of	Table	66,	 reporting	net	profits,	confirms	this.	
The	net	margin,	calculated	as	net	profits	on	revenues,	varies	
between 25% and 42%. However, margins decrease from 
the top (wholesale) towards the bottom (retail) of the 
chain. This is due to the higher number of actors dealing 
with heroin at retail. The low value of the net margin at retail 
indicates that, although heroin prices have a higher mark-up 
at retail, there are numerous actors selling heroin at this level 
of the supply chain. Once the living expenses of each actor 
have	been	subtracted,	what	remains	as	net	profits	at	retail	is	a	
lower fraction of the total revenues. By contrast, much higher 
are	 the	 net	 profits	 for	middle-market	 and	 wholesale	 actors,	
indicating that living expenses have a modest impact on the 
total revenues.
Countries
Retail Middle Market Wholesale Total
min max min max min max min max
Finland 27.0 52.9 11.1 18.9 9.2 15.4 47.3 87.1
France 32.5 307.5 105.3 187.8 65.0 110.9 202.8 606.2
Ireland 284.2 505.0 97.4 163.6 19.8 33.3 401.4 701.9
Italy -6. 1 250.2 91.7 168.6 171.6 290.7 257.1 709.6
Netherlands -3.9 8.6 2.8 6.6 3.9 7.7 2.9 22.8
Spain 16.8 67.9 17.9 33.2 32.8 56.1 67.4 157.2
United Kingdom -272. 4 84.7 115.4 222.6 336.6 568.7 179.7 876.0
Total OCP Countries 78.1 1,276.7 441.7 801.3 638.8 1082.8 1,158.6 3,160.7
Table 65 – Net profits generated from the supply of heroin for the seven OCP countries. Millions of euro
Source: Transcrime elaboration
224.	The	tiny	difference	between	minimum	and	maximum	is	given	by	seizures,	
which	are	constant	 for	both	minimum	and	maximum	(see	 the	Methodological	
Annex).
225.	The	Eurostat	defines	the	gross	operating	rate	as	the	surplus	generated	by	
operating activities after the labour factor input has been recompensed.
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Retail Middle Market Wholesale Total
min max min max min max min max
Revenues 4,557.0 7,595.0 2,783.6 4,623.0 2,269.3 3,749.1 4,557.0 7,595.0
Gross	profits 1,773.4 2,972.0 514.3 873.9 646.1 1,090.0 2,933.8 4,935.9
Net	Profits 78.1 1,276.7 441.7 801.3 638.8 1,082.8 1,158.6 3,160.7
Gross	margin	(%) 39% 39% 18% 19% 28% 29% 64% 65%
Net	margin	(%) 2% 17% 16% 17% 28% 29% 25% 42%
Table 65 – Net profits generated from the supply of heroin for the seven OCP countries. Millions of euro
Source: Transcrime elaboration
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WHERE DO 
PROCEEDS GO? 
ORGANISED CRIME 
INVESTMENTS IN 
THE EUROPEAN 
LEGITIMATE 
ECONOMY
Part 2.                      
After analysing and quantifying, in Part 1, the illicit proceeds generated by criminal groups in illicit markets in 
Europe, Part 2 explores where and how these proceeds are then invested in the legitimate economy, and in 
particular:
•		 In	what	geographic areas;
•		 In	what	types of assets;
•		 In	what	business sectors;
•		 With	what	differences	across	different criminal actors;
•		 Because	of	what	drivers and purposes.
Part	2	has	a	structure	similar	to	that	of	Part	1	(illicit	markets):	
•		 First,	it	furnishes	an	analysis	of	organised	crime	investments	at	European	aggregate	level	(Chapter 7);
•		 Then	(Chapter 8) it focuses on the 7 OCP countries (Finland,	France,	Ireland,	Italy,	the	Netherlands,	Spain,	
and	the	United	Kingdom);	
•		 Finally,	Chapter 9 explores the impact on, and the costs of organised crime investments for, the European 
legitimate economy.
The related methodological issues are discussed in Chapter 2 and in the Methodological Annex.
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Where do organised crime groups invest the proceeds 
generated by illicit markets in Europe? In what countries and 
regions? In what assets and business sectors? And why? This 
chapter,	summarizing	the	findings	of	the	 in-depth	analysis	at	
country level presented in Chapter 8, provides:
•		 An	 analysis	 of	 the	 geography of organised crime 
investments	in	Europe	(Section	7.1);
•		 An	analysis	of	the	types of assets with the largest evidence 
of	criminal	investments	(Section	7.2);
•		 An	 analysis	 of	 the	 business sectors with the largest 
evidence	of	criminal	investments	(Section	7.4);
countries, primarily to differences in the availability of data 
and information.
It is more interesting to consider the distribution of the 
evidence on criminal investments across European regions. 
Figure 24 below expresses the weights of NUTS 2 areas as a 
percentage of each country total. Some areas emerge with a 
higher	degree	of	infiltration.	These	include,	among	others:
•		 Southern	Italy,	Lazio	and	north-western	Italy	(in	particular	
Lombardy);
•		 PACA	(Provence-Alpes-Côte	d’Azur),	in	France;
•		 Andalusia	and	the	Madrid	area,	in	Spain;
•		 South-Western	Scotland	and	the	area	of	London,	in	the	UK;
•		 The	Amsterdam	and	Rotterdam	areas,	in	the	Netherlands;
•		 And,	 in	 non-OCP countries, regions such as the Berlin 
area, the Düsseldorf-Köln area, the Stockholm area, 
Bucharest and the Romanian border with Moldavia.229 
226. To obtain an updated and non-biased picture of the phenomenon in the 
whole Europe, it would be necessary to extend the scope of this exercise to all 
the other EU MS and other European countries not covered by this project.
227. In order highlight that the focus of the data collection and analysis is on the 
seven OCP countries, OCP and non-OCP EU MS are marked with two different 
colours,	 respectively	blue	and	grey.	Classes	are	 identified	using	Jenks	natural	
breaks	optimization.
7. Organised crime 
investments in Europe                         
Michele Riccardi, Cristina Soriani and Priscilla Standridge (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
7.1. Geography of organised crime investments                                                                                                                             
•		 An	illustration	of	the	differences	among	the main criminal 
actors in	terms	of	investment	strategy	(Section	7.5);
•		 Some	 concluding	 remarks	 on	 the	 drivers and factors 
which may explain organised crime investments in the 
legitimate	economy	(Section	7.5).
All these analyses are based on the evidence of criminal 
investments	 as	 defined	 in	 section	 2.1	 and	 collected	 in	 the	
DOCI according to the methodology described in section 2.2.
Although the focus is on the 7 OCP countries, the analysis 
provided in this chapter covers, where possible, Europe as a 
whole. In this sense, it furnishes a first exploratory picture of 
this phenomenon at European aggregate level.
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is not possible to rank 
European countries in terms of the amount of cases of 
organised crime investments, because data collection has 
been	systematic	only	in	the	7	OCP	countries	(which	represent	
more than 70% of the references gathered, see 2.2.2).226
However, despite this bias, it is important to note that 
evidence has been collected in almost all EU MS	 (24	out	
of	 28)	 and	 in	most	 neighbouring	 countries	 (e.g.	 Switzerland,	
Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Albania, etc.).
Figure 23 shows the distribution of the references across 
OCP and non-OCP European countries.227	 Among	 the	 first	
group, Italy	 gathers	most	of	collected	evidence	 (about	30%	
of the whole dataset), followed by the Netherlands	 (about	
17%), Spain	(about	12%)	and	the	UK (about	9%),	and	then,	to	
a lesser extent, France, Finland and Ireland. But again, given 
the bias in the data collection, this ranking may be attributed, 
rather	than	to	the	different	levels	of	criminal	infiltration	across	
229. Since the collection of cases was systematic only in the 7 OCP countries, 
the evidence collected on other EU MS should be interpreted cautiously and 
only	as	a	preliminary	’snapshot’	of	the	situation.
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Table 67	reports,	for	the	seven	OCP	countries,	the	first	three	
NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 regions in terms of number of references 
from the DOCI. 
What are the characteristics of these areas? Although 
more in-depth analysis will be provided in Chapter 8 for each 
OCP country, the regions collecting most evidence are:
•		 Areas	with	a	historical or well-rooted strong presence 
of OCGs,	such	as	southern	Italy	(see	Section	8.4),	southern	
France	(see	8.1)	or	Andalusia	(see	8.6);
•		 Border regions	 (e.g.	 Andalusia,	 Lombardy,	 Franche-
Comté and Lorraine, Bucureşti – Ilfov etc.) or areas with 
important ports	 (e.g.	 Noord-Holland	 and	 Zuid-Holland,	
Côte	d’Azur/Marseille,	etc.)	which	may	play	a	crucial	role	in	
several	kinds	of	illicit	trafficking	(see	Part	1);
•		 Large urban	areas	(e.g.	Madrid,	Paris,	London,	Amsterdam,	
Berlin,	etc.);
•		 Tourist or coastal	areas	(e.g.	Côte	d’Azur,	Murcia,	Malaga	
or European capitals).
Although the analysis should be more empirically grounded, 
it already suggests that organised crime investments may be 
more frequent in areas where the activity of criminal groups 
in illicit markets and trades is greater (see	Part	 1),	where	
their control of the territory is stronger, or where business 
opportunities (such	as	a	profitable	real	estate	market)	may	
arise.231
Figure 23 - European countries with evidence of organised crime investments228
Legend
OCP Countries
Low 
Medium-Low
Medium-High
High
Non-OCP Countries
Low
Medium-Low
Medium-High
High
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
231. The relation with the economic environment is unclear, because some of 
the	 highlighted	 regions	 are	 among	 the	 poorest	 in	 Europe	 (e.g.	 Southern	 Italy	
and	some	Andalusian	provinces)	while	others	are	among	the	richest	(e.g.	Côte	
d'Azur,	Lombardy).	At	the	same	time,	by	focusing	on	the	7	OCP	countries,	this	
analysis may miss important issues, such as the role played by Eastern and 
South-Eastern Europe in terms of attracting criminal investments.228.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
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Figure 24 - European regions (NUTS 2) with evidence of organised crime investments - Percentages of the country total230
Legend
OCP Countries
Low 
Medium-Low
Medium-High
High
Non-OCP Countries
Low
Medium-Low
Medium-High
High
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI 
Country NUTS 2 NUTS 3
Finland Indications of NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 not available
France
Provence-Alpes-Côte	d'Azur;	Franche-Comté;	Île-
de-France
Doubs;	Alpes-Maritimes;	Paris
Ireland Southern	and	Eastern;	Border,	Midland	and	Western Dublin;	South-East;	West
Italy Lombardy;	Sicily;	Calabria Milano;	Roma;	Reggio	Calabria	Palermo
Netherlands Noord-Holland;	Zuid-Holland
Groot-Amsterdam;	Groot-Rijnmond;	Agglomeratie	
Haarlem
Spain Andalusia;	Community	of	Madrid;	Catalonia Madrid;	Malaga;	Murcia
United Kingdom
South	Western	Scotland;	Inner	London;	North	
Eastern Scotland
Glasgow	City;	Inner	London	-	West;	Aberdeen	City	
and Aberdeenshire
Table 67 - First three NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 areas in terms of number of references from the DOCI (OCP countries)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI 
230.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.	Although	references	to	OCGs	are	available	in	most	countries,	in	some	cases	they	do	not	give	indications	
of	 the	relevant	NUTS	2	or	 the	number	of	 references	with	NUTS	2	 indication	 is	 too	 low	to	be	meaningful	and	representative.	Therefore,	 for	some	countries	 (Austria,	
Bulgaria,	Cyprus,	Czech	Republic,	Denmark,	Estonia,	Greece,	Croatia,	Hungary,	Ireland,	Lithuania,	Luxembourg,	Latvia,	Malta,	Portugal,	Slovakia),	the	national	value	is	
reported with the same classes as adopted in Figure 23.
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The transnational dimension of organised crime 
investments
It seems that, as with illicit markets, when organised crime 
groups	 infiltrate	 the	 legitimate	 economy,	 they	 move	 across	
borders	in	pursuit	of	investment	opportunities	and	profit.	It	is	
therefore crucial to understand the international dimension 
of criminal investments that has emerged from study of the 7 
OCP countries.
According to the collected evidence, European countries may 
act both:
•		 As	origins of outward criminal investments: the OCGs 
may invest the illicit proceeds generated in one country 
in others, often their country of origin. For example, there 
is evidence that North African OCGs and groups from 
quartiers sensibles active in the illicit drug trade in France 
have laundered their proceeds in the real estate sector in 
Morocco	(see	Section	8.3).	Similarly, Turkish or Colombian 
OCGs active in the Netherlands, Germany or the UK have 
transferred the proceeds from heroin or cocaine trafficking 
back	 to	 their	 home	 countries	 (see	 7	 and	 8.7).	 Finally,	
evidence can be found of Chinese OCGs moving the 
revenues from sexual exploitation and forced labour from 
Italy	to	China	(see	8.4);
•		 As	 recipients of inward criminal investments: 
European regions can attract investments by foreign and 
non-local criminal groups. For example, there is evidence 
that Spain has collected investments by, among others, 
Italian	Camorra	groups	or	Motorcycle	gangs	(see	8.6);	while	
Côte	d’Azur	has	aroused	the	interest	of	Russian	OCGs	and	
Italian	mafias	(see	8.2).
In both cases, the transnational dimension of criminal 
investments	 poses	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 financial	 and	 banking 
systems of European countries, which may be used to 
facilitate cross-border illicit transfers. Moreover, OCGs may 
also use alternative channels to move their proceeds cross-
border, including money transfer agencies	 (which	 have	
become a preferential business sector for investment, see 
below), underground banking systems	(like	hawala bankers 
-	 see	e.g.	Soudjin,	2014;	Siegel	&	Van	de	Bunt,	2014),	trade-
based money laundering, commercial relations among 
companies or, often, cash-transfers by means of couriers 
and cash-mules. 
The transnational nature of criminal investments is evident 
especially in certain EU MS. Among OCP countries, Spain 
has the largest number of categories of OCGs232 investing in 
the	 legitimate	 economy	 (28),	 followed	 by	 the	 Netherlands 
(25),	the	UK	(17),	France	(16),	Italy	(13),	Finland	(5)	and	Ireland	
(4).	 Also	 some	 non-OCP	 countries	 record	 quite	 significant	
numbers	(in	particular	Germany,	Switzerland,	Belgium).	
Transit countries, such as France, Spain and the Netherlands, 
are also those with the highest percentages of the total 
number	of	references	(respectively	92.4%,	81.6%	and	68.3%)	
that can be attributed to foreign (i.e. non-national) OCGs 
(Figure	25).233
In the UK, Finland234 and Ireland the database splits between 
local	(i.e.	British,	Finnish	and	Irish	groups)	and	foreign	ones.
In Italy, less than 10% of the references refer to foreign 
OCGs,	 confirming	 both	 the	 ‘Italian	 mafia’	 nature	 of	 criminal	
infiltration	 in	the	 Italian	economy	and	the	 lack	of	 information	
Figure 25 - Foreign OCG investments. Percentages of the 
total number of evidence per each OCP country235
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
Region (NUTS 2) Country
Number of 
categories of 
OCGsa
Andalusia Spain 13
Community of Madrid Spain 13
Catalonia Spain 10
Balearic Islands Spain 9
Inner London UK 9
Community of Valencia Spain 7
Galicia Spain 7
Noord-Holland Netherlands 7
Emilia-Romagna Italy 6
Lazio Italy 6
Lombardy Italy 6
Tuscany Italy 6
a	The	number	includes	also	local	(i.e.	national)	OCGs	(e.g.	British	OCGs	in	
UK, Camorra in Italy, etc.).
Table 68 - Regions (NUTS 2) with the highest number of 
categories of OCGs investing in the area
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
232.	For	details	on	how	categories	of	OCGs	have	been	classified,	see	Chapter	2	
and the Methodological Annex.
233. As regards the Netherlands, analysis of the nationalities of suspects in the 
database	of	the	prosecutors’	office	in	the	Netherlands	(PPO)	shows	that	most	
of	cases	involving	investments	can	be	referred	to	Dutch	nationals	(see	Section	
8.5). The difference with respect to the analysis of the DOCI may be due to both 
a	different	classification	of	OCGs	(e.g.	the	PPO	includes	information	on	the	place	
of birth but not on the ethnic group nor on the criminal group) but also to the 
different	availability	and	type	of	information	included	in	the	two	databases	(see	
Section 8.6 for more details).
234.	 In	this	case	also	Motorcycle	gangs	are	considered	as	 ‘foreign’	although	in	
most cases they may have a Finnish background, but it is not always possible to 
determine their geographic provenance.
235. In brackets number of references for which information on OCG is available.
49.9%
81.6%
68.3%
7.4%
45.5%
92.4%
51.7%
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on	 foreign	OCGs	 in	 the	 country	 (see	 Section	 8.4	 for	 further	
discussion).
In regard to NUTS 2 regions, the areas which record the highest 
number of criminal investments are the Spanish communities, 
in particular Andalusia	 (13	 OCGs)	 (Table	 68	 below).	 It	 is	
also worth noting that, among Italian regions, those with the 
highest number are Lazio, Lombardy, Emilia Romagna 
and Tuscany	 (6	OCGs	 each),	 which	 are	 not	 regions	with	 a	
traditional	mafia	presence.236 
7.2. Types of assets 
Although	 in	Europe	most	confiscations	 from	criminal	groups	
are limited to cash and registered assets such as cars and 
boats	 (see	 Part	 3),	 the	 evidence	 collected	 shows	 that	 the	
portfolio of organised crime is composed of a much wider 
variety of assets, including real estate properties, companies, 
bonds, credits and other movable goods. 
It is difficult to provide a ranking of what are the preferred 
types of assets. This depends on the investment strategy 
of each criminal organisation and on the scope of their 
criminal activities. However, some general considerations are 
suggested below.
Registered assets
Registered	 assets	 (cars, boats, motorcycles, etc.) play an 
important role in the portfolio of OCGs in Europe. They are 
acquired both because they are instrumental to many illicit 
activities and because they are status symbols for many 
criminals. 
In particular, they are central for the transportation of 
illicit goods of any kind. It is no coincidence that one of the 
preferred	sectors	for	criminal	investment	is	logistics	(see	7.3):	
OCGs set up transportation companies as fronts, misusing 
companies’	 legitimate	 trucks	 or	 containers	 for	 illicit	 trade	
purposes.
Boats are widely used, for example, to transport trafficked 
persons and drugs: according to PNSD data, in Spain they 
represent	a	significant	 fraction	of	 the	assets	confiscated	 for	
drug-related	crimes	(see	Section	12.6).	Boats	are	also	used	in	
ITTP	 (see	4.4),	e.g.	among	Baltic	states	 (Calderoni,	Aziani,	&	
Favarin,	2013;	Calderoni	et	al.,	 2013a)	and	between	 Italy	and	
south-eastern Europe.
In particular, cargo ships are often used to traffic counterfeit 
goods, illicit drugs, stolen assets and illicit tobacco products 
(UNICRI,	 2011;	WCO,	 2014;	 Transcrime,	 2015).	 The	 evidence	
collected shows that OCGs may directly control cargo 
companies, e.g. in the Netherlands for drug trafficking 
(Kruisbergen	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Kruisbergen,	 Kleemans,	 &	
Kouwenberg,	2014;	see	Section	8.5).	
Trucks are widely used – individually or through the ownership 
of transportation companies – in many forms of illicit 
trafficking, from drugs to ITTP. Also cars are increasingly used, 
especially because of the growth of smaller crime gangs and 
freelance	criminals	(see	Part	1)	that	cannot	afford	large-scale	
investments and vehicles and do not move large shipments of 
illicit	products	(e.g.	the	use	of	individual	cars	in	ITTP	cases	is	
high:237 see Transcrime, 2015). In France, the number of go-
fast convoys238 transporting cannabis or cocaine from Spain 
to	northern	Europe	is	increasing	(see	Section	5.2	and	8.1).
But registered assets also serve prestige purposes: cases 
of Ferrari, Lamborghini and other luxury cars confiscated	
from	OCGs	 are	 quite	 common	 in	many	OCP	 countries	 (see	
Part 3). And also yachts and even jets and helicopters are 
not	rare	(see	e.g.	in	Ireland,	Sections	8.3	and	12.4).	To	be	noted	
in this regard is the use of Pipers and other small aircraft as 
alternative means to transport drugs, persons, and other illicit 
goods from Morocco, the western Balkans or among EU MS 
(Europol,	2011a;	Olimpo,	Galli,	&	Santucci,	2014).
Finally,	registered	assets	may	be	integral	parts	of	OCGs’	culture:	
the most immediate example is provided by motorbikes, and 
in particular Harley Davidsons,	which	represent	a	significant	
fraction	of	Motorcycle	gangs’	portfolios	in	Finland	(see	8.1	and	
0). These OCGs are also often involved in the management of 
garages and car-dealership and motor-dealership.239
Movable assets
Movable goods also represent important holdings in criminal 
groups’	 portfolios.	 They	 may	 range	 from	 cash	 and	 bank	
accounts	 to	 bonds,	 other	 financial	 instruments,	 artworks,	
valuables, jewels or fur coats.240
It is difficult to assess how much of the proceeds produced by 
OCGs in illicit markets is held in cash and bank accounts. 
Certainly,	 the	 investigations	 and	 seizures	 mentioned	 in	 this	
report	have	often	involved	large	amounts	(see	e.g.	Operation	
Emperor in Spain - Box 33 - and Operation Octopod in the 
UK - Box 38). The availability and the capacity to manage 
liquidity	is	crucial	for	any	legitimate	company	(O’Regan,	2006,	
p.	230);	but	 it	may	be	even	more	so	 for	criminal	enterprises,	
which	 often	 have	 to	 pay	 their	 expenses	 in	 cash	 (e.g.	 for	 the	
purchase of cocaine shipments).241
Evidence	of	criminal	investments	in	financial	instruments	like	
bonds, stocks, options, futures, etc. is not widespread. As 
suggested	by	a	large	body	of	literature	(e.g.	Transcrime,	2013a;	
236. This is consistent with the literature which assumes that in southern Italian 
regions	(e.g.	Sicily	or	Campania)	the	control	by	the	local	mafia	groups	on	both	
illicit	markets	and	business	activities	makes	it	difficult	for	foreign	OCGs	to	‘enter	
the	market’	(see	Sections	5.4	and	8.4).
237. In ITTP, trucks appear to be the type of vehicle most often used to smuggle 
and	transport	illicit	tobacco	products	across	borders	(Transcrime,	2015).
238.	These	are	organised	convoys	of	cars	driven	at	high	speed	(even	more	than	
200	Km/h)	along	motorways.	They	have	been	widely	used	especially	in	France	
and	 Spain	 for	 the	 transportation	 of	 hashish	 and	 cocaine	 (see	 e.g.	 Eurojust,	
2013b).
239. This business preference has been found also in relation to other criminal 
groups	in	other	countries,	such	as	Italy	(see	8.4)	and	the	UK	(see	8.7).	It	has	been	
hypothesized	that,	by	managing	garages,	OCGs	can	also	rent	vehicles	to	other	
criminal	partners	for	the	commission	of	illicit	activities	(see	in	Finland	8.1)	or	also	
for	crash-for-cash	frauds	(see	in	Ireland	and	the	UK,	8.3	and	8.7).
240.	For	the	classification	of	assets	adopted	in	the	report,	see	the	Methodological	
Annex. Stocks are considered movable goods only if they are minority shares. If 
they are majority shares, or of an amount which allows control of the company, 
they	are	considered	as	‘companies’	in	themselves.
241. This may be a reason why the legitimate companies controlled by OCGs, 
for	example	in	Italy	by	Italian	mafias,	have	usually	higher	levels	of	current	assets	
and	cash	than	their	peers	(Standridge,	2012;	Transcrime,	2013a;	Riccardi,	2014a	
–	see	Section	8.4).	In	fact,	on	the	one	hand	keeping	the	company’s	capital	in	cash	
proves	useful	because	it	may	be	misappropriated	from	the	firm	when	expenses	
related	 to	 illicit	 activities	 have	 to	 be	 borne	 (e.g.	 payment	 of	 a	 drug	 order);	 on	
the other, current assets can be more easily liquidated in anticipation of asset 
confiscation	 by	 law	 enforcement	 agencies	 (Riccardi,	 Soriani,	 &	 Standridge,	
2014).
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Riccardi,	2014a;	Kruisbergen,	Kleemans,	&	Kouwenberg,	2014),	
criminal	 investments	 may	 not	 be	 particularly	 sophisticated;	
rather	they	search	proximity	and	control	of	the	territory	(see	
drivers	 in	 7.5).	 Findings	 at	 country	 level	 (Chapter	 8)	 confirm	
this impression, although the growth of more sophisticated 
fraud	schemes	may	entail	a	wider	use	of	financial	instruments.
Moreover, other forms of movable assets can be important, 
both for speculative reasons and, again, as status symbols: 
paintings and other artworks	 are	 often	 confiscated	 from	
criminal	groups	(see	e.g.	 in	the	UK	and	the	Netherlands),	and	
they can be both symbols of prestige and investments in the 
art market. The same applies to goods like jewels, watches 
and other valuables, but also clothes like fur coats, which 
are	 often	 confiscated	 in	 many	 EU	 MS	 and	 mostly	 relate	 to	
fraud	and	money	 laundering	 (e.g.	 in	 the	UK,	 the	Netherlands	
and Spain). 
Finally,	also	significant	is	the	weight	of	electronic appliances 
(mobile	 phones,	 laptops,	 tablets,	 etc.)	 which	 have	 become	
crucial because of the increasingly ICT nature of criminal 
activities	such	as	frauds,	and	which	have	been	seized	in	many	
countries	(e.g.	in	Spain	–	see	8.6).
Real estate properties
Houses, villas, flats and other immovable properties are 
assets preferred for investment by many OCGs in most of 
OCP and other European countries. 
In Italy, they constitute more than 50% of the goods 
confiscated	from	OCGs	in	the	past	thirty	years,	representing	
strategic	assets	 for	mafia	organisations	(see	8.4	and	12.5).	 In	
the Netherlands they are frequently found in the portfolios 
of	criminal	suspects	identified	in	the	PPO	data	(see	8.5)	and,	
according	 to	 previous	 research	 (e.g.	 Meloen	 et	 al.,	 2003,	
p. 246), they are frequently involved in cases of money 
laundering.242 In other OCP countries, such as France, Spain 
or the UK, the growth of the real estate market, especially in 
coastal areas and around capital cities, has collected a great 
deal	of	evidence	on	criminal	investments	(see	respectively	8.2,	
8.6 and 8.7).
There are numerous reasons why immovable properties 
attract OCG investments:
•		 First,	 real	 estate	 properties	 are	 safe investments 
(Ferwerda,	 2012;	 Transcrime,	 2013a):	 criminals	 may	
replicate the same investment behaviour of families across 
Europe, which consider investment in a house to be the best 
way to save money. Indeed, statistics show that, despite 
recent decreases, the volatility of the real estate market in 
Europe is still much less than that of the stock market. 
•		 Second,	properties	can	guarantee	high returns, especially 
in areas characterised by a booming real estate market. 
Much evidence of criminal investments has been found, 
for example, in tourist areas such as Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur	in	France	(one	of	the	few	regions	in	Europe	with	still	
rising	 house	 prices)	 (see	 8.2	 for	 details),	 Andalusia	 (and	
especially Costa del Sol), Balearic and Canary islands in 
Spain	(see	8.6),	 the	Balkan	coast	on	the	Adriatic	Sea	and	
in	 European	 capitals	 (such	 as	 London,	 Paris,	Madrid	 and	
Dublin where the recent crisis has affected the real estate 
market to a lesser extent).
•		 However,	 immovable	 properties	 can	 guarantee	 profits 
also in the form of rents: a house bought by an OCG with 
illicit proceeds, and then regularly rented, is effective for 
laundering	money	and	producing	periodic	 “white	 returns”	
(Ferwerda,	2012,	p.	80;	Transcrime,	2013a;	Dugato,	Favarin,	
&	Giommoni,	forthcoming).
•		 Fourth,	 real	 estate	 properties	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	
facilitating illicit activities: in many OCP countries 
(e.g.	 Ireland,	 Italy,	 UK,	 Spain)	 they	 have	 served	 as	 either	
warehouses	 in	which	 to	 stock	 illicit	 goods	 (such	as	drugs	
or counterfeit products, e.g. in Ireland, see 8.3) or places 
in	 which	 to	 exploit	 prostitution	 rings	 (e.g.	 the	 Qian Liu 
investigation case in Italy, see 8.4). Private houses have also 
been used to conceal criminals at large or as safe houses 
for members of criminal groups, or as laboratories to 
synthesise illicit drugs or to cultivate home-grown cannabis 
(EMCDDA,	2012,	p.	29).
•		 Similarly,	 the	 purchase	 of	 real	 estate	 can	 itself	 generate	
opportunities to commit illicit activities: for example, 
mortgage-frauds, which, according to public authorities, 
are	increasing	in	certain	countries	(e.g.	in	Ireland	–	see	8.3)	
•		 Moreover,	an	investment	in	real	estate	can	also	guarantee	
close control of the territory: this seems to be the case 
of	 Southern	 Italy,	where	mafia	 investments	 in	 immovable	
properties seem much more frequent in areas and city 
neighbourhoods	 already	 characterised	 by	 a	 significant	
presence	 of	 criminal	 groups	 (Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Dugato,	
Favarin,	&	Giommoni,	forthcoming).
•		 Finally,	 real	 estate	 properties	 often	 also	 have	 value	 as	
status symbols and to gain prestige: OCGs investments 
in villas or luxury houses are common among local OCGs 
in	 areas	 such	 as	 southern	 France	 or	 Spain	 (see	 8.2	 and	
8.6), but also for certain OCGs such as Russian-speaking 
criminal	 groups	 or	 Italian	 Camorra	 (see	 Box	 29	 on	 the	
Sandokan villa in 8.4). 
Companies
Although	 they	 are	 confiscated	 in	 only	 a	 few	 European	
countries	 (see	 Part	 3),	 there	 is	 much	 evidence	 of	 OCG	
investments in legitimate companies in Europe. More than 
3,600 references from the DOCI refer to companies, 82.7% 
in the seven OCP countries alone, and evidence has been 
found in 20 out of 28 EU MS.
Investments in legitimate businesses respond to a wide array 
of purposes and drivers, which are discussed below. The 
following	section	identifies	the	business	sectors	preferred	by	
criminal investors and highlights some patterns as regards the 
companies active in those sectors.
7.3. Business sectors
A large number of business sectors record investments by 
OCGs in Europe. Table 69 shows those with higher and lower 
levels of evidence according to the number of references 
included in the DOCI.243
242.	According	 to	Meloen	et	 al.	 (2003,	 p.	 236),	 in	 about	40%	of	 the	 cases	of	
money laundering analysed, money was invested in real estate properties. 
243. Taking into account only the 2,942 references stating the business sector. 
Business	 sectors	 have	 been	 defined	 according	 to	 the	 reclassification	 of	 the	
NACE categories illustrated in the Methodological Annex.
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At	first	glance,	the	business	sectors	with	the	highest	levels	of	
criminal investments have characteristics which, according 
to	the	literature,	facilitate	the	infiltration	by	criminal	groups	of	
businesses	or	which	better	respond	to	OCGs’	needs	(see	also	
7.5):
•		 Cash-intensive	 sectors	 (e.g.	 bars	 and	 restaurants,	
retail trade, clubs, casinos), which may facilitate money 
laundering	(Fijnaut	&	Paoli,	2004,	p.	382;	Ferentzy	&	Turner,	
2009);
•		 Territorial-specific	 (e.g.	 real	 estate	 activities,	
construction, hotels), which can prove useful in monitoring 
the	surrounding	area	and	may	benefit	from	stricter	control	
over	 the	 territory	 of	 OCGs	 (Unger	 &	 Ferwerda,	 2011;	
Standridge,	2012;	Transcrime,	2013a;	Riccardi,	2014a,	p.	199);
•		 Low-tech and labour-intensive	 sectors	 (e.g.	 bars	
and restaurants, construction) which on the one hand 
may reflect the unskilled backgrounds and know-how 
of criminals, and on the other, build social consensus 
for OCGs by distributing jobs among a wide array of 
beneficiaries	 (including	 the	 members	 themselves	 of	 the	
OCG)244 and enable the exploitation of irregular workers 
and	forced	 labour	(Gambetta	&	Reuter,	 1997;	Calderoni	&	
Riccardi,	2011;	Riccardi,	2014a).
•		 Protected sectors, characterised by inelasticity of 
demand and low openness to international competition, 
which may facilitate the establishment of local monopolies 
and	 rent-seeking	 positions	 (Gambetta	 and	 Reuter,	 1997;	
Daniele	and	Marani,	2008;	Transcrime,	2013a);	
•		 Sectors	 with	 the	 high	 involvement of the public 
administration or public resources/subsidies	 (e.g.	
real estate, construction, renewable energy), so as to 
benefit	from	infiltration	and	corruption	 in	the	political	and	
administrative	 system	 (Calderoni	 &	 Caneppele,	 2009;	
Riccardi,	2014a);
•		 Sectors	 characterised	 by	 small firms and a weak 
commercial and infrastructural fabric, which OCGs can 
more	easily	infiltrate	(Bertoni	&	Rossi,	1997;	Masciandaro	&	
Ruozi,	1999;	Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	420);
•		 Sectors	 functional	 to	 illicit activities, for example as 
fronts	 to	 conceal	 illicit	 trafficking	 (e.g.	 transportation	
and	 wholesale	 trade),	 or	 criminal	 activities	 (e.g.	 labour	
exploitation),	useful	for	transferring	illicit	funds	(e.g.	money	
transfer businesses), or in which frauds can be easily 
committed	(e.g.	tax	excise	frauds	in	petrol	and	gas	supply);
•		 Sectors	 characterised	 by	 a	 weak or developing 
regulation: e.g. construction and public procurement 
(Vander	 Beken,	 2005;	 Savona,	 2010;	 Caneppele,	 2014),	
VLT	 and	 slot	 machine	 or	 renewable	 energy	 (Caneppele,	
Riccardi,	&	Standridge,	2013).	
Criminal investments and sectors’ profitability 
What about the returns on investment? Are the sectors with 
higher levels of infiltration also those that are most 
profitable? Answering this question is difficult because it 
entails	 individual	 analysis	 of	 the	 companies	 infiltrated	 by	
OCGs. This is not possible given the scope of the project and 
the data available.245 
What can be done is conduct an aggregate examination of the 
gross	profitability,	on	the	basis	of	Eurostat	structural	business	
statistics, of the sectors with evidence of criminal investments 
(Table	70).
At	first	glance,	it	seems	that	the	business	sectors	with	higher	
levels	 of	 infiltration	 are	 not	 necessarily	 those	 characterised	
by the highest productivity, measured by value added per 
employee.	 Indeed,	 this	 is	 the	 finding	 of	 previous	 research	
(e.g.	 Standridge,	 2012;	 Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Riccardi,	 2014a;	
Kruisbergen,	 Kleemans,	 &	 Kouwenberg,	 2014),	 which	 shows	
that profitability is not necessarily correlated with OCGs 
investments in legitimate businesses.
244.	As	will	be	evident	from	many	cases	reported	at	country	level	(Chapter	8),	
members	of	the	OCGs	are	often	fictitiously	hired	as	employees	of	the	companies	
that	they	control	so	that	they	can	be	paid	‘regular’	salaries	and,	often,	provided	
with alibis to cover illicit activities.
245. In the DOCI, it is not always possible to identify exactly the companies 
involved, because in most cases names are not reported or only aggregate 
studies	 are	 available.	 Moreover,	 analysis	 of	 the	 financial	 accounts	 of	 OCG-
controlled companies may be difficult due to accounting manipulations and 
unreliable	 financial	 representations	 (see	 Transcrime	 2013a).	 A	more	 detailed	
analysis	of	case	studies	on	OCG	infiltration	of	individual	companies	at	European	
level is conducted by the EU-funded and Transcrime-coordinated project 
ARIEL	(www.arielproject.eu).
Level of 
evidencea
Business sectors
Higher
Bars	and	restaurants;	
Construction;	
Wholesale and retail tradeb;	
Transportation;	
Real	estate	activities;	
Hotels
Medium
Waste	and	scrap	management;	
IT	and	other	services;	
Casinos,	VLT	and	betting	activities;	
Sex,	tattoo	and	other	personal	activities;	
Banking	and	financial	activities;	
Manufacturing;
	Clubs;	
Agriculture	and	fishing;	
Repair	and	retail	of	vehicles;	
Sports	and	gaming;	
Legal and professional activities
Lower
Money	service	businesses;	Hospitals	
and	residential	care;	Private	security;	
Other	sectors;	Mining	and	quarrying;	
Renewable	energy;	Petrol	and	gas	
supply;	Maintenance	and	cleaning	
services
a The classes are divided according to the value of the mean plus ±0.5 
standard deviations of each sector. The classes are:
•			High:	>	mean+0.5	SD
•			Medium:	mean+0.5	SD	<	x	>	mean-0.5	SD
•			Low:	<	mean	-	0.5	SD
b In particular, wholesale and retail trade of food products, clothing and 
textiles and gold and jewellery.
Table 69 - Business sectors with evidence of organised 
crime investments in Europe
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
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Focus on the most infiltrated business sectors
The following Sections focus on the business sectors that 
record the most criminal investments at European level:
Bars and restaurants 
These	 register	 investments	by	a	high	number	of	OCGs	 (see	
Section 7.4 below). Due to their cash-intensive nature, they 
are widely used for money laundering purposes. Evidence of 
the	infiltration	of	bars,	clubs,	pizzerias,	kebab	shops,	fast	food	
restaurants,	street	food	stalls,	and	‘high-class’	restaurants	can	
be found in many OCP countries. They can also be used as 
fronts for criminal activities, for example to conceal the retail 
sale	of	illicit	drugs	(e.g.	Operation	Shovel, see Section 8.3), but 
also prostitution or forced labour.  
Restaurants are also often linked to companies engaged in the 
wholesale of food products, which is another business sector 
preferred	by	OCGs	(e.g.	see	investments	of	a	Camorra	OCG	
in	Spain	in	food	import/export,	catering	services	and	pizzerias	
– Section 8.6). Finally, they are also important to maintain 
public relations with	 ‘high-level’	 customers	 like	 managers,	
public	officials,	sports	or	entertainment	stars	(e.g.	see	Section	
8.2 - France), especially if bars and restaurants are opened 
by	 OCGs	 in	 the	 proximity	 of	 public	 buildings	 (e.g.	 tribunals,	
ministries,	 public	 agencies,	 police	 stations)	 to	 ‘capture’	
sensitive	conversations	between	customers	(see	Section	8.4	
- Italy).246 
Construction 
The construction sector is preferred for investment by many 
OCGs,	primarily	 Italian	mafias,	although	 there	 is	evidence	of	
infiltration	 not	 only	 in	 Italy	 but	 also	 in	Finland, France, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the UK (see	Table	71	and	Chapter	8).	
Public	construction	plays	a	crucial	role	in	this	sector	(Sciarrone	
et	al.,	2010;	Sacco,	2010;	Transcrime,	2013a;	Riccardi,	2014a),	
particularly	 in	 the	 public	 procurement	 area	 (Savona,	 2010;	
Caneppele, 2014), where OCGs can exercise their capacity 
for	corruption,	 intimidation	and	infiltration	in	the	political	and	
administrative sphere). 
Criminal investment in construction companies is therefore 
a more ‘alarming’ phenomenon than simple money-
laundering through restaurants or immovable properties, 
because	 this	 entails	 more	 capillary	 infiltration	 of	 the	 local	
political,	business	and	social	community	(see	e.g.	cases	in	Italy,	
Section 8.4, and in France, 8.2). 
Moreover,	 because	 construction	 companies	 (together	 with	
mining and quarrying) are necessary for the creation of other 
business	 activities	 (e.g.	 building	 a	 supermarket	 or	 a	 wind	
power plant – see below), they guarantee close monitoring of 
an entire area, thus facilitating control of the territory by OCGs 
(Transcrime,	2013a;	Riccardi,	2014a).247 
The presence of different types of criminal conducts within 
this	 sector	 has	 been	 confirmed	 by	 the	 high	 victimisation	
level of companies operating in construction across Europe 
(Dugato	et	al.,	 2013).	 In	 fact,	 this	 sector	accounts	 for	a	quite	
large	 proportion	 of	 specific	 crimes	 committed	 to	 influence	
strategies	 and	 collude	 with	 public	 administrations	 (e.g.	
extortion, theft, bribery and protection money).
Wholesale and retail trade 
This is the sector in Europe with the largest number of 
registered	 companies;	 hence	 its	 significant	 weight	 also	 for	
the OCG economy is not surprising. It is also the sector most 
victimised at EU level, in that it concentrates 44% of crimes 
against	businesses	in	Europe	(Dugato	et	al.,	2013).	Most	of	the	
evidence of criminal investments in this sector concerns:
•		 Wholesale	and	retail	of	clothing and textiles, particularly 
important	 for	 Chinese	 OCGs	 (see	 below)	 and	 Italian	
Camorra	 trading	 and	 selling	 counterfeit	 apparel	 (see	
Section 4.5).
•		 Wholesale	 and	 retail	 of	 food products which, besides 
reflecting	food-culture	specificities	of	countries	(e.g.	trade	
in	olive	oil	from	Andalusia,	fish	from	Galicia,	dairy	products	
Business sector
Value added/N. 
employees (EU-
28 aggregate – 
2013)
Level of 
evidence 
of criminal 
investmentsa
Mining and 
quarrying
6,604.5 LOWER
Renewable 
energy
5,773.6 LOWER
Real estate 
activities
3,892 MEDIUM
Legal and 
professional 
activities
1,585.5 LOWER
Manufacturing 1,559.2 LOWER
Transportation 1,293.2 HIGHER
Waste and scrap 
management
1,227.6 LOWER
Wholesale and 
retail trade
1,122.9 HIGHER
Construction 1,102.7 HIGHER
IT and other 
services
813.5 LOWER
Hotels and 
other tourist 
accommodations
782.7 MEDIUM
Bars and 
restaurants
552.6 HIGHER
Private security 670.2 LOWER
a See Table 69 above.
Table 70 - Gross profitability of business sectors with 
evidence of OCG investments
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
246. Interestingly, according to the EU business victimisation survey conducted 
by Transcrime and Gallup in 2013, companies operating in accommodation and 
food	services	also	experience	high	levels	of	victimisation	across	Europe	(Dugato	
et al., 2013), being vulnerable to various criminal conducts, including protection 
racketeering, counterfeiting, vandalism, theft and burglary.
247. Finally, construction may conceal other illicit activities such as fraud or 
money laundering because low-quality, sub-standard and low-price materials 
(sand,	 cement,	 etc.)	 can	 be	 purchased	 and	 over-invoiced	 so	 as	 to	 create	
opportunities	for	trade-based	money	 laundering	and	slush	funds	(see	Section	
8.4	-	Italy);	or	illicit	waste	trafficking,	because	illegal	waste	can	be	dumped	while	
preparing	building	sites	or	digging	landfills.
158 | Part 2
in southern Italy, particularly Campania), have been widely 
used	in	many	countries	(see	e.g.	Italy,	Spain,	UK)	as	fronts	
to conceal the transnational trafficking of illicit drugs. 
•		 Import/export companies, again used to hide the illicit 
drug trade but also, according to some evidence, by 
Eastern European OCGs to export cross-border goods 
stolen	 in	organised	property	crime	episodes	(see	Section	
8.4 - Italy).
Other	 commercial	 sub-sectors	 with	 evidence	 of	 infiltration	
are the retail of gold and jewellery	(especially	in	Italy	with	the	
rapid	growth	of	 ‘compro-oro’	shops	–	Section	8.4	-	 Italy)	and	
also the wholesale of medicines, given that there are cases 
of fake companies established in various EU MS to trade 
stolen	or	adulterated	medicines	(see	Section	4.10).
Transportation 
This sector shows much evidence of criminal investment. 
Transportation and logistics companies are crucial means 
to	conceal	 illicit	 trafficking	 (e.g.	drugs,	counterfeits,	firearms,	
etc.).	There	is	evidence	of	infiltration	of	this	sector,	for	example,	
across	 the	border	between	 Ireland	and	 the	UK	 (see	8.3	and	
8.7)	and	in	areas	with	major	ports	(e.g.	the	Netherlands,	 Italy,	
the UK, France), and even of foreign shipping companies 
(see	Section	on	Netherlands,	8.5).
Moreover, to be noted is that transportation companies can 
play	a	key	role	in	control	of	the	territory	(see	e.g.	the	case	of	
infiltration	by	‘Ndrangheta	of	TNT	subcontractors	in	Northern	
Italy – Section 8.4) and may be related to cargo crimes in 
several	EU	MS	(see	8.5).248
Real estate companies and Hotels 
Investments	 in	 real	 estate	 properties	 (see	 7.2)	 can	 often	 be	
made by OCGs through real estate agencies and companies, 
which	may	 provide	 anonymity	 and	 tax	 advantages	 (e.g.	 see	
the use of societe civile immobilieres in France, see 8.2). 
Complex networks of real estate companies have been used, 
for example, for the purchase of tourist resorts in southern 
Spain	 (see	 8.6),	 in	 southern	 Italy	 (e.g.	 Operation Metropolis, 
see	8.3),	and	in	the	PACA	region	of	France	(see	8.2).
Similarly, hotels and the tourist sector attract the interest 
of	 OCGs	 in	 many	 OCP	 countries	 (e.g.	 France,	 Italy,	 the	
Netherlands and Spain, see Table 71) especially in areas with 
large	tourism	 industries	 (e.g.	Côte	d’Azur,	Sicily,	Apulia)	or	 in	
large urban areas. 
Emerging sectors
Finally, although they do not yet register high evidence of 
infiltration,	according	to	DOCI,	emerging	business	sectors	are	
the following:
•		 Renewable energy: OCGs may take advantage of the 
large public subsidies offered by national and regional 
governments	to	incentivize	the	production	of	green	energy.	
Important	signals	of	infiltration	can	be	found,	for	example,	
in	 the	 wind	 power	 sector	 in	 Italy	 (10%	 of	 installed	 wind	
power plants are under investigation for corruption or 
mafia	 association,	 according	 to	 Caneppele,	 Riccardi,	 &	
Standridge, 2013 – see Section 8.4). 
•		 Waste and scrap management (including renovation): 
investments in this sector may be instrumental, among 
other things, to illicit waste trafficking, and they are 
widespread	 in	 Italy	 (especially	 in	 Campania,	 due	 to	
Camorra	interests	–	see	8.4)	but	also	in	other	EU	MS	(e.g.	
the	 companies	 managing	 the	 largest	 landfills	 in	 Europe	
near	 Bucharest,	 Romania,	 have	 been	 seized	 by	 Italian	
authorities	on	mafia	and	money	laundering	allegations).
•		 Money transfer businesses: alarm about the use of 
money service agencies to transfer illicit funds was raised 
already in the mid-2000s by FATF. However, there is new 
evidence of direct control of these companies by OCGs 
(e.g.	in	UK,	Ireland,	Italy	and	Spain	–	see	Chapter	8).249
•		 Casinos, VLT, betting, gaming: as already highlighted in 
Section 4.9, these companies can often be used for money-
laundering	 purposes	 (due	 to	 their	 cash-intensive	 nature)	
or	may	 be	 connected	 to	 illegal	 gambling	 or	match-fixing.	
Besides	 ‘traditional’	casinos,	also	smaller	VLT	and	betting	
centres	are	emerging	as	vulnerable	to	OCG	infiltration	(e.g.	
Italy).
Differences across countries 
Although	the	sectors	described	show	evidence	of	 infiltration	
in almost all OCP countries and in many other EU MS, some 
distinctive features at country level are apparent. Table 71 
reports for each OCP country the sectors with higher and 
medium numbers of references to investment.
Again taking the biases in the database into account, 
differences across countries may be due to various factors, 
including:
•		 The	business structure and entrepreneurial culture of 
the country: e.g. construction has been historically a driver 
of	the	Italian	economy	(see	8.4);	agriculture,	fishery	and	the	
wholesale	of	food	products	are	important	in	Spain,	etc.	(see	
8.6);
•		 Investment opportunities: e.g. investments in hotels, 
bars, restaurants are stronger in countries and regions with 
large	tourism	industries	(e.g.	Andalusia,	Côte	d’Azur,	etc.);
•		 Vulnerabilities	 in	 the	 national	 administrative, political 
and regulatory systems: e.g. evidence of investments in 
renewable	energy	(windpower)	is	widespread	in	Italy,	where	
loopholes in the administrative procedures have been 
identified	(Caneppele,	Riccardi,	&	Standridge,	2013),	while	
it	is	limited	in	other	EU	MS;
•		 The	 role	 played	 by	 the	 country	 in	 terms	 of	 illicit 
activities: in transit countries, such as the Netherlands, 
a	 more	 significant	 weight	 of	 criminal	 investments	 in	
transportation	and	cargo	companies	can	be	found	(see	5.3	
and	8.3);	 similarly,	OCGs	 investments	 in	waste	and	scrap	
management companies are higher in Italy owing to the 
interest	of	mafias	in	illicit	waste	trafficking	(see	5.4	and	8.4);
248. In some cases of organised theft, instead of assaults on cargo vans, OCGs 
have preferred to set up fake transportation companies, obtain subcontracts 
from	manufacturers,	and	then	disappear	(with	the	cargo	truck	and	the	company	
itself)	with	the	transported	goods	(see	e.g.	with	reference	to	medicines	Riccardi,	
Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014).
249. At least one case of an MSB controlled by Pakistani OCGs has been 
reported in the UK. In Italy, between 2010 and 2012, according to investigators 
at least 14 controlled MSB served Chinese OCGs to transfer more than 4 billion 
euro	 of	 illegal	 proceeds	 (from	 counterfeiting,	 sexual	 and	 labour	 exploitation)	
from	Italy	to	China	(see	Operation	Qian	Liu	and	Qian	Ba	–	Section	8.4).
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Country Higher*
Finland	(61a)
Construction;	
Repair	and	retail	of	vehicles;	
Bars and restaurants
France	(87)
Wholesale and retail tradeb;
	Bars	and	restaurants;	
Real	estate	activities;	
Construction
Ireland	(10)
Real	estate	activities;	
Wholesale and retail tradeb
Italy	(1369)
Construction;	
Bars	and	restaurants;	
Wholesale and retail tradec;	
Waste	and	scrap	management;	
Hotels	and	tourist	accommodations;
 Real estate activities
Netherlands 
(610)
Transportation;	
Bars	and	restaurants;	
Wholesale and retail tradeb;	
Hotels	and	tourist	accommodations;	
Real	estate	activities;	
Legal	and	professional	activities;	
Sex, tattoo and other personal activities
Spain	(107)
Real	estate	activities;	
Wholesale and retail traded;	
Bars and restaurants
United Kingdom 
(257)
Bars	and	restaurants;	
Wholesale and retail tradec;	
Transportation
a Total number of references with information available on the business 
sector.
b	Including	wholesale	and	retail	trade	(WRT)	of	food	products,	clothing	and	
textiles	and	not	specified	WRT.
c In	which	WRT	of	food	products	covers	a	significant	role.
d In which WRT of food products and of clothing and textiles cover a 
significant	role.
* The classes are divided according to the value of the mean plus ±0.5 
standard deviations of each sector. The classes are:
•			High:	>	mean+0.5	SD
•			Medium:	mean+0.5	SD	<	x	>	mean-0.5	SD
•			Low:	<	mean	-	0.5	SD
Table 71 - Business sectors with higher evidence of OCGs 
investments (OCP countries)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
•		 The	investment strategies preferred by the OCGs active 
in the country: e.g. criminal investments in private security 
and repair of vehicles companies are higher in Finland 
because of the investment patterns of Motorcycle gangs.
While	 the	 country-specific	 analyses	 presented	 in	 Chapter	
8 will explore the distinctive features at national level, the 
different investment patterns that characterise different 
OCGs are examined in the next section.
7.4. Actors
As in illicit markets, a plurality of criminal actors also 
invest	in	the	legitimate	economy.	They	range	from	‘traditional’	
organisations	 such	 as	 Italian	 mafias	 and	 large	 hierarchical	
OCGs to smaller criminal groups, loose networks and 
individuals	(see	Section	3.2).	
Criminal actors and investments in the legitimate 
economy: emerging trends
The evidence collected by Project OCP has highlighted the 
following features and emerging trends:
•		 An	 increasing	 role	 is	 played	 by	 individual brokers and 
freelance entrepreneurs. These may be in simultaneous 
contact with several criminal groups, and act either as 
frontmen for OCGs or as facilitators, in the sense 
that they ease criminal investments both in geographic 
areas not under the traditional control of OCGs and in 
business	 sectors	 requiring	 some	 level	 of	 expertise	 (e.g.	
the	windpower	sector	in	Italy	-	see	Caneppele,	Riccardi,	&	
Standridge, 2013). 
•		 Moreover,	 as	 often	 stressed	 by	 numerous	 international	
organisations	 (e.g.	 FATF,	 WEF	 and	 the	 European	
Commission), financial institutions, professionals 
(e.g.	 lawyers,	 accountants,	 etc.)	 and	 company service 
providers are key enablers, wittingly or otherwise, of money 
laundering by criminals and criminal organisations. In some 
cases they are integral parts of these criminal consortia, 
although	it	seems	that	some	OCGs	(such	as	‘Ndrangheta)	
prefer direct control over legitimate businesses without 
the involvement of external professionals and managers 
(Riccardi,	Soriani,	&	Standridge,	2014).	
•		 Also	 increasing	 is	 the	number	of	cases	of	 joint ventures 
between different groups in the management of legitimate 
businesses and legitimate markets: cases of cooperation 
can	 be	 identified,	 for	 example,	 between	 Camorra	 and	
Chinese OCGs in the clothing industry in relation to 
counterfeiting	 (see	8.4);	various	 Italian	mafia	groups	have	
set up cartels for the management of agri-food markets 
in	 Italy	 (see	 8.4);	 while	 a	 high-level	 money-laundering	
scheme dismantled by Italian GDF involved Spanish OCGs, 
‘Ndrangheta	OCGs	and	former	Irish	paramilitary	members,	
which invested illicit proceeds in tourist resorts in Southern 
Italy	(see	8.3	and	8.4).
The categories of OCGs most active in terms of invest-
ments
Although,	 as	 underlined	 in	 Part	 1	 (see	 3.2)	 OCGs	 active	 in	
Europe are increasingly multinational and interethnic, some 
categories of OCGs with a dominant geographical or ethnic 
origin250	are	more	 ‘active’	 than	others	 in	 terms	of	 investment	
in the legal economy.
250. As illustrated in Chapter 2 and in the Methodological Annex, 35 categories 
of	OCGs	have	been	identified.	The	classification	mainly	relies	on	a	nationality-
based	 or	 ethnicity-based	 taxonomy	 (e.g.	 Turkish-speaking	 OCGs,	 Chinese	
OCGs, etc.).
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In particular, Italian mafias	 (especially	 ‘Ndrangheta and 
Camorra), Chinese OCGs, Russian/Georgian OCGs but 
also British and Dutch criminal groups	 (of	 various	 ethnic	
origins) are those for which the largest amount of evidence 
of investments has been found in the sources consulted. 
These categories of OCGs also appear to be the most 
transnational ones, i.e. those with evidence of investment in 
the	largest	number	of	countries	(see	Figure	26,	Figure	27	and	
Figure 28).251 
Russian/Georgian OCGs appear to be the most widespread 
in	 Europe	 in	 terms	 of	 infiltration	 of	 the	 legitimate	 economy.	
Although the focus of the data collection was on the 7 OCP 
countries, evidence of investments was found in 12 countries 
(see	below).	Among	Italian	mafias,	Camorra	and	‘Ndrangheta	
are the most transnational ones. This is consistent with 
the	 findings	 of	 previous	 studies	 (see	 e.g.	 Forgione,	 2009;	
Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Calderoni	 et	 al.,	 forthcoming).	 Chinese	
OCGs	 rank	 first,	 in	 terms	 of	 number	 of	 references,	 among	
non-European OCGs investing in Europe. 
Table 72 presents, for the selected categories of OCGs 
identified	 above,	 the	 first	 three	 countries	 and	 five	 business	
sectors in terms of number of references to investment in and 
infiltration	of	 the	 legitimate	economy.	The	 following	sections	
comment	 on	 some	 of	 the	main	 actors	 active	 in	 this	 field	 in	
Europe.
Italian mafias
Cosa Nostra OCGs
Besides Italy, and in particular Sicily	 (see	 Section	 8.4),	
evidence of investments by Cosa Nostra OCGs can be found 
in a variety of European countries. 
251. In this regard, it should be stressed once again that the focus of the data 
collection was on the 7 OCP countries, while evidence on other European non-
OCP countries was collected, but not systematically. Hence the analysis may be 
not fully representative outside the OCP area.
In Spain	 (see	 Section	 8.6),	 companies	 connected	 to	 the	
Sicilian	 mafia	 have	 been	 found	 in	 Andalusia,	 Galicia	 and	
Catalonia	 (Diario	 Cordoba	 2008;	 Savio,	 2009;	 Transcrime,	
2013a). In particular, in 2008 in Galicia, Cosa Nostra members 
set up front-companies selling seafood products in order to 
lauder proceeds from criminal activities, while in Andalusia 
they	were	active	in	the	olive	oil	sector	(La	Opinión	de	Galicia,	
2008;	Faro	de	Vigo,	2008;	Tojo,	2008,	see	8.6).	Evidence	has	
also	 been	 found	 in	 Germany	 and	 Switzerland	 (Transcrime,	
2013a), while in France there is evidence of money laundering 
by Cosa Nostra through casinos and hotels, especially in 
Côte	 d›Azur	 and	 Corsica	 (Chavane,	 2005;	 Jérôme,	 2006;	
Transcrime, 2013a, pp. 236-237).
The interest of Cosa Nostra OCGs in casinos is also apparent 
in Croatia and Romania. In the latter country, a large number 
of	sectors	(wholesale	trade,	transportation,	real	estate,	waste	
management	with	involvement	in	the	largest	landfill	in	Europe,	
near	 Bucharest)	 has	 been	 infiltrated,	 often	 through	 local	
entrepreneurs	 and	 figureheads	 (Transcrime,	 2013a;	 see	Box	
14).	Particularly	significant	 in	 this	 respect	 is	 the	2013	seizure	
by Italian authorities of the waste management companies 
controlling	 the	 biggest	 landfill	 in	 Europe,	 near	 Bucharest,	
whose	beneficial	ownership	could	be	related	to	Cosa	Nostra,	
according	to	police	sources	(Box	14).
In terms of business sectors, besides the historical interest 
in construction and real estate activities	 (e.g.	 Sacco,	
2010;	 Savona	 2010;	 Fondazione	 RES,	 2013;	 Transcrime,	
2013a;	 Riccardi,	 2014a;	 see	 Section	 8.4),	 waste and scrap 
management and renewable energy are attracting OCG 
attention.	 In	 particular,	 there	 are	 signals	 of	 infiltration	 of	 the	
wind	power	and	photovoltaic	sectors	(Caneppele,	Riccardi,	&	
Standridge,	2013;	De	Paolo,	2013).252
252. The large-scale Operation ‘Via	col	Vento’	conducted	by	Italian	LEAs	led	to	
the	seizure	of	dozens	of	wind	energy	companies	believed	to	be	connected	with	
most	wanted	Cosa	Nostra	boss	Matteo	Messina	Denaro	(see	8.4).
Categories of OCG First three countries First five business sectors
Cosa Nostra OCGs Italy;	Spain;	Romania
Construction;	Wholesale	and	retail	tradea;		Bars	and	restaurants;	
Manufacturing;	Real	estate	activities
Camorra OCGs Italy;	UK;	Spain
Wholesale and retail tradea;	Bars	and	restaurants;	Construction;	
Waste	and	scrap	management;	Casinos,	VLT	and	betting	activities
‘Ndrangheta	OCGs	 Italy;	Germany;	Spain
Construction;	Bars	and	restaurants;	Hotels	and	other	tourist	
accommodations;	Agriculture	and	fishing;	Wholesale	and	retail	tradea
Chinese OCGs Italy;	Netherlands;	UK
Wholesale and retail tradea;	Bars	and	restaurants;	Transportation	and	
renting	of	motor	vehicles;	Real	estate	activities;	Sex,	tattoo	and	other	
personal activities
Russian OCGs Spain;	Italy;	UK
Wholesale and retail tradea;	Bars	and	restaurants;	Real	estate	
activities;	Hotels	and	other	tourist	accommodation;	Casinos,	VLT	and	
betting activities 
Outlaw Motorcycle gangs
Finland;	Sweden;	
Netherlands
Bars	and	restaurants;	Construction;	Private	security;	Wholesale	and	
retail tradea;	Repair	and	retail	of	vehicles
a Including	WRT	not	specified,	WRT	of	food,	WRT	of	gold	and	jewellery.
Table 72 - First three countries and five business sectors with the highest evidence of investment - Selected categories of 
OCGs
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
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Camorra OCGs
Among	 Italian	 mafias,	 Camorra	 criminal	 groups	 are	 those	
emerging as most active in terms of investments at European 
level	 and	 outside	 the	 area	 of	 origin	 (Italy,	 in	 particular	
Campania,	 southern	 Lazio	 and	 northern	 Apulia).	 Abroad,	
major investments are made in restaurants, pizzerias, bars, 
catering companies and wholesalers of food products 
(especially	 dairy	 products).	 These	 last	 may	 be	 used	 also	
as fronts for the smuggling of illicit goods, especially drugs. 
However, there is also growing interest in construction 
companies in foreign countries.
In	particular,	strong	infiltration	can	be	found	in	the	economy	of 
Spain	 (see	Section	8.6),	where	Camorra	also	plays	a	 leading	
role in drug trafficking. In Spain, Camorra affiliates set up 
successful	 and	 profitable	 companies,	 and	 have	 even	 been	
able to manage the catering of events organised by the Italian 
Chamber of Commerce in Madrid and the Italian embassy 
(Transcrime	2013a),	thus	exhibiting	a	strong	link	with	the	local	
community;	 and	 they	have	also	been	able	 to	acquire	 shares	
in large construction companies involved in the building 
of	 a	 real	 estate	 complex	 and	 tourist	 resort	 (see	 Operation 
Laurel, Box 35). Evidence has also been found in Scotland 
(Campana,	2011a;	Transcrime,	2013a),	Germany,	Romania	and	
Switzerland.
To be noted is that Camorra, among the OCGs covered by 
this study, is probably the one involved in the widest variety 
of	business	sectors	 (see	Section	8.6):	wholesale and retail 
trade of food, dairy products, clothing	 (crucial	 also	 for	
the marketing of counterfeit apparel), flowers and plants, 
gold and jewellery	 (through	 the	 so-called	 ‘compro-oro’	
shops), mining, quarrying and construction and VLT 
and slot machines	 (Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Transcrime,	 2013b;	
Gruppo	Antimafia	 Pio	 La	 Torre,	 2014,	 p.	 11;	 Riccardi,	 2014a).	
In	 particular,	 significant	 differences	 in	 terms	 of	 investment	
strategy and degree of specialisation can be found among 
different	Camorra	clans	(Riccardi,	2014a).	
Increasing investments are also made in transportation, and 
in particular petrol stations, both in Campania and other 
Italian	regions	(e.g.	Emilia	Romagna)	(Cantone	&	De	Feo,	2010;	
La	Repubblica,	2013;	Gruppo	Antimafia	Pio	La	Torre,	2014,	p.	
11). In particular, investment in petrol stations seems to serve 
both laundering purposes and control of the territory, but it is 
also instrumental to VAT frauds, excise frauds, product frauds 
(through	alteration	of	fuel	dispensers)	and	fuel	smuggling.
‘Ndrangheta OCGs
As	 already	 underlined	 in	 Part	 1,	 ‘Ndrangheta	 has	 rapidly	
expanded	its	illegal	activities	(from	cocaine	trafficking	to	ITF)	
outside	 its	 territory	 of	 origin	 (i.e.	 Calabria)	 into	 other	 Italian	
regions and other European countries.
In terms of investments in the legal economy, it seems 
that	 ‘Ndrangheta	 has	 extended	 its	 businesses	 to	 several	
European	 countries.	 Evidence	 of	 ‘Ndrangheta	 investments	
has been found in southern France	 (e.g.	 French	 Riviera)	
in	 the	 construction	 industry	 (see	 8.4)	 and	 the	 real	 estate	
sector	 (Galliano,	 2011;	 Le	 Mentonnais,	 2012;	 Leclerc,	 2012a;	
Transcrime, 2013a, p. 248).253
Several	 investments	have	been	made	by	 ‘Ndrangheta	 in	 the	
real estate sector in Italy, Spain, and the UK.	 ‘Ndrangheta’s	
interest in the real estate market has also been underlined 
by Operation Metropolis	 (see	 Box	 26),	 where	 ‘Ndrangheta	
members established relations with real estate companies 
in Ireland, Spain and the UK in order to attract investments 
in tourist resorts in Calabria. According to the available 
information,	 the	 ‘Ndrangheta	 also	 invests	 in	 Germany, 
especially in hotels and restaurants, construction, and the 
wholesale and retail of food, and in other European countries 
(e.g.	in	Portugal).	In	the	Netherlands, despite the recognised 
presence	 of	 criminal	 affiliates	 in	 illicit	 markets	 (see	 5.5),	 no	
specific	evidence	of	investments	has	been	identified.
Regarding	 business	 sectors,	 ‘Ndrangheta	 invests	 in	
construction, hotels, bars and restaurants, transportation 
and wholesale and retail trade in both traditional and 
non-traditional	 territories	 (see	 8.4	 and	 Transcrime,	 2013a;	
Caneppele,	Riccardi,	&	Standridge,	2013;	Riccardi,	2014a).	 In	
particular,	to	be	noted	is	that	some	‘Ndrangheta	groups	have	
a	 sort	 of	 specialisation	 in	 infiltrating	 specific	 sectors	 (e.g.	 in	
Lombardy in construction, hotels, bars and restaurants – see 
8.4).254 
Chinese OCGs
Chinese	 criminal	 groups	 have	 diversified	 their	 activities	
and	 infiltrated	 the	 legal	 economies	 of	 several	 EU	 countries.	
They are the non-European criminal groups with the highest 
number of references, and evidence of their investments has 
As	mentioned	above,	 infiltration	of	 the	construction	 industry	
appears	 less	 significant	 in	 foreign	 countries,	 and	 legal	
companies serve primarily to facilitate illicit activities, such 
as	 drug	 trafficking	 (disguised	 by	 shell	wholesale trade and 
import-export	companies)	and	even	fraud	(e.g.	in	the	olive	oil	
sector in Andalusia - see Transcrime 2013a).
253.	The	investments	by	 ‘Ndrangheta	in	southern	France	and	in	particular	the 
Côte	 d'Azur	 should	 be	 analysed	 in	 conjunction	 with	 its	 strong	 infiltration	 of	
the economic and administrative fabric in the Italian region of Liguria, and in 
particular	in	the	province	of	Imperia,	which	adjoins	the	French	Riviera	(see	8.2).
254.	Moreover,	in	some	cases	‘Ndrangheta	groups	have	formed	‘joint-ventures’	
with	 other	 Italian	 mafia	 groups:	 for	 example,	 with	 Camorra	 groups	 for	 the	
management	of	nightclubs	on	Lake	Garda	(see	Box	28),	or	with	Camorra	and	
Cosa	Nostra	members	 for	 control	 of	 the	 fruit	markets	 of	 Fondi	 (near	 Rome),	
Milan	and	Piacenza.
Box 14 - Sicilian interests in Europe’s largest 
landfill site near Bucharest 
In	 2013,	 the	 Italian	 judicial	 authorities	 seized	 three	
companies in Romania that were managing the 
largest	 landfill	sites	 in	Europe	(Gline	and	Tulcea)	near	
Bucharest	 (Amadore,	 2011;	 Lo	 Bianco	 &	 Lillo,	 2012;	
Amadore, 2013). 
According to the Italian prosecutors, the companies, 
active	in	the	treatment	and	disposal	of	non-hazardous	
waste, could be indirectly linked to M.C., son of former 
Palermo	mayor	V.C.	 sentenced	 for	mafia	 association.	
In particular, the prosecutors believed that these 
companies served to launder the proceeds of illicit 
trafficking by Cosa Nostra. Local entrepreneurs may 
have	been	used	to	set	up	these	businesses	(Amadore,	
2011;	Lo	Bianco	&	Lillo,	2012;	Amadore,	2013).
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Figure 26 - European countries with evidence of invest-
ments by Cosa Nostra, Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta OCGs
Camorra
Cosa Nostra
'Ndrangheta
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
been	 found	 in	all	 the	OCP	countries	 (except	Finland)	and	 in	
several other European countries.
Chinese OCGs invest their money in various sectors. 
Investments in bars and restaurants have been discovered 
in Italy, France and the UK. In France and the UK investments 
in real estate as well as wholesale and retail trade relate to 
illegal	activities	(e.g.	human	trafficking,	counterfeiting,	money	
laundering,	 and	 drug	 trafficking)	 (El	 País,	 2012b;	 Marraco,	
2012). 
In Spain, Chinese criminal groups set up businesses for 
money laundering purposes and operate in the hotels, 
restaurants	 and	 real	 estate	 sectors	 (see	 Box	 33).	 Evidence	
in Italy has been found in various business sectors, including 
the	wholesale	 and	 retail	 of	 clothing	 (also	 in	 connection	with	
counterfeiting), bars and restaurants, real estate, massage 
parlours	 (as	 covers	 for	 sexual	 exploitation	 activities)	 and	
money transfer businesses, also used to transfer illicit funds 
to	China	(see	Box	32).	
Russian and Georgian OCGs
Russian/Georgian	OCGs	appear	 to	be	 the	most	widespread	
in Europe in terms of number of countries with cases of 
investment	in	the	legitimate	economy	(see	Figure	27).	
In recent years, Russian criminal groups have invested 
particularly in construction, transportation and logistics, 
the real estate sector, the wholesale and retail trade, bars and 
restaurants, and hotels. Their activities in the legal economy 
are often related to schemes to launder the illicit proceeds of 
criminal	activities	(e.g.	organised	theft	and	firearms	trafficking,	
etc.).
Russian OCGs set up businesses in all OCP countries. 
In Finland	 they	 have	 infiltrated	 the	 construction	 and	
transportation	 sectors,	 and	 their	 ‘legal’	 activities	 are	 often	
functional	 for	 the	 commission	 of	 other	 crimes	 (e.g.	 fraud,	
money laundering – see 8.1). In France, cases are reported of 
the	infiltration	of	the	real	estate	sector	 in	Paris	and	southern	
regions	(INHES	-	OND,	2008;	Gendarmerie	Nationale-STRJD,	
2013).
In Italy	 (see	 8.4)	 there	 is	 evidence	 of	 investments	 related	
to high-level money-laundering schemes in hotels and 
restaurants	 and	 real	 estate;	 and	 also	 of	 smaller-scale	
investments in import-export, wholesale trade and 
transportation companies to conceal the transfer to Eastern 
Europe	 of	 goods	 stolen	 during	 organised	 thefts	 (Bianconi	 &	
Santucci, 2012).
In the UK there are cases of Russian OCGs running businesses 
active	in	sports	and	gaming,	banking	and	the	financial	sector,	
and	 the	 wholesale	 and	 retail	 trade	 (see	 8.7).	 Substantial	
evidence of Russian OCGs investments can be found in the 
real estate sector, bars and restaurants, and gas stations 
in Spain in relation to money laundering, frauds and human 
trafficking	(Kegö	&	Molcean,	2011;	La	Vanguardia,	2013;	Parjea,	
2013, and see Box 15).
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Motorcycle gangs
Although Outlaw Motorcycle gangs (OMCGs) have 
historically been active in particular in Scandinavia and 
Northern Europe, there are signals of an expansion and 
sophistication	 of	 their	 financial	 interests	 in	other	European	
countries	(see	Figure	27).
Besides the laundering of illicit proceeds from criminal 
activities	 (e.g.	 drug	 trafficking)	 through	 both	 real	 estate	
and registered assets, in particular motorbikes, there is 
evidence of investments in legitimate businesses, mostly bars 
and restaurants and construction companies, but also 
private security	 (especially	 in	 Finland	 –	 see	 8.1),	 wholesale	
and retail trade activities, repair and retail of vehicles and 
transportation. 
Box 16 – Operation Casablanca: Hells Angels 
across Europe
Operation Casablanca was a large-scale international 
police operation involving Interpol, Europol and 
German,	Austrian	and	Dutch	authorities	(Burgen,	2013).	
It led to the arrest of 25 members of the Hells Angels 
Motorcycle gang on suspicion of drug trafficking, 
trafficking in human beings, extortion and sexual 
exploitation. Illicit goods, movable and registered 
vehicles	(e.g.	luxury	cars	and	motorcycles)	were	seized	
during the investigation, especially in Mallorca, where 
the OMCG had its headquarters. Apparently, the group 
was planning to invest in a F1 circuit to be built on the 
island	(Burgen,	2013).
Other organised crime groups
Among other types of criminal groups active in Europe in terms 
of investments in the legitimate economy, Balkan and other 
South-Eastern European OCGs, Turkish OCGs and North 
African OCGs are those that register the highest amount of 
cases	in	several	European	countries	(see	Figure	28).
Despite the large number of studies on, and investigative 
cases	of,	their	activity	in	illicit	markets	across	Europe	(see	Part	
1),	 there	 are	 few	 references	 regarding	 infiltration	 of	 the	 legal	
economy. 
Cases have been found of North African criminal groups 
mainly involved in drug trafficking and investing dirty money 
Figure 27 - Countries with evidence of investments of Chi-
nese OCGs, Russian/Georgian OCGs and OMCGs
Chinese OCGs
Russian OCGs
Motorcycle gangs
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
Box 15 – Operation Clotilde: Russian criminal 
groups infiltrate Spanish economy
Operation Clotilde targeted Russian criminals in Spain 
operating in various business sectors and laundering 
the illicit proceeds of crimes. According to investigative 
evidence, the Russian criminals had their headquarters 
in Lloret de Mar but were active in Catalonia and 
linked to representatives of the local economic and 
political	 system	 (La	Vanguardia,	 2013).	They	 set	 up	a	
complex money laundering scheme with construction 
companies, restaurants, retail shops, real estate 
businesses and gas stations.
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in	 fast-food	 restaurants	 (e.g.	 kebab	 shops)	 in	 France	 (see	
Box 21). The same applies to Turkish OCGs, which used a 
real	 estate	 company	 (société civile immobilière) to invest in 
immovable	goods	in	the	area	of	Metz,	not	far	from	the	German	
border	(Gendarmerie	Nationale-STRJD,	2013).
However it has been frequently signalled that both North 
African and Turkish OCGs tend to transfer the illicit proceeds 
generated in Europe to their countries of origin	(Gendarmerie	
Nationale,	2012;	Gendarmerie	Nationale-STRJD,	2013).
•		 Second,	profit:	 although	 the	 correlation	 with	 profitability	
is not clear, there is evidence that criminal groups invest 
in	 very	 profitable	 sectors	 (e.g.	 renewable	 energy)	 or	 in	
areas	 (e.g.	 PACA,	Costa	 del	 Sol,	 etc.)	 characterised	 by	 a	
sustained real estate market. 
•		 Third,	control of the territory: investments in territorial-
specific	 business	 activities	 such	 as	 construction,	 hotels,	
bars and the acquisition of real estate properties make it 
possible to monitor a certain area constantly. 
•		 Fourth,	 investments	 in	 legal	 assets	 are	 also	 crucial	
for infiltrating and expanding influence on the 
local politics, public administration and business 
community. This has historically been a feature of Italian 
mafias,	 especially	 in	 their	 areas	 of	 origin	 (see	 8.4);	 but	 it	
has	 started	 to	 characterize	 –	 according	 to	 the	 evidence	
collected	 and	 analysed	 –	 mafia	 investments	 outside	 the	
country of origin, and also the investment activity of foreign 
OCGs	(e.g.	Chinese,	Motorcycle	gangs,	Eastern	European	
OCGs), which, in a sense, seem to have increased their 
mafia infiltration behaviour.
It is evident that criminal groups use investments in the 
legitimate economy not only to launder money but also 
to exercise their power and influence, and to exploit 
economies of scale with the criminal activities in which they 
are involved. OCGs do not discriminate between illicit and 
legitimate	markets;	rather,	they	see	them	as	a	continuum along 
which	 to	 grasp	 profit	 opportunities	 and	 expand	 their	 power	
and economic gain.
Other patterns of criminal investment, especially in legitimate 
businesses, are emerging and should be stressed: 
•		 First,	 the	 expansion of criminal investments beyond 
‘traditional areas’: examples are the investments by 
Italian	mafias	 in	northern	 Italy	or	 in	 foreign	countries	 (e.g.	
Cosa Nostra in Romania, Camorra in Spain, etc.) or the 
expansion	of	the	financial	interests	of	Motorcycle	gangs	in	
southern Europe.
•		 Second,	the	change	in	control and ownership strategies: 
there is evidence that criminal groups are accelerating 
the	 shift	 from	 more	 direct	 control	 (i.e.	 OCG	 members	
directly involved as shareholders or administrators of their 
companies) to more indirect control entailing the greater 
use	 of	 figureheads,	 freelance	 entrepreneurs	 hired	 on	
occasional	bases,	or	the	use	of	informal	‘banking’	services	
(i.e.	 the	 lending	 of	 funds)	 which	 most	 often	 result	 in	 a	
decisive influence on the decision-making process of the 
company	itself	(see	so-called	‘banks	of	the	‘Ndrangheta’	in	
Northern Italy – Section 8.4). 
•		 Third,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 increasing number of 
‘joint-ventures’ among different criminal groups for the 
management of legal companies, the control of legitimate 
markets, or the organisation of high-level money laundering 
schemes	(see	above).	
This	 first	 exploration	 has	 important	 implications	 for	 the	
understanding of the dynamics of criminal investments but 
still leaves some crucial research questions unanswered. 
The results presented above must be interpreted cautiously, 
because	OCGs	do	not	necessarily	think	‘as	one’.
It is instead necessary to determine at what level of the 
criminal organisation consumption patterns and investment 
strategies are determined. Who, in a criminal group, decides 
Figure 28 - Countries with evidence of investments of 
other organised crime groups
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
Other OCGs
7.5. Drivers and concluding 
remarks
The analysis carried out by Project OCP has shown that 
organised crime investments not only respond to money 
laundering needs but serve a wider variety of purposes:
•		 First	 of	 all,	 investments	 in	 the	 legitimate	 economy,	
either in companies or other assets, may facilitate the 
commission of illicit activities, for example:
- Criminal groups can use transportation companies, 
import/export	 and	 wholesale	 trade	 firms	 (especially	
of food products) as fronts to conceal the trafficking 
of illicit drugs or the smuggling of illicit, counterfeit or 
stolen	goods;
-  They manage bars and restaurants, clubs and hotels as 
covers for prostitution rings or marketplaces for illicit 
drugs;
- They buy real estate properties and use them to 
accommodate victims of sexual exploitation, stock illicit 
goods,	or	as	laboratories	to	produce	synthetic	drugs;
-			They	control	money	service	businesses	(MSB)	to	ease	
the	cross-border	transfer	of	illicit	funds;
-			They	exploit	oil	and	gas	firms	or	petrol	stations	to	commit	
fraud	(e.g.	excise	fraud,	fuel	laundering,	product	fraud,	etc.).
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whether to buy a real estate property or to acquire a share of 
a construction company? Is the decision taken at individual 
level, in the sense that the single OCG member may choose 
individually	how	 to	 launder	 the	 illicit	money	 that	s/he	earns?	
Answers to these questions indubitably constitute the most 
crucial area for research in the future.
This chapter is devoted to analysis of investments by criminal 
groups in the seven OCP countries: Finland, France, Ireland, 
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Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
For each country, the analysis will follow the structure of 
Chapter 7, focusing on:
•		 the	 geographical distribution of the evidence on 
organised	crime	investments;
•		 the	most	frequently	mentioned	types of assets;
•		 the	most	frequently	mentioned	business sectors;
•		 the	differences	in	terms	of	investment	strategy	among	the 
main criminal actors active in the country.
Methodological remarks
Owing to the lack of data on criminal investments, for the 
purpose of this analysis it was necessary to take account of a 
range	of	‘softer’	sources,	including:
•		 Reports by LEAs, and in particular crime situation reports, 
threat assessments, and annual reports produced by the 
National	Bureau	of	Investigation	(NBI);256
•		 Reports	and	data on seized and confiscated assets	(see	
Section	12.2	for	details);
•		 Academic literature;
•		 Open	sources,	in	particular	media reports	(e.g.	the	Finnish	
newspaper Helsingin Sanomat).
The information collected from these sources yielded a 
limited set of references on criminal investments.257 Where 
255. Unlike in some other countries, members of the Finnish OC are not listed 
openly as owners, managers or employers, and it is highly unusual if the names 
of the criminals appear e.g. in company documents.
256.	 As	 mentioned	 in	 Section	 5.1,	 the	 NBI’s	 main	 task	 is	 to	 combat	 serious,	
international and organised crime, and produce up-to-date and reliable 
situational awareness on these crime areas. The NBI has the most extensive 
updated information on OC in Finland. Its surveys are based on criminal 
intelligence gathered in cooperation between police authorities, Finnish 
Customs and Finnish Border Guard Service. The reports include also police and 
other	 agencies'	 reports,	 judicial	 evidence,	 crime	 and	 administrative	 statistics	
and open sources. Most of the NBI reports are not publicly available since they 
contain	confidential	 information.	That	is	why	they	are	referenced	only	with	the	
name of the institution and the year of publication.
8. Focus on seven 
European countries                                                  
8.1. Finland                                                                                                                             
Sarianna Petrell and Jarmo Houtsonen (Police University College, Finland)
8.1.1. Introduction
There is not much literature or research on organised 
crime investments in Finland. This may be due, among other 
factors, to the use of legitimate fronts and strawmen as facades 
behind which criminals, especially upper-level OCG members, 
use	and	control	their	property	(Junninen,	2006).255 The use of 
front men and shell companies not only hinders investigations 
but also makes it difficult to obtain an overall and current 
picture of the situation on criminal investments in Finland. 
Also the Police Information System Patja, which is used as the 
main	 source	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 confiscated	 assets	 (Section	
12.2), gives a similar picture: the assets of the most experienced 
upper-level OCG members are hard to trace, while most of the 
activities of the Finnish lower-level OCG members appear to 
be quite small scale. 
Bearing these limitations in mind, an attempt has been made to 
carry out an exploratory study, based on a variety of sources, 
of where criminals may invest their illegal proceeds. The 
analysis, the first of this kind produced at national level, 
does	 not	 aspire	 to	 producing	 a	 definitive	 description	 of	 the	
phenomenon, but can be considered a starting point for future 
research	in	this	field.
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available, for each case, information about geographic region, 
type of asset or business sector, and type of criminal actor 
involved was collected. Given the limited amount of cases, 
the information collected hardly represents a representative 
sample, so that a quantitative analysis would not be very 
informative. Therefore the next sections will provide a more 
qualitative assessment. After some general considerations 
about the characteristics of criminal investments in Finland, 
the focus will be on geographical patterns, types of assets and 
business sectors, and on the criminal actors involved.
Organised crime investments in Finland: general 
considerations
The	 reports	by	 the	NBI	 (2012–2014)	 indicate	 that	OCGs	use	
illicit proceeds to cover the operating costs of illegal 
activities, to buy property, and to invest in the illegal 
and legal economy.	 Money	 laundering	 and	 profit,	 together	
with facilitation of crime, seem to be important drivers behind 
investments. However, it is difficult to estimate how illicit 
proceeds are divided according to different needs, goals, 
markets, offences and OC actors. It is also hard to identify 
any patterns of investments for different OCGs. 
Taking the structure of organised crime groups in Finland into 
account	 (see	 Section	 5.1),	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 discern	 two	main	
layers and roles in organised crime in the country, which may 
correspond to two levels of criminal investments:
•		 Most	of	the	activities	of	the	Finnish	OCG	members	are	quite	
small scale. The lowest layer of the criminal community 
lives hand-to-mouth and commits crimes only in order to 
satisfy daily needs. The small sums of money that these 
OCG members earn from criminal activities are used for 
everyday	expenditure;	there	is	nothing	left	to	buy	property	
or	invest;
•		 The	upper level of organised crime in Finland consists 
of the more organised and experienced OCG members, 
who are able to plan and commit serious and well-organised 
crimes	 in	 cooperation	 with	 other	 criminals,	 financiers	
and	specialists	(see	Section	5.1).	This	upper	 level	of	OC	is	
committed mostly in flexible ways and through networking: 
members of OCGs cooperate in appropriate roles with 
other	actors	in	both	the	criminal	and	the	legal	sphere	(NBI,	
2013).
The most typical method used to launder illegal proceeds 
in Finland is still to report them as the property of close 
intimates or other strawmen	 (Junninen,	 2006;	NBI,	 2013):	
wives, cohabitees, lawyers, children, friends, or any reliable 
person	who	may	legally	own	and	run	a	business	(see	Box	17).	
The front is used as a facade so that the authorities are unable 
to	confiscate	assets.	The	reliable	front	is	formally	responsible	
for ownership and management of the business in return for a 
small compensation.
Fronts seeking easy money are not difficult to find in Finland 
(Junninen,	 2006).	 Needy	 or	 credulous	 people	 are	 willing	 to	
serve the purposes of money launderers.258 False identities 
are rather easily available in public data sources as well 
(NBI,	2012).	Junninen	(2006)	stated	that	 it	 is	also	possible	to	
use ghost companies as fronts, or persons who themselves are 
not even aware of the fact that there are companies registered 
in their name. One method of hiding and re-investing the 
proceeds of crime is also to deposit the money abroad in 
different currencies, e.g. in Russia or tax haven countries. 
Today, however, money laundering is increasingly carried out 
with systematic and professional methods, e.g. by making 
use of business structures and companies both at home 
and abroad, as well as by using the expertise of professional 
business and law specialists. Financiers of criminal projects 
operate	 in	 close	 cooperation	 with	 the	 OC	 figures	 because	
they know how to carry out both legal and illegal business 
operations. There are also a number of underworld bankers 
who	finance	criminal	projects	in	Finland	(NBI	2012).259
Even more sophisticated money laundering schemes are used. 
Illegal money obtained, e.g. in narcotics crime, is laundered by 
using business companies to pay unreported wages and 
make	 investments.	 The	 beneficiaries	 of	 criminal	 projects	
obtain	 their	share	 (also	 laundered)	as	well	as	other	benefits 
like cars. Vehicles are obtained by entering into agreements 
with car dealers cooperating with the OCGs260	 (Junninen,	
2006).
258. Gullible persons interested in extra money and ready to lend their bank 
accounts are easily found on the Internet, and they are exploited by OCGs from 
abroad. Persons in difficult economic and social circumstances are also easily 
available in the criminal environment, and they are used as money mules to 
conceal the origin of proceeds.
259. For example, certain car dealers are specialised in serving criminal 
customers and providing them with underworld banking services. Holding 
companies are used to channel illegal proceeds into, for example, vehicles to be 
used	by	the	perpetrators	and	organisers	(NBI,	2013).
260. The cars used by criminals are often owned by car dealers specialised in 
serving criminal customers. The dealers know that the criminals work in illegal 
businesses and accept payments in cash. In return, they register the cars in the 
names of their companies.
257.	In	particular	only	about	70	references	have	been	collected	(see	Chapter	2 
and the Methodological Annex for details).
Box 17 - The criminal’s girlfriend as strawman of a 
large money laundering scheme
In	 2007,	 one	 OC	 figure,	 who	 had	 businesses	 in	 the	
car trade and the construction sector, both in Finland 
and Estonia, was arrested for aggravated narcotics 
offences. Despite being in prison, he continued his 
criminal activities during 2008–2010. The possessions 
acquired from narcotics and black economy 
businesses were laundered by transferring them with 
artificial	arrangements	under	the	name	of	his	girlfriend.	
Altogether 16 apartments were registered in the name 
of the girlfriend, who was later suspected of aggravated 
money laundering. Also other relatives and the former 
trial counsel of the main suspect were suspected 
of aggravated money laundering and frauds. The 
prohibition of transfer ordered by the court covered 
property worth 1.8 million euro. The property consisted 
of several apartments, real estate and plots of land 
both in Finland and Estonia. Also a car and jewellery 
were	confiscated	(NBI,	2013).
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Some of the money earned from black market operations 
and economic crime is redirected to the criminal groups by 
way of tax and accounting fraud. Criminal money is also 
used to finance other criminal activities, including drug 
trafficking	 and	 illegal	 bars	 (NBI,	 2013).	Moreover,	Hietaniemi	
and	Korpisaari	(2005)	reported	that	OC	members	use	illegal	
profits	gained	from	criminal	activities	to	pay	debts	and	living	
costs, and to buy companies, intoxicants and luxury items. 
Moreover, an overlap between illegal activities carried 
out by criminal groups and investment into legitimate 
businesses	 can	 be	 identified.	 Huhtanen	 (2010)	 stated	 that	
OCGs in Finland are mainly engaged in the drugs business. 
However,	 they	 seem	 increasingly	 to	 favour	 financial	 crime	
almost	 as	 much,	 because	 of	 higher	 profits,	 lower	 risks	 and	
shorter sentences. 
8.1.2. Geography 
Given the limited amount of evidence, it is difficult to determine 
which geographic areas of Finland are most exposed to 
criminal	 infiltration	 and	 investments.	 Some	 information	 can	
be	 derived	 from	 analysis	 of	 confiscated	 assets	 (for	 details,	
see Section 12.2). According to this database, the locations 
of	 the	 confiscations	 vary	 from	 South	 to	 North	 Finland,	
concentrating in areas where the influence of the OC is 
known to be strong.	 Most	 of	 the	 confiscations	 have	 been	
recorded in the province of Uusimaa, which includes the three 
big cities of Helsinki, Vantaa, and Espoo. This seems to 
confirm	what	has	been	reported	also	in	other	OCP	countries:	
that criminal investments concentrate mostly in populated 
urban areas or where the presence of criminal organisations 
is stronger.
8.1.3. Assets and business sectors
Although	most	confiscated	assets	are	cash	and	vehicles	(see	
Section	 12.2),	criminals’	 investments	 in	Finland	can	be	made	
in a variety of assets, including real estate and legitimate 
companies, movable and registered assets	 (e.g.	 cars,	
boats, etc.). 
Real estate properties
Only	 a	 few	 confiscated	 real	 estate	 properties	 were	 found	
regarding	assets	confiscated	from	OC	members	(see	Section	
12.2). Some of them had a value of up to 800,000 euro. 
However, it should be borne in mind that real estate properties 
are usually owned by legal fronts and reported under their 
name, which makes it difficult to determine if they are a 
preferred form of investment by criminal groups.
Registered and other movable assets
Registered assets represent a substantial proportion of the 
assets	 confiscated	 from	 organised	 crime	 groups	 in	 Finland	
(see	 Section	 12.2).	 The	 majority	 of	 them	 consist	 of	 motor 
vehicles, mainly cars and motorcycles. To be noted is that, 
as regards motorcycles, the most common make is Harley-
Davidson.261 Motorbikes are an integral part of the 
OMCG culture:	 they	can	serve	both	as	 ‘investments’	and	as	
instruments to exercise power and to commit crimes.
Motor	 vehicles	 are	 confiscated	 especially	 in	 cases	 of	
aggravated	 narcotics	 offences	 and	 tax	 frauds	 (see	 Section	
12.2). Instead, the cars used by criminals are often owned by 
car dealers specialised in serving criminal customers, which 
makes	confiscation	more	difficult	(Junninen,	2006).
As regards movable assets, cash is the asset most frequently 
confiscated.	 This	 suggests	 that	 cash constitutes a 
significant part of OCGs’ portfolios	 (see	 Section	 7).	
The	 sums	 confiscated	 vary	 from	 a	 few	 euro	 to	 hundreds	 of	
thousands. Also some bank accounts, jewellery, and stock 
certificates	have	been	confiscated.
Companies
According to media reports, police believe that hundreds of 
Finnish	companies	are	 in	 the	grip	of	 organised	crime	 (Passi,	
2011). It is estimated by the police that more than half of the 
members of the most significant OCGs have companies 
of their own, or they occupy responsible positions in other 
companies.	 Infiltration	 of	 business	 activities	 is	 an	 important	
means to gain influence, obtain crucial information, earn and 
launder illegal money, and carry out other criminal activities. 
As	 mentioned	 above,	 infiltration	 by	 organised	 crime	 of	
companies is difficult to trace because the latter are 
usually owned by relatives, strawmen, or other legal fronts. 
Consequently, no companies were found in the database 
regarding confiscated assets	(see	Section	12.2).
The business sectors receiving investments from the OCGs 
in	 Finland	 (Table	 73)	 are	 construction and renovation, 
maintenance and cleaning, bars and restaurants, 
machine repair, second-hand machine and car retailing, 
tattoo and sex shops, and private security services 
(including	bouncers	in	popular	nightclubs).	
Business networks in these sectors provide several 
opportunities to commit crime and launder money. In 
addition	to	facilitation	of	crime,	some	activities	(e.g.	bouncers	
in nightclubs) are used to gain influence and control over 
Level of 
evidence*
Business sectors
Higher Construction;	Repair	and	retail	of	vehicles;	Bars	and	restaurants	
Medium
Maintenance	and	cleaning	services;	Private	security;	Transportation	and	renting	of	motor	vehicles;	Clubs;	
Sex, tattoo and other personal activities
* The	classes	are	divided	according	to	the	value	of	the	mean	plus	±0.5	standard	deviations	of	each	sector	(see	Chapter	7).	Information	available	for	61	references.
Table 73 - Business sectors with evidence of organised crime investments in Finland
Source: PCF elaboration on DOCI
261. The values of motor vehicles were, instead, usually not available.
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the territory	 (NBI,	 2013).	 These	 are	 the	 branches	 in	 which	
the	members	of	OC	groups	do	invest	for	personal	profit,	and	
which they know and therefore use for their business activities. 
OCGs have concentrated on labour-intensive	 (e.g.	
construction) and low-tech	(e.g.	bars	and	restaurants)	sectors,	
and also on those close to OCG cultures and lifestyles, like 
sex and tattoo shops, motorcycle repair, and private security 
for the OMCGs. These are also branches in which OCG 
members can utilise the knowledge, skills and contacts that 
they typically possess. Also the lack of supervision, e.g. in 
the construction industry and the restaurant business, makes 
them vulnerable to exploitation by the OCGs. The resources 
to monitor these labour-intensive sectors are inadequate, and 
as	a	consequence	the	risk	of	being	caught	is	rather	low	(NBI,	
2013, 2014).
Numerous OCG members and their close acquaintances 
engage in business activities which serve the purposes of OC 
infiltration	of	society	and	its	structures.	Some	sectors,	e.g.	the	
restaurant business, also enable the laundering of stolen, 
smuggled or counterfeited products	(NBI,	2013).	
Both companies registered in Finland and abroad are 
involved in money laundering by OC members. The companies 
related to OCGs are usually fairly small, but multi-business 
firms often provide a variety of services, such as security 
combined with various other services, like maintenance, 
cleaning, recruitment. These sectors can be used to gain entry 
to	places	that	become	targets	of	criminal	activity	(NBI,	2013).
OC members increasingly incorporate specialist support 
services into their networks, especially ones operating the 
fields	 of	 law	 and	 business.	 Professionals and company 
service providers are exploited in all phases of the criminal 
project, from preparation and commission to laundering of 
the	proceeds.	The	 infiltration	of	 business	by	OC	figures	 has	
brought	 financial	 crime-connected	 violence	 and	 extortion	
into	companies	(NBI,	2013).	There	follow	comments	on	some	
representative business sectors.
Construction 
Police suspected that a criminal organisation linked to 
Bandidos	 MC	 (BMC)	 was	 behind	 an	 enormous	 series	 of	
economic crimes in the construction sector. Altogether 100 
people were suspected of committing crimes in 200 different 
companies. Twenty million euro of suspicious money was 
transferred through these companies. At least 1 million euro 
were	confiscated.	The	types	of	crime	ranged	from	aggravated	
tax frauds to accounting offences. Most of the companies 
acted on the border between the legal and illegal sectors, and 
they used black labour and bogus receipts. The targets of 
the construction projects included a prison, a garrison, and a 
ministry	building	(Kerkelä,	2006)	(Box	18).
Bars and Restaurants
One method commonly used to invest criminal money is to 
purchase a restaurant. OC members engaged in smuggling 
are often also involved in the restaurant business. Restaurants 
are constructed and renovated, and refurbishments are made 
by illegal workers using stolen equipment and materials. 
Alcohol and tobacco sold in these restaurants may often be 
smuggled or stolen	(Junninen,	2006).	Many	OCGs,	like	Hells	
Angels	 MC	 (HAMC),	 have	 been	 accused	 of	 illegally	 selling	
alcohol	in	order	to	gain	profits	(Salovaara,	2013b).	
Police suspect that a chapter of Bandidos MC earned tens 
of thousands of euro by running an illegal drinking place 
in their club house in South Finland. The activity lasted for at 
least a year and the customers were both members and non-
members of the BMC. The alcohol was apparently bought in 
Estonia	(Vähäsarja,	2011).
Private security 
In the security sector related to bars and restaurants, a 
significant	 phenomenon	 began	 in	 the	 early	 2000s,	 when	
OCGs started to use their members as bouncers at the doors 
of night clubs or to establish their own companies in the door 
supervision sector. The bouncer business can be used gain 
influence and acquire a legal facade for criminal actions, 
since the same companies are also active in money laundering 
and the drug and doping business. Especially Cannonball MC 
has gained control of the doors to the big night clubs in Helsinki 
(Palovaara	&	Passi,	2012).
Box 19 – The United Brotherhood company which 
sold security devices to public authorities
A notable case arose in the security service sector 
at the end of 2013. Police authorities, the Finnish 
Customs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
purchased security devices, mainly electronic tags, 
from a company partly owned by an investment 
company founded and headed by the sister of the 
leader of the OCG United Brotherhood. United 
Brotherhood is a new underworld alliance which was 
established	 by	 members	 of	 certain	 significant	 gangs	
in 2010. It is notorious for narcotics offences and the 
use of violence in, for example, debt collection. Half of 
its approximately 90 members are currently in prison. 
Also economic crimes, aggravated frauds, bribery 
and abuse of public office are connected to the case. 
Investigations	 are	 still	 under	 way	 (Passi	 &	 Reinboth,	
2013).
Box 18 – From bikers to builders: the Hells Angels 
construction company
In 2010, a Finnish minister discovered that the heating, 
piping,	and	air	conditioning	(HPAC)	company	that	she	
had hired to renovate her mansion was owned by Hells 
Angels	 MC	 (Salovaara,	 2013a).	 The	 same	 company	
had also been hired by a police station in south-east 
Finland	 (Nieminen,	 2013).	 Another	 example	 of	 OC	
activity in construction business is provided by a 
staffing company owned by a Romanian man who was 
also in charge of an OCG which brought 21 Romanians 
into Finland to work for very low wages on construction 
sites. The man was convicted of trafficking in human 
beings	in	Romania	(Passi,	2011).
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Sex and tattoo shops
The	 most	 significant	 outlaw	 Motorcycle	 gangs	 have	
established tattoo shops in the biggest cities of Finland. 
Setting	 up	 a	 tattoo	 business	 serves	 to	 mark	 the	 gang’s	
foothold in the area and to support marketing and recruiting. 
These shops attract local young people interested in the biker 
lifestyle and perhaps to some extent already familiar with 
criminal subculture. The shops introduce them to the ideology 
and	 activities	 of	 the	 gang	 (NBI,	 2013).	 Hells	 Angels	 MC,	
Bandidos MC and Cannonball MC have their own tattoo shops 
around Finland. HAMC and BMC also have stores where they 
sell	their	support	products	(Mölsä, 2008).
Emerging sectors
The OC companies seek to avoid restrictions imposed by 
legislation and public regulation so that they can react to 
changes in the economy, legislation and consumer demand 
more rapidly than legal companies. By using black market 
cheap labour and avoiding taxes, OC companies can save 
money, offer cheap services, and win competitive biddings. 
Like all businesses, also OC is increasingly shifting its activities 
to the Internet, where anonymity, topicality and lack of 
borders are substantial advantages. Finland is among the top 
countries in combating corruption. Nevertheless, companies 
run by OCGs try to affect competition, for example in the 
construction business, by means of corruption and bribery 
(NBI,	2013).
to Rajamäki	 (2006),	 the	 use	 of	 black-market	 cheap	 labour	
from Estonia and other Baltic countries occurs particularly 
in the metropolitan area, in the construction, catering and 
accommodation sectors. 
Money laundering by Russian OCGs is a threat especially to 
the	 construction	 sector,	 because	 financing	 which	 originates	
from Russia may contain illegally obtained money, and 
therefore strengthen the strategies of action typical of 
Russian	 OC	 in	 the	 sector	 (NBI,	 2012).	 In	 addition,	 Saarinen	
(2007)	found	that	financial	crime	related	to	foreign	trade	and	
transportation via of forwarding agencies262 is conducted by 
Russian perpetrators with links to Russian criminal groups. 
Small logistics and forwarding agencies have been set 
up by Russian OCGs in Southern Finland in order to commit 
fraud	and	financial	crime	in	connection	with	foreign	trade	and	
commercial transit transport to the Russian market. 
8.1.5. Concluding remarks 
The lack of research on OC investments in Finland makes it 
difficult to estimate the economic activities of the Finnish 
OCGs and to identify their investment patterns. Moreover, 
it is hard to gain a reliable overall picture of investments by 
analysing	 confiscated	 assets.	 Consequently,	 it	 has	 been	
necessary to rely on reports and estimates made by the 
National Bureau of Investigation and then included in the 
DOCI	(see	Chapter	2).	
The concealment of criminal earnings is an integral part of 
organised crime. Criminal proceeds must be laundered to 
become part of the legal economy. In Finland, this is usually 
done by relying on strawmen, often chosen among close 
intimates. Today, however, money laundering is increasingly 
carried out in systematic and professional ways, e.g. by 
making use of business structures and companies both 
at home and abroad, as well as by using the expertise of 
professional business and law specialists. The use of fronts 
and facades to hide the real ownership of organised crime 
properties complicates not only investigations but also the 
production of analyses and situational awareness.
OCGs use illicit proceeds to cover the operating costs of 
illegal activities, to buy property, and to invest in the 
illegal and legal economy. Even so, there are no reliable 
estimates of how illicit proceeds are divided according to 
different needs, goals, markets, offences, and OC actors. 
Similarly, the patterns of investments by different OCGs are 
impossible to identify. 
Finnish OCGs have hierarchical structures and flexible ties 
with various business experts that they need to plan and carry 
out operations. The largest proportion of criminal activity is 
undertaken by the lowest layer of the criminal community, 
whereas the upper level plans and commits serious and more 
sophisticated crimes in cooperation with other criminals, 
financiers,	 and	 business	 specialists	 (NBI,	 2013).	 In	 Finland,	
companies and real estate are seldom confiscated, 
although they are often mentioned in NBI reports and analyses 
as important economic assets of organised crime. This may 
be because of the use of strawmen and relatives as nominal 
owners	 of	 property	 while	 the	 criminal	 figure	 maintains	 real	
control. 
262. Forwarding agencies are companies that transport goods on behalf of 
other	companies;	therefore	they	are	also	responsible	for	customs	clearance	and	
other administrative issues related to import and export.
Box 20 – A criminal gang’s snow business
One feature of the OCGs is that they adjust rapidly 
to changes in society, and in different sectors. One 
example of how OCGs can extend their actions into 
new branches was apparent a few years ago during 
an	 exceptionally	 snowy	 winter.	 OCGs	 set	 up	 ‘snow	
business’	companies	and	offered	to	plough	roads	and	
clear roofs. The work was done by cheap black labour 
hired	from	abroad	(Passi,	2011).	When	spring	came,	the	
house owners noticed that the workers had damaged 
their roofs, but the companies responsible for the snow 
clearance were no longer to be found. Instead, cheap 
repair	work	was	soon	on	offer	(NBI,	2013).
8.1.4. Actors
As described above, according to the available evidence, 
Motorcycle gangs and other Finnish OCGs are the criminal 
groups	most	 active	 in	 investment	 in	 the	 country’s	 legitimate	
economy. Their main areas and preferred business sectors 
for	 infiltration	are	those	described	above,	although	there	are	
differences among groups in terms of investment strategy. 
However,	 there	 is	also	evidence	of	 foreign	financial	 interests,	
especially	in	the	‘grey	area’	between	legitimate	companies	and	
illegal markets. 
Besides cooperation between Finnish OCGs, there is also 
cooperation between Finnish and Estonian OCGs in the 
field	of	financial	crime.	Estonian	partners	are	able	to	provide	
black-market or low-wage labour for the purposes of OCG-
related grey economy enterprises. In the case of joint criminal 
projects with Estonian criminals, especially in the construction 
sector, money is transferred to Estonia, for example using 
companies	 registered	 in	 that	 country	 (NBI,	 2012).	According	
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The business branches most typically with OCG involvement 
in Finland are construction and renovation, maintenance 
and cleaning, bars and restaurants, machine repair, 
second-hand machine and car retailing, tattoo and sex 
shops, and private security service	 (NBI,	 2013).	 Business	
networks in these sectors provide several opportunities to 
commit crime and launder money.
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8.2.1. Introduction 
Money laundering and criminal infiltration constitute a 
threat for the legitimate economy of France and a concern 
for	 the	French	public	 authorities	 (INHESJ	 -	ONDRP,	 2012,	 p.	
233;	Tracfin,	 2013,	 p.	 3).	 In	 recent	 years,	 regulatory	 changes	
have been made at national level to tackle money laundering 
and	financial	crime	(FATF,	2011a)	and	a	variety of agencies – 
investigative, judicial, and administrative – have been created 
for	the	identification	and	recovery	of	criminal	assets	(INHESJ	
- ONDRP, 2012, p. 232). They include, for example, the PIAC,263 
the BRIFN264 and the French Financial Intelligence Unit 
TRACFIN.	More	recently,	in	2011,	the	AGRASC	(Agence de la 
Gestion et Recouvrement des Avoirs Saisis et Confisqués)265 
has	been	 created	with	 the	 purpose	 of	managing	 seized	 and	
confiscated	assets	(see	Section	10.4	and	12.3).266
There are various reasons why France is not exempt from 
money laundering but on the contrary may attract organised 
crime	 investments	 (some	 of	 them	 have	 been	 anticipated	 in	
Section 5.2). 
•		 First,	 illicit	markets	 in	 the	country	 generate	a	significant 
amount of illicit proceeds. According to OCP estimates 
(see	5.2),	France	ranks	third	in	terms	of	size	of	illicit	markets	
among	OCP	countries	(16	billion	euro	taking	account	only	
of illicit drugs, ITTP, counterfeiting, MTIC frauds and cargo 
theft). Although not all these revenues are attributable 
to organised crime groups and are laundered locally, a 
substantial proportion may enter the French legitimate 
economy.
•		 Second,	 France’s	 central	 position	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	
various	 illicit	 trafficking	 routes	 (see	5.2)	may	also	make	 it	
a transit country for illicit fund transfers, in particular 
across	 border	 areas	 (e.g.	 at	 the	 south-eastern	 frontier	
with Italy or the north-eastern frontier with Germany and 
Belgium).
•		 Third,	 and	 related	 to	 the	 previous	 point,	 the	 different	
ethnic	 origins	 of	 OCGs	 active	 in	 France	 (see	 5.2)	 and	
their interconnections with the motherland and other 
immigrant communities worldwide, may expose the 
French	banking	and	financial	system,	more	than	others,	to	
illicit	financial	inflows	and	outflows.
•		 Fourth,	 France	 is	 a	 developed	 country	 still	 offering	many	
profitable investment opportunities: for example in the 
real estate sector in certain regions such as Île-de-France 
and Côte	d’Azur	 (see	below).	The	proximity	of	centres	of	
financial	excellence	like	Luxembourg	or	the	Principality	of	
Monaco may also facilitate the establishment of businesses 
in	the	country	(INHES	-	OND,	2008,	p.	211).	
•		 Finally,	according	to	TRACFIN	(2013),	the	recent economic 
crisis has increased the risk of money laundering and 
criminal	investments,	because	small	companies	in	financial	
distress	may	be	more	easily	infiltrated	by	OCGs	(TRACFIN,	
2013, p. 11).
However, despite the attention by public agencies, criminal 
investments still remain understudied by scholars, and 
large-scale studies are almost non-existent. This can be 
explained, as already mentioned in Section 5.2, on the one 
hand by the lack of statistics on the activity of criminal 
groups	 in	 France	 (Gendarmerie	 Nationale-STRJD,	 2013),	
and on the other, by difficulties in defining and classifying 
organised crime	 in	 the	 country	 (Lalam,	 2004):	 criminal	
groups are numerous, more or less hierarchical, often linked 
to foreign groups but not always ascribable to international 
criminal organisations and therefore not often clearly 
identifiable	(Gendarmerie	Nationale-STRJD,	2013).	
Taking all these difficulties into account, this section attempts 
to provide a first exploratory analysis of the investments 
by OCGs in the French legitimate economy. It does so by 
drawing on the various sources described below.
Methodological remarks
Owing to the lack of statistics on money laundering and 
criminal assets, for the purpose of this analysis it has been 
necessary to draw on a range of sources, including:
•		 Reports	 by	 LEAs	 (e.g.	 Gendarmerie	 Nationale-STRJD,	
TRACFIN,	etc.);
•		 Institutional	 reports	 (e.g.	 annual	 reports	 by	 INHESJ	 –	
ONDRP,267	FATF,	FIUs,	etc.);
•		 Reports	 and	 data	 issued	 by	 asset	 recovery	 offices	 (e.g.	
annual reports by AGRASC)
•		 Open	sources,	in	particular	media	reports;
•		 Academic	literature.
Evidence	of	criminals’	investments	in	the	legitimate	economy	
was collected from these sources and then organised into 
the DOCI. For each case, where available, information about 
geographic region, type of asset or business sector, and type 
of	criminal	 actor	 involved	was	collected	 (see	Chapter	2	and	
the Methodological Annex for further details). 
This resulted in a set of 114 references to organised crime 
investments, most of them taken from institutional reports 
263. The PIAC - Plateforme d’Identification des Avoirs Criminels is a specialised 
law	 enforcement	 unit	 established	 in	 2005	 and	 dedicated	 to	 financial	 and	
patrimonial	investigation	(see	12.3).
264. The BRIFN – Brigade de recherches and d’investigations financières 
nationale – provides operational support for investigations related to money 
laundering	 and	other	 forms	of	 organised	crime	 in	 the	 economic	and	financial	
field	(INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012,	p.233).
265.	The	agency	for	the	management	and	recovery	of	seized	and	confiscated	
assets is a public administrative institution under the joint supervision of the 
Ministry of Justice and Finance. It was created by law no. 2010-768, 9 July 2010 
which	 aims	 to	 facilitate	 criminal	 seizure	 and	 confiscation	 (http://www.justice.
gouv.fr/justice-criminal-11330/agrasc-12207/).
266. Moreover, to be noted is that France also hosts the Financial Action Task 
Force	 (FATF),	 a	 pivotal	 international	 organisation	 in	 the	 field	 of	 anti-money	
laundering.
267. The French National Institute for Advanced Studies in Security and Justice 
- INHESJ is a national public administrative institution under the supervision 
of the French prime minister, created by Decree no. 2009-1321 of October 28, 
2009.
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(e.g.	 INHESJ	 -	 ONDRP,	 Gendarmerie	 Nationale-STRJD,	
TRACFIN – see the Methodological Annex). To be highlighted 
is the lack of cases that could be collected from newspapers, 
which suggests low media interest in this matter. Given 
the limited amount of cases and the diversity of sources, the 
dataset collected does not represent a well-representative 
sample, so that a quantitative analysis would not be very 
informative. Instead, the next sections will provide a more 
qualitative assessment focused on the following issues: 
geography	 of	 criminal	 investments	 (8.2.2),	 types	 of	 assets	
and	of	business	sectors	 (8.2.3),	 criminal	actors	 involved	and	
drivers	behind	investment	(8.2.4).
8.2.2. Geography
Among the already limited number of references collected, 
those	specifying	the	exact	region	of	infiltration	are	even	fewer.	
Therefore,	 a	 systematic	 mapping	 of	 criminals’	 investments	
across French regions is almost impossible. However, some 
trends can be highlighted. 
Organised crime illicit financial outflows
First, not all of the illegal proceeds produced in France are 
then laundered or invested locally. Instead, OCGs (especially 
of foreign origin) operating in France may invest back in 
their home countries or in those where they have strong ties 
(INHES	 -	OND,	 2008,	 p.	 211;	Gendarmerie	Nationale-STRJD,	
2013, p. 2). 
In particular, there is evidence that North African OCGs 
or gangs from ‘difficult suburbs’	 (quartiers sensibles) 
involved in the trafficking of illicit drugs have invested their 
proceeds abroad, for example in Morocco in the real estate 
sector	 (Gendarmerie	Nationale-STRJD,	2013,	p.	2).	Similarly,	
Georgian OCGs involved in organised theft move their illicit 
proceeds	 from	France	 to	Russia	 and	Georgia	 (Gendarmerie	
Nationale-STRJD, 2013, p. 4).
This trend not only exposes French banks and money 
transfer agencies to the risk of being victims of illicit fund 
transfers;	 it	 also	 constitutes	 a	 double loss for the French 
economy, because crimes are committed in the country and 
criminal proceeds are laundered abroad. 
Organised crime illicit financial inflows
As	mentioned	 above,	 specific	 indications	 of	 the	 locality	 are	
given in only a limited number of cases. According to the 
evidence, the areas of France that seem to attract most 
criminal investments are:
•		 The	PACA region	(Provence-Alpes-Côte	d’Azur);
•		 Île-de-France;
•		 Corsica;
•		 The	 north-eastern border	 (with	 Switzerland,	 Germany,	
Belgium), and in particular Rhone-Alpes, France-Comté 
and Lorraine.
South-eastern France, and in particular the Côte d’Azur, is a 
crucial region	in	terms	of	criminal	infiltration	of	the	legitimate	
economy for various reasons:
Figure 29 - Geographical distribution of evidence of crimi-
nal investments in France (NUTS 2)268
Legend
Low
Medium-Low
Medium-High
High
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
Box 21 – Illicit proceeds from the French drugs 
market to Moroccan real estate
In 2012, the French Gendarmerie dismantled an 
international organisation trafficking drugs from 
Morocco via Spain. A Moroccan family, very well 
established in the city of Besançon, built an alliance 
with local criminals near Paris. Highly structured, the 
organisation controlled the entire supply chain, from 
production in Morocco to the retail market in France. 
It organised transportation of the drugs through Spain 
concealed among goods and semi-wholesale products 
(Gendarmerie	 Nationale-STRJD,	 2013).	 The	 illegal	
proceeds, mostly generated in the French market 
of Besançon, were invested in France in fast food 
companies, but also abroad. 
The second case involved a Moroccan family, located 
in Mayenne, which used the same strategy – local 
alliances and organised transportation – to smuggle 
drugs	 from	 Morocco	 to	 France.	 Their	 illicit	 profits	
were invested in real estate back in Morocco, where, 
according to documents discovered by the police 
during their raid, they purchased a residential property 
valued	at	380,000	euro	(Gendarmerie	Nationale,	2012).
268.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
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•		 First,	since	the	 ‘French	Connection’	of	 the	 1930s,269 it has 
been, together with Corsica, an area of influence of the 
French ‘grand banditry’	 (grand banditisme traditionel) 
–	especially	around	Marseille,	Nice,	Toulon	(Montel,	2008;	
Gounev	 &	 Bezlov,	 2010)	 –	 which	 has	 often	 been	 able	 to	
create	 an	 ‘underworld’	 (milieu) of connections within the 
social	 and	 political	 fabric	 and	 infiltrate	 the	 political	 and	
economic system.
•		 Second,	 south-eastern	 France	 has	 often	 been	 subject 
to infiltration by Italian mafias	 (Cosa	Nostra,	Camorra,	
‘Ndrangheta),	which	have	taken	advantage	of	geographical	
proximity	 with	 Italy	 and	 language	 (most	 people	 in	 Côte 
d’Azur	 are	 able	 to	 speak	 Italian).	 To	 be	 stressed	 in	 this	
regard	is	the	strong	evidence	of	infiltration	by	‘Ndrangheta 
in the Liguria region, and in particular the province of 
Imperia	 (Demer,	 2012;	 Transcrime,	 2013b;	 Zancan,	 2014;	
Pracchi,	 2014;	 see	also	Section	8.4)270 and that there is a 
risk that it may extend across the border, in particular into 
Côte	 d’Azur,	 thus	 creating	 a	 continuum open to criminal 
investments.
•		 Finally,	Côte	d’Azur	 is	attractive to foreign investors, in 
particular in the real estate and hotel sectors. Properties in 
the areas record a surge in sales, unlike the rest of France 
and	of	Europe	 (Sullivan,	2014),	 and	 they	account	 for	25%	
of	all	the	international	sales	in	the	country	(Sullivan,	2014).	
The booming real estate market, strong tourist appeal, 
together	with	proximity	 to	 centres	of	 financial	 excellence	
like Monaco, may expose this area to high-level investments 
by both local and foreign OCGs.
South-eastern	 France	 is	 located	 (together	 with	 other	
European regions like Andalusia) at the crossroads of 
the financial interests of numerous OCGs at the same 
time, including the traditional banditisme,	 Italian	 mafias	
(in	 particular	 ‘Ndrangheta)	 and	 other	 foreign	 groups	 (e.g.	
Russian).	Moreover,	‘joint	ventures’	among	these	organisations	
for	investment	purposes	cannot	be	excluded	(see	Chapter	7).
As regards the other areas, Corsica, similarly to southern 
France,	 has	 been	 historically	 targeted	 for	 infiltration	 and	
investment by local OCGs because the criminal proceeds of 
Corsican	 groups	 are	 often	 laundered	 on	 the	 island	 (Gounev	
et al., 2010. See also 8.2.4 below). The Paris area is obviously 
exposed given its crucial role in terms of both business 
opportunities and criminal markets, while cases of money 
laundering by OCGs have also been found in north-eastern 
border regions such as Lorraine and Franche-Comté, 
in particularly related to illicit drug trafficking and fraud 
(Gendarmerie	 Nationale-STRJD,	 2013).	 However,	 it	 is	 not	
possible to determine the magnitude of the phenomenon in 
these areas given the limited amount of information available.
8.2.3. Assets and business sectors
There is evidence of criminal investments in assets of all kinds, 
including	movable	and	registered	assets	(e.g.	cars,	boats,	etc.),	
real estate and legitimate companies. The following sections 
describe the main trends for each type of asset, and provide a 
more	detailed	review	of	the	most	infiltrated	business	sectors.
Real estate properties
Real estate is a preferred form of investment for OCGs 
active	 in	 France	 (Gendarmerie	 Nationale-STRJD,	 2013;	
TRACFIN,	2011,	p.	25),	and	it	is	often	considered	one	of	the	first	
steps	 in	 infiltrating	 the	 local	 legal	 economy	 (Lalam,	2004,	p.	
382). Investments in real estate occur both in France and in the 
home	country	through	transnational	illicit	flows	(Gendarmerie	
Nationale-STRJD, 2013).
Properties also represent, in monetary value, the most 
important asset confiscated in relation to serious and 
organised	 crimes,	 according	 to	 AGRASC	 data	 (see	 Section	
12.3),	although	it	should	be	borne	in	mind	that	the	confiscation	
of companies is almost non-existent in France. 
According to the available information, the types of real estate 
most	 frequently	 mentioned	 (or	 confiscated)	 are	 villas and 
luxury houses,	as	well	as	apartments	and	land	(Lalam,	2004,	
p. 382). This may suggest, as in other countries, patterns of 
luxury consumption by criminals.
In regard to related predicate offences, drug trafficking 
and fraud appear to be the main sources of illicit proceeds 
subsequently	 invested	in	real	estate	(INHES	–	OND,	2009,	p.	
194;	FATF,	2011a;	INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012,	p.	232).	
Investments may be made in personal names or through 
holding companies. There is evidence of the increasing 
use of société civile immobilière (SCI) or société de 
gestion immobilière (SGI)	 (INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012,	p.	232;	
Gendarmerie Nationale-STRJD, 2013): these offer tax and 
management advantages, a wider range of possibilities in 
terms of the buying and selling of properties, and they make it 
more	difficult	to	trace	and	seize	assets.
As	concerns	 the	geography	of	criminals’	 investments	 in	 real	
estate,	inspection	of	the	distribution	of	confiscated	immovable	
properties	 (see	 Section	 12.3)	 shows	 that	 the	 most	 targeted	
areas	have	been	Nord-Pas-de-Calais,	Île-de-France,	Lorraine,	
Rhône-Alpes,	 and	 Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur	 (AGRASC,	
2013, p. 39). 
269.	 The	 ‘French	Connection’	 of	 the	 1930s	 organised	 the	 purchase	 of	 opium	
in Turkey, processed it into heroin in laboratories operated by Corsicans in 
Marseille,	 and	 then	 smuggled	 the	 final	 product	 into	 the	 United	 States.	 It	 is	
estimated that, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the French Connection 
supplied	a	large	amount	of	the	heroin	used	in	the	United	States	(UNODC,	2012,	
p. 67).
270.	To	provide	an	example,	the	councils	of	Ventimiglia	(on	the	French	border)	
and	 Bordighera,	 less	 than	 20	 km	 from	 Menton	 (Galliano,	 2011),	 have	 been	
dissolved	due	to	infiltration	by	‘Ndrangheta.
Box 22 - Corsican OCGs and real estate 
investments in Provence
In Aix-en-Provence, a number of affiliates to the 
Corsican Brise de mer OCG had invested in the 
real estate sector, making use of holding real estate 
companies	 (société civile immobilière - SCI). Among 
them was an important representative of the local 
hotel	 sector	 (L’Alsace,	 2011).	 When	 this	 person	 was	
questioned in 2011, it was found that he had been 
laundering money through the purchase of a house in 
Corsica and shares in a holding company operating in 
Aix-Les	Milles	(Provence-Alpes-Côte	d’Azur).	
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Finally to be noted is the interest of OCGs active in French 
illegal markets in the real estate sectors of foreign countries, 
more often the country of origin. For example, evidence 
of	 investments	 by	 North	 African	 drug	 traffickers	 (active	 in	
France) in operations immobilieres in Morocco has been 
found, as well by Russian/Georgian OCGs in properties in 
the motherland	(Gendarmerie	Nationale-STRJD,	2013).
Companies and business sectors
Criminal investments in legitimate businesses are quite 
frequent in France, regardless of the type of actor involved. 
They may be made by the grand banditisme traditionnel, 
foreign groups active in illicit trafficking in the country, smaller 
local	gangs	from	difficult	suburbs,	or	foreign	mafia-type	OCGs	
(Gendarmerie	Nationale-STRJD,	2013).
Legitimate businesses serve a plurality of purposes, 
including	 money-laundering,	 profit-making,	 infiltration,	 and	
influence	on	the	social	and	political	community;	or	they	can	be	
used	as	fronts	for	illegal	trafficking	(e.g.	transportation	of	drugs	
or of human trafficking) or they may host illegal activities such 
as	usury	and	illegal	gambling	(INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012,	p.	233;	
TRACFIN,	2013;	Gendarmerie	Nationale-STRJD,	2013).	
Investments may be made through the acquisition of direct 
shareholdings or they may rely on more or less complex forms 
of	 ‘layering’,	 such	 as	 the	 use	 of	professionals or shell and 
fictitious companies,	often	registered	abroad	(FATF,	2007,	p.	
18;	STRJD,	2013,	p.	2;	TRACFIN,	2013,	p.	13).
According	to	the	data,	criminal	infiltration	in	France	targets	a	
variety of business sectors. Table 74 below lists the sectors 
with the highest and medium levels of evidence of criminal 
investment. Other sectors include internet points and 
phone centres	(INHESJ	-	ONDRP,	2012,	p.	233),	tobacconist 
shops	 (INHESJ	 -	 ONDRP,	 2012,	 p.	 233),	 car dealerships 
(Gendarmerie	 Nationale-STRJD,	 2013)	 and	 casinos 
(Transcrime,	2013a).
Bar and restaurants
Evidence	of	infiltration	in	this	sector	by	both	local	OCGs	(e.g.	
see	Box	23)	and	foreign	ones	(e.g.	Chinese	OCGs,	see	Berry	
et al., 2003, p. 10) can be found. Investments are usually made 
in ‘pizzerias’, fast food restaurants, street food stalls (e.g. 
kebabs) and bars	across	the	whole	of	France	(Gendarmerie	
Nationale-STRJD,	 2013;	 Saubaber	 &	 Monnier,	 2013).	 As	
already noted, bars and restaurants do not require high-level 
management	skills,	are	 labour	 intensive	(useful	 for	exploiting	
or concealing irregular workers), can facilitate laundering due 
Level of 
evidence*
Business sectors
Higher Wholesale and retail tradea;	Bars	and	restaurants;	Real	estate	activities;	Construction	
Medium
Transportation	and	renting	of	motor	vehicles;	Hotels	and	tourist	accommodations;	IT	and	other	services;	
Sport	and	gaming;	Casinos,	VLT	and	betting	activities;	Clubs
*	The	classes	are	divided	according	to	the	value	of	the	mean	plus	±0.5	standard	deviations	of	each	sector	(see	Chapter	7).	The	information	is	available	for	87	
references.
a In particular, the wholesale and retail trade of food and of clothing and textiles.
Table 74 - Business sectors with evidence of criminal infiltration in France
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
Construction and public procurement
Investments in the construction sector are most common in 
southern France and Corsica,	where	cases	of	infiltration	of	
the	public	administration	have	been	most	frequent	(Cornevin,	
2011;	 Le	 Mentonnais,	 2012;	 Pelletier,	 2012)	 and	 where	 the	
buoyant	 real	 estate	 market	 (see	 above)	 offers	 numerous	
opportunities for investment. The grand banditisme 
traditionnel	 has	 often	 been	 associated	 with	 infiltration	 of	
public works in the PACA region. More recently, cases of 
infiltration	of	construction	companies	operating	on	the	French	
Riviera	 have	 also	 involved	 Italian	 mafia	 OCGs,	 in	 particular	
the ‘Ndrangheta	 (see	 Box	 25	 below).	 Infiltration	 of	 public	
procurements has also concerned transportation and the 
waste management	 sector	 (e.g.	 in	 Marseille,	 Verne,	 2011;	
Bertrand	&	Lecadre,	2011;	see	Box	24).
to their cash-intensive nature, and are also crucial for public 
relations (Lalam,	 2004,	 p.	 382;	 Saubaber	 &	 Monnier,	 2013).	
Moreover, bars may also host illegal activities such as illegal 
gambling	and	usury	(see	Chapter	4).
Box 23 – A brewery in the south of France and a 
complex corporate ownership scheme
In 2012, while investigating night clubs in Aix-en-
Provence, the police discovered a scheme to launder 
money via bars, restaurants, clubs and real estate. 
Criminal proceeds from extortion racketeering were 
invested in ALPHA,271 a Swiss company created in 2000 
for the sole purpose of buying BETA, a brewery in the 
South	of	France.	When	BETA’s	owner	was	arrested	for	
organised money laundering, his shares were acquired 
by another company, GAMMA, which in turn acquired 
a restaurant, DELTA, through a Malian company, ETA, 
based	in	Bamako	(Saubaber	&	Monnier	2013).
Box 24 – A case of corruption, money laundering 
and manipulation of public procurements in 
Marseille
This case concerns conflict of interest, money 
laundering, corruption, fraud and extortion. Two 
brothers from Marseille, one a high-level politician 
and the other an entrepreneur, helped each other by 
manipulating	public	procurements	(Meeus,	2011).
271.	The	names	of	the	companies	are	fictitious
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Hotels and other tourist accommodations 
Infiltration	of	the	French	hotel	sector	has	been	mainly	recorded	
in southern France, especially on the French Riviera and 
in Corsica. It regards both the traditional grand banditisme 
and foreign OCGs, in particular the Italian Cosa Nostra and 
‘Ndrangheta	 (Transcrime,	 2013a,	 pp.	 234-249).	 Cases	 of	
infiltration	by	Russian	OCGs	have	also	been	reported.
Casinos 
As described in Chapter 4.6, casinos and legal gambling 
activities may often be used for laundering purposes. Judicial 
evidence shows that French OCGs have invested in casinos in 
Nice	and	Menton	(Lalam,	2004,	p.	383)	and	in	entertainment	
bars	 in	 Paris	 (Saubaber,	 2013).	 Evidence	 of	 investments	 by	
Italian	Cosa	Nostra	in	casinos	on	the	Côte	d'Azur	can	also	be	
found	(Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	237). 
Wholesale and retail trade
The	records	reveal	the	interest	of	French	OCGs,	Italian	mafias	
(in	particular	 the	Camorra	 in	Rhône-Alpes,	Provence-Alpes-
Côte	 d'Azur	 and	 Île-de-France,	 see	 Forgione,	 2009),	 and	
Chinese	OCGs	in	this	sector	(Lalam,	2004;	Le	Parisien,	2012).	
Retail shops can be used to launder money or to sell counterfeit 
products such as clothing and accessories. Wholesale trade, 
and in particular import-export companies, are instead 
crucial as fronts for a variety of illicit trafficking, including 
drugs and the transfer of stolen goods. 
Movable and registered assets
Owing to the lack of data, it is not possible exactly to determine 
the	 role	 played	 by	 movable	 (e.g.	 bank	 accounts,	 financial	
assets, but also jewels, other valuables, etc.) and registered 
assets	(cars,	boats,	etc.)	 in	the	portfolios	of	OCGs	 in	France.	
In	fact,	none	of	the	cases	reported	in	the	TRACFIN	(2011,	2013)	
reports exclusively concerns the purchasing of cars and 
boats.	However,	 the	data	on	confiscated	assets	provided	by	
AGRASC	(see	12.3)	suggest	that	these	goods	have	a	significant	
weight. 
In particular, on the one hand registered assets like cars 
(Gendarmerie	 Nationale-STRJD,	 2013)	 are	 often	 used	 for	
illicit trafficking, because most of the illicit routes in France 
are by road	 (see	Section	5.2);	on	the	other,	the	quantities	of	
jewels, other valuables, and luxury cars and yachts that are 
seized	suggest	 that	movable	and	registered	assets	are	used	
as status symbols and hence have a key role in the lifestyles 
of many affiliates of OCGs.
8.2.4. Actors
As	 discussed	 above	 (see	 also	 Section	 5.2),	 a	 plurality of 
criminal actors operate in illicit markets in France. They 
differ from each other in terms of both levels of organisation 
and ethnic origin. They are active in a variety of illicit markets, 
some at more local and others at international level.
The same variety can be found when considering investments 
in the legitimate economy: traditional indigenous and well-
rooted	OCGs	(such	as	the	grand banditisme from Corsica or 
Marseille), former Corsican independent groups converted 
into OCGs, smaller criminal gangs originating from quartier 
sensibles and often linked to North-African groups, Italian 
mafias	 (in	particular	 ‘Ndrangheta),	Russian-Georgian	OCGs,	
Chinese criminal organisations, Turkish OCGs, south-eastern 
or	 eastern	 European	 groups	 (Albanian,	 Rumanian,	 Balkan,	
Lithuanian) are all, at different levels, investing in the French 
legitimate	 economy	 (Gendarmerie	 Nationale-STRJD,	 2013,	
p. 1). This makes France, together with Spain, the European 
country with the widest range of foreign OCGs.
However, owing to the lack of data and the problems in 
classifying	 these	 groups	 (see	 5.2	 and	 8.2.1);	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
detect	 well-identifiable	 investment	 strategies.	 Nevertheless,	
some patterns can be highlighted.
French OCGs
French criminal groups investing in the legitimate economy 
are of two types. 
First, local OCGs linked to the traditional ‘grand banditry’ 
(grand banditisme).	 Their	 infiltration	 of	 the	 legitimate	
economy	 is	 particularly	 significant	 in	 Provence-Alpes-Côte	
d'Azur	 (especially	 in	 the	 urban	 areas	 of	 Nice	 and	Marseille)	
and in Corsica, where their influence on the local economy 
is	 substantial	 (Gounev	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 These	 groups	 exploit	
their high-level connections and their corruption and 
intimidation potential by investing in sectors related 
to public procurements such as construction, waste 
management,	 transportation,	 or	 real	 estate	 (Lalam,	 2004;	
Meeus,	 2011;	 Sariroglou	 &	 Guilledoux,	 2011;	 Gendarmerie	
Nationale-STRJD, 2013). Moreover, there is evidence of 
investments in bars, restaurants, casinos and nightclubs 
(Lalam,	2004,	p.	382;	Saubaber	&	Monnier,	2013),	which	can	
be used also to build contacts and networks with politicians, 
celebrities,	and	‘elites’	(Saubaber	&	Monnier,	2013).	
The second category of indigenous criminal groups 
comprises those originating from quartiers sensibles 
(‘difficult	suburbs’),	which	can	also	be	linked	to	North	African	
OCGs.	 They	 are	 mainly	 involved	 in	 drug	 trafficking	 (both	
on the Netherlands-France route and the Morocco-Spain-
France one) and they can invest either in France or abroad, 
for	 instance	 in	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 (especially	 Morocco)	
(Gendarmerie	 Nationale-STRJD,	 2013,	 p.	 2).	 They	 usually	
opt for less sophisticated business activities such as 
restaurants	 (kebab	 shops,	 fast-food	 restaurants,	 pizzerias,	
etc.),	real	estate	and	car	dealerships	(Gendarmerie	Nationale-
STRJD, 2013).
In 2004, A.G. mandates a consulting company for 
bidding in waste management, to which he appoints a 
friend’s	 firm.	 Police	 investigations	 revealed	 a	 1	million	
euro fraud, perpetrated mainly through false invoices 
issued by A.G. and his friends. He used shell companies 
in the UK and Luxembourg to transfer the money. A.G. 
was able to obtain contracts for the La Ciotat centre 
and	the	police	premises	of	Orgon	in	2006;	a	1.6	million	
euro contract for the construction of a building in June 
2007;	 the	 rehabilitation	of	 the	General	Council	 of	 the	
senior	club	Marseille	Saint-Jérôme	at	143,000	euro	in	
2008;	 and	 the	maintenance	 of	 HLM	 houses	 in	 2009	
(Meeus,	2011).	
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Italian mafias
Southern France, especially the PACA region, has been 
targeted	by	Italian	mafia	investments	in	recent	years	(Leclerc,	
2012). Evidence of infiltration by the ‘Ndrangheta of the 
construction and real estate sector on the French Riviera 
is	 increasingly	 reported	 by	 the	 media	 (Galliano,	 2011;	 Le	
Mentonnais,	2012;	Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	248).	To	be	noted	 is	
the	 strong	 presence	 of	 the	 ‘Ndrangheta	 in	 the	 neighbouring	
Imperia province in Liguria, which has even led to the 
dissolution of the councils of Ventimiglia and Bordighera, 
less	than	20	kilometres	from	Menton,	due	to	mafia	infiltration	
(Galliano,	2011).
Evidence	 of	 investments	 by	 other	 Italian	 mafia	 can	 also	 be	
found. Cosa Nostra has invested in the south of Corsica and in 
the	gambling	sector	in	Nice	(Transcrime,	2013a,	pp.	236-237),	
while there are reports of Camorra interests in the wholesale 
and	retail	of	clothing	and	textiles	 in	Rhône-Alpes	and	 Île-de-
France	(Forgione,	2009).
Other OCGs
According to the sources, there is also evidence of Dutch, 
British, North American, Western European and Chinese 
OCGs	groups	(Berry	et	al.,	2003,	p.	10;	WODC,	2012,	p.	364),	
mainly	 in	 the	 Paris	 real	 estate	 sector	 (INHES	 -	 OND,	 2008,	
p. 210). Chinese are also present in small-scale restaurants 
(Berry	et	al.,	2003,	p.	 10;	 INHES	-	OND,	2008,	p.	210),	and	 in	
the wholesale and retail trade, which can also be used to sell 
counterfeit	products	(Le	Parisien,	2012).	
Evidence of money laundering by Turkish OCGs in real estate 
properties	 (through	 société civile immobilière) has been 
identified	in	the	area	of	Metz,	not	far	from	the	German	border	
(Gendarmerie	Nationale-STRJD,	2013).
8.2.5. Concluding remarks
This	Section	has	attempted	to	provide	the	first	picture	of	OCG	
investments in France. As said, the research encountered 
a number of problems, including the lack of statistics 
and case studies on criminal investments in France and 
difficulties in comparing evidence collected from a variety 
of sources	( judicial	evidence,	institutional	reports,	police	and	
LEA reports, media and newspapers). Nevertheless, some 
important	findings	have	been	obtained.
In particular, two levels of infiltration of the legitimate 
economy	 can	be	 identified.	The	 first	 characterises	smaller 
groups like criminal gangs from quartier sensibles or foreign 
OCGs	 (such	 as	 North	 African	 OCGs	 or	 Georgian	 OCGs)	
active in drug trafficking or in organised theft and robberies. 
Such	infiltration	seems	widespread	across	France.	It	consists	
in low-scale investments in unsophisticated economic 
activities, such as bars, fast-food restaurants and small 
shops, and appears to be mainly driven by money laundering 
purposes.
The second level is typical of the grand banditisme 
traditionnel and is a more sophisticated and complex 
infiltration which relies on a consolidated underground 
(milieu) network of contacts among political, economic and 
social actors. These contacts can be exploited for higher-level 
investments in real estate, construction, waste management, 
and any other activity related to public procurements and 
public	resources.	This	type	of	infiltration	may	be	more	frequent	
in	specific	areas	of	France	such	as	Corsica	and	the	Provence-
Alpes-Côte	d'Azur	(PACA).	Besides	the	traditional	Corsican	or	
Marseille OCGs, there is evidence that also Italian mafias (in 
particular the ‘Ndrangheta) are increasingly adopting this 
approach on the French Riviera.
Also to be noted is that some of the groups active in France 
tend to invest back in their home countries, rather than 
launder	 locally.	 This	 exposes	 the	 French	 financial	 system	
(traditional	 banking	 but	 also	 the	 system	 of	 money	 transfer	
agencies) to illicit fund transfers and outflows.
Russian/Georgian OCGs
There	 is	 evidence	of	Russian/Georgian	OCG	 investments	 in	
the real estate sector	 in	 Paris	 (INHES	 -	OND,	 2008,	 p.	 211)	
and	 in	 Southern	 France,	 mainly	 in	 the	 PACA	 region	 (Kegö,	
Leijonmarck,	&	Molcean,	2011,	 p.	 39).	 It	 is	 likely	 that	also	 the	
hotel sector on the French Riviera has attracted these inflows.
By contrast, Georgian OCGs	(Vor-y-Zakone) active in illegal 
markets in France, in particular organised theft, may prefer 
to send the proceeds of crime back to their home countries 
(INHES	 -	OND,	 2008,	 p.	 211;	Gendarmerie	Nationale-STRJD,	
2013).
North African OCGs
North African groups are mainly involved in drug trafficking 
along the Morocco-Spain-France-northern Europe route. 
Although, according to police evidence, they are more likely 
to	invest	back	home	(e.g.	in	the	real	estate	sector	in	Morocco)	
(Gendarmerie	 Nationale,	 2012;	 Gendarmerie	 Nationale-
STRJD, 2013), some have laundered their illicit revenues 
through	French	fast-food	restaurants	(e.g.	kebab	shops)	(see	
Box 21).
Box 25 – ‘Ndrangheta on the Côte d'Azur: the 
Pellegrino case
A	 Calabrian	 family	 deemed	 close	 to	 ‘Ndrangheta	
was spotted in the town of Menton in Provence-
Alpes-Côte	 d’Azur.	 Although	 on	 the	 run,	 they	 were	
able to establish a legal registered company which 
obtained several construction contracts on the French 
Riviera	 (Le	 Mentonnais,	 2012).	 In	 2008,	 the	 French	
police intercepted the two Calabrian brothers while 
discussing a deal linked to money laundering. They 
heard	the	name	of	a	luxurious	building,	the	Royal	Plaza,	
which turned out to have been built by a contracting 
company	owned	by	the	mafia.	The	municipality	bought	
premises from a company owned by this family. This 
same company built 37 apartments and managed 
5	 construction	 sites.	 It	 even	 built	 police	 offices	 (Le	
Mentonnais, 2012).
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8.3.1. Introduction
It	is	not	easy	to	provide	a	detailed	overview	of	OCG	infiltration	
of the Irish legitimate economy. Firstly, most of the available 
literature about OCGs in Ireland, at both academic and 
investigative level, focuses on their role in illicit markets 
(see	 Section	 5.3)	 rather	 than	 on	 their	 money-laundering	
activities. Secondly, as in many other countries, it is not always 
possible to determine if a criminal conduct is ascribable 
to	 ‘organised	 crime’	 and	 thus	 decide	 whether	 an	 asset	 or	
investment	 has	 been	 part	 of	 an	 organised	 crime	 group’s	
strategy	or	of	individuals’	investment	behaviours.	
However, given the activity of OCGs in diverse illicit markets 
in	Ireland	(see	Section	5.3),	particularly	the	trafficking	of	illegal	
drugs,	firearms,	 tobacco	products,	and	more	recently	 frauds	
(An	Garda	Síochána,	2011;	An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a;	
OCTF,	2013;	CAB,	2013a;	Grant	Thornton	 Ireland,	2014),	and	
considering	Ireland’s	nature	as	a	‘transit’	country	for	a	range	of	
illicit goods, it is likely that illegal proceeds generated by these 
activities are laundered in the Irish legitimate economy. 
There is a growing attention to this issue in terms of 
media coverage	(an	increasing	number	of	reports	have	been	
devoted	to	OC	 infiltrations),	public	agencies’	 reports	 (e.g.	An	
Garda	 Síochána,	 2011;	 An	 Garda	 Síochána	 &	 PSNI,	 2012a;	
CAB,	2012;	CAB,	2013a),	and	studies	by	private	organisations	
(e.g.	Grant	Thornton	Ireland,	2014).	
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that whilst Ireland was 
already one of the most advanced jurisdictions in Europe 
in terms of criminal asset recovery and efficiency of the 
law	enforcement	system	(Calderoni,	Rotondi,	&	Favarin,	2013,	
p. 51), the legislative framework has been further improved 
with the adoption of additional measures to combat money 
laundering	and	criminal	 infiltration	of	 the	 legal	 economy	 (for	
a	 review	of	 these	measures	see	Davey,	2008;	Mitchell,	2012;	
FATF,	2013b;	Grant	Thornton	Ireland,	2014).
Despite this action, information on OCG investments is still 
scant, which makes it difficult to carry out any comprehensive 
and systematic analysis of this phenomenon. Therefore, for 
the purpose of this study, it was necessary to rely on a variety 
of sources, including:
•	 	 Reports by Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs),	 such	
as the annual reports of the An Garda Síochána, of the 
Organised	Crime	Task	Force	(OCTF)	and	the	Cross	Border	
Organised Crime Assessments issued by An Garda 
Síochána	jointly	with	the	Police	Service	of	Northern	Ireland;	
•		 Annual reports	of	the	CAB	-	Criminal	Assets	Bureau;
•		 Reports	by	public	and	private	organisations	(e.g.	FATF,	
MONEYVAL,	Grant	Thornton,	etc.);
•		 Academic literature;
•		 Media reports	and	other	open	sources;
•		 Statistics	on	seized and confiscated assets	(CAB,	Offices	
of Director of Public Prosecutions and Revenue Customs – 
see Section 12.4 for details).
Relying on this information, it was possible to identify some 
evidence	 of	 OCG	 infiltrations,	 and	 a	 dozen	 important	 case	
studies that were examined in detail in the analysis reported 
below. Although the information may be not sufficient to reach 
any	definitive	conclusions	on	OCG	investments	in	Ireland,	the	
following issues and trends may be highlighted:
•		 First,	 as	already	mentioned	 in	Section	5.3,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	
identify	a	specific	profile	of	Irish	OCGs	investing	in	the	legal	
economy: they may take the form of ‘occasional’ criminal 
enterprises or of business-oriented criminal groups 
with	 contacts	 among	 foreign	 groups	 (such	 as	 Italian	
‘Ndrangheta	or	Russian	OCGs)	and	in	foreign	countries,	or	
they may result from former paramilitary groups such as 
the IRA. 
•		 The	 cases	 identified	 are	often transnational in nature, 
in the sense that there is evidence that some foreign 
countries	 (in	 particular	 Spain,	 the	 UK	 and	 Italy)	 have	
received investments or witnessed money-laundering 
activities by Irish OCGs. It may happen that Irish OCGs 
use their international links with foreign groups not only 
for	 illegal	 trade	 but	 also	 for	 money	 laundering	 (see	 e.g.	
Operation Metropolis in Box 26).
•		 In	most	of	 the	cases	 identified,	 the	assets	 in	which	OCGs	
invested had not only a laundering role but also a functional 
purpose, in that they served for the commission of the 
illegal activity itself: e.g. OCGs invested in properties that 
were used also to store illegal drugs and smuggled goods, 
or	 in	 companies	 useful	 for	 transporting	 illicit	 drugs	 (e.g.	
wholesalers of food products, see below) or for selling them 
(e.g.	bars	and	restaurants).
•		 Thus,	 it	 cannot	 be	 ruled	 out	 that	 other Irish business 
sectors that may be strategic for certain illegal markets 
are	also	targeted	by	OCG	infiltration:	e.g.	petrol	stations	or	
oil	supply	companies	for	fuel	laundering	(see	below,	5.3	and	
also Section 12.4), transportation companies for smuggling, 
or	financial	companies	for	committing	frauds.
•		 However,	considering	 the	boom	of	 the	real	estate	market	
that has characterised Ireland in the past twenty years 
(see	Section	8.3.3	and	Figure	31),	and	taking	account	of	the	
similarities with the UK environment, it cannot be excluded 
that also real estate has attracted investments by criminal 
groups,	 including	 foreign	 ones	 (e.g.	 Russian	 OCGs)	 and	
especially	 in	 large	 urban	 areas,	 for	 both	 ‘speculative’	 or	
money-laundering	 purposes	 (McDonald,	 2008;	 Quigley,	
2013).
•		 Finally,	 new	 opportunities	 for	 OCGs	 investments	 or	
money laundering may have been created by recent 
developments	 in	the	financial	system,	such	as	the	spread	
of money service businesses	 and	 pre-paid	 cards	 (An	
Garda Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a,	p.	16)	or,	more	recently,	by	
the emergence of bitcoins.272
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272.	Ireland	seems	to	be	one	of	the	European	economies	more	‘open’	to	the	use	of	
bitcoins. In fact, some private companies offering services for the accumulation 
and	storage	of	bitcoins	have	been	set	up	in	the	past	year	(TechCentral.ie,	2014),	
and	even	bitcoin	ATMs	have	been	installed	in	Dublin	(O’Regan,	2014).	According	
to	some	investigative	reports,	the	first	cases	of	seizures	of	bitcoins	have	been	
also registered.
These	findings,	which	in	some	cases	may	appear	speculative,	
confirm	that	 further	research	 is	needed	 in	this	field,	perhaps	
based on a larger amount of evidence and data. The following 
sections instead report the results of an exploratory analysis 
conducted on the information collected to date.
8.3.2. Geography 
As said above, evidence of OCG investments can be found 
both in Ireland and foreign countries in which Irish OCGs 
operate	(see	Figure	30).
In Ireland
In	 Ireland,	most	 of	 the	 cases	 of	OCG	 investments	 identified	
according to the available information seem to be located in 
the southern and eastern region, especially in the Dublin 
area. The prevalence of large urban areas, in particular Dublin, 
may be explained on the one hand by the higher level of OCG 
activity	(such	as	drug	trafficking	and	sexual	exploitation),	and	
on the other, by the greater opportunities for investments, 
especially	in	the	real	estate	market	(see	Figure	31).
As will be discussed in Section 12.4, these patterns seem to 
reflect also the distribution of confiscated assets: in 2012 
CAB	was	able	to	recovered	a	large	amount	of	assets	identified	
as proceeds of crime, especially under the Proceeds Of 
Crime	Act	 (POCA)	 legislation,	 in	 large	cities,	 such	as	Dublin,	
Cork,	Limerick	and	Waterford	(CAB,	2012,	p.	11).	 In	particular,	
according to POCA, the Dublin region attracts the majority of 
investments in real estate, followed by eastern regions.
However,	 operations	 leading	 to	 the	 seizure	 of	 assets	 have	
been conducted also in the western region (e.g.	Operation	
Foolscape (2009)	-	An	Garda	Síochána,	2010,	2011)	or	in	the	
south-east	 of	 the	 country	 (e.g.	 Operation	Munster	 (2014)	 -	
Gleeson, 2014). 
Although	 it	 offers	 fewer	 ‘market	 opportunities’,	 also	 the	
border with Northern Ireland may not be exempt from OCG 
investments and money laundering. In particular, companies 
or businesses activities that could play a strategic role in illicit 
trafficking	 or	 smuggling	 (see	 above	 and	 Section	 5.3)	 may	
be	at	 risk	of	OCG	 infiltration.	To	be	mentioned	 in	 this	 regard	
is the evidence of OCG intrusion into some Money Service 
Businesses	 (MSBs)	 in	 the	 border	 region,	 which	 are	 used	 to	
transfer	 illicit	 flows	or	 to	 launder	 illegal	 proceeds	 (An	Garda	
Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a,	p.	16).	
Finally,	 there	 is	 evidence	 of	 infiltration	 of	 the	 Irish	 economy	
also	by	foreign	criminal	groups	involved	in	illegal	markets	(e.g.	
human trafficking, drug dealing, ITTP) often in connection with 
local	criminal	groups	 (see	Section	5.3).	 In	particular,	British, 
Russian, Chinese and Eastern European OCGs may invest 
or launder their illicit proceeds in the same country where they 
conduct	the	illicit	activity	(An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a;	
Breen, 2014). British and Chinese nationals are among the 
owners	of	assets	confiscated	pursuant	to	sections	4	and	4A	of	
POCA	(see	Section	12.4).
From Ireland
As said, Irish OCGs or other groups operating in Ireland may 
invest in foreign countries as well, in particular where Irish 
OCGs	are	active	in	illicit	markets	(e.g.	foreign	regions	which	act	
as logistical bases for drug trafficking) or where other foreign 
OCGs	 with	 which	 they	 have	 links	 are	 well-established	 (see	
Section 5.3). 
Besides the USA, where the criminal and money laundering 
activities	 of	 Irish	 OCGs	 are	 well	 known	 (Cressey,	 1969;	
Albanese, 2004), in Europe there is evidence of illegal activity 
by Irish gangs primarily in Spain, the UK, the Netherlands 
(McDonald,	 2008;	O’Keeffe,	 2009;	CAB,	 2010,	 p.	 27,	 2011,	 p.	
31;	An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a,	p.	5;	Belfast	Telegraph,	
2012;	 An	 Garda	 Síochána,	 2013,	 p.	 5;	 Breen,	 2014),	 and	
Sweden (Europol,	 2013b;	 PSNI,	 2013;	 Nilsson,	 2013).	 In	
particular, evidence of investments has been found in Spain, 
the UK, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, in Italy	(see	Figure	30	
below) and other EU countries. 
Spain seems to be an important logistical base not only 
for	 British	OCGs	 (see	 5.7)	 but	 also	 for	 Irish	OCGs	 (see	 5.3),	
in	 particular	 those	 involved	 in	 drug	 trafficking	 (CAB,	 2010,	
p.	 27,	 2011,	 p.	 31;	 An	 Garda	 Síochána	 &	 PSNI,	 2012a,	 p.	 5;	
An	 Garda	 Síochána,	 2013,	 p.	 5).	 Spain	 may	 thus	 be	 also	 a	
preferred destination for investment or money laundering 
activities	(McDonald,	2008;	Breen,	2014).	Operation Shovel 
dismantled an Irish OCG with important connections abroad 
(Majidi,	2010;	Sur	in	English,	2010;	Drugs	Info	News	Line	Ireland,	
2010;	 Malmström,	 2011)	 and	 which	 had	 apparently	 invested	
in properties and companies in several countries, including 
Spain	(Costa	del	Sol	-	see	Box	27).	 In	particular,	around	200	
trading companies used for laundering illegal proceeds were 
Figure 30 - Countries and regions with evidence of Irish 
OCGs investments
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
180 | Part 2
identified	by	 the	Spanish	authorities.	 Finally	 to	be	noted	are	
properties	 confiscated	 by	 the	 Irish	 CAB	 under	 the	 POCA	
regime	also	in	Alicante	(see	Section	12.4).
As regards the UK, which was also involved in Operation 
Shovel, it is Northern Ireland that is a money-laundering 
destination for groups operating on the border. In particular, 
OCG	 infiltration	 can	 occur	 in	 companies	 functional	 for	 the	
smuggling of goods between Ireland and the UK, such as 
transportation, oil companies, car sales and wholesale trade. 
Evidence	 of	 infiltration	 has	 been	 found	 in	 Money	 Service	
Businesses	(MSBs)	(An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a,	p.	16).
Italy has recently emerged in relation with Operation 
Metropolis, which uncovered a laundering scheme set up by 
Italian	‘Ndrangheta	in	conjunction	with	former	members	of	Irish	
paramilitary	groups	and	Spanish	criminals	 (Bone	&	Farmery,	
2013;	Cordova,	2013;	Galullo,	2013;	Macrì,	2013;	MNnews,	2013;	
Tribunale di Reggio Calabria, 2013). In particular, the OCGs 
invested	in	real	estate	and	tourist	resorts	in	Southern	Italy	(see	
Box 26).
As for Sweden, investments can be related to the presence 
of Irish OCGs involved in human trafficking and sexual 
exploitation	(Europol,	2013b;	PSNI,	2013)	or	to	Irish ‘traveller’ 
groups	 (Europol,	 2011c;	 Nilsson,	 2013),	 which	 are	 known	 to	
be involved in certain illegal activities and to offer cheap 
construction	labour,	mainly	as	asphalt	workers	(Nilsson,	2013).	
Their construction businesses are suspected of being related 
to	violent	offences,	tax	evasion,	and	other	illegal	activities	(e.g.	
labour	exploitation	and	human	trafficking)	(Nilsson,	2013).	
Also to be mentioned is the possibility that Irish ‘traveller’ 
groups invest back in Ireland	 (in	 real	 estate	 and	 other	
assets) the proceeds of illegal activities carried out throughout 
Europe,	 especially	 smuggling	 (e.g.	 of	 rhino	 horns	 and	 other	
crimes)	(Europol,	2011c).
Finally, other countries can be used to set up companies 
or bank accounts related to Irish OCGs. To be cited in this 
regard are the investigations conducted by the Irish CAB in 
conjunction with foreign counterparts that led to the recovery 
of bank accounts in Austria and the Isle of Man linked to Irish 
criminal Brian Meehan	 (following	 his	 conviction	 for	 the	
murder	of	Veronica	Guerin	 in	 Ireland	 in	 1996)	 (CAB,	2012,	p.	
39). 
8.3.3. Assets and business sectors
As said, according to the available data there is evidence 
of OCGs interest in properties and real estate, companies, 
intangible assets, vehicles, valuables, and jewels. But it is 
difficult to rank these types of assets in terms of OCGs 
investment preferences. However, some patterns are 
described below.
Real estate properties
As in other countries, also in Ireland immovable properties 
may be destinations for OCG investments. There is evidence 
of	infiltration	in	the	real	estate	market	throughout	the	country	
and, in particular, in the large urban areas of the southern 
and eastern regions. 
Moreover,	real	estate	represents	a	significant	proportion	of	the	
confiscated	assets	pursuant	 to	 sections	4	 and	4A	of	POCA	
(see	Section	12.4).	Several	police	operations	against	criminal	
gangs	 have	 led	 to	 the	 seizure	 of	 real	 estate	 properties.	 For	
example, the above-mentioned Operation Munster (2014)	
led	to	the	seizure	of	more	than	40	properties	from	a	criminal	
group involved in organised property crime and operating in 
the	south-east	of	the	country	(Gleeson,	2014).
A	significant	number	of	properties	were	also	recovered	under	
Operation Shovel (2010)	(see	Box	27),	in	Ireland,	Spain,	and	
other countries. According to the sources, the majority of the 
money had been invested in the real estate industry on the 
Costa del Sol and also in various other locations worldwide. 
In	Brazil	 this	criminal	network	had	six	 tourist	complexes	and	
luxury residences. However, it is difficult to determine where 
they	were	exactly	 located	 (Majidi,	2010;	Sur	 in	English,	2010;	
Drugs	Info	News	Line	Ireland,	2010;	An	Garda	Síochána,	2011;	
Malmström, 2011). 
Box 26 - Operation Metropolis. Italian ‘Ndrangheta, 
Irish paramilitary groups and Spanish figureheads
Operation Metropolis was conducted in 2013 in 
Italy.	 Police	 investigations	 led	 to	 the	 identification	 of	
members	 of	 Italian	 (‘Ndrangheta),	 Irish	 and	 Spanish	
OCGs	 laundering	 illegal	 proceeds	 and	 infiltrating	 the	
legal economy, especially in Southern Italy.
In particular, Irish national H. J. F., former militant of a 
paramilitary organisation and already charged with 
terrorist offences, was believed to have set up in 2006, 
with	 members	 of	 the	 Italian	 'Ndrangheta,	 a	 complex	
business structure of shell companies and offshore 
accounts to launder proceeds of illegal activities 
(including	drug	trafficking)	in	tourist	resorts	in	Calabria,	
in particular ALPHA, a holiday village located in 
Brancaleone, Italy. 
The	Italian	police	seized	the	holiday	village	and	several	
companies used to launder proceeds of criminal 
activities, and they issued European arrest warrants 
for	H.	J.	F.	and	other	Italian	and	Spanish	suspects	(Bone	
&	 Farmery,	 2013;	Cordova,	 2013;	Galullo,	 2013;	Macrì,	
2013;	 MNnews,	 2013;	 Tribunale	 di	 Reggio	 Calabria,	
2013). 
In fact, H.J.F. and Italian criminal A.V. shared ownership 
of BETA, a real estate company based in Dublin. The 
company was linked to Italian construction businesses, 
GAMMA and DELTA, with a contract to promote 
the Calabrian properties, sell real estate throughout 
Europe,	 and	 advise	 potential	 customers	 (Cordova,	
2013;	 Galullo,	 2013;	 Tribunale	 di	 Reggio	 Calabria,	
2013). Similar laundering schemes were set up with 
companies	registered	in	Spain	(Bone	&	Farmery,	2013;	
Tribunale di Reggio Calabria, 2013).
The investigative evidence suggests that H. J. F. knew 
that A.V. and the Italian businesses had close links with 
the	 ‘Ndrangheta	 (Morabito-Bruzzaniti-Palamara	 and	
Aquino families) that controlled the local construction 
industry	 (Cordova,	 2013;	 Galullo,	 2013;	 Tribunale	 di	
Reggio Calabria, 2013).
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Evidence of OCGs investments in real estate is also provided by 
Operation Foolscape (2009),	which	led	to	the	identification	
of	several	premises	(both	private	residences	and	professional	
offices) resulting from criminal activity in the Western region 
(An	Garda	Síochána,	2010,	2011),	and	by	Operation	Metropolis 
(2013),	which,	as	said,	dismantled	a	complex	scheme	to	launder	
money through properties and tourist resorts in Southern Italy 
(Bone	 &	 Farmery,	 2013;	 Cordova,	 2013;	 Galullo,	 2013;	Macrì,	
2013;	 MNnews,	 2013;	 Tribunale	 di	 Reggio	 Calabria,	 2013).	 In	
this latter case, investments by OCGs related to former Irish 
paramilitary groups were made through a real estate company 
registered	in	Dublin	(see	Box	26).	
Companies
information	on	cases	involving	OCG	infiltration	of	companies	
is weak and does not allow comprehensive analysis of this 
type of investment. However, some comments can be made.
First, there is evidence that Irish OCGs use companies to 
facilitate smuggling or illicit trafficking. As seen, the 
criminal group targeted by Operation Shovel controlled 
wholesale food traders used to export drugs from Spain to 
Ireland	(see	Box	27).	This	is	somehow	a	‘golden	rule’	because	
also	other	foreign	OCGs	(especially	Italian	mafias,	see	Chapter	
5	and	8)	 rely	on	 food	 import/export	 companies	 to	 transport	
heroin and cocaine across countries.
Given this rule, it cannot be excluded that other business 
sectors	are	exposed	to	OCG	infiltration	due	to	their	functional 
nature, although evidence cannot be found in the available 
sources. In particular, transportation companies can be of 
service	to	smugglers;	or	fuel and gas supply companies may 
be	infiltrated	by	OCGs	because	they	are	instrumental	to	fuel	
laundering	 (see	Section	 5.3),	 which	 is	 particularly	 significant	
across	the	border	with	Northern	Ireland	(An	Garda	Síochána	
&	 PSNI,	 2012a,	 p.	 16).	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	 worth	 considering	
that oil supply is one of the business sectors most involved in 
confiscations	pursuant	to	POCA	(see	Section	12.4).
In the border region, MSBs have been found to facilitate 
money laundering	 and	 illicit	 flows	 from/to	 Ireland,	 so	 that	
some degree of involvement of OCGs in this sector may be 
hypothesised	(An	Garda	Síochána	&	PSNI,	2012a,	p.	16).
Given the interest in real estate, also real estate agencies 
may	 be	 at	 risk	 of	 OCG	 infiltration.	 The	 groups	 targeted	 by	
Operation Metropolis were running a real estate company 
based in Dublin and co-owned by a former Irish paramilitary 
Box 27 - Operation Shovel: an Irish criminal gang 
and investments in Costa del Sol 
Operation Shovel was conducted in May 2010. The 
investigation started from a transnational drug 
trafficking	 case	 (more	 than	 20	 countries	 involved	
worldwide)	 and	 led	 to	 the	 identification	of	 real	 estate	
and companies belonging to OCGs in Ireland, Spain 
and	 the	 UK	 (Majidi,	 2010;	 Sur	 in	 English,	 2010;	 Drugs	
Info	News	Line	Ireland,	2010;	Malmström,	2011).
Food trading companies, bars, and restaurants were 
set	up	in	 Ireland,	Spain	(Costa	del	Sol)	and	the	UK	for	
laundering and functional purposes. According to the 
Ministry of the Interior, since 2008 officers of UDEF 
(Economic	 and	 Fiscal	 Crime	 Unit)	 and	 the	 Costa	
del Sol UDDYCO had traced more than 200 trading 
companies that used to channel funds acquired by 
the	group	through	illegal	business	deals	(Sur	in	English,	
2010).
Real estate properties were used by criminals as 
houses or warehouses in which to stock smuggled 
goods. Moreover, the food import-export company 
based in Ireland was run by Irish criminals who used 
the business to transport drugs from Spain to Ireland 
(Majidi,	 2010;	 Sur	 in	 English,	 2010;	 Drugs	 Info	 News	
Line	 Ireland,	2010;	Malmström,	2011).	Finally,	once	 the	
drugs had entered Ireland, Irish criminals sold them to 
criminal	gangs	nationwide,	making	significant	profits.
Figure 31 - Average house prices (euro) in Ireland (1980-
2013)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on data by Central Statistics Office 
As regards the reasons why OCGs investments in real estate 
may	occur,	three	main	drivers	can	be	identified:
•		 First,	 investments	 may	 have	 a	 ‘speculative’ nature, in 
particular considering the boom of the Irish real estate 
market in the late 1990s and 2000s	 (see	 Figure	 31)	
(OECD,	2011,	p.	5;	10)	that	may	have	attracted	the	interest	
of legitimate actors and criminal organisations. Besides 
local OCGs, and given the similarities with the UK situation, 
it	cannot	be	excluded	that	also	foreign	OCGs	(e.g.	Russian-
speaking) invested in properties across the country 
(Breen,	2014).	However,	it	should	be	stressed	that	the	Irish	
real estate market has fallen greatly in value since 2008 
(see	also	CAB,	2012,	p.	13;	Gray,	2013).
•		 Second,	 as	 highlighted	 by	 the	 Irish	 CAB,	 infiltration	 of	
real estate may also be used as a means to launder 
illicit proceeds, in particular through the payment of 
mortgages:	“using	funds	obtained	from	criminal	conduct	to	
repay mortgage and other forms of borrowing has become 
more	prevalent	in	recent	years”	(CAB,	2012,	p.	13)	and	may	
also be related to mortgage frauds	(see	Section	5.3).
•		 Third,	as	described	in	Chapter	7,	investment	in	real	estate	
may also respond to functional needs, in that properties 
may be used to facilitate the illegal activity itself. For 
example	 the	 properties	 identified	 by	 Operation	 Shovel 
(see	Box	27)	were	used	as	warehouses	of	smuggled	goods	
or for the storage of illicit drugs. Generally speaking, there 
is	extensive	evidence	that	OCG	infiltration	of	real	estate	is	
frequently associated with several kinds of illicit trafficking, 
including	human	trafficking	(OSCE,	2010;	FATF,	2011b).
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member	and	 Italian	entrepreneurs	 linked	 to	 the	 ‘Ndrangheta	
(Bone	 &	 Farmery,	 2013;	 Cordova,	 2013;	 Galullo,	 2013;	Macrì,	
2013;	MNnews,	2013;	Tribunale	di	Reggio	Calabria,	2013).	This	
company	was	owned	by	another	holding	company	(for	which	no	
information is available) and attracted overseas investments 
in	tourist	resorts	in	Southern	Italy	(see	Box	26).	According	to	
the	 latest	 financial	 statements,	 the	 company	 had	 significant	
revenues	(3.8	million	US	dollars	in	2008,	2.1	million	US	dollars	
in 2009), but it is not possible to determine if it invested in 
other properties in Ireland or other countries, although it was 
connected with some Spanish and Italian companies as well 
(Cordova,	2013;	Tribunale	di	Reggio	Calabria,	2013).	
Bars and restaurants may be used not only as money 
laundering channels but also to distribute illicit goods like 
drugs, smuggled cigarettes or illicit medicines. The Irish OCGs 
targeted by Operation Shovel possessed bars and restaurants 
in	 Ireland,	 the	 UK	 and	 Spain	 (see	 Box	 27),	 although	 it	 is	 not	
possible to identify where exactly these businesses were 
located,	how	they	were	owned,	or	if	they	were	profitable.
As regards Operation Shovel, according to the information 
available,	money	was	also	 invested	 in	other	sectors:	 "Thanks	
to	the	vast	profits	made	from	drug	trafficking	and	the	sale	of	
arms, the network had tried to introduce themselves into the 
sectors of renewable energy, infrastructure, recycling, 
telecommunications and recreational activities"	 (press	
release by Min. Interior mentioned in Sur in English, 2010).
Finally, although there is some evidence of connections of 
construction	companies	(especially	abroad)	with	OCGs	linked	
to	 Irish	 ‘travellers’	 (see	 above),	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 determine	 if	
construction companies in Ireland are at high risk of OCG 
infiltration.	 Construction	 often	 responds	 to	 the	 ‘ideal’	 profile	
of	 OC	 companies	 (labour-intensive	 and	 cash-intensive	
businesses	 with	 strong	 territorial	 specificity	 and	 close	 to	
public administration and public procurements - see Chapter 
7).	Moreover,	OCG	infiltration	of	construction	is	more	frequent	
in	 areas	 characterised	 by	 a	 booming	 (and	 deregulated)	 real	
estate	 market	 and	 large	 urban	 projects	 (e.g.	 Southern	 Italy,	
some Northern Italian large urban areas, southern France or 
the Spanish coastal area – see Chapter 8) and in this sense 
Ireland, especially Dublin, experienced a surging real estate 
market	 in	 the	2000s	 (see	above).	However	concrete	signals	
of	OCGs	infiltration	of	the	construction	industry	in	the	country	
cannot be found.
To	 summarize,	 although	 evidence	 is	 much	 weaker	 than	 in	
other countries covered by this report, the business sectors 
with	signs	of	OCG	infiltration	in	Ireland	or	from	Irish	OCGs	are	
the following:
•		 Wholesale	and	retail	trade	of	food	products;
•		 Bars	and	restaurants;
•		 Transportation;
•		 Car	sales;
•		 Oil	supply;
•		 Real	estate	agencies;
•		 Money	service	businesses.
There is evidence, limited to Operation Shovel,	of	infiltration	
also in the following sectors:
•		 Renewable	energy;
•		 Infrastructure;
•		 Recycling;
•		 Telecommunications.	
Movable assets
According to the literature, Irish OCGs are frequently 
associated with patterns of luxury consumption. In particular, 
the Irish Criminal Assets Bureau continues to acknowledge 
the interest of OCGs in high-value cars	 (CAB,	 2012,	 p.	 14),	
and	 some	 luxury	 cars	 (and	 even	 helicopters) have been 
recovered according to the proceeds of crime act.
Investments of criminal proceeds in jewels, precious metals, 
luxury watches	is	also	frequent.	In	2012	alone	the	CAB	seized	
5 Rolex, 1 Breitling and 1 Chanel watches under Part 2 of the 
POC	Act,1996	(CAB,	2012,	p.	11).	Also	to	be	mentioned	is	that	
the	CAB	has	been	one	of	the	first	AROs	in	Europe	to	dispose	
of	 seized	 watches	 through	 e-commerce	 portals,	 obtaining	
important	revenues	for	the	state	budget	(Baker,	2013;	O’Reilly,	
2013).
According	 to	 statistics	 on	 confiscated	 assets	 in	 Ireland,	
registered	 assets	 (cars,	 vehicles,	 etc.)	 and	 movable	 assets	
(cash,	 bank	 accounts,	 deposits,	 etc.)	 still	 represent	 the	
biggest share of confiscated goods	 in	Ireland	(see	Section	
12.4 for details).
8.3.4. Concluding remarks
This	 section	 has	 been	 a	 first	 attempt	 to	 provide	 a	 picture	
of OCG investments in Ireland. The research reported had 
limitations mostly due to the lack of information available. 
However	evidence	of	criminal	infiltration	of	the	legal	economy	
can be found.
Besides	 criminals’	 interest	 in	 luxury	 movable	 goods	 (cars,	
boats, jewels, watches, etc.), properties may have attracted 
the	 interest	 of	 both	 Irish	 OCGs	 and	 foreign	 groups	 (e.g.	
Russian), also because of the boom of the Irish real estate 
market in the late 1990s until 2008 and for functional reasons. 
More recently, investments by real estate companies related 
to Irish OCGs have been registered in foreign properties.
Legal companies may be used by Irish OCGs to launder illegal 
proceeds	 and	 facilitate	 illegal	 activities	 (e.g.	 smuggling,	 fuel	
laundering) or to conceal the transport and distribution of illicit 
drugs. The most frequently mentioned sectors are catering, 
bars and restaurants, wholesale trade of food products, 
but also oil supply and money transfer businesses. 
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8.4.1. Introduction
Infiltration	of	the	Italian	legitimate	economy	by	organised	crime	
groups,	 in	particular	 Italian	mafias,273 has been a priority on 
the agenda of Italian governments, judicial authorities, 
law enforcement agencies, scholars and media for the 
past	thirty	years	(Transcrime,	2013a;	Riccardi,	2014a).
In	 the	belief	 that	mafia	groups	could	be	better	combated	by	
“following the money trail”	 (Falcone	 &	 Padovani,	 2004;	
Turone, 2007), a wide range of legislative measures have 
been introduced since the 1980s to ensure more effective 
identification	and	confiscation of mafia assets	(see	Section	
10.6 for a review). 274
However, despite this attention at the social, political and 
academic level, gaps still remain in the study of organised 
crime investments in Italy:
•		 First,	 the	 lack of empirical analyses: with some 
exceptions	(see	below),	most	of	the	research	produced	in	
this	 field	 is	 limited	 to	 sociological	 and	 qualitative	 studies	
(e.g.	Catanzaro,	1988;	Santino	&	La	Fiura,	1990;	Fantò,	1999;	
Arlacchi,	2007;	Dalla	Chiesa,	2012)	rather	than	quantitative	
research;	or	it	has	focused	more	on	assessing	the	quantity	
of	illicit	proceeds	generated	(see	Part	1,	in	particular	Section	
5.4) than on how and where they are laundered.
•		 Second,	the	lack of studies on investments by foreign 
organised crime groups: most previous research has 
focused	on	Italian	mafias,	while,	with	some	exceptions	(e.g.	
CNEL,	 2011;	 Becucci,	 2013,	 2014),	 infiltration	 by	 Chinese,	
Russian or Eastern European groups has never been 
subject of wide-scale analyses.
This section aims to address these gaps. It provides an 
analysis	of	the	investments	of	both	Italian	mafias	and	foreign	
OCGs, considering their geographical distribution	(Section	
8.4.2), the types of assets and business sectors	 (Section	
8.4.3), and the types of actors involved	 (8.4.4)	 The	 final	
considerations	 (8.4.5)	 discuss	 the	 drivers	 behind	 criminal	
investments in Italy and some research and policy implications.
Methodological remarks
Previous	 empirical	 studies	 (e.g.	 Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Riccardi,	
2014a;	Riccardi,	Soriani,	&	Standridge,	2014;	Dugato,	Favarin,	
&	 Giommoni,	 forthcoming)	 have	 used	 data	 on	 assets 
definitively confiscated in Italy from 1983 to 2012 as a proxy 
for the portfolio of investments of organised crime groups 
in the country.275
Although this database is, at present, the best resource for 
statistical	 analysis	 in	 this	 field	 (Transcrime,	 2013a,	 p.	 96),	 it	
presents some biases, and its representativeness can be 
questioned	(Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	383):
•		 First,	 data	 on	 confiscated	 assets	 concern	 almost 
exclusively Italian mafias, because until 2013 almost 
no	 foreign	 groups	 were	 tackled	 by	 confiscation	 of	 their	
criminal	assets;	
•		 Second,	they	may	provide	an	out-of-date picture of the 
phenomenon	 (since	 assets	 reach	 definitive	 confiscation	
only after some years, see 12.5) and hence miss, for 
example, territories and sectors characterised by emerging 
infiltration	(e.g.	renewable	energy,	see	below)	that	have	not	
yet	been	addressed	by	confiscation	measures;
•		 Third,	they	may	overestimate assets, business sectors 
and territories	 where	 confiscation	 is	 easier	 or	 is	 more	
intense	 (e.g.	 in	 provinces	 including	 the	 chief	 town	 of	 the	
region, see Figure 85).
For	 this	 reason,	 and	 in	 particular	 to	 address	 the	 first	 two	
issues, it was decided to extend the analysis beyond data on 
confiscated	assets	to	a	wider variety of sources, including: 
•		 Judicial	files	(e.g.	arrest	warrants,	seizure	orders,	etc.);
•		 LEA	reports	(e.g.	reports	by	DIA	–	Direzione Investigativa 
Antimafia, Guardia di Finanza, UIF-Unità di Informazione 
Finanziaria,	reports	on	selected	police	operations);
•		 Institutional	 reports	 (e.g.	 reports	 by	 DNA	 -	 Direzione 
Nazionale Antimafia, Commissione Parlamentare 
Antimafia,	the	FATF,	FIUs,	etc.);
•		 Academic	literature;
•		 Media	reports.
As a result, about 1,500 references to organised crime 
investments	 were	 identified	 and	 included	 in	 the	 DOCI	 (see	
Chapter 6 for details).276 They referred to the period 2005-
2013	and	covered	both	Italian	mafias	(92.6%	of	the	total)	and	
foreign	 groups	 (7.4%).	 Most	 of	 the	 evidence	 regards	 police 
operations which have led to the seizure of companies 
and other assets. Although, as already pointed out in other 
country	profiles,	it	is	not	possible	to	analyse	these	references	
from a strictly quantitative point of view, the inclusion of this 
information makes it possible to provide a more updated and 
complete picture of the phenomenon.
273.	 As	 illustrated	 in	 Section	 5.4,	 the	 term	 ‘Italian	 mafias’	 refers	 here	 to	 the	
criminal groups belonging to the main Italian criminal organisations, namely Cosa 
Nostra,	Camorra	and	‘Ndrangheta,	and	to	other	smaller	criminal	organisations	
(Sacra	Corona	Unita,	etc.)	(Transcrime	2013a).
274.	Confiscation	has	probably	proved	the	most	powerful	–	and	feared	–	tool	in	
the	wider	strategy	against	mafia	in	Italy,	becoming	a	model	for	the	rest	of	Europe	
and	 a	 landmark	 for	 the	 new	 EU	 confiscation	 directive	 under	 finalization	 (see	
Section	3).There	is	evidence	that	members	of	all	the	main	mafia	organisations	
(Cosa	 Nostra,	 Camorra,	 ‘Ndrangheta,	 Sacra	 Corona	 Unita)	 are	 particularly	
afraid	of	having	their	assets	seized,	and	would	much	prefer	prison	sentences	to	
having	 their	 belongings	 (movable	 assets,	 businesses,	 properties)	 confiscated	
(Transcrime	2013a).
275.	 The	 database	 on	 definitively	 confiscated	 assets	 (beni confiscati in 
via definitiva) in Italy is managed by ANBSC – Agenzia Nazionale per 
l'amministrazione e la destinazione dei beni sequestrati e confiscati alla 
criminalità organizzata.	 The	 database	 (see	 Section	 12.5	 for	 further	 details)	
includes more than 20,000 records covering a wide range of assets, including 
movable	 goods,	 cars,	 real	 estate	 properties	 and	 companies	 confiscated	 as	 a	
result	 of	 preventative	 and	 criminal	 confiscation	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 serious	 and	
organised crime offences foreseen by article 51, Section 3-bis of the Italian Code 
of	Criminal	Procedure,	e.g.	mafia	related	crimes,	organised	crime,	counterfeiting,	
trafficking in human beings, etc.
276. References have been collected from 432 documents. As for the type of 
source,	about	half	of	the	references	(51%)	come	from	media	sources,	47%	from	
LEA reports and judicial evidence, and the remaining 2% from academic studies.
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8.4.2. Geography 
The geographical distribution of criminal investments in 
Italy differs widely if only Italian mafias or also foreign 
criminal groups are considered. In fact, as suggested in 
Section 5.4, while some southern regions have a traditional, 
well-rooted	 and	 almost	 exclusive	presence	of	 Italian	mafias,	
central	 and	 northern	 regions	 also	 witness	 infiltration	 by	 a	
plurality of criminal organisations. This distinction is taken into 
account below.
Geography of the investments of Italian mafias 
As mentioned in Section 5.4, while attempts to map and 
measure the presence of	Italian	mafias	can	be	frequently	found	
in	the	literature	(for	a	review	see	Calderoni,	2011;	Transcrime,	
2013a;	Calderoni,	2014b),	atlases	of	the investments of Italian 
mafias	are	much	fewer.	The	most recent mapping of Italian 
mafia investments has been produced by Transcrime 
(2013a)	 using,	 as	 said	above,	confiscated	assets	as	a	proxy	
(see	 Figure	 32).	 Further	 studies	 have	 then	 mapped	 the	
distribution	 of	 confiscated	 companies	 (Riccardi,	 2014a;	
Riccardi,	Soriani,	&	Standridge,	2014)	and	of	confiscated	real	
estate	(Dugato,	Favarin,	&	Giommoni,	forthcoming).	
On the other hand, the geographical distribution of the 
references to organised crime investments included in the 
DOCI is reported in Figure 33. 277
Strong similarities	between	the	two	figures	can	be	identified:	
Sicily, Calabria, Campania – areas of origin of the main 
Italian	 mafias,	 respectively	 Cosa	 Nostra,	 ‘Ndrangheta,	
Camorra – and Lombardy	collect	most	of	both	confiscated	
assets and references to criminal investments in the DOCI.
The vulnerability of southern Italy	 to	 mafia	 infiltration	 in	
the legitimate economy has been acknowledged by a large 
body	of	literature	(see	Transcrime,	2013a	and	Sciarrone,	2011,	
for	 a	 review).	 Previous	 studies	 (e.g.	 Daniele	 &	 Marani,	 2011;	
Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	208;	Riccardi,	2014a,	p.	202;	Calderoni,	
2014b) have shown that the distribution of criminal investments 
concentrates in areas with a high and traditional mafia 
presence but also characterised by low levels of openness 
towards international trade and foreign investments, low 
levels of R&D and of infrastructural development, high 
levels of tax evasion and of money laundering suspicious 
transaction reporting.
The	 analyses	 suggest	 that	 Italian	 mafias	 prefer	 to	 invest	
in ‘traditional’ territories under their strict control 
(Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Riccardi,	 2014a;	 Dugato,	 Favarin,	 &	
Giommoni, forthcoming) or where the social, economic 
and	 financial	 environment	 is	 weaker	 and	 more	 vulnerable	
(Sciarrone,	 1998;	 Polo,	 2011).	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	 determine	 the	
extent	to	which	mafia	infiltration	is	a cause or a consequence 
of the underdevelopment of these economies, but, as 
pointed	out	by	some	scholars	(e.g.	Pinotti,	2012,	p.	5),	it	is	more	
likely that the causality goes in both directions.
Figure 32 - Geographical distribution of evidence of confis-
cated assets in Italy (1983-2012, NUTS 2)278
Figure 33 - Geographical distribution of evidence of OCGs 
investments in Italy (NUTS 2)279
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Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
Source: Transcrime elaboration on ANBSC
277.	Out	 of	 1,497	 total	 references	 in	 Italy,	 for	 292	mentions	 (19.5%)	 it	was	 not	
possible to identify the NUTS 2. Indication of NUTS 3 is not available for 766 
references	(51.2%).
278.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
279.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
However, the importance of northern Italy	 and	 of	 ‘non-
traditional	 regions’	 increases	 if	 consideration	 is	made	of	not	
only	 confiscated	 assets	 but	 also	 more	 recent	 judicial	 and	
police	evidence,	such	as	that	included	in	the	DOCI	(see	Figure	
33 and Table 75). Indeed, the diffusion of mafia investments 
in northern regions has been widely recognised by both 
public	 authorities	 (e.g.	 Presidenza	 del	 Consiglio	 dei	Ministri,	
2014;	DIA,	2014)	and	scholars	(e.g.	Forgione,	2008;	Campana,	
2011a;	 Varese,	 2011;	 Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Sciarrone	 &	 Storti,	
2014), but it may be not yet fully reflected, for various reasons, 
in	terms	of	confiscations.280
185 | Part 2
280.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 confiscated	 assets	 may	 not	 provide	 an	 updated	
picture	 of	 the	 phenomenon,	 because	 it	may	 take	 years	 for	 a	 seized	 asset	 to	
reach	definitive	confiscation	 (see	Section	 12.5).	For	example,	 the	database	on	
confiscated	assets	does	 not	 yet	 include	hundreds	of	 assets	 (companies,	 real	
estate	 properties,	 registered	 goods)	 seized	 in	 important	 operations	 against	
the	 ‘Ndrangheta	 in	Lombardy	and	Piedmont	 (such	as	 the	 Infinito/Crimine and 
Minotauro Operations). 
The	 transplantation	 of	mafia	 financial	 interests	 to	 the	 north	
follows business opportunities	 (such	 as	 those	 offered	 by	
the	new	large-scale	public	works	(grandi cantieri) in Lombardy, 
Piedmont or Emilia Romagna, see 8.4.3 below for details) and 
also	better	chances	of	infiltrating	the	local political, business 
and social community, often relying on the support of local 
entrepreneurs	and	politicians,	or	on	‘joint	ventures’	with	other	
criminal	groups	(see	Box	28).
In	 this	 regard,	 recent	 studies	 have	 highlighted	 that	 mafias	
may have shifted their investment strategy from large 
urban conurbations	(e.g.	Palermo,	Naples,	Milan)	to	smaller 
municipalities and peripheral areas, where they can hide 
better,	 are	 less	 monitored,	 and	 can	 more	 easily	 infiltrate	 or	
corrupt	 the	 public	 administration	 (Caneppele,	 Riccardi,	 &	
Standridge,	 2013;	Osservatorio	 sulla	Criminalità	Organizzata	
dell’Università	degli	Studi	di	Milano,	2014,	p.	10).281
Geography of the investments of foreign OCGs
Figure 35 is the first attempt in the literature to map 
investments by foreign organised crime groups in the 
Italian legitimate economy. It shows the geographical 
distribution at NUTS 2 level of the evidence on investments 
by	foreign	OCGs	taken	from	open	sources	(judicial	evidence,	
LEA reports, institutional reports, media, etc.) and organised 
in the DOCI. Despite the limited amount of cases collected282 
some trends can be already highlighted:
•		 First,	there	is	almost	no	overlap	with	the	map	of	confiscated	
assets: this is because, as said, confiscation in Italy has 
to date addressed almost exclusively Italian mafias.283 
Macroregion
% of total number of confiscated assets 
(1983-2012)
% of total number of DOCI references 
(2005-2013)
Northern Italya 17.2% 27.7%
Central Italya 5.9% 19.4%
Southern Italyb 63.7% 33.3%
Location	N/A 13.2% 19.5%
a Including Sardinia. 
b Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Sicily.
Table 75 - Weights of Italian regions in terms of distribution of confiscated assets and of references to organised crime 
investments
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
Box 28 - Mafia on Lake Garda and on the Riviera dei 
Fiori: Italian mafia investments in non-traditional 
territories
In the early 1990s some members of a family close 
to a Camorra clan settled on the Lombardy side of 
Lake Garda. There they established a number of 
companies active in the management of discotheques 
and	 nightclubs	 (Tribunale	 di	 Brescia,	 2007;	 Corte	 di	
Cassazione	 2010).	 Another	 group,	 presumed	 to	 be	
linked	with	‘Ndrangheta,	started	to	be	interested	in	the	
lucrative nightlife business and sought to break the 
Camorra	 group’s	 monopoly	 through	 intimidation	 and	
extortion. Eventually, the two groups decided to forgo 
confrontation	and	 instead	 to	 form	a	 ‘joint	 venture’	 for	
management of the sector. The economic and criminal 
association was established with the creation of an 
ad hoc corporate ownership scheme with, on top, a 
Swiss	fiduciary	holding	the	financial	interests	of	the	two	
factions	(Transcrime,	2013a).
In recent years, there have been a growing number 
ofepisodes	 of	 infiltration	 in	 the	 local	 economy	 of	
the Liguria region, characterised by collusion with 
politicians and with representatives of the local 
public	 administration.	 Two	 councils	 (Ventimiglia	 and	
Bordighera)	were	dissolved	due	to	mafia	infiltration,	and	
in	October	2014	the	court	of	Imperia	sentenced	for	mafia-
association	 about	 twenty	 members	 of	 ‘Ndrangheta	
groups active on the Riviera dei Fiori, where they had 
invested in various business activities and fraudulently 
obtained	public	procurements	(Gavino,	2014).
281.	Again,	this	phenomenon	is	not	fully	reflected	in	terms	of	confiscated	assets.	
Most	confiscations	concentrate	in	provinces	characterised	by	large	urban	areas	
or	which	contain	the	chief	town	of	the	region	(e.g.	Palermo,	Naples,	Milan,	Rome)	
where the judicial authorities are probably better-equipped or have longer 
experience	in	identifying	and	confiscating	mafia	assets.
282. As mentioned above, the DOCI in Italy includes about 210 references to 
foreign OCGs investments, of which only 100 have indication of NUTS 2 location.
283. In recent years, operations by the Italian Guardia di Finanza have led to the 
seizure	of	a	large	amount	of	companies	and	properties	from	Chinese	organised	
crime	groups	(see	Section	8.4.4	and	in	particular	Operation	Qian Liu and Qian 
Ba	 -	 Box	 32).	 However,	 these	 assets	 (at	 the	 end	 of	 2013)	 have	 not	 yet	 been	
confiscated	and	they	do	not	appear	in	the	database	ANBSC.
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Figure 34 - Geographical distribution of evidence of Italian 
mafia investments (NUTS 2)
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•		 Second,	 regions	 with	 a	 traditional	 presence	 of	 Italian	
mafias,	 such	 as	 Sicily	 or	 Calabria	 or	 Campania,	 show	
very low levels of foreign OCG investment, which instead 
concentrates in ‘non-traditional mafia regions’ such as 
Tuscany,	Lazio,	Abruzzo,	Piedmont,	Lombardy	and	Veneto.
Some hypotheses can be put forward to explain these 
patterns:
•		 First,	it	may	be	that	foreign	OCGs	prefer	to	avoid	territories,	
such	 as	 southern	 Italy,	 already	 under	 ‘monopolistic’	
control	by	 Italian	mafias,	and	 thus	prefer	 to	 invest	where 
infiltration by mafias has been historically weaker	(e.g.	
central Italy, rather than the north), and where business 
opportunities have not yet been fully absorbed by 
‘incumbent’ OCGs.
•		 Second,	 foreign	 criminal	 groups	 may	 invest	 in	 territories	
characterised by an already strong presence of 
communities of the same ethnic origin, which may, 
unwittingly	 or	 not,	 ease	 criminal	 investments	 (e.g.	 by	
providing contacts, a wide customer base or illegal 
manpower):	 for	 example,	 Tuscany	 (and	 in	 particular	 the	
provinces	of	Prato	and	Florence)	for	Chinese	OCGs	(CNEL,	
2011,	p.	30;	Becucci,	2013).
•		 Third,	 they	may	 invest	 in	areas where they are already 
involved in illicit activities	 (see	 Section	 5.4):	 if	 for	
example Chinese OCGs have workshops producing 
counterfeit clothes in the Prato cluster, they may launder 
their	 money	 in	 the	 same	 area	 (not	 necessarily	 in	 the	
clothing	sector	–	see	Box	32).	Similarly,	Russian/Georgian	
OCGs and Eastern European criminal groups active in 
organised	 property	 crime	 may	 invest	 in	 import/export	
businesses	 on	 the	 Italian	 Adriatic	 coast	 (from	 Veneto	 to	
Apulia), from which it is easier to receive or dispatch illicit 
goods	 from/to	Eastern	Europe	(e.g.	stolen	medicines:	see	
Riccardi,	Dugato,	&	Polizzotti,	2014).
8.4.3. Assets and business sectors
Assets of all types are represented in the portfolio of organised 
crime in Italy: real estate properties, legitimate companies 
active in a wide array of business sectors, movable goods 
ranging	from	financial	instruments	to	jewels,	cars, boats, and 
other registered assets. Although the DOCI mostly collects 
cases	of	infiltration	of	legitimate	businesses,	useful	information	
can	be	derived	also	from	the	statistics	on	confiscated	assets,	
which are analysed in detail in Section 12.5. In what follows, 
the focus is on two main types of investment: real estate 
properties and companies. For the latter, a detailed review of 
the	most	infiltrated	business	sectors	will	be	also	carried	out.
Real estate properties
Immovable properties are a preferred form of investment 
and laundering for Italian mafias	 (Transcrime,	 2013a,	 pp.	
114-144).	About	50%	of	the	assets	confiscated	in	Italy	between	
1983	 and	 2012	 (as	 mentioned	 above,	 almost	 exclusively	
from	mafias)	were	 real	 estate	 properties,	mainly	 residences	
(34%	of	the	total	real	estate)	and	land	(20%),	while	villas	and	
independent	houses	constituted	only	a	minor	share	(8%)	(see	
Section 12.5). 
These results may be unsurprising, given that it is well 
known that real estate is also the form of investment most 
preferred by Italian families and, in economic value, 
Figure 35 - Geographical distribution of evidence of foreign 
OCG investments in Italy (NUTS 2)
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Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
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Figure 36 – Confiscated flats: rate per 100,000 buildings 
(1983-2012)
Figure 37 - Farmland confiscated every 1000 km2 of 
agricultural surface (1983-2012)
Figure 38 – Confiscated detached houses and mansions: 
rate per 100,000 buildings (1983-2012)
Source: Transcrime, 2013a
Source: Transcrime, 2013a
forthcoming).	 These	 findings	 suggest	 that	 OCGs	 do	 not	
invest	 in	 properties	 for	 ‘speculative’	 profit	 purposes,	 but	
instead use real estate for residential purposes (personal 
use or for criminal affiliates), as well as instruments to 
strengthen control of the territory or as a status symbols 
in	the	communities	which	they	already	dominate	(Transcrime,	
2013a,	p.	145;	Dugato,	Favarin,	&	Giommoni,	forthcoming).
Although not grounded on equally rich statistics, there is 
evidence that also foreign OCGs, in particular Chinese and 
Russian/Georgian, may invest in properties. In particular, 
cases have been reported of Chinese OCGs buying properties 
in	Tuscany	and	throughout	Italy	(CNEL,	2011)	and	of	Russian-
speaking OCGs, especially in central and northern Italy, doing 
so	on	Lake	Garda	(Toresini,	2014)	or	on	the	Adriatic	coast	(La	
Repubblica, 2002).
Box 29 – Luxury real estate as a status symbol: the 
Scarface villa in Casal di Principe 
F.	S.	 (aka	Sandokan)	was	a	boss	of	 the	Casalesi	clan,	
an important Camorra criminal group. He built a 
villa	 in	 Casal	 di	 Principe	 (Caserta,	 Italy)	 that	 was	 a	
reproduction of the Tony Montana mansion in the 
Scarface movie by Brian De Palma. The entrance was 
lined with doric columns and the property featured 
colonnades, arches and stairs covered with marble. 
The	villa	was	a	landmark	and	a	visible	sign	of	the	clan’s	
power over the local community.
represents	the	largest	share	of	their	portfolios	(Banca	d’Italia,	
2013, p. 9). 
Some scholars have attempted to determine whether the 
distribution	 of	 confiscated	 real	 estate,	 shown	 in	 the	 figures	
below, is correlated with variables such as real estate market 
prices	or	the	presence	of	mafia	groups.
According	 to	 previous	 studies	 (Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Dugato,	
Favarin,	 &	 Giommoni,	 forthcoming)	 real	 estate	 investment	
concentrates in areas with a high mafia presence, while 
the	 correlation	 with	 market	 prices	 is	 not	 always	 significant	
(Transcrime,	 2013a,	 p.	 126;	 Dugato,	 Favarin,	 &	 Giommoni,	
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Companies
As	 already	 underlined,	 the	 infiltration	 of	 companies	 plays	 a	
crucial role in the strategy of Italian mafias	 (Sciarrone,	
1998;	 Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Sciarrone,	 2014;	 Riccardi,	 2014a).	
According to the available information, there is also growing 
evidence that foreign criminal groups invest in legitimate 
businesses	(see	below).	
Since	 the	 1960s,	 Italian	 mafias	 have	 increasingly	 become	
’entrepreneurial criminal organisations’, involved also in 
legitimate	businesses	(Santino	&	La	Fiura,	1990;	Commissione	
parlamentare	d’inchiesta,	2003;	Arlacchi,	2007).	The	reasons	
may be:
•		 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 traditional	 mafia	 activities	 (such	 as	
extortion racketeering) were no longer sufficient sources 
of	 profit	 and	 control	 of	 the	 territory,	 and	 this	 may	 have	
increased the activities of criminals in the legal economy 
(Fantò,	1999;	Arlacchi,	2007).	
•		 On	 the	other	hand,	 the	surplus generated in the 1980s 
by drug-trafficking required other forms of laundering 
besides real estate properties and movable goods 
(Riccardi	&	Savona,	2011).
•		 Third,	 legal	 companies	 started	 to	 fulfil	 a	 crucial	 role	 as	
fronts for emerging illegal activities	by	Italian	mafias	(in	
particular those connected to the Camorra, see Section 
5.4), such as illicit waste disposal, counterfeiting, or the 
smuggling	and	resale	of	stolen	goods	(e.g.	medicines).
•		 But	more	importantly,	legal	companies	rapidly	became	the	
most	powerful	tool	in	the	hands	of	Italian	mafias	to	infiltrate 
the political, social and economic environment, and to 
connect	 with	 the	 public	 administration	 (Sciarrone,	 1998;	
Fantò,	1999;	Santino,	2006;	Arlacchi,	2007).
This	explains	the	widespread	distribution	of	mafia	investments	
in	 companies	 across	 Italy	 (Figure	 33),	 both	 in	 northern	 and	
southern regions. But what are the most infiltrated business 
sectors?
According	to	the	evidence	collected	in	the	DOCI	(see	above),	
the	business	sectors	with	the	highest	 levels	of	 infiltration	are	
those reported in Table 76 below. Construction, bars and 
restaurants, wholesale and retail trade (in	 particular	
of food products and of clothes and apparel), waste 
management, hotels and real estate activities are the 
sectors concentrating most of the references to organised 
crime investments in Italy. To a lesser extent, other sectors 
may	be	identified,	including	transportation and casinos.
These	results	are	in	line	with	the	findings	of	previous	research.	In	
particular, analysis of confiscated companies	(Transcrime,	
2013a;	Riccardi,	2014a;	Riccardi,	Soriani,	&	Standridge,	2014)	
reveals	that	hotels	and	restaurants	and	wholesale/retail	trade	
accounted	 for	 about	 half	 of	 all	 the	 businesses	 confiscated	
from	mafias	between	1983	and	2012	(Table	77).284 
Although	 this	 ‘snapshot’	 of	 confiscated	 companies	 may	
miss some important trends,285 it is useful for determining 
the relative weight of some sectors with respect to the 
legitimate economy. For example, construction is almost two 
times more important among mafia companies than 
among legitimate businesses	(1.8),	while	the	wholesale	and	
retail	trade	has	the	same	weight	(a	ratio	of	1.0),	thus	indicating	
an equal distribution between criminal and legitimate 
companies. The weight of mining and quarrying is fully 16 
times	 higher	 among	 confiscated	 than	 registered	 companies	
in	 Italy,	 confirming	 the	 crucial	 role	 played	 by	 this	 activity	 in	
the	 economy	 of	 organised	 crime	 (Riccardi,	 2014a;	 Riccardi,	
Soriani,	&	Standridge,	2014;	see	below).
The following sections provide brief descriptions of the 
business sectors that have the highest evidence, and most 
importance	for,	OCG	infiltration	in	Italy.	
Level of 
evidence*
Business sectors
Higher
Construction;	Bars	and	restaurants;	Wholesale	and	retail	tradea;	Waste	and	scrap	management;	Hotels	and	
other	tourist	accommodations;	Real	estate	activities
Medium
Transportation	and	renting	of	motor	vehicles;	Casinos,	VLT	and	betting	activities;	Agriculture	and	fishing;	
Manufacturing;	Hospitals	and	residential	care;	IT	and	other	services;	Mining	and	quarrying;	Renewable	energy	
(in	particular	wind	power);	Sex,	tattoo	and	other	personal	activities;	Clubs;	Private	security;	Banking	and	
financial	activities
Emerging 
sectors
Retail	trade	of	gold	and	jewellery	(‘compro	oro’);	Money	transfer	businesses;	Petrol	and	gas	supply;	Wholesale	
of pharmaceutical products
*	The	classes	are	divided	according	to	the	value	of	the	mean	plus	±0.5	standard	deviations	of	each	sector	(see	Chapter	7).	The	information	is	available	for	1,369	
references.
a In particular, wholesale and retail trade of food and of clothing and textiles.
Table 76 - Business sectors with evidence of OCG investments in Italy
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
284.	Note	that	the	classification	of	sectors	of	confiscated	companies	(based	on	
NACE 2002 standard) slightly differs from the one adopted in Project OCP and 
illustrated in Chapter 2 and in the Methodological Annex.
285. As mentioned above, some emerging sectors, like renewable energy, which 
have	recently	witnessed	dozens	of	company	seizures,	are	not	represented	here	
because	they	have	not	yet	reached	definitive	confiscation.	Again,	 the	analysis	
of	confiscated	companies	may	provide	an	outdate	picture	of	the	phenomenon.
286.	In	particular,	in	Sicily	over	three	decades	(1950s-1970s)	urban	areas	were	
radically reshaped by the booming and often uncontrolled construction of new 
buildings, behind which the involvement of Cosa Nostra families has been widely 
proved	 (on	 this,	and	on	 the	so-called	sacco di Palermo	 (sack	of	Palermo)	see	
Dickie, 2004).
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287. This applies in particular in the case of mining, because abandoned quarries 
become	ideal	sites	for	the	stocking	of	 illicit	or	toxic	waste	(Transcrime,	2013a;	
Transcrime	2013b;	Riccardi,	2014a).	See	also	Box	30.
288.	Indeed,	only	well-rooted	and	infiltrated	criminal	groups,	have	the	power	to	
connect with the public administration and use corruption and intimidation in 
order to manipulate public bids. It is no coincidence that the construction sector 
is	 far	 less	 important	 for	 Italian	 mafia	 investments	 abroad,	 where	 they	 have	
weaker	infiltration	of	the	political	and	economic	sphere	(see	Chapter	7).
allows criminal groups to maintain capillary monitoring on the 
local	economy	in	a	certain	area	(Savona	&	Riccardi,	2011).
Recent	 investigations	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 Italian	 mafia	
investments in this sector are widespread also in northern 
and	‘non	traditional’	regions:	for	example,	 in	Piedmont in the 
building	of	the	high-speed	train	railway	(Galullo,	2014a,	2014b;	
Legambiente, 2014) or of the Turin 2006 Olympic games sites 
(Molinaro,	2010;	Ciccarello,	2012;	Voci,	2014);	in	Lombardy, e.g. 
in	the	construction	of	the	EXPO	2015	International	exposition	
site	 (Milosa,	 2014;	 De	 Riccardis,	 2014);	 in	Emilia Romagna, 
again	in	high-speed	railway	(Trigari,	2011;	Università	di	Bologna,	
2012, p. 46), and in Liguria	(DIA,	2011a,	p.	113;	Giacalone,	2013).
Given the level of control over the construction industry by 
Italian	mafias,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 foreign OCGs appear 
less involved in it. 288
Business sectora % of the total
Rate every 10,000 registered 
companiesb
Relative weight in the legal 
economyc
Construction 26.3% 0.6 1.8
Wholesale	and	retail	trade;	
repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal and 
household goods
25.9% 0.3 1.0
Other sectors 9.8% 0.5 1.6
Hotels and restaurants 9.3% 0.5 1.5
Real estate, renting and 
business activities
7.8% 0.2 0.7
Agriculture,	hunting	and	fishing 5.9% 0.1 0.4
Other community, social and 
personal service activities
5.0% 0.3 1.0
Transport, storage and 
communication
3.6% 0.2 0.7
Manufacturing 2.1% 0.1 0.2
Financial intermediation 1.5% 0.3 0.8
Mining and quarrying 1.3% 5.1 16.1
Health and social work 1.0% 0.6 1.8
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.4% 0.5 1.5
a Classified	according	to	NACE	2002	code	1	digit.
b Rate	calculated	by	dividing	the	number	of	companies	confiscated	in	each	business	sector	by	the	number	of	companies	registered	in	Italy	in	the	same	sector.
c Calculated	as	the	relative	weight	of	business	sector	I	comparing	confiscated	companies	and	registered	companies.	
i.e.	where																																																C	=	confiscated	companies;	R	=	registered	companies	and	i	=	business	sector.	If	Wi	>	1,	then	the	weight	of	sector	i	among	confiscated	
companies is higher than	among	registered	companies,	i.e.	in	the	legal	economy.	If	Wi	<	1,	then	business	sector i weighs more on the legal economy than among 
confiscated	assets.	If	Wi	~	1,	then	the	business	sector	has	the	same	weight	between	confiscated	and	registered	companies	(Transcrime,	2013a;	Riccardi,	Soriani,	&	
Standridge, 2014).
Table 77 - Business sectors of confiscated companies in Italy (1983-2012)
Source: Riccardi, 2014a; Riccardi, Soriani, & Standridge, 2014
Construction and Mining
The construction industry has historically represented one 
of	 the	preferred	 targets	 for	mafia	 investments	 in	 Italy.	 It	 has	
offered numerous business opportunities owing to the leading 
role that it played in the post-war Italian economic boom, 
in	particular	in	Sicily	(Sacco,	2010).286 Since then, by investing 
in	 construction	 companies,	 mafia	 groups	 have	 been	 able	
exploit their capacity for intimidation and corruption to 
manipulate and obtain public procurements	(Sciarrone	et	
al.,	2010;	Savona,	2010;	Caneppele,	2014).	 It	 is	not	by	chance	
that	 most	 mafia	 investments	 occur	 in	 public	 construction	
companies	(Transcrime,	2013a;	Riccardi,	2014a).	
Moreover, as already illustrated in Section 7.2, construction 
has certain characteristics which facilitate infiltration 
and money laundering: e.g. a low technological level, high 
labour intensity, high cash-intensiveness, plenty of individual 
companies,	 and	 wide	 use	 of	 subcontracts	 (Sciarrone	 et	 al.,	
2010;	Sacco,	2010;	Riccardi,	2014a).	Furthermore,	 it	makes	 it	
possible	to	commit	related	illegal	activities,	such	as	frauds	(e.g.	
the use of low-cost and low-quality materials, see Transcrime 
2013a, p. 189), use of black labour, extortion or illegal waste 
disposal.287
Also to be stressed is the central position occupied by 
construction in any business supply chain	 (for	 example,	
to	operate	a	 supermarket,	 you	first	have	 to	build	 it)	 and	 this	
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Wholesale and retail trade
Wholesale and retail play an important role for the economies 
of	both	Italian	mafias	(in	particular	Camorra)	and	foreign	OCGs	
active	in	Italy	(in	particular	Chinese).	Most	of	the	evidence	on	
infiltration	refers	to	specific	subsectors:
•		 Trade in food products: this is widely used as a front to 
conceal	illicit	drug	trafficking	(see	Chapter	7)	but	it	 is	also	
driven	by	mafia	culture	and	geographical	proximity	to	‘food	
clusters’;289
•		 Trade in clothing and textiles: this is crucial for the 
economies	 of	 OCGs	 (such	 as	 the	 Camorra	 or	 Chinese	
OCGs) closely involved in the counterfeiting of clothes and 
apparel	(see	Section	5.4);
•		 Department stores: emerging cases of investments in 
GDO – Grande Distribuzione Organizzata	-	by	Italian	mafias	
(in	particular	Cosa	Nostra)	can	be	 identified,	especially	 in	
Sicily	(Brunello,	2011);
•		 Import-export companies: these have interested also 
foreign	 OCGs	 (mainly	 Eastern	 European	 and	 Russian/
Georgian OCGs) because they are useful for certain illegal 
activities	(e.g.	smuggling	and	‘product	laundering’	of	stolen	
goods).
•		 Trade in gold and jewellery: a booming sector in the past 
2-3 years, this may be used for money-laundering purposes 
(due	 to	 its	 cash-intensive	 nature)	 or	 to	 ‘launder’	 stolen	
jewels.
Transportation and logistics
Transportation, in particular road freight, has always been 
crucial	 for	 the	 Italian	 legitimate	 economy	 (Maggi,	 2009).	
But	 it	 has	 proved	 vulnerable	 to	 criminal	 infiltration	 because	
of	 certain	 characteristics	 (e.g.	 a	 high	 number	 of	 individual 
enterprises, the wide use of subcontractors, regulatory 
loopholes).
Infiltration	 by	 Italian	 mafias	 has	 often	 been	 associated	
with episodes of drug trafficking, corruption, extortion and 
intimidation	(see	the	Operation	Decollo Ter in	the	box	below);	
more	 recently,	 there	 have	 been	 concerns	 about	 infiltration,	
also	by	foreign	OCGs	(mainly	Eastern	European),	of	logistics 
and transportation companies, especially in Emilia 
Romagna	and	Lombardy.	Such	infiltration	is	often	associated	
with the use of irregular workers, often of Eastern European 
origin	(Di	Vico,	2014b)	and	even	with	episodes	of	cargo	theft,	in	
particular	in	pharmaceutical	transportation	(Riccardi,	Dugato,	
&	Polizzotti,	2014).	
Box 31– Cocaine, extortion and transportation in 
Calabria: the Operation Decollo Ter 
In July 2014 several members of an organised 
crime	 group	 linked	 to	 ‘Ndrangheta	 were	 convicted	
by the Tribunal of Vibo Valentia for drug trafficking 
and extortion committed against a well-known 
German discount supermarket chain with branches 
in	 Southern	 Italy	 (Cn24tv,	 2014).	 The	 ‘Ndrangheta	
members laundered the proceeds from large-scale 
trafficking of cocaine from South America into a 
range of transportation companies, which obtained, 
through extortion and intimidation, monopoly over 
transportation	 of	 the	 supermarket	 chain’s	 goods	 in	
Southern Italy. Despite the numerous countermeasures 
adopted, including the use of armed escorts, the 
Italian branch of the German company was unable 
to use alternative transportation brokers because of 
numerous acts of intimidation and violence committed 
by	the	‘Ndrangheta	group	(Cn24tv,	2014).
290.	 According	 to	 Caneppele,	 Riccardi	 and	 Standridge	 (2013),	 this	 sector	 is	
attracting	 the	 interest	 of	 Italian	mafias	 for	 various	 reasons,	 including	 copious	
public	subsidies,	strong	territorial	specificity,	and	vulnerabilities	in	the	regulation,	
especially at the regional and local level. In 2013 Operation Eolo led to the 
seizure	of	40	windpower	companies	controlled	(directly	or	indirectly)	by	a	man	
considered	a	figurehead	for	the	Cosa	Nostra	most-wanted	boss	Matteo	Messina	
Denaro	(Marazziti,	2010).
Box 30 - The Camorra entrepreneur and the 
Casalesi clan’s interests in the construction 
industry 
The	 entrepreneur	 R.S.,	 sentenced	 in	 2005	 for	 mafia	
association	(Anselmo	&	Braucci,	2008,	p.	325),	served	
as	 one	 of	 the	 figureheads	 of	 the	 Casalesi	 Camorra	
clan in the construction industry in Campania. His 
business covered all the phases of the cement cycle 
from the extraction to the production of concrete, to 
construction	companies	themselves.	Relying	on	mafia	
methods, the criminal consortium obtained several 
public procurements, even the supply of concrete 
for construction of the prison of Santa Maria Capua 
Vetere	 (Anselmo	 &	 Braucci,	 2008,	 p.	 259).	 R.S.	 was	
also involved in illicit waste disposal, because his 
companies’	 mines	 were	 considered	 ideal	 sites	 for	
the	 final	 storage	 of	 hazardous	 waste	 (Commissione	
Parlamentare	 D’inchiesta,	 2000).	 Indeed,	 in	 1998	 the	
Italian Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta sui 
rifiuti	 described	 R.S.	 as	 "one	 of	 the	 most	 important	
exponents throughout the entire cycle of toxic waste 
disposal"	 (Commissione	 Parlamentare	 D’inchiesta,	
1998).
289. For example, the trade in dairy products for Camorra criminal groups, see 
Transcrime, 2013a and 2013b.
Emerging sectors
Besides the traditional sectors described above, some others 
have recently emerged in police investigations, although most 
of	 them	have	not	yet	been	addressed	by	 the	confiscation	of	
companies:
•		 Renewable energy, in particular windpower: according 
to	Riccardi,	Caneppele	and	Standridge	 (2013),	 at	 least	 15	
on-going investigations, corresponding to approximately 
10% of the installed windpower in Italy, have involved 
windpower plants with reference to cases of corruption, 
fraud,	criminal	and	mafia	association. 290
•		 Petrol and gas supply:	 infiltration	 of	 this	 sector	 has	
concerned Camorra and Cosa Nostra groups in particular 
(DIA,	 2012a,	 2013b;	 Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Trnews,	 2014).	
Through	 the	 infiltration	 of	 petrol	 stations,	 mafias	 have	
increased	 their	 control	 over	 the	 territory	 (Cantone	 &	 Di	
Feo,	2010;	Transcrime,	2013b)	and	produced	 illegal	extra-
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profits	 through	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 fraud	 schemes	 including	
VAT fraud, excise frauds, and manipulation of fuel counters. 
There	is	also	evidence	that	Cosa	Nostra	has	infiltrated	gas	
supply	companies	(in	particular	LPG,	Transcrime,	2013a).
•		 Money transfer businesses: between 2010 and 2012 
around	15	money	transfer	agencies	were	seized	by	 Italian	
LEAs from Chinese OCGs. According to police reports, 
through these companies, which were directly controlled by 
the criminal group, about 4.5 billion euro of illicit proceeds 
(from	 counterfeiting,	 sexual	 and	 labour	 exploitation)	
produced	in	Italy	had	been	transferred	back	to	China	(see	
Box 32). 
Ownership and management strategies
According	 to	 recent	 studies	 (Standridge,	 2012;	 Transcrime,	
2013a;	Donato,	Saporito,	&	Scognamiglio,	2013;	Soriani,	2013;	
Riccardi,	Soriani,	&	Standridge,	2014)	mafia	companies	exhibit	
some frequent characteristics in terms of ownership and 
management strategies:
•		 Most	 of	 them	 are	 limited liability companies	 (S.r.l. – 
Società a responsabilità limitata), which represent the 
easiest form to incorporate and manage but are also 
among	 the	 most	 effective	 means	 to	 conceal	 beneficial	
ownership291	 (Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Soriani,	 2013;	 Riccardi,	
Soriani,	&	Standridge,	2014);
•		 Whilst	 there	 is	 evidence	 of	 the	 widespread use of 
figureheads and strawmen	 (according	 to	 Soriani,	
2013,	 54%	 of	 the	 companies	 confiscated	 from	 mafias	
are	 controlled	 through	 figureheads),	 in	 most	 cases	 they	
are chosen from within the family and among relatives, 
thus suggesting the need to maintain direct, familistic 
and ‘in-house’ control over the company, especially by 
‘Ndrangheta292	(Transcrime,	2013a;	Soriani,	2013;	Riccardi,	
Soriani,	&	Standridge,	2014);
•		 At	 the	 same	 time,	 there	 is	 evidence	 of	 the	 widespread	
use of complex cross-shareholdings and ‘Chinese box’ 
ownership schemes	(Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	207);
•		 From	 a	 management	 (and	 accounting)	 point	 of	 view,	 it	
emerges	 that,	 on	 average,	mafia	 companies	 (Standridge,	
2012;	Transcrime,	2013a):
- Have lower levels of financial debt with respect to their 
‘legitimate’	 peers	 and	 higher	 levels	 of	 current assets 
(e.g.	cash,	receivables,	etc.)	and	of	trade	payables;
- Often employ more staff than necessary	 (Riccardi,	
Soriani,	&	Standridge,	2014);
- Are often not well managed;	
- And as a result, their profitability is lower or equal to 
that	of	legal	peers;
•		 These	 findings	 suggest	 that	 most	 of	 these	 companies	
act	merely	 as	 ‘empty	 boxes’	 useful	 for	money	 laundering	
purposes but with no productive intent293	 (Arlacchi,	
2007;	 Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Riccardi,	 Soriani,	 &	 Standridge,	
2014).
However, more indirect forms of control have emerged 
from	recent	investigations,	particularly	in	the	North	(Livesicilia.
it,	2013;	Il	Quotidiano	della	Calabria,	2014).294 For example. to 
be monitored are the cases of ‘informal banks’ set up by 
mafias	(in	particular	‘Ndrangheta)	lending	to	legal	companies	
at usurious interest rates, and conditioning, in practice, the 
management	 of	 these	 businesses	 towards	 actual	 control	 (Il	
Messaggero, 2014). 
8.4.4. Actors
As anticipated in 5.4, a plurality of criminal groups invest in 
the Italian legitimate economy: traditional mafia groups, 
more or less structured foreign OCGs, smaller criminal 
groups, loose networks of individuals including brokers, and 
freelance entrepreneurs.
According	 to	 the	 available	 evidence,	 the	 lion’s	 share	 is	 still	
attributable	 to	 the	 main	 Italian	 mafia	 organisations	 (Cosa	
Nostra,	Camorra,	‘Ndrangheta).	Although	Cosa Nostra is the 
most	represented	in	terms	of	assets	(definitively)	confiscated,	
in the more recent investigations included in the DOCI, the role 
of ‘Ndrangheta has been increasing. Similarly, also foreign 
OCGs are emerging.295
There follows a brief description of the investment patterns of 
the	main	Italian	mafia	and	foreign	groups.
Italian mafias 
Cosa Nostra
This	 was	 the	 mafia	 most	 able	 to	 infiltrate	 the	 legitimate	
economy until the early 1990s, and then the one most 
targeted	by	financial	 investigations	and	confiscations	 in	 the	
1990s	and	2000s.	Most	of	the	evidence	of	infiltration	by	Cosa	
Nostra concentrates in Sicily, in particular in the provinces of 
Palermo, Catania and Trapani	 (where	 most	 confiscated	
companies	are	located).	Outside	Sicily,	evidence	of	infiltration	
can	 be	 found	 in	 both	 central	 Italy	 (e.g.	 Tuscany)	 and	 in	 the	
North,	mainly	Lombardy	(Milan,	Varese,	Bergamo,	Pavia)	and	
Liguria.
293. On the other hand, recent studies have highlighted that, between the 
start	 of	 the	 investigation	 and	 the	 seizure,	 these	 companies	 may	 undergo	 a	
disinvestment strategy by the criminal group, which seeks to liquidate as many 
of	 its	assets	as	possible	 in	order	to	avoid	their	confiscation	(Donato,	Saporito,	
&	Scognamiglio,	2013).	This	may	explain,	among	other	things,	 the	high	 level	of	
current assets and cash.
294.	The	EU-funded	ARIEL	Project	(www.arielproject.eu)	will	hopefully	provide	
further insights into how OCG companies are controlled and managed in Europe.
295.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 data	 on	 the	 definitive	 confiscation	 of	 assets	
(companies,	in	this	case)	do	not	include	foreign	OCGs	because	some	companies	
seized	from	non-Italian	criminal	groups	have	not	yet	reached	final	confiscation.	
As	anticipated	and	as	will	be	specified	in	Part	3,	the	development	of	confiscation	
regulation	 in	 Italy	 has	 historically	 been	driven	by	 the	 need	 to	 hit	 the	 financial	
interests of Cosa Nostra in Sicily. It is therefore not surprising that, initially, 
it was used primarily against Cosa Nostra, which accounts for the majority of 
confiscated	assets.
291. In Italy an S.r.l. can be set up with only 10,000 euro of minimum share capital. 
They do not need external accountants but at the same time they can well 
conceal	 the	 real	beneficial	owner	 (if	 a	plurality	of	 shareholders	are	used)	and	
defend	against	confiscation.
292.	According	to	available	studies,	‘Ndrangheta	is	the	mafia	most	concerned	to	
maintain	direct	and	‘in	house’	control	over	the	company,	which	may	also	reflect	
the	 organisational	 and	 familistic	 structure	 of	most	 of	 its	 groups.	 Other	mafia	
groups, such as Cosa Nostra and the so-called Banda della Magliana, apparently 
make	wider	use	of	 limited	companies	and	 joint-stock	companies	(Transcrime,	
2013a;	Soriani,	2013;	Riccardi,	Soriani,	&	Standridge,	2014).
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As regards business sectors, most Cosa Nostra groups 
have been historically active in the construction industry 
(Sacco,	2010).	It	is	not	by	chance	that	almost	half	(42%)	of	the	
companies	 confiscated	 from	Cosa	Nostra	 are	 in	 this	 sector	
(Transcrime	2013a,	p.	170).	However,	more	recently	some	sort	
of	‘diversification’	has	been	apparent,	particularly	into	related	
sectors like real estate activities, oil and gas supply297 and 
renewable energy, in particular wind power	 (Caneppele,	
Riccardi,	&	Standridge,	2013;	De	Paolo,	2013).
Camorra
Investments by Camorra groups appear to be relatively 
widespread in terms of both territories and of business 
sectors. The geographic area recording the highest level of 
infiltration	 is	the	one	extending	from	Campania	(in	particular	
the provinces of Naples and Caserta) to Lazio	(with	Latina,	
Frosinone and Rome). But also northern regions, such as 
Lombardy and Emilia Romagna	 (especially	 on	 the	 ‘A14	
Highway	axis’)	are	emerging	(Tizian,	2012;	DIA,	2013b,	p.	294).
As regards business sectors, Camorra exhibits a quite 
marked diversification	 among	 its	 clans	 (Transcrime,	
2013a;	Riccardi,	2014a;	Riccardi,	Soriani,	&	Standridge,	2014).	
Whilst the Casalesi group has a substantial control over the 
mining and construction sector in the province of Caserta 
(Transcrime	 2013a,	 p.	 173;	 Transcrime	 2013b),	 other	 clans	
seem more involved in the wholesale and retail trade 
(mainly	 in	 clothing	 and	 textiles,	 food	 and	 dairy	 products,	
flowers	and	plants	–	Transcrime	2013a;	Riccardi,	2014a)	and	
in	 bars	 and	 restaurants.	 Other	 sectors	 with	 significant	 and	
emerging evidence are petrol stations and transportation 
(La	Repubblica,	2013;	Gruppo	Antimafia	Pio	La	Torre,	2014,	p.	
11). 
‘Ndrangheta
This has emerged as one of the most powerful OCGs able to 
penetrate the legitimate economy, not only in its area of origin 
(southern Calabria), where control over the legal economy 
is extensive, particularly in the construction, transportation, 
and health sectors, but also in north-western regions 
(Varese,	 2011;	 Transcrime	 2013a):	 in	 particular	 Lombardy 
(where	 investigations	such	as	 Infinito have	 led	 to	 the	seizure	
of	 hundreds	of	 ‘Ndrangheta	 companies),	Piedmont	 (see	 for	
example Operation Minotauro) and Liguria at the border with 
France	(see	also	Box	28).	
In all these regions, city councils have been dissolved 
for	 ‘Ndrangheta	 infiltration	 (Sciarrone,	 1998,	 pp.	 281–307;	
Commissione	 parlamentare	 d’inchiesta,	 2003,	 pp.	 94–97;	
Varese,	 2011;	 Commissione	 parlamentare	 d’inchiesta,	 2013,	
pp.	 104,	 125;	 Gazzetta	 Ufficiale	 della	 Repubblica	 Italiana,	
2013), and several investigations into the manipulation of 
public procurements have been carried out. More recently, 
expansion	 into	 ‘non-traditional’	 regions	 such	 as	 Emilia 
Romagna, e.g. in the transportation sector, has also been 
reported	 (Fondazione	 Antonino	 Caponnetto,	 2014,	 p.	 77;	
Gruppo	Antimafia	Pio	La	Torre,	2014,	p.	10).	
As regards business sectors, there is evidence of investments 
by	‘Ndrangheta	in	traditional sectors such as construction, 
transportation, bars and restaurants. Some sort of 
specialisation	by	Ndrangheta	groups	in	specific	sectors	can	be	
also highlighted298	(Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	175;	Riccardi,	2014a).	
More recent evidence also concerns the windpower sector 
(Caneppele,	Riccardi,	&	Standridge,	2013)	and	call centres. 
Joint-ventures among different mafias?
Recent	investigations,	in	particular	in	‘non-traditional’	regions	
like	 Lombardy	 or	 Lazio,	 have	 uncovered	 an	 increasing	
number	 of	 cases	 in	 which	 different	 mafias	 cooperate	 for	
the management of one or more legitimate businesses 
(Transcrime,	2013a,	p.169).	This	may	be	considered	a	further	
development	 of	 the	 joint	 ventures	 between	 mafias	 in	 illicit 
markets, such as drugs, during the 1980s.299
Examples are the cooperation between Camorra and 
‘Ndrangheta	 for	 control	 of	 nightclubs	 on Lake Garda	 (see	
Box	28),	 the	 ‘cartel’	set	up	by	Camorra	(Casalesi clan), Cosa 
Nostra	 (Santapaola-Ercolano)	 and	 ‘Ndrangheta	 to	 control	
transportation services in the key fruit markets of Fondi near 
Latina	(Sud Pontino and Iblis	Investigations),	Milan	(For a King 
and Esperanza	 Investigations),	 and	 Piacenza	 (Fondazione	
Antonino Caponnetto, 2014, p. 64).
298. For example, while the Coco-Trovato-Flachi clan in Lombardy seems 
active in the hotels, bars and restaurants sector, other clans like the Morabito 
are more involved in the construction industry. These differences may be due to 
the different opportunities provided by the territory, or they may be determined 
by	 individual	 members’	 investment	 preferences	 (Transcrime,	 2013a,	 p.	 175;	
Riccardi, 2014a, p. 203).
299.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
296. Percentages not including references for which indication of OCGs was 
not	available.	A	 ‘criminal	affiliation’	was	attributed	by	Transcrime	 (2013a)	only	
to	confiscated	companies;	it	could	not	be	attributed	to	real	estate	and	to	other	
types	of	confiscated	assets	(see	Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	387	for	further	details).	
“Other	 foreign	 OCGs”	 includes	 African,	 Albanian,	 Romanian,	 Balkan,	 African,	
Irish, Romanian and other criminal groups.
297. Given the lack of railway infrastructures, in Sicily road freight and road 
transport still play a crucial role. Controlling petrol stations may yield important 
profit	 margins,	 as	 well	 as	 opportunities	 for	 fraud	 schemes	 (VAT	 fraud,	 fuel	
counter manipulations, etc.). At the same time, gas supply, in particular LPG, is 
still important, given that it is widely used for heating in private houses. To be 
cited in this regard is a business group constituted by several companies and 
controlled by Cosa Nostra families which had the monopoly over the distribution 
of	LPG	in	Western	Sicily	(Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	187)	until	 it	was	confiscated	by	
the Italian judicial authority.
Figure 39 - Main organised crime groups involved in invest-
ments in the legitimate economy in Italy296
Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI and ANBSC data
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Figure 40 - Geographical distribution of evidence of investments by Camorra, Cosa Nostra and ‘Ndrangheta in Italy (NUTS 
2)300
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Foreign organised crime groups
Chinese OCGs
Analysis of the activity of Chinese criminal groups in illicit 
markets in Italy was widely addressed in Section 5.4. However, 
large	evidence	of	 their	 infiltration	of	 the	 legitimate	economy	
can	 also	 be	 found	 (CNEL,	 2011;	 Becucci	 2013,	 2014),	 in	
particular	 in	 central	 Italy	 (e.g.	 Tuscany and Lazio) and 
in	 the	 north	 (in	 particular	 Lombardy), where the Chinese 
community	is	also	larger	(CNEL,	2011,	p.	26;	DIA,	2013a,	p.	195).	
In	Tuscany,	 in	 the	province	of	Prato	 (near	Florence),	 there	 is	
a high likelihood that some Chinese-controlled legitimate 
businesses	are	used	for	money	 laundering	purposes	(CNEL,	
2011, p. 30).
Besides real estate properties	 (Da	 Rold	 &	 Rinaldi,	 2014),	
bars, restaurants, wholesale and retail trade and personal 
activities	(e.g.	massage	parlours,	hairdressers,	nail	shops,	etc.)	
appear	 to	 be	 the	 most	 infiltrated	 business	 sectors	 (CNEL,	
2011;	Da	Rold	&	Rinaldi,	2014).	
Some may be functional to illegal markets, like massage 
parlours	 for	 prostitution	 (DIA,	 2008,	 p.	 270;	 Da	 Rold	 &	
Rinaldi, 2014), or the wholesale and retail trade for the sale 
of counterfeit products	 (often	 in	connection	with	Camorra	
groups,	see	5.4)	(CNEL,	2011,	p.	123).	More	recently,	evidence	
has	 emerged	 of	 infiltration	 of	 the	 transportation and 
logistics sector	 (again	 useful	 for	 smuggling	 purposes)	 and	
money transfer businesses	 (to	 facilitate	 the	 cross-border	
transfer	of	illicit	proceeds)	(see	Box	32).
To be noted is that most of these companies rely on an ethnic 
base	 and	 employ	 people	mostly	 of	 the	 same	 origin	 (CNEL,	
2011;	 DNA,	 2014).	 Other	 interesting	 patterns	 are	 the	 high	
frequency in change the managers of their businesses, which 
may also help avoid monitoring by LEAs and FIUs, especially 
regarding tax and illegal labour300	(CNEL,	2011,	pp.	30-31;	DNA,	
2014,	pp.	214-215;	Da	Rold	&	Rinaldi,	2014).	
Box 32 – Investments by Chinese OCGs: the Qian 
Liu, Qian Ba I and Qian Ba II Operations 
The Qian Liu, Qian Ba I and Qian Ba II Operations, 
conducted	 by	 the	 Italian	 Guardia	 di	 Finanza	 (GDF)	
between	 2010	 and	 2012,	 were	 the	 first	 large-scale	
investigations	 targeted	 on	 infiltration	 by	 Chinese	
300.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
301.	In	fact,	companies	are	frequently	set	up	for	a	limited	period	of	time	(about	
two years) and then formally shut down, changing their names and the formal 
owners	 (CNEL,	 2011;	 DNA,	 2014,	 pp.	 214-215;	 Da	 Rold	 &	 Rinaldi,	 2014).	 This	
mechanism may enable Chinese criminals to evade their tax obligations and 
resume the same business under the names of strawmen, maintaining the same 
equipment,	personnel,	customers	and	suppliers	(Da	Rold	&	Rinaldi,	2014).
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Russian/Georgian criminal groups
There	 is	evidence	of	 investment	by	Russian/Georgian	OCGs	
throughout	 Italy	 in	 both	 real	 estate	 and	 companies	 (Kegö	&	
Molcean,	 2011;	Varese,	 2011;	Corriere	Del	Mezzogiorno,	 2013;	
DNA, 2014, pp. 207–212). Two types of investment strategy 
may	be	identified:	
•		 The	first	 is	 linked	to	 larger-scale and high-level money 
laundering schemes through hotels and real estate, 
in particular in tourist areas like Sardinia, Lake Garda 
(Toresini,	 2014)	 or	 the	 Adriatic	 coast	 (La	 Repubblica,	
2002);
•		 The	second	is	smaller scale and often functional to the 
illegal activity: for example, import-export, wholesale 
trade and transportation companies controlled by 
Georgian Vor-Y-Zakone criminal groups, set up in several 
Italian regions, have been used to conceal the transfer of 
goods	stolen	during	organised	thefts	(Bianconi	&	Santucci,	
2012).
Eastern European criminal groups
Although	 other	 Eastern	 European	 criminal	 groups	 (in	
particular Albanian, Bulgarian and Romanian) are increasingly 
active	 in	 illegal	markets	 in	 Italy	(see	Section	5.4),	 information	
on their money laundering activity is still scant. There is 
evidence	that	they	infiltrate	legal	businesses	(Berticelli,	2008;	
Kruisbergen	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Ministero	 dell’Interno,	 2013),	 but	
comprehensive analysis of territories and business sectors is 
not possible given the limited amount of data. 
8.4.5. Concluding remarks
Italy is an attractive country for the laundering of illicit money 
and	 in	which	criminal	groups,	both	 Italian	mafias	and	 foreign	
OCGs, can invest in the legitimate economy. Historical and 
well-rooted	 infiltration	 by	 Italian	 mafias	 (in	 particular	 Cosa	
Nostra	groups,	Camorra	groups	and	‘Ndrangheta	groups)	may	
weaken the investment ambitions of foreign OCGs, especially 
in	Southern	‘traditional’	regions.
However,	 other	 areas,	 such	 as	 the	 Centre	 (in	 particular	
Lazio	 and	 Tuscany)	 and	 the	 North	 (in	 particular	 Lombardy,	
Piedmont, Liguria and Emilia Romagna) exhibit more fluid 
situations where both the main Italian mafia groups and 
foreign ones invest. To be monitored in these regions are new 
and	more	subtle	forms	of	infiltration,	such	as	‘joint ventures’ 
between	different	mafia	groups	(see	Box	28),	the	use	of	local	
‘freelance’ entrepreneurs and brokers, and informal 
banking services	 (usually	 at	 usurious	 interest	 rates)	 which	
are in fact used to influence the control and management of a 
company	(see	above).
It is evident that investments by OCGs in Italy move where 
opportunities arise and where law enforcement control, 
regulation, and the socio-economic environment are more 
vulnerable. The evidence shows that they serve a plurality of 
criminal purposes, including money laundering, control of the 
territory,	and	gaining	social	consensus	(see	Table	78).
To	conclude,	it	appears	that,	while	Italian	mafias	use	legitimate	
businesses primarily to exercise control over the territory and 
to	 infiltrate	 the	 political	 and	 administrative	 sphere,	 foreign	
OCGs use investments for functional purposes related to their 
illegal activities or for money laundering. But these patterns 
may change because also foreign criminal groups may 
increasingly adopt a ‘mafia-style’ approach in the local 
community.
Although this chapter has sought to provide a comprehensive 
picture of criminal investments in Italy, the analysis should 
be improved by identifying more precisely the vulnerabilities 
(particularly	in	the	North),	regulations,	and	business	sectors	in	
order to produce more effective risk assessments useful for 
both prevention and investigation purposes in the private and 
public sector. 
organised	 crime	 of	 Italy’s	 legal	 economy.	 The	
investigations discovered a galaxy of businesses in 
various	 Italian	 regions,	 among	 them	 Tuscany,	 Lazio,	
Emilia Romagna, Lombardy, Apulia and Campania, 
which could be related to a Chinese criminal group. 
Around 200 companies active in the wholesale and 
retail of clothing, bars and restaurants, import-export 
and	money	transfer	businesses	were	seized.	The	money	
earned	from	illicit	activities	(e.g.	sexual	exploitation	and	
forced labour, counterfeiting) was laundered through 
money	transfers,	the	use	of	figureheads	and	tax	havens	
(CNEL,	2011;	Tribunale	di	Firenze,	2010,	2011,	2012).	 In	
particular, the GDF estimated that about 4.5 billion 
euro of illicit proceeds had been transferred to China.
Figure 41 - Geographical distribution of evidence of 
Chinese OCGs in Italy (NUTS 2)302
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Source: Transcrime elaboration on DOCI
302.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
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Driver Examples
Money 
laundering
Using cash-intensive businesses such as bars and restaurants to conceal the illicit origin of money and 
launder illicit proceeds
Profit
Investing	in	sectors	characterised	by	high	profit	margins,	also	guaranteed	by	copious	public	subsidies	(e.g.	
renewable energy)
Control of the 
territory
Investing	in	territorial-specific	business	sectors,	such	as	petrol	stations	or	construction,	which	allow	capillary	
monitoring of the territory and its economic activities
Influencing the 
political and 
administrative 
sphere
Investing in sectors with a strong public sector role, such as public construction or the health system, in order 
to	infiltrate	the	local	political	and	public	administration	system
Increasing 
social 
consensus
Offering jobs, either regular or irregular, in strongly labour-intensive sectors, or setting up businesses easily 
recognisable by the population
Facilitating 
illegal activities
Investing	in	business	sectors	(e.g.	transportation,	wholesale	of	food	products,	import/export	companies)	
useful	for	concealing	the	illicit	trafficking	of	drugs,	counterfeits,	stolen	goods	or	in	sectors	(e.g.	oil&gas	supply,	
financial	services)	where	it	is	easy	to	commit	VAT	frauds,	excise	frauds	etc.
Table 78 - The drivers of criminal investments in Italy
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8.5.1. Introduction
Especially in the 1990s, there were concerns in the Netherlands 
about	 criminals	 taking	 over	 (parts	 of)	 city	 centres,	 with	 an	
especial	focus	on	Amsterdam	(Commission	Van	Traa,	1996).	
The Netherlands consequently developed the so-called 
BIBOB-law that allows administrative institutions to revoke 
or reject licences to open for instance a bar when links with 
crime are suspected. In terms of crime, the Netherlands 
is mostly a transit country where the major OCGs engage 
mainly in smuggling activities and other international crimes. 
It is therefore not surprising that the transportation sector is 
one of the sectors that attracts the most investment. It has 
been suggested that the Netherlands is susceptible to money 
laundering	because	of	 the	relative	size	of	 its	financial	sector,	
its openness to trade, and the amount of criminal proceeds 
(FATF,	2011c).
Methodological remarks
Two different databases have used to identify the investment 
patterns of organised crime in the Netherlands:
•		 the	database of the Dutch PPO, to which full access was 
granted for this project. For details on the selection and 
operationalization	of	this	database	see	Section	5.5,	and	the	
Methodological	Annex;303
•		 to	 address,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 the	 bias	 due	 to	 the	 use	 of	
seizures	 and	 confiscations,304 another database, a 
selection	of	references	from	the	DOCI	(see	Chapter	2	and	
the Methodological Annex), has been used. This database 
is a collection of all the Dutch cases that could be found 
in the public domain. The sources of this database were, 
among others:
- the WODC Organised Crime Monitors, which are 
discussed earlier in this report in Section 4.5.1.
- Previous academic literature	 (e.g.	 Ferwerda	 et	 al.,	
2007;	Fijnaut	&	Bovenkerk,	1996;	van	de	Bunt	et	al.,	2011).	
The relevant part of the DOCI analysed consists of 859 
references to organised crime investments. Business 
sectors	in	which	OCGs	had	invested	were	identified	in	613	of	
these references.
The next two Sections analyse the two databases in regard to 
several	aspects:	geographical	patterns	(8.5.2),	type	of	assets	
and	business	sectors	of	 investments	(8.5.3),	and	the	criminal	
actors	involved	(8.5.4).	It	concludes	with	a	review	of	the	drivers	
of	investments	(8.5.5).
8.5.2. Geography 
Organised crime investments in the Netherlands
Analysis of the geographical patterns of criminal investments 
in the Netherlands can be carried out by considering the 
distribution of the 541 seized real estate properties,305 
which	 are	 the	 only	 seizures	 for	 which	 the	 location	 can	 be	
determined. 
Before	 analysing	 seized	 real	 estate	 abroad,	 examination	
is made of the geographical distribution of the domestic 
properties. Table 79 below reports how many assets have 
been	 seized	 in	 the	 various provinces of the Netherlands 
(NUTS	2).306  
Most	 real	 estate	 has	 been	 seized	 in	 and	 around	 the	 capital	
Amsterdam in the province of North Holland (NH), and in and 
around the international harbour of Rotterdam in the province 
of South Holland (ZH). This in itself may not be surprising, 
because these are the most populated provinces of the 
Netherlands. To gain a better idea of where there are relatively 
many	properties	seized,	the	number	of	seized	properties	per	
million	 inhabitants	 was	 calculated	 for	 each	 province	 (Figure	
42).307
As will be seen from the map and the table, after the number of 
seizures	have	been	corrected	for	the	number	of	inhabitants	of	
each province, those generally mostly associated with crime in 
the	Netherlands	(North	Holland	(NH)	and	South	Holland	(ZH))	
are no longer at the top of the list. Flevoland, a relatively 
new province in the Netherlands, reclaimed from the 
sea in 1986, is at the top of the list. Closer inspection of the 
data	shows	that	 the	seized	real	estate	 is	primarily	 located	 in	
Almere, which is sometimes described as a suburb of the 
capital Amsterdam.308 
Organised crime investments from the Netherlands
Kruisbergen,	Kleemans,	 and	Kouwenberg	 (2014,	p.	 364-370)	
note that the investment location seems often related to the 
country of origin of the criminal(s). To verify the extent to 
which this can also be seen in the database of the Dutch PPO, 
the table below shows what criminal groups were related to the 
303.	For	all	the	12,946	suspects	data	on	both	seizures	and	confiscations	related	
to	organised	crime.	As	regards	confiscation,	unfortunately	only	the	total	amount	
confiscated	and	not	 a	 detailed	 list	 of	 all	 the	 confiscated	 goods	 is	 available.	 It	
was	therefore	decided	to	focus	on	seized	goods	and	cash	to	gain	an	idea	of	the	
investment patterns of organised crime in the Netherlands.
304.	Although	the	analysis	of	seized	assets	may	provide	important	information	
on	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 ‘portfolios’	 of	 criminal	 groups,	 it	may	 be	 biased	by	
the level of enforcement or by how the regulation is applied. For example, the 
amount	 of	 seized	 companies	 is	 low	 despite	 the	 large	 evidence	 on	 criminal	
infiltration	of	companies	in	the	Netherlands.	
305. The database officially refers to immovable registered goods in general, 
but closer inspection shows that nearly all of the listed goods are real estate. 
For	readability	the	term	‘real	estate’	is	therefore	used	for	the	rest	of	this	chapter.
306. Information about the locations of real estate properties are in open text 
fields.	Therefore	the	location	had	to	be	determined	by	hand.	As	a	result,	it	was	
possible to determine the location for only 328 objects, of which 311 were located 
within the Netherlands and 17 abroad.
307.	Note	 that	with	 ‘only’	 328	 assets	 divided	 among	 12	 provinces,	 the	 results	
are	 relatively	 sensitive;	 one	 large-scale	 investigation	 involving	 many	 seized	
real	estate	properties	can	influence	the	results	significantly.	For	example,	there	
are a couple of large-scale investigations involving more than 20 real estate 
properties, which is more than can be found in total in most provinces.
308. This is for instance mentioned by the designer of the city of Almere, Brans 
Stassen:	 http://www.omroepflevoland.nl/Nieuws/54774/almere-almere-blijft-
altijd-voorstad-amsterdam.
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17	real	estate	properties	seized	outside	the	Netherlands	(Table	
80). Although there is evidence that Turkish OCGs active in 
the Netherlands invest back in Turkey, there are insufficient 
data to reach reliable conclusions on this matter.
8.5.3. Assets and business sectors 
In	 the	 Netherlands	 there	 is	 evidence	 of	 organised	 crime’s	
investment	 in,	or	possession	of,	a	wide	variety	of	assets	 (e.g.	
real estate, company, movable goods, jewellery, vehicles). They 
can	be	analysed	from	two	perspectives:	first	by	looking	at	the	
‘portfolio’	that	can	be	deduced	from	an	analysis of the seized 
assets (database PPO), and secondly by analysing the 
database on references to organised crime investments 
(DOCI), which includes almost solely companies.
A breakdown of the portfolio of organised crime assets
The	seizures	in	the	Dutch	PPO	database	have	been	analysed	to	
gain	an	idea	of	the	goods	on	which	OCGs	spend	their	(illegally	
obtained)	money	 (Table	81).	 In	 the	Netherlands,	 investments	
are	rarely	made	by	a	crime	organisation	as	a	central	strategy;	
capital is personal and not in the hands of the organisation 
(Kruisbergen,	Kleemans,	&	Kouwenberg,	2014).
A substantial amount of luxury items are being seized, 
together with jewellery, cars and ships. This is in line with 
former studies on the spending of criminals in the Netherlands 
(see	 e.g.	 Naylor,	 2002,	 p.	 20-21;	 Kruisbergen,	 Kleemans,	 &	
Kouwenberg 2014). 
Cash	 in	 foreign	 currency	 is	 sometimes	 specified	 in	 the	
database, detailing the amount of money and which currency, 
but this is not done often enough to enable a good estimate of 
the total amount of money involved. For domestic money, the 
total	value	is	filed	for	only	66	of	the	664	pre-judicial	seizures.	
Province NUTS 2 Name
Number of seized real estate 
properties
Population
Seized real estate properties 
per million inhabitants
NH Noord-Holland 72 2,719,764 26.5
ZH Zuid-Holland 57 3,560,205 16.0
GE Gelderland 46 2,013,903 22.8
UT Utrecht 40 1,243,161 32.2
NB Noord-Brabant 34 2,470,184 13.8
OV Overijssel 18 1,138,571 15.8
LI Limburg 17 1,121,483 15.2
FL Flevoland 14 397,772 35.2
DR Drenthe 7 489,912 14.3
FR Friesland 4 647,239 6.2
GR Groningen 1 582,161 1.7
ZE Zeeland 1 381,202 2.6
Table 79 - Number of real estate properties seized from OCGs in the Netherlands (2003-2014) per province (NUTS 2)
Source: UU elaboration on PPO database
Figure 42 - Number of real estate properties seized 
from OCGs in the Netherlands (2003-2014) per million 
inhabitants at province level (NUTS 2)309
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Source: UU elaboration on PPO database
309.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
198 | Part 2
Country Number of seized real 
estate properties
Type of OCG
Dutch British
Other Eastern 
European
Romanian
South 
American
Turkish
Belgium 1 1
Curaçao 4 3 1
Germany 1 1
UK 1 1
France 2 2
Portugal 1 1
Spain 3 3
Suriname 1 1
Thailand 1 1
Turkey 2 2
Table 80 - Number of real estate properties seized from OCGs (2003-2014) that were located outside the Netherlands
Source: UU elaboration on PPO database
Type of assets seized N. assets under criminal seizures N. assets under pre-judicial seizures
Sharesa 0 9
Jewelry 47 1,354
Cars 28 526
Cash	(in	foreign	currency) 92 162
Cash	(in	domestic	currency) 1,338 664
Alive and dead animals 25 10
Weapons 23 5
Immovable property 0 540
Other	/	not	specified 643 2,243
Ships 0 29
Narcotics 5 0
Collections 2 157
Food and drinks 0 54
Assets/claimsb 28 1,156
a Including	whole	companies	(as	majority	shares	of	a	company).
b Including movable assets such as bank accounts, claims to companies, cheques, insurance policies, third-party accounts, tax refunds, delayed pay-checks, 
mortgage claims.
Table 81 - Number of assets seized from OCGs in the Netherlands (2003-2014)310
Source: UU elaboration on PPO database
310.	 In	 the	Netherlands	two	types	of	seizures	are	distinguished,	criminal	seizures	 (art.	94	Dutch	Criminal	Procedure	Code)	and	pre-judicial	seizures	 (art.	94a	Dutch	
Criminal	Procedure	Code).	Whilst	criminal	seizures	are	made	primarily	for	objects	relevant	to	the	investigation	or	in	court	(such	as	an	administration	or	a	t-shirt	bearing	
a	bloodstain),	pre-judicial	seizures	are	made	to	ensure	that	there	are	goods	to	be	confiscated	later.	For	a	more	detailed	description,	see	Chapter	11.	In	the	database,	all	
criminal	seizures	without	any	value	(which	is	mostly	paperwork)	were	filtered	out	to	limit	the	size	of	the	database,	and	because	they	said	nothing	about	the	investment	
patterns	of	OCGs.	The	table	shows	the	amount	of	objects	seized	in	the	two	different	categories.
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The	 amount	 of	 seized	 cash	 in	 domestic	 currency	 in	 OCG	
cases ranges from 750 euro to 4.6 million euro, with an 
average of about 290,000 euro.311 
The	 category	 ‘food	 and	 drinks’	 contains	 mostly	 expensive	
bottles	 of	 alcohol.	 Assets/claims	 are	mostly	money	 in	bank 
accounts,	 but	 can	 be	 any	 financial	 claim,	 such	 as	 cheques,	
insurance policies, tax refunds, delayed pay-checks, mortgage 
claims,	etc.	The	total	value	of	the	assets/claims	is	filed	for	106	
of	the	1156	pre-judicial	seizures.	The	amount	of	money	in	these	
bank	accounts	or	the	financial	value	of	the	claims	range	from	
40 euro to 26 million euro, with an average of 1.2 million 
euro.312 There are no companies seized and shares are only 
pre-judicially seized in four investigations. In all four of the 
investigations, the OCG was Dutch. According to Meloen et al. 
(2003)	criminal	proceeds	are	also	used	for	lending,	often	with	
ridiculously high interest rates. These loans do not show up in 
our database.
Real estate properties
As mentioned above, the PPO-database lists at total of 541 
seized real estate properties. Investing in real estate has 
advantages and disadvantages for criminals. The advantages 
are the high prices and volume and the non-transparent 
price determination	(Van	Gestel	et	al.,	2008;	KLPD	–	IPOL,	
2009, p. 141). The disadvantage is that the money is relatively 
immobile after the investment	(Soudijn,	2011,	pp.	44-45).	
The database reports an estimated value for only 37 
properties.313 The estimated values range from 16,000 euro 
to 3.6 million euro, with an average value of about 720,000 
euro.314 As mentioned above, a total of 17 properties outside 
the	Netherlands	were	seized.	
Companies and business sectors
Although	biased	(see	Chapter	2),	the	only	available	information	
on	infiltrated	companies	and	business	sectors	concerns	those	
included in the DOCI, i.e. collected from judicial or police 
investigation cases	(e.g.	those	reviewed	by	the	WODC).	The	
DOCI consists of 859 references to the Netherlands, of which 
the	invested	sector	could	be	identified	in	613	references.	The	
table below shows in which of the 28 different sectors OCGs in 
the Netherlands invested, and to what extent.
Criminals in the Netherlands prefer to invest in sectors with 
which	 they	 are	 familiar	 (Kruisbergen	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 The	most	
popular sectors for OCG investments are: transportation 
and renting of motor vehicles, bars and restaurants, 
wholesale and retail trade, and hotels and other tourist 
accommodations. 
Kruisbergen,	Kleemans	and	Kouwenberg	(2014,	pp.	364-370)	
draw a similar conclusion after analysing 150 organised crime 
cases in the Netherlands. The sectors in which they found most 
investments were: real estate, horeca	 (Dutch	 abbreviation	
for hotels, restaurants and bars) and transport companies. 
However, it should be noted that there is some overlap between 
the cases that were used in this study and the references in the 
DOCI.	Kleemans	et	al.	(2014)	conclude	that	money	laundering	
purposes are also important for investment decisions, like 
the	abundant	use	of	cash	in	‘horeca’	and	car	dealerships.	The	
descriptive results of the analysis on the DOCI point in the 
same direction, with relatively cash-intensive sectors high 
on our list	(bars,	restaurants,	hotels,	tourist	accommodations,	
sex, tattoo and other personal services).
•		 Bars, restaurants, hotels and other tourist attractions. 
The Van Traa parliamentary committee signalled 
already in 1996 that criminals were investing in Horeca 
(Dutch	 abbreviation	 for	 hotels,	 restaurants	 and	 bars)	 in	
Amsterdam. Consequently, a new law was designed that 
made it possible for administrative institutions to reject 
or revoke licences for these type of businesses if there 
are suspicions that the businesses are related to crime. 
This so-called BIBOB-law is intended to prevent criminals 
from taking over certain business sectors in city centres. 
Level of 
evidencea
Business sectors
Higher
Transportation and renting of motor 
vehicles;
Bars and restaurants;
Wholesale and retail trade;
Hotels and other tourist 
accommodations
Medium
Real estate activities;
Legal and professional activities;
Sex, tattoo and other personal activities;
Banking	and	financial	activities;
IT and other services;
Repair and retail of vehicles
Lower
Manufacturing;	Other;	Construction;	
Casinos,	VLT	and	betting	activities;	
Money	service	businesses;	Clubs;	
Sports	and	gaming;	Waste	and	scrap	
management;	Wholesale	and	retail	of	
food;	Wholesale	and	retail	of	clothing	
and	textiles;	Petrol	and	gas	supply;	
Private	security;	Agriculture	and	
fishing;	Hospitals	and	residential	care;	
Maintenance	and	cleaning	services;	
Mining	and	quarrying;	Wholesale	and	
retail	of	gold	and	jewellery;	Renewable	
energy
a The classes are divided according to the value of the mean plus ±0.5 
standard	deviations	of	each	sector	(see	Chapter	7).	The	information	is	
available for 859 references.
Table 82 – Business sectors with evidence of OCG 
investments in the Netherlands
Source: UU elaboration on DOCI
311. The median value is 25,000 euro, indicating a very skewed distribution. 
312. The median value is 130,000 euro, indicating a very skewed distribution.
313. We use the so-called kpi estimated value. Kpi stands for key performance 
indicator	(literal	translation	from	Dutch:	Kritieke	Prestatie	Indicator).
314. The median value is 350,000 euro, indicating a rather skewed distribution.
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OCG Business sectors with higher evidence
Business sectors with medium-low 
evidence
Dutch OCGs
Bars	and	Restaurants;	Hotels	and	other	tourist	
accommodations;	Legal	and	professional	activities;	
Manufacturing;	Repair	and	retail	of	vehicles;	Sex,	tattoo	
and	other	personal	activities;	Transportation	and	
renting	of	motor	vehicles;	Wholesale	and	retail	trade	
Casinos, VLT and betting activities
Turkish OCGs Bars and restaurants -
other Asian OCGs Bars and Restaurants Wholesale and retail of clothing and textiles
Other Eastern 
European OCGs
-
Legal	and	professional	activities;	Repair	and	
retail	of	vehicles;	Transportation	and	renting	
of	motor	vehicles;	Wholesale	and	retail	trade
Motorcycle gangs Bars and restaurants Hotels and other tourist accommodations
Table 83 - Frequency of investment in different sectors by the various OCGs
Source: UU elaboration on DOCI
Source: UU elaboration on PPO data
OCG DR FL FR GE GR LI NB NH OV UT ZH ZE
African 2
Chinese 1
Colombian 1
Dutch 5 12 2 45 1 16 30 61 7 35 36
Middle Eastern 2 2 4
North African 1 1
Other Asian 1 2 2 1
Other Eastern European 1 1
Romanian 1 16
South American 2 1 2 3
Turkish 2 3 9
Table 84 - Number of seized real estate properties (2003-2014) per OCG per province (NUTS-2 level) in the Netherlands
However, bars, restaurants, hotels and other tourist 
attractions are still popular businesses to invest in for 
criminals	 in	 the	Netherlands,	as	 in	 the	rest	of	Europe	(see	
Section 7.2.2). Not only are these sectors very familiar to 
criminals, they also involve numerous cash transactions, 
which may foster money laundering. 
•		 Transportation and renting of motor vehicles is 
also a sector with which criminals are relatively familiar 
(Kruisbergen	et	al.,	2012),	especially,	of	course,	Motorcycle	
gangs and OCGs involved in illicit trafficking activities. 
Investing in this sector, moreover, creates possibilities to 
use for instance trucks or ships belonging to the company 
for	drug	trafficking,	human	trafficking,	or	ITTP	(see	cases	1,	
11, 24, 25, 28, 86 and 103 in Kruisbergen et al., 2012)
•		 Wholesale and retail trade is the biggest sector in the 
legitimate economy and may therefore also be found 
relatively	often	 in	 the	 investment	portfolios	of	OCGs	(see	
Section 7.2.2). Moreover, this sector involves numerous 
cash transactions, which creates money laundering 
opportunities. 
A result in the literature that seems to align somewhat less 
with	the	results	in	Table	82	is	Meloen	et	al.’s	(2003)	finding	that	
the	most	infiltrated	sectors	in	the	Netherlands	are	mining	and	
quarrying,	 construction,	 wholesale	 and	 retail	 trade	 (among	
others: dairy products, leather clothes, flowers and plants), and 
hotels	and	restaurants	(Meloen	et	al.,	2003,	p.	161).	Especially	
for mining and quarrying, Table 82 indicates only a low amount 
of evidence.
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8.5.4. Actors
Different criminal groups may have different investment 
strategies in terms of territories and business sectors for 
investments. To gain a better insight into the investment 
patterns of different OCGs, the DOCI was analysed to 
differentiate among OCGs and the territories and sectors in 
which they invest. 
As regards business sectors, note that the amount of 
references diminishes even further, because not only the 
references	in	which	the	invested	sector	could	not	be	identified	
(246	 cases)	 are	 omitted	 but	 also	 the	 cases	 in	 which	 the	
OCG	could	 not	 be	 identified	 (497	 cases).	 Table	 83	 gives	 an	
overview of which OCGs invested in which sectors.315 
Since the amount of observations decreases substantially, 
it is somewhat harder to draw strong conclusions from this 
table. What seems salient is that Turkish OCGs, other Asian 
OCGs, and motor cycle gangs invest primarily in bars and 
restaurants. Outlaw bikers are related to the legal sectors 
of horeca	(a	Dutch	abbreviation	for	hotel,	restaurant	and	café)	
and security	 (note	on	outlaw	bikers	from	the	Dutch	Ministry	
of Security and Justice to the Dutch Second Chamber on 17 
August 2012), which seems to be in line with our results.
The table below instead shows the geographical distribution, 
across	Dutch	provinces,	of	seized	real	estate	properties	(the	
only	seized	goods	with	information	about	location,	see	above)	
according	to	the	relevant	OCG	(Table	84).
Again, the relatively low number of observations makes 
it	 difficult	 to	 draw	 firm	 conclusions,	 but	 our	 data	 seem	 to	
indicate that the provinces with the country’s main airport 
(Schiphol	 in	 North Holland, NH) and the main harbour 
(Rotterdam	 in	 South	 Holland,	 ZH) have more real estate 
investments by foreign OCGs. This may be due to the more 
international focus of these OCGs.
8.5.5. Concluding remarks
Criminals in the Netherlands seem to invest primarily in 
sectors with which they are familiar and that can assist them 
with	their	(international,	trafficking)	crimes.	Moreover,	sectors	
with numerous cash transactions seem to attract criminal 
investments, which may be related to the accompanying 
money laundering opportunities. In order to limit criminal 
investments in businesses such as bars and restaurants, the 
Netherlands has enacted the so-called BIBOB-law, which 
allows administrative institutions to revoke or reject licences 
when there are suspicions of links with crime. There are 
indications that international OCGs in the Netherlands prefer 
to invest back in their countries of origin, but there are not 
enough	 international	 confiscations	 to	 draw	 firm	 conclusions	
on this point. The regions with most criminal investments are 
located around Amsterdam with its international airport, and 
Rotterdam with its international harbour.
 
315.	All	OCGs	for	which	not	a	single	sector	 investment	could	be	 identified	are	
omitted, and so too are all sectors in which not a single OCG investment could 
be	identified.
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8.6.1. Introduction
According to the available evidence, Spain is emerging as a 
major location for investments in the legitimate economy 
by	a	wide	number	and	range	of	criminal	groups	 (see	below).	
As already mentioned in 4.6, this phenomenon seems to be of 
significant importance in the Spanish public debate and 
on the political agenda, and aligned with the international 
concern regarding the increasing threat that OCGs represents 
to	the	EU	(Barras,	2014).
The Spanish government has recently implemented 
measures to fight this phenomenon. In this regard, over 
the past few years law enforcement action against organised 
crime, drug trafficking, and money laundering has reduced 
Spain´s attractiveness as an entry point	(U.S.	Department	
of State, 2014). As a result of implementation of the Organic 
Law	 5/2010,316	 the	 number	 of	 cases	 in	 which	 confiscation	
is allowed without a criminal conviction being necessary 
has	 been	 extended	 (Di	 Giovanni,	 2011).	 Moreover,	 the	 most	
important measure against organised crime investments has 
been	the	regulation	on	extended	confiscation	included	in	the	
Spanish	Criminal	Code	 in	 recent	 years	 (Jiménez	&	Villarejo,	
2012)	 (see	Section	 10.8).	As	 regards	 information	 technology,	
the	 development	 in	 2004	 of	 a	 Unified	 Index	 (centralized	
database)317 system has enhanced the involvement of notaries 
in	the	AML-CFT	regime	(SEPBLAC,	2008;	Palomo	et	al.,	2012).
Several governmental efforts have been recently made 
to combat money-laundering practices as well as to 
tackle Spain’s submerged economy. In 2012, a new anti-
fraud law was enacted to limit cash transactions between 
businesses and professionals to 2,500 euro318	 (BOE,	2013,	p.	
2).	Moreover,	the	creation	of	the	‘Financial	Ownership	File’,	 in	
order	 to	 prevent	money	 laundering	 and	 terrorism	 financing,	
established the obligation of conducting periodic reviews on 
Spanish	 credit	 institutions	 (Decree	 304/2014).319 Together 
with regulatory developments, new police units as well as 
coordinating agencies	 have	been	created	 in	 order	 to	 fight	
organised	 crime	 and	money	 laundering	 (see	 5.6.1).320 Today, 
Spain is considered to be one of the European countries in 
which	 the	 incidence	 of	 organised	 crime	 is	 most	 significant	
(Diez	Alcalde,	2013),	and	this	applies	also	in	terms	of	criminal	
investments	and	infiltration	of	the	legal	economy.	
There are various reasons why Spain may be an attractive 
and a preferred destination for organised crime 
investments: 
•		 First,	as	mentioned	above,	the	extent of proceeds from 
illegal markets in Spain is significant	 (see	 5.6).	 For	
example,	Spain	ranks	first	 in	Europe	as	regards	proceeds	
from the illegal cannabis market and third for the cocaine 
market	 (5.6).	 Although	 none	 of	 these	 proceeds	 may	 be	
laundered locally, some of them may pollute the local 
Spanish economy.
•		 Second,	the	nature	of	Spain as a ‘transit’ country for a 
wide	range	of	 illicit	 trafficking	(e.g.	of	 illicit	drugs,	tobacco	
products, humans, see 5.6) makes it vulnerable also to 
illicit	 financial	 inflows	and	outflows.	 In	 this	 regard,	Spain’s	
geographical	 proximity	 with	 ‘producer’	 countries	 (e.g.	
North Africa) may create vulnerabilities in terms of criminal 
investments as well.
•		 Related	 to	 the	 previous	 point,	 Spain	 shows	 the	multiple 
presence of a variety of different criminal groups 
(see	7.4).	This	‘competition’	suggests	that	Spain	still	offers	
a wide array of opportunities for both illegal activities and 
legitimate businesses.
•		 Another	reason	may	be	related	to	the	tourism industry. 
The massive flows of tourism arriving each year in Spain 
generate a multicultural scenario that facilitates anonymity 
for	individuals	trying	to	invest	their	illicit	funds	(EFE,	2014a).
•		 A	 further	 important	 factor	 is	 Spain’s	 proximity to tax 
havens like Gibraltar or Andorra	 (Presidencia	 del	
Gobierno, 2013), which may facilitate the establishment of 
businesses because of the low tax rate or high incentives 
(Rodríguez,	2013).
•		 Moreover,	 especially	 in	 some	 sectors,	 Spain	 offers	
important investment opportunities: for example, the 
surge in the prices of immovable properties in Spanish in 
recent years has also helped OCGs to launder their illicit 
profits	 in	the	country’s	real estate market	 (FSC,	2012,	p.	
14). 
316.	Until	2003	the	Spanish	Criminal	Code	only	allowed	confiscation	based	on	
drug trafficking or money laundering. In 2010, the implementation of the Organic 
Law	5/2010	has	expanded	 the	cases	 in	which	confiscation	 is	allowed	without	
a	 criminal	 conviction.	 No	 conviction-based	 confiscation	 allows	 to	 confiscate	
goods	 related	 to	 the	 criminal	 offence,	 confiscation	 of	 goods	 when	 they	 are	
hidden,	destroyed	or	inaccessible	after	the	final	sentence	or	the	sentence	in	a	
plea	bargain	for	specific	crimes;	or	mafia-type	criminal	association	and	serious	
crimes.
317.	 The	 Unified	 Index	 (centralized	 database)	 contains	 all	 the	 transactions	
performed	 by	 notaries	 (there	 are	 230	 types	 of	 operations	 codified).	 The	
information from notaries is entered into the database every two weeks 
through	a	secure	and	confidential	network	using	a	certified	signature	process.	
The database is a public instrument for other competent authorities which 
may	access	 it	 using	a	 special	 card	with	a	CIP	 (Personal	 Identity	Code)	 and	a	
password.
318. Transactions that fail to comply with this cash limitation may be subject 
to	 administrative	 fines	 equal	 to	 25%	 of	 the	 cash	 amount.	 Moreover,	 Spanish	
law does not allow more than 100,000 euro in cash to be carried within Spain. 
If an individual is found carrying more than 100,000 euro in cash, the Spanish 
authorities	can	seize	the	money	until	the	individual	is	able	to	prove	its	licit	origin	
(Law	7/2012).
319.	 For	 each	 account	 and	 deposit,	 the	 file	 includes	 specific	 data,	 such	 as	
numbers of each product, date of opening or cancellation, but also information 
about	the	persons	involved	(identification	of	the	holders	of	any	other	person	with	
powers of disposition, etc.)
320. Some improvements have been made to international cooperation order 
to	 fight	 organised	 crime	 efficiently.	 In	 2009,	CICO	 and	 the	 Special	 Anti-Drug	
Prosecution Office were designated as the Spanish contact points for Asset 
Recovery	Offices	 (CICO,	2012).	Also,	 in	 line	with	 the	EU	Drug	Strategy	 (2013-
2020),	 Spain	 has	 established	 the	 “Bogotá	 Platform”	 (Colombia)	 with	 other	
Member	States	that	want	to	cooperate	with	it	(Ministerio	del	Interior,	2013).	The	
objective of this Platform is to exchange strategic and operational information 
on	cocaine	trafficking	from	the	Andean	region	to	Europe.	The	choice	of	Bogotá	
is particularly pertinent since actions in the region where cocaine is produced 
will have a more disruptive impact on the cocaine traffic. Finally, collective action 
will	 better	 support	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	 Colombian	 government.	 (Council	 of	 the	
European Union, 2013).
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As a result, several major organised crime groups have chosen 
Spain	 to	 launder	 their	 illicit	 earnings	 (see	 9.6.4),	 including	
Italian mafias	 (Camorra,	 ´Ndrangheta	 and	 Cosa	 Nostra	
above all), Russian organised crime groups, Chinese, British 
OCGs and others.	Russian	mafias	arrived	in	the	country	after	
the	break-up	of	the	USSR,	investing	their	illicit	profits	obtained	
in their home country in the Spanish real estate and service 
sectors	(Giménez-Salinas	Framis,	2010).	
More recently, there has been growing evidence of 
connections between organised crime and political 
corruption, denoting a ‘higher level’	 type	 of	 infiltration	 of	
the legitimate economy, with the involvement of criminal 
groups, entrepreneurs, and representatives of the political and 
administrative	system	(CSD,	2010).	
Methodological remarks
The available information on criminal investments in Spain 
is	still	 less	 than	data	on	 illegal	markets	 (see	Section	5.4).	No	
extensive	 data	 on	 confiscation	 are	 available	 (see	 10.8	 and	
12.7), so that evidence had to be drawn from a wide variety of 
sources, including:
•		 Judicial acts	 (e.g.	 Court	 sentences	 related	 to	 cases	
involving	organised	crime);
•		 LEAs reports	(e.g.	reports	by	the	CICO,	press	releases	by	
the	Civil	Guard	and	National	Police,	etc.);
•		 FIU reports	(e.g.	annual	reports	by	SEPBLAC);
•		 Institutional reports	(e.g.	reports	from	the	Plan	Nacional	
sobre	Drogas	(PNSD),	reports	by	Public	Prosecution	Office,	
etc.);
•		 Academic	literature;
•		 Open sources and media reports.
The evidence was collected using the methodology described 
in Chapter 2. In particular, the iNotitium platform321 was 
used to gather cases from the media. The evidence collected 
in Spain was organised in the DOCI according to the criteria 
described in Chapter 2. As a result, a total number of 
577 references to organised crime investments were 
identified.322
As regards the academic literature, to be noted is the very 
limited number of studies addressing this topic. A bibliometric 
analysis showed that out of 2,436 articles published on 
organised crime,333 only 12 covered Spain. This once again 
shows the limited access that researchers have to Spanish 
data	on	organised	crime	(see	Section	5.6.1).
Despite	the	significant	amount	of	evidence	collected,	the	bias	
in	the	methodology	(see	Chapter	2)	precludes	drawing	specific	
conclusions on the trends and patterns of the investments by 
the	criminal	groups	identified.	
8.6.2. Geography
Regarding the geographical distribution of criminal 
investments	 in	 Spain,	 all	 the	 regions	 (Autonomous	
Communities, Comunidades Autonomas) show evidence of 
them	(see	Figure	44).	But	in	particular	three areas record high 
or	medium	evidence	of	infiltration:
•		 Andalusia;
•		 Autonomous	Community	of	Madrid and	Catalonia;
•		 Eastern Spain.
The region with by far the highest amount of evidence on 
investments is Andalusia. This may be due to various 
reasons, which recall the drivers already highlighted for Spain 
as a whole:
•		 Because	 of	 its	 strategic	 geographical	 position,	 Andalusia	
is the ‘entry point’ to a variety of illicit markets, in 
particular	 drugs	 (mainly	 cannabis	 from	North	Africa	 and,	
to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 cocaine	 (together	 with	 Galicia),	 illicit	
tobacco products, and human trafficking. 
•		 The	 nature	 of	 Andalusia	 as	 an	 entry	 point	 and	 transit	
country explains the wide array of criminal groups 
active	 in	 the	 area	 (Ministerio	 del	 Interior	 &	 CICO,	 2014).	
This	 may	 imply	 a	 significant	 level	 of	 money	 laundering	
and/or	 high	 levels	 of	 illicit	 financial	 inflows	 and	 outflows	
(Almoguera	et	al.,	2012).
•		 The	 high luxury living standards	 (especially	 on	 the	
coast),	 also	 due	 to	 foreign	 investments	 (see	 Box	 34,	
Operation Ballena Blanca) may provide a good front behind 
which to conceal high-level standards of criminals investing 
in the legitimate economy. In this regard, Andalusia seems 
to be above the average in reception of flows of tourists 
visiting Spain and leading tourist´s speeding in the country 
together with the Canary Islands. Moreover, there is 
evidence of Russian tourists increasing their average 
spending	 in	 Spain	 (Ministerio	 De	 Industria,	 Energía y 
Turismo,	2013;	TURESPAÑA,	2014;	EFE,	2014b)
•		 There	 is	 wide	 array	 of	 investment opportunities, in 
particular in the real estate market and the tourist sector: 
Moreover,	 the	 House	 Price	 Index	 (Índice de Precios de 
Vivienda) for Andalusia seems to have been above the 
national	average	during	the	economic	recession	years	(see	
Figure 43).
321. iNotitium is a software developed by the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos to 
collect	 information	specifically	on	 issues	regarding	organised	crime	infiltration	
and	 money	 laundering	 in	 seven	 countries	 (Finland,	 France,	 Italy,	 Ireland,	
Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom). See Box 1 in Chapter 2 for details.
322. Most of the references came from 147 case studies. In terms of type of 
source, 69% came from media sources, 13% from court sentences, 9% from 
institutional reports, 5% from academic studies, and 4% from investigative 
evidence and newspaper articles.
323. Mapped through the SCOPUS Database.
Figure 43 - House Price Index variation for Andalusia 
(2007- 2013)
Source: URJC elaboration on INE data
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As a result, in this region, there is evidence of investments in 
companies, real estate, registered and movable assets by a 
wide variety of criminal groups.324 
At the medium level category, Madrid seems also to have 
a notable presence of criminal investments. In this region, 
over	 45%	 of	 the	 identified	 references	 involved	 movable	
assets and concerned companies investing in real estate, 
probably because of the opportunities in this sector offered 
by	 the	 capital’s	 urban	 area.	 The	 autonomous	 communities	
of Valencia and Catalonia show medium evidence of 
infiltration	 in	 the	 legitimate	 economy,	 which	may	 be	 related	
also to tourism.
As	 already	 mentioned	 (see	 Section	 7),	 the	 geographical	
location of Spain gives OCGs opportunities to move their 
illicit money to nearby tax havens like Andorra, located in the 
north-east region of Spain, and Gibraltar situated close to the 
autonomous	community	of	Andalusia	(Olmos	Jiménez,	2013).
Illicit outflows
Also, under the common practice of immigrants to repatriate 
profits from their legal activities, money transfer agencies 
(also	referred	to	as	wire	transfer	services	or	money	business	
services) are frequently used also to launder money and to 
transfer illicit proceeds. These transfer services offer an easy 
way	to	move	cash	all	around	the	world.	A	significant number 
of transfers that originate in Spain usually end up in Latin 
America countries, especially in Colombia. Wire transfer 
services can be found in non-bank outlets such as call centres 
(so	called	locutorios)	(small	communication	centres	that	offer	
money	 transfer	 services)	 (International	 Narcotics	 Control	
Strategy Report, 2013). There is also evidence of cross-
border cash smuggling, for example related to Chinese 
criminal	groups	(see	Box	33	–	Operation	Emperador).
8.6.3. Assets and business sectors
Although evidence of criminal investments in Spain have been 
collected with regard to all types of assets, it is difficult to 
rank what type of assets are preferred by criminal groups. In 
this regard, once again to be noted is that criminal investments 
regard real estate, companies, motor vehicles, watercrafts, 
electronics, as well as jewels and other movable assets. 
Real estate properties
The real estate market in Spain seems to be an attractive 
option for OCGs seeking to launder their illicit earnings. 
Although real estate does not represent an important part 
of	 the	 assets	 confiscated	 and	 managed	 by	 the	 PNSD	 (see	
Section	12.7),	some	cases	showed	that	large	part	of	criminals’	
illicit earnings are invested in properties	 (An	 Garda	
Síochána,	2010;	Diario	Jurídico,	2011;	El	País,	2012a;	Agencia	
Tributaria,	2013;	EFE,	2014c;	Europa	Press,	2014).	In	particular,	
to be noted is that most of the cases involved drug trafficking 
(63%	of	all	 the	references	 involving	real	estate	 in	Spain)	and	
money	laundering	(79%).
An important operation regarding real estate, Operacion 
Emperador	 (Box	 33),	 was	 able	 to	 seize around 130 real 
estate properties related to a Chinese criminal group 
established in Spain. These properties were distributed 
around various regions of Spain with the purpose of money 
laundering	(El	País,	2012b;	EFE,	2012),	 for	example	by	buying	
and	selling	properties	(Diario	Jurídico,	2011;	EFE,	2013).	
As regards the drivers behind investments, the housing 
boom experienced by Spain since the second half of the 
1990s has increased real estate prices to unprecedented 
levels	(European	Commission,	2014;	see	Figure	45).	This	trend	
may have caught the attention not only of legal entrepreneurs 
but also of criminal groups and other individuals seeking to 
launder	their	illicit	profits	through	the	real	estate	market	(FSC,	
2012, p. 14). Moreover, there is also evidence of luxury houses 
and apartments being used by individuals related to criminal 
groups	 as	 their	 main	 residences	 and	 safe	 shelters	 (El	 País,	
2012b;	Europa	Press,	2014b;	Diario	de	Mallorca,	2014).
Figure 44 – Autonomous communities with evidence of 
organised crime investments in Spain325
Legend
Low 
Medium-Low
Medium-High
High
Source: URJC elaboration on DOCI
324. Various criminal groups have been found operating in Andalusia, including 
Camorra,	‘Ndrangheta,	Russian	and	Western	OCGs:	see	below.
325.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
Figure 45 - Average price (euro) per square meter of hous-
ing in Spain (1995-2013)
Source: URJC elaboration on INE data 
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is also evidence concerning a large number of criminal 
groups,	 including	 Italian	 mafias,	 Chinese	 criminal	 groups,	
Russian/Georgian	 OCGs,	 Motorcycle	 gangs,	 Irish	 criminal	
groups,	 and	 other	 local	 and	 foreign	 criminal	 groups	 (Sur	 in	
English,	2010;	Kegö	&	Mocelan,	2011;	Transcrime,	2013a).	
As regards business sectors, those collecting the most evidence 
are reported in Table 85. In particular, real estate activities, 
wholesale and retail trade, and bars and restaurants 
record the largest amount of references to investment, 
followed by agriculture, construction, hotels and tourist 
accommodations and transportation. However, other 
sectors are emerging in terms of attractiveness to criminal 
groups.	The	table	also	reports	the	number	of	identified	OCGs	
involved in the sectors so as to provide another measure of 
the	level	of	attractiveness	and	‘competition’.	There	follow	brief	
comments on the main sectors.
Real estate activities
Real estate activities in Spain have for long attracted 
investments	by	organised	crime	 (Sands,	2007).	 In	particular,	
according to several police and judicial investigations, and 
as already mentioned, the Costa del Sol area has become 
one	of	 the	main	 areas	 of	 significant	 organised	 crime	money	
laundering	 through	 the	 real	 estate	 market	 (Díez	 &	 Gómez-
Céspedes,	 2008).	 In	 this	 region,	 police	 operations	 (such	
as Operation Ballena Blanca, see Box 34) have dismantled 
complex	 financial	 structures	 composed	 of	 drug	 traffickers	
(including	 Italian	 individuals)	 and	 created	 to	 launder	 illicit	
proceeds through real estate agencies investing in Costa del 
Sol,	as	well	as	in	other	countries	like	the	Netherlands	and	Brazil	
(El	Mundo,	2006).	
Box 33 – Operation Emperador: the Spanish real 
estate market and the money laundering schemes 
of a Chinese OCG
Operation Emperador dismantled a major Chinese 
OCG after three years of rigorous investigations by 
the Spanish authorities. Its leader, G.P., had been able 
to launder between 200 and 300 million euro per year 
through	a	complex	financial	network	in	which	Spanish	
criminals were also involved. The main goal of this 
organisation	 was	 to	 find	 companies	 and	 individuals	
willing	 to	 launder	 its	 illicit	 money	 (Policía	 Nacional,	
2012).
The money was laundered using a complex network of 
companies.	Family	members	of	G.P.	had	specific	tasks	
in order for the laundering process to be successful. 
One of the methods used to launder revenues concern 
bringing on customs the illicit money generated in Spain 
on journeys that members of the organisation made to 
China. Moreover, one of the members was arrested at 
the Madrid-Barajas airport carrying over 380,000 euro 
in	cash	(Ceberio	Belaza	&	Altozano,	2012).
Another method used by the criminal group was 
based	 on	 the	 smurfing	 technique	 through	 wire	
transferring business always below 3,000 euro. The 
criminal group also used extortion within the Chinese 
community by charging higher loan rates to irregular 
Chinese immigrants in Spain. During the Operation, 83 
individuals were arrested and a total of over 11.6 million 
euro	were	seized	in	cash	plus	another	11	million	in	bank	
accounts. A total number of 124 real estate properties 
were	 seized	 together	 with	 firearms,	 jewellery,	 motor	
vehicles	and	works	of	art	(EFE,	2012).
Companies and business sectors
Although the data are not sufficient for deep and extensive 
analysis	(Díez	&	Gómez-Cépesdes,	2008)	–	also	because	the	
wide use made of fake societies, screen companies and 
tax havens makes it difficult to identify companies related 
to criminal groups – there is evidence that organised crime 
in	 Spain	 invests	 widely	 in	 legitimate	 companies	 (Giménez-
Salinas	 Framis,	 2010;	 Eurojust,	 2012;	 see	 above	 for	 details).	
As described above, investments are made in a wide array 
of regions	 (including	 the	 Madrid	 area,	 Andalusia,	 Galicia,	
Valencia and Catalonia) and business sectors;	 and	 there	
Box 34 - Operation Ballena Blanca. Drug trafficking 
and criminal investments in Costa del Sol
The operation began in 2005 and represents a 
milestone for the anti money-laundering in Spain. 
The	 Spanish	 Anti-Corruption	 Prosecutor's	 Office	
uncovered a complex laundering network that 
operated	 through	 a	 law	 firm	 in	 Marbella	 (Andalusia)	
which managed more than 500 different companies. 
The operation found branches of this criminal group in 
various countries, including the United States, Canada, 
Russia,	Turkey,	Algeria,	Iran	and	Morocco	(El	País,	2011).	
The	law	firm	was	the	main	hub	of	the	money-laundering	
network. It channelled multimillion investments 
by criminal groups dedicated to drug trafficking, 
arms trafficking, prostitution, kidnapping and fraud. 
Moreover the network was made up by notaries and a 
large number of companies which headquarters were 
based in tax heaves such as Gibraltar, Cayman Islands 
and	Panama	(Pagola	&	Muñoz,	2013).
In	 this	 operation,	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 companies	
were investigated by police forces, and it was found 
that more than 250 million euro from organised crime 
were being laundered with different methods. The 
seized	 assets	 included	 a	 total	 number	 of	 251	 real	
estate properties in the Costal del Sol area. During 
the operation over 50 people were arrested, including 
Dutch	and	Russian	individuals	(EFE,	2014b).
In this regard, to be noted is that real estate is the preferred 
target for criminal investments especially in the coastal 
areas of the south and east of Spain	(Diario	Jurídico,	2011;	
U.S.	 Department	 of	 State,	 2014;	 Europa	 Press,	 2014b;	 see	
Figure 44). It is not by coincidence that southern Spain, and in 
particular Andalusia, also comprises most of the real estate 
confiscated	in	relation	to	illicit	drug	trafficking	(see	12.7).
Because in most of the cases analysed there was no of 
the	 specific	 type	 of	 real	 estate	 asset,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 make	
comparisons or to rank the different types of property. 
However, houses and apartments appear more frequently than 
other	categories	(EFE,	2013;	Europa	Sur,	2013;	Moltó,	2013).	As	
will	be	discussed	in	14.6,	nor	do	the	data	on	confiscated	assets	
distinguish	among	types	of	real	estate	(PNSD,	2014a).	
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Construction
There is evidence of investments by organised crime in the 
construction sector. Following the pattern shown by real 
estate, there is evidence that criminal groups invest in Costa 
del Sol	 (Sur	 in	English,	2010)	and	 the	Canary Islands	 (Civil	
Guard;	 2013).	 In	 this	 business	 area,	 the	 various	 stages	 of	
Operation Laurel showed that foreign criminal groups used 
investment in the Spanish construction and real estate market 
as	the	main	means	to	launder	their	illicit	revenues	(see	Box	35).
Level of 
evidence*
Business sectors
Number of identified criminal groups 
involved in the sector
Higher
Real estate activities HIGHER
Bars and restaurants HIGHER
Wholesale and retail tradea HIGHER
Medium
Agriculture	and	fishing HIGHER
Construction MEDIUM-LOW
Hotels and other tourist accommodations MEDIUM-HIGH
Sports and Gaming MEDIUM-LOW
Transportation MEDIUM-LOW
IT and other services MEDIUM-LOW
Petrol and gas supply
Emerging sectors
Renewable energy MEDIUM-LOW
Repair and retail of vehicles MEDIUM-LOW
Waste and scrap management MEDIUM-LOW
*	The	classes	are	divided	according	to	the	value	of	the	mean	plus	±0.5	standard	deviations	of	each	sector	(see	Chapter	7).	The	information	is	available	for	610	
references.
a Including in particular wholesale and retail trade of food and of clothing and textiles.
Table 85 - Business sectors with evidence of OCG investments in Spain
Source: URJC elaboration on DOCI
Box 35 – Operation Laurel: Camorra investments 
in construction companies in Spain
Since 2009, the Spanish Civil Guard has addressed 
infiltration	 by	 Camorra	 members	 in	 Spain.	 Various	
investigations in collaboration with the Carabinieri have 
made	 it	 possible	 to	 dismantle	 some	 of	 the	 paranze	
(Camorra	operative	cells)	and	to	arrest	key	members	
of	 the	 organisation	 operating	 in	 Spain	 (Operation	
Laurel VII). Camorra members had established in 
Spain a highly complex money laundering scheme 
in collaboration with Spanish criminals, who were 
in charge of logistics and management for the clan 
(Lázaro,	2013)
The results from this network allow the creation of 
an important business group in Spain as well as in 
Italy,	by	 investing	 illicit	profits	 in	 real	 estate,	 shopping	
malls, and clubs. During the next operation, Laurel VIII, 
30 members of the Polverino clan were arrested in 
Spain	(69	in	Italy),	and	136	real	estate	properties	were	
seized	 together	 with	 a	 large	 number	 of	 luxury	motor	
vehicles.	 The	 clan’s	 main	 activity	 was	 laundering	 the	
revenues from the illegal trafficking of hashish. In this 
particular case, Spain was a transit country as well as 
serving money-laundering purposes. The revenues 
were invested in companies related to construction: for 
example, the Spanish company ALPHA, listed on the 
Spanish	stock	exchange	(formerly	listed	on	the	Madrid	
IBEX	35	index)	(Guardia	Civil,	2013).
Bar and restaurants
The bar and restaurant sector also seems to attract the 
attention of organised crime. There is evidence that Russian 
and Italian organised crime, as well as Spanish OCGs, 
infiltrate	the	sector	in	order	to	launder	their	illicit	revenues	from	
drug	 trafficking	 (Diario	 Jurídico,	 2011;	 Kegö	&	Mocelan,	 2011;	
Garcia,	 Castedo,	 &	 Carranco,	 2013).	 There	 is	 also	 evidence	
of North African and other western European groups 
(including	British	and	Irish	ones)	using	bars	and	restaurants	in	
the south-west region of Spain as screen companies to justify 
their illicit earnings and sustain their high living standards 
(Olles	&	Peris,	2013;	Europa	Sur,	2013).
Agriculture and fishing
As	regards	the	agriculture	and	fishing	sector,	there	is	evidence	
of	Italian	mafias,	such	as	Camorra	or	Cosa	Nostra,	operating	
in	this	economic	area.	The	Spanish	fishing	sector	occupies	a	
distinctive place in the world, since Galicia is one of the most 
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important regions in terms of fish and shellfish canning 
(Amigo	 and	 Garza,	 2008).	 In	 2008,	 in	 Galicia,	 individuals	
related to Camorra and Cosa Nostra were found to be using 
a	range	of	screen	companies	(see	box	below)	(Tojo,	2008;	La	
Opinión	 de	Galicia,	 2008;	 Faro	 de	 Vigo,	 2008,	 see	 Box	 36).	
There	 is	also	evidence	of	 Italian	mafias	 investing	 in	the	olive 
oil sector,	 particularly	 in	 the	 Andalusia	 region	 (Transcrime,	
2013a).	 In	this	case,	the	mafia	groups	also	carried	out	frauds	
and thefts of products from legitimate competitors.
In addition, some sectors are emerging in terms of 
attractiveness to criminal investment. They include:
•		 Sports	and	gaming;
•		 Renewable	energy;
•		 Repair	and	retail	of	vehicles;
•		 Transportation	and	renting	of	motor	vehicles;
•		 Waste	and	scrap	management;
•		 IT	and	other	services.
Finally, it is worth noting that some of these business sectors 
seem to attract a wider array of criminal groups. Table 
85 shows, in the third column, the number of criminal groups 
which, according to the collected evidence, operate in the 
sector. Higher numbers may denote the existence of more 
‘opportunities’ to be exploited by criminal actors in this 
field	 and/or	 higher	 levels	 of	 attractiveness	 (e.g.	 because	 of	
higher	profit	margins,	public	subsidies,	weaker	controls,	etc.).	
On the other hand, higher numbers may imply a higher level 
of ‘competition’ among criminal groups. Future studies 
should	 pay	 attention	 to	 this	 specific	 phenomenon	 in	 order	
to determine whether criminal groups operating in the 
same sector challenge each other or whether they reach 
agreements and set up joint ventures	 (as	 increasingly	
frequently happens in Italy, see 8.4)
Movable assets and cash
Official	data	on	confiscated	movable	assets,	such	electronics	
or jewels, indicates that these types of assets have historically 
attracted	the	attention	of	organised	crime	(PNSD,	2014	–	see	
12.7). According to the available information, and the data 
contained	 in	 the	 DOCI,	 there	 is	 large	 evidence	 of	 seizures	
and	 confiscations	 of	 cash	 during	 police	 investigations	 (El	
Periodic,	 2011,	 2013;	 El	 Faro	 de	 Vigo,	 2013;	 Europa	 Press,	
2014c). According to recent data issued by the Ministry of 
the Interior, during 2013 a total of 30 million euro in cash and 
bank accounts	 was	 seized	 from	 organised	 crime	 in	 Spain	
(Ministerio	 del	 Interior	 &	 CICO,	 2014).	 As	 for	 other	 types	 of	
movable	assets,	criminals’	proceeds	have	also	been	invested	
in jewellery, other luxury goods, cellphones and other 
electronics	 (see	Table	86)	 (El	País,	 2012;	 20	minutos,	 2014;	
Aragón	Digital,	2014;).	In	many	cases,	these	goods	(especially	
cellphones, weapons and electronic equipment) besides 
having	 an	 ‘investment’	 or	 personal	 consumption	 nature,	 are	
also widely used in the commission of illicit activities, and this 
may	explain	the	large	amounts	seized.	
Registered assets
Registered assets, too, play a crucial role in the economies 
and illegal activities of organised crime groups. They are 
instruments either for commission of the criminal activity 
itself	(e.g.	cars	or	watercraft	are	widely	used	to	transport	drugs	
between North Africa and Southern Spain), for personal use 
and recreation, or as a form of ‘investment’.
The most frequently mentioned registered assets in the DOCI 
are cars followed by watercraft	 (in	 particular	 inflatables	
and outboard boats). Data from official sources show also a 
high	 number	 of	 vehicles	 and	watercraft	 among	 the	 seizures	
from	organised	crime	 (see	Table	86),	and	 in	 terms	of	assets	
confiscated	and	managed	by	Plan	Nacional	Sobre	Drogas	 in	
relation to illicit drug trafficking	(see	Section	12.7).	
Box 36 - Cosa Nostra and Camorra cooperating in 
autonomous community of Galicia
In 2008, the GRECO police unit together with 
the Spanish Civil Guard uncovered a network of 
companies,	 exporting	 shellfish	 and	 fish,	 used	 by	
Camorra	and	Cosa	Nostra	to	launder	their	illicit	profits.	
The companies were used as screen companies in 
order to launder illegal revenues from drug trafficking, 
human	trafficking,	and	the	firearms	trade	(Tojo,	2008).	
There is evidence that the companies, most of them 
based	in	Vigo	(Galicia),	began	their	money-laundering	
activities back in 2006. The illicit proceeds laundered 
through these companies were diverted to Italy in 
amounts less than the legal limit in order not to arouse 
suspicions	(La	voz	de	Galicia,	2008).
Wholesale and retail trade
The wholesale and retail trade sector also seems to attract 
criminal	 investments	 (An	 Garda	 Síochána,	 2010;	 Kegö	 &	
Molcean, 2011). The available data do not provide enough 
information to rank all the various types of businesses in the 
wholesale and retail trade sector, but some patterns can 
be highlighted. In this regard, there is evidence of different 
OCGs	operating	in	this	sector	(Chinese, Russian/Georgian, 
British, Irish and Spanish) but none of them seems to stand 
out.
Money transfer agencies
Although	this	sector	does	not	show	the	same	level	of	infiltration	
as the other business activities described above, there is 
growing	evidence	that	 it	 is	 frequently	used	to	 launder	profits	
from drug trafficking and other illicit markets. As mentioned 
in Section 9.6.2, some criminal groups, especially foreign 
ones, tend to transfer abroad (in particular in the home 
country) the illicit proceeds generated in Spain. Using the so-
called smurfing	 technique	(Prieto	et	al.,	2010),	wire	transfers,	
usually	of	small	amounts	(below	the	legal	threshold),	are	made	
through money business services to send money of illicit origin 
to individuals related to the criminal organisation and resident 
in other countries. According to recent evidence, criminal 
groups	do	not	 only	 use	money	 transfer	 agencies;	 they	have 
started to invest directly and set up their own businesses 
in this sector, with the main purpose of laundering and 
transferring abroad the proceeds from their illegal activities 
(SEPBLAC,	2008;	El	Economista,	 2011;	Álvarez,	 2011;	Muñoz,	
2013).
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8.6.4. Actors
Given the lack of reliable hard data, it is difficult to understand 
if, in Spain, different criminal actors have different 
investment strategies. Nevertheless, there are some general 
characteristics that can be highlighted.
Italian mafias
Even	 though	 Italian	 mafias	 have	 a	 significant	 presence	 in	
Spain	 (see	e.g.	Transcrime,	2013a),	 it	 is	difficult	 to	determine	
their	 investment	 patterns.	 The	 evidence	 shows	 a	 significant	
number	of	cases	where	 Italian	mafias,	 such	as	Cosa	Nostra,	
Camorra	 and	 ´Ndrangheta,	 have	 invested	 in	 the	 real	 estate	
sector	(see	Table	85)	(Diario	Jurídico,	2012;	Transcrime	2013).	
There	 is	 also	 evidence	 of	 infiltration	 by	 Camorra	 and	 Cosa	
Nostra in companies related to the agriculture sector and 
construction	 (see	 Section	 8.6.3).	 Other	 economic	 sectors	
with	evidence	of	mafia	infiltration	are	bars and restaurants, 
transportation and renting of motor vehicles. The related 
illegal activities are money laundering, drug trafficking, human 
trafficking, extortion and counterfeiting.
Russian organised crime groups
Activities by Russian OCGs indicate that they invest money 
in diverse economic areas. There is also a high presence of 
Russian OCG investments in the real estate sector as well 
as in bars and restaurants. Their illegal activities range from 
drug trafficking and money laundering to human trafficking 
and	fraud	(Kegö	&	Molcean,	2010;	La	Vanguardia,	2013;	El	País,	
2013).
Chinese organised crime groups
Chinese OCGs are also present in various business sectors. 
Evidence of investments in real estate as well as wholesale 
and retail trade is forthcoming. The related illegal activities 
include human trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, 
and	smuggling	(Marraco,	2012;	El	País,	2012b).
Western European organised crime groups 
Although research and intelligence reports on these groups 
are almost non-existent, evidence of investments by other 
western European OCGs has been found: criminal networks 
with French, Portuguese, Spanish and British members belong 
in this category together with other European OCGs. Various 
sectors	 have	been	 infiltrated:	 they	 range	 from	 real	 estate	 to	
the bar and restaurant business sector. In particular, it seems 
that Spanish OCGs collaborate with other foreign organised 
groups to provide them with the tools and infrastructure 
necessary to launder their illegal incomes in the country 
(Europa	Sur,	2013;	Olles	&	Peris,	2013).	
Colombian organised crime groups
Evidence on Colombian OCGs is not closely related to 
investment in Spain, but rather to illicit financial outflows 
to the home country. In particular there is evidence that 
Colombian OCGs have developed professional and complex 
laundering	 systems	 (El	 Economista,	 2011,	 including	 wire	
transfer services, to launder proceeds from drug trafficking. In 
addition, a high percentage of the transactions detected had 
Colombia and Dominican Republic	as	the	final	destination	
countries	(Ministerio	del	Interior,	2014).	Related	illegal	activities	
include	drug	trafficking,	fraud,	money	laundering	and	theft	(El	
Economista,	2011;	Álvarez,	2011).
8.6.5. Concluding remarks
As discussed, the analysis provided here may have limitations 
due to the lack of hard data and statistics. In order to remedy 
this gap, a wide range of sources have been used. This 
has	 yielded	 a	 comprehensive	 picture	 of	 the	 phenomenon;	
however, the biases in the data collection approach make 
it difficult to provide a quantitative and systematic 
analysis of criminal investments across the Spanish regions, 
business sectors, and criminal groups active in the country. 
As regards the drivers which may explain criminal investments, 
the evidence indicates a variety of purposes, including money 
laundering, profit, control of the territory and economies 
of scale with illegal markets. Even though there is a wide 
array of criminal groups investing in Spain, no evidence has 
been found regarding the presence of a ‘dominant’ OCG in 
the country. In business sectors like real estate or bars and 
restaurants, a significant number of OCGs have been 
identified, which may indicate that there is a wide range of 
investment	 opportunities	 for	 them	 (see	 e.g.	 Table	 85).	 It	 is	
important to note that no evidence has been found for analyse 
the level of competition in those business sectors.
In particular, as regards legitimate businesses, organised 
criminal groups use companies for money laundering 
purposes, investing their illicit proceeds in a wide variety 
of	 business	 sectors	 (see	 Tojo,	 2008;	 Faro	 de	 Vigo,	 2008;	
SEPBLAC,	 2008;	 Olles	 &	 Peris,	 2013).	 Furthermore,	 these	
A	significant	number	of	registered	assets	were	recovered	by	
the Operation Laurel VII carried out by Spanish and Italian law 
enforcement	 agencies	 against	 the	Camorra	 (Polverino	 clan)	
in	 Spain	 (see	 Box	 35	 above):	 a	 total	 number	 of	 117	 vehicles	
were	confiscated	 from	 the	clan,	as	well	as	62	 trucks	and	23	
motorcycles	 (Guardia	 Civil,	 2012;	 Tobella,	 2013;	 Fernandez	
Diaz,	2013;	Muñoz,	2013).	
Type of assets
Num. of seized assets
2012 2013
Vehicles 1,670 2,102
Boats 118 119
Aircrafts 2 6
Firearms 549 558
Sharp weapons 201 630
Computers 615 909
Cellphones 6,455 4.498
Euro	(cash) 44 million 30 million
Table 86 – Assets seized from OCGs in Spain
Source: URJC elaboration on data by the Ministerio del Interior -CICO
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companies are more capital than labour-intensive. Hence, 
when	 confiscated,	 these	 companies	 are	 easily	 liquidated	
by the value of the property subtracting debts at the time of 
seizure.	According	 to	 the	data,	real estate	 has	a	 significant	
presence of OCGs seeking to launder their illegal revenues 
(U.S.	 Department	 of	 State,	 2014).	 Other	 business	 sectors,	
such as wholesale and retail trade, bars and restaurants, 
hotels, but also construction and transportation, have shown 
much	 evidence	 of	 infiltration	 (see	 DOCI).	 Also,	 in	 banking	
and	 financial	 services	 have	 been	 found	 evidences	 of	OCGs	
operating	activities	(Álvarez,	2011).	Finally,	screen	companies	
may be established by OCGs in order to cover other illegal 
activities such as fraud, drugs and arms trafficking, and human 
trafficking	(see	Table	87).
As regards the geographical distribution of investments, there 
are some regions with more evidence of OCG investments. 
The autonomous community of Andalusia, together with 
Madrid, appears to attract OCGs wanting to invest their illicit 
profits.	 Movable	 assets,	 such	 as	 jewellery,	 electronics	 and	
cell phones, represent a high percentage of the cases found. 
Regarding the weight of organised crime investment, the data 
collected do not provide enough information with which to 
measure	its	impact	on	Spain’s	legal	economy.	
Patterns of investment are unclear, and they cannot 
be associated with a particular OCG. The purposes of 
investments in business sectors range from creating screen 
companies,	through	justifying	illicit	profits,	to	hiding	criminals	
from the authorities. In addition, there is evidence of groups 
collaborating in carrying out illicit activities and money 
laundering.
Role or functions Examples
Conceal illicit traffics
Real estate, business premises, and industrial buildings used to hide illicit assets such as drugs, 
arms, counterfeited products, etc.
Money laundering and tax 
evasion
Screen	companies	created	to	justify	their	illicit	benefits	(bar,	restaurants,	real	estate,	
construction,	financial	services,	hotel	and	tourist	accommodations,	petrol	and	gas	supply)
Fraud  Establishment of companies to generate false documents such as invoices or statements
Shelter Real estate properties might be used to hide criminals and OCG members from the authorities
Human trafficking Clubs used, in some cases, for human trafficking related to sexual exploitation
Distribution channels
Wholesale and retail companies used to sell counterfeited products. Fitness places as 
distribution channels for drugs
Table 87 – The drivers of criminal investments in legitimate companies
Source: URJC elaboration
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8.7.1. Introduction
Income from organised crime can be used for personal 
consumption,	 saved	 (cash	 or	 money	 in	 bank	 accounts),	
invested	 in	 assets	 (properties,	 valuables	 etc.)	 or	 used	 as	
capital for legitimate or other criminal enterprises. Evidence 
of all these types of spending, saving and investment is 
present in the UK and can be inferred from the data collected, 
although the prevalence of each type could not be estimated. 
Evidence	 suggests	 that	 investment	 in	 assets	 (registered,	
movable or real estate) is more common than investment in 
companies, and that the latter is predominantly for use as a 
front for illicit business, not as investment per se. 
Organised crime is an increasing concern for public opinion 
and institutions, mostly in terms of its costs to the economy 
and the lifestyle enjoyed by the members of organised crime 
groups. Since the introduction of the 2002 Proceeds of 
Crime	Act	 (POCA),	 law	enforcement	agencies	have	become	
increasingly concerned with developing effective responses 
to	 money	 laundering	 and	 the	 confiscation	 of	 proceeds	 of	
crime. There is growing concern about the infiltration of 
legitimate businesses and economic sectors by OCGs. 
Currently a new Serious Crime Bill is under consideration in 
the Parliament and which will, among other things, create a 
new	offence	of	“participation	in	an	organised	crime	group”	with	
a	penalty	of	up	to	five	years	in	prison	(Travis,	2014).
The	 National	 Crime	 Agency’s	 (NCA)	 National	 Strategic	
Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2014 has 
highlighted the attractiveness of the UK’s financial system 
for the laundering of international and domestic criminal 
money because of high transaction volume, language, 
developed	financial	services	businesses	and	political	stability;	
this makes the laundering of criminal proceeds a strategic 
threat	 to	 the	UK’s	economy	(National	Crime	Agency,	2014b).	
This is in the form of money in bank accounts, stocks and 
shares or real estate. However, proceeds generated in the 
UK are not laundered only in the country but also abroad 
(for	 example,	 British	 OCGs	 invest	 in	 properties	 or	 holiday	
complexes in Spain, see Section 8.6).
The main driver of investments in the UK appears to be the 
ability to satisfy personal/family consumption needs 
and lifestyle preferences, and secondly the possibility 
to facilitate illegitimate businesses	 (rather	 than	 the	
legitimation of proceeds or control of the territory). 
It is also important to note that some, particularly low-level, 
offenders, will never make enough money to invest. They 
will	“offend	and	spend”	rather	than	“save	and	legitimise”	(Levi,	
2014).	As	noted	by	Ruggiero	and	Khan	“small	dealers	do	not	
normally manage to get out of the drug market and start a 
legitimate	 business	 except	 on	 rare	 occasions”	 (Ruggiero	 &	
Khan, 2006, p. 478). 
Methodological remarks 
Given the lack of information available on cases of organised 
crime	 infiltration	 in	 the	 legitimate	economy	 (see	Chapter	6),	
and	 of	 statistics	 on	 confiscated	 assets	 (see	 Part	 3),	 a	 wide	
variety of sources have been reviewed, including:
•		 Institutional reports	(e.g.	LEA	reports,	FIU	reports,	etc.);
•		 Investigation files	 (including	 interviews	 with	 law	
enforcement	officials	about	cases	of	criminal	investments);
•		 Academic literature;
•		 Media reports	 (in	 particular	 local	 newspapers)	 of	
OCG	 activities	 and	 cases	 of	 confiscation	 of	 proceeds	
(e.g.	 accessed	 through	 search	 engines	 such	 as	 Lexis	
Professional database, see details in the Methodological 
Annex). 
As illustrated in Chapter 2, the evidence collected from these 
sources has been organised into the DOCI. The section 
of the database regarding the UK contains 419 references 
(from 171 cases), of which the majority came from media 
sources,	 academic	 and	 institutional	 reports	 (see	 Chapter	 2	
and the Methodological Annex).
As already widely discussed in Chapter 6, the use of these data 
poses	significant	methodological	challenges.	First,	newspaper	
reports,	 academic	 articles	 and	 LEA	 reports	 of	 confiscated	
assets capture some investments, but they are not 
representative of the whole range of OCG investments. 
Some assets are never discovered by law enforcement bodies 
and they include bank accounts, cash, stocks and shares, 
valuables or properties in the UK or abroad. 
Secondly, although it has been possible to identify various 
types of investments, it is difficult to say, based on the 
sample, what investments are prevalent, or attribute 
particular types of investments to particular groups, with 
some exceptions. 
Hidden investment is another issue: no doubt there are 
investments	abroad	or	 in	 relatives/friends	names.	Often	 it	 is	
difficult	 to	 say	whether	 an	 investment	 (for	 example,	 in	 bars,	
restaurants, retail etc.) is for criminal purposes or an attempt 
to save and legitimise.
8.7.2. Geography
What UK regions collect most cases of investments? 
Based on the evidence captured by the DOCI, London 
(including inner and outer London) emerges in terms of 
number	 of	 references.	 But	 there	 is	 also	 a	 very	 significant	
presence	in	terms	of	infiltration	of	companies	in	some parts 
of Scotland (North East, East and South West). 
However,	as	mentioned,	there	is	also	evidence	of	a	significant	
presence of British OCG investments in companies and real 
estate abroad: in particular in Spain	(e.g.	Andalusia,	Catalonia	
and Community of Madrid) and also in Ireland, Netherlands 
and France. 
Investment in real estate in London is attractive for those 
looking to invest large sums of money because of the increase 
in property prices, and it is a good ‘buy to let’ investment.326 
326. Investment in residential properties which are privately rented. With 
low cost mortgages, for those able to raise a big deposit this can be a better 
investment	 than	 some	other	options,	 such	as	 savings	accounts;	 it	 is	 also	 less	
volatile than stocks and shares.
8.7. United Kingdom                                                                                                                                     
David Wall and Yulia Chistyakova (Durham University, United Kingdom)
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It is also likely to attract more investment in companies and 
other assets because of better economic opportunities in 
London compared to any other area in the country. Glasgow 
appears to be another city with high concentration of OCG 
investments in various business activities. Figure 46 shows 
the geographical distribution of references to criminal 
investments across UK regions. 
8.7.3. Assets and business sectors
There is evidence that the following types of assets are 
represented in the portfolios of organised crime groups 
in the UK: real estate, movable assets, registered assets, and 
companies. It is difficult to rank different types of assets, 
but it is possible to say what assets were mentioned more 
frequently in the sample. Companies prevail, followed by real 
estate, movable assets and registered assets. Below a brief 
description of evidence on the four types of assets is provided. 
Real estate
Real	estate	(in	the	form	of	property	and	land	(non-specified),	
houses, apartments, villas, cottages) is a fairly common type 
of investment, and is mentioned in about a quarter of all UK 
records on the database DOCI. Large urban areas in the UK 
are	more	exposed	(London,	Glasgow	in	particular),	but	there	is	
also evidence of British OCGs investing in real estate in foreign 
countries	(e.g.	Spain).	
The areas with relatively more evidence of investments in real 
estate are London and South Western Scotland. 
The preferred real estate is properties that can be rented 
for	 profit,	 but	 also	 properties	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 facilitate	
human trafficking. Houses appear to be the most common 
type, although apartments seem to be fairly common too. 
This seems to be explained by the fact that houses are 
the predominant type of real estate in the UK. As regards 
investments abroad, interest in real estate in Spain has 
increased because of gradual economic recovery and low 
prices	(Global	Property	Guide,	2014;	see	also	Section	8.6).
The drivers behind the purchase of real estate by OCGs 
range from investment purposes, personal use, or as a means 
to perform or facilitate a criminal activity. For example, houses 
and flats are used to accommodate victims of sex trafficking 
or illegal immigrant labour	 (often	 in	 poor	 and	 crowded	
conditions)	or	as	 ‘indoor’	cultivations	to	grow	cannabis.	Non-
residential	 properties	 (storage)	 are	 used	 to	 store illegal 
goods. Sometimes illegal means are used to obtain real estate: 
for	example,	housing	and	council	tax	benefit	fraud	is	used	to	
finance mortgage repayments	 (see	 Sections	 4.9	 and	 5.7;	
see also Hampstead and Highgate Express, 2011).
OCG investments have followed real estate market trends. 
From 1975 onwards UK property prices grew faster than 
in other countries in Europe because of immigration, low 
interest	rates,	London’s	financial	boom	and	weak	construction	
activity	 (Global	 Property	 Guide	 2014).	 This	 made	 the	
real estate market in the UK, especially in London and 
surrounding areas, an attractive investment opportunity 
for anyone wishing to invest large amounts of money in real 
estate, including for OCGs. After a slump in 2008-2010 prices 
started rising again, fuelled by low interest rates and limited 
supply of new properties.
Movable assets
A	wide	array	of	movable	assets	has	been	identified	in	relation	
to cases of OCG investment. They include cash, stocks 
and shares, trusts, bonds, life insurance, pension funds, 
bank/building society account, jewellery and gold but 
also designer clothing, artwork, other luxury items, watches, 
computers, race horses, fur coats and cosmetics.328
The most common type of movable assets found in the 
criminal portfolio is cash. This may be due to the fact that 
Figure 46 – Geographical distribution of evidence of organ-
ised crime investments in the UK (NUTS 2)327
Legend
Low
Medium-Low
Medium-High
High
Source: UDUR elaboration on DOCI
327.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
328. References to movable assets have been found in a number of UK areas. 
West Wales and The Valleys, East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire, Greater 
Manchester, Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire and South Western 
Scotland are the areas where these recoveries appear to be most common 
(Table	28).
Box 37 – VAT missing trader fraud and luxury 
properties
The	boss	of	a	criminal	gang,	author	of	the	UK’s	largest	
ever VAT MTIC frauds on import and export of mobile 
phones, bought luxury properties on the Thames at 
Putney Wharf, Chelsea Harbour, and in Spain and 
Gibraltar	 (HMRC,	 2013).	 Once	 convicted	 and	 already	
jailed for laundering his share of a £250 million VAT 
fraud,	he	was	ordered	 to	 repay	criminal	profits	of	£14	
million, within nine months, or remain in jail for a further 
ten years. Fifteen other career criminals were also jailed 
for almost 100 years for their part in the conspiracy.
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cash	seizures	appear	 to	be	 the	most	common	 type	of	asset	
recovered	(see	also	Section	12.8).	This	is	followed	by	valuable	
consumer goods such as luxury watches and high value 
jewellery, bank accounts, and designer clothing. Luxurious 
holidays were also frequently mentioned in newspaper 
reports as criminal expenditure, supporting the idea of 
‘lifestyle’	investments	or	consumption	patterns.	
A luxury lifestyle, but also investment in high-value items 
appear to be among the drivers behind the purchase of movable 
assets. High-value goods such as antiques, artworks, and 
jewellery may be a way to invest in something of high 
and stable value,	and/or	a	way	to	launder	money	(Thompson,	
2003). Cash and money in bank accounts are extremely 
important	 as	 enablers	 of	 future/ongoing	 criminal	 activities	
(see	also	Section	7.2),	 but	 since	POCA	allows	 the	 seizure	of	
cash,	criminals	are	getting	better	at	hiding	it	from	seizure;	for	
example, by using mules, or placing money in condoms and 
swallowing	them	(HMIC,	HMcpsi,	&	MCSI,	2004,	p.	12).	
It can be speculated that the POCA has provided an 
incentive for offenders to spend their money fast rather 
than save and invest it, knowing that they have to pay the 
money back, and most certainly part with at least some of 
their assets if they get caught.329
Registered assets
Evidence of purchase and investment in registered assets 
include cars (most	frequently	mentioned),	bicycles, number 
plates, boats, and even private jets and helicopters. They 
are	important	first	of	all	as	symbols	of	success	(Hobbs,	2013)	
and patterns of luxury lifestyle. However, they can also play 
a functional role in criminal activity: for example, boats are 
used	to	transport	illegal	goods	(e.g.	drugs).
Companies
Companies play a crucial role in the investment portfolios 
of OCGs in the UK and represent most of the references 
found	 in	 the	 DOCI	 in	 the	 country	 (266	 references).	 They	
include a wide variety of economic activities and business 
sectors, from retail outlets and grocery shops, to restaurants, 
taxi	firms	and	construction	companies.330 
The	 sectors	 with	 the	 higher	 evidence	 of	 infiltration	 are 
wholesale and retail, bars and restaurants and 
transportation.	Below	more	details	about	relevant	infiltrated	
sectors are provided.
Wholesale and retail trade 
Evidence	of	 infiltration	 in	 this	sector	by	British	OCGs,	 Italian	
mafias	(Camorra	and	‘Ndrangheta),	but	also	by	Irish,	Chinese,	
Russian/Georgian,	 Turkish	 and	 other	 Asian	 OCGs	 has	
been	 identified.	 Most	 of	 the	 cases	 concentrate	 in	 London,	
Scotland	 (Northern	and	Southern)	and	Greater	Manchester.	
Companies in this sector are used either as an investment, as 
fronts for criminal activities, or to perform an illegal activity, 
for	example,	to	sell	fake	designer	goods	(Kington,	2009).	
In particular wholesale and retail of food, such as 
convenience stores and off-licences, are typically fronts for 
illicit	 activities	 (Silverstone	 &	 Savage,	 2010)	 or	 are	 used	 to	
sell	 illicit	goods	(e.g.	alcohol)	or	may	be	offered	 illicit goods 
by	OCGs	 (Tilley	&	Hopkins,	2008);	 food	 importing	by	 Italian	
mafia	 for	 restaurants	 in	Scotland	 is	both	 for	profit	purposes	
but	also	to	facilitate	the	criminal	activity	(Campana,	2011b).	
Bars and restaurants 
In	this	sector,	several	OCGs	have	been	identified:	they	include	
British,	 Italian	 mafias	 (Camorra),	 Chinese,	 Irish,	 Turkish	
and Other Asian. Geographically, most of the cases were 
found in Scotland, London, East and West Midlands and 
Greater Manchester. Bars and restaurants are used as either 
investments	 or	 fronts	 for	 criminal	 activities	 (Hobbs,	 1998;	
Silverstone	&	Savage,	2010;	Leask,	2010;	Fellstrom,	2014).
329. Based on an interview with a law enforcement official.
330. However, it is interesting to list the full set of sectors which has been found 
so	as	to	provide	an	idea	of	the	wide	array	of	financial	 interests	of	OCGs	in	the	
country. In particular, references to organised crime investments have been 
found in retail outlets, grocery shops, small restaurants, supermarkets, jewellers, 
music shops, petrol stations, convenience stores and off-licences, bars, pubs, 
clubs, sun bed parlours, tanning salons, hair and nail salons, hotels, video shops, 
auto recovery companies, claims management companies, scrapyards, taxi 
firms,	 private	 security,	 second-hand	 car	 dealerships,	 second-hand	 furniture	
businesses, warehouses, plumbing businesses, construction businesses, 
property development, painting and decorating companies, catering 
businesses, cheque cashing services.
 Level of evidence* Business sectors
Higher
Bars	and	restaurants;	Wholesale	
and retail tradea;	Transportation
Medium
Construction;	Sports	and	
gaming;	Sex,	tattoo	and	other	
personal	activities;	Money	service	
businesses;	Casinos,	VLT	and	
betting	activities;	Repair	and	retail	
of	vehicles;	Banking	and	financial	
activities;	IT	and	other	services
* The classes are divided according to the value of the mean plus ±0.5 
standard	deviations	of	each	sector	(see	Chapter	7).	The	information	is	
available for 257 references.
a Including	WRT	not	specified,	WRT	of	food,	WRT	clothing	and	textiles.
Table 88 - Business sectors with evidence of criminal 
investments in the UK
Box 39 – A gang leader involved in fraud and money 
laundering invests in real estate, properties, a golf 
club and a restaurant
The wealthy co-owner of a football club made a 1 million 
GBP loan to a company controlled by a man considered 
head of an organised crime network involved in fraud, 
money-laundering	 and	 ‘extreme	 violence’.	 The	 loan	
was	 secured	against	 several	 of	 this	man’s	 properties,	
including a golf club and a restaurant once owned by 
famous	actors	and	footballers	(Fellstrom,	2014).
Box 38 - Operation Octopod: Rolexes and 
computers for the criminal gang
In a series of raids in February 2014 police arrested 
fifteen	members	of	 a	London-based	organised	crime	
group – the Adams syndicate. The members of the 
group were charged with fraud, money laundering, 
conspiracy to assault and criminal damage. Police 
confiscated	around	£275,000	 in	cash	as	well	as	guns	
and luxury items like Rolexes, computers and phones 
(Luke	Garratt,	2014).
Source: UDUR elaboration on DOCI
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London and Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire. 
Companies in this sector are used for investment and money 
laundering. Football and other sports clubs are typical 
investments	(Fellstrom,	2014).
Money service businesses. These include foreign currency 
exchange, money transfer, and cheque cashing services. 
British, Turkish and Colombian OCGs have invested in this 
sector. Evidence of investments has been found in London, 
Greater Manchester, North Yorkshire and West Yorkshire. 
Money service businesses are typically used for money 
laundering	(Thompson,	2002).
Purchase of financial products	 (mortgages	 and	
investments)	is	also	a	way	to	launder	money	(National	Crime	
Agency, 2013). Mortgage fraud is often used to buy real 
estate. Payday loan companies332 offer good legal covers for 
laundering income from drugs, prostitution and racketeering.
Sex, Tattoo and other personal activities. This includes 
nail bars, tanning salons, hair salons, massage parlours, 
sunbed parlours, and escort companies. A wide range of 
OCGs are involved in this sector, including British, Chinese 
and Vietnamese OCGs. Investments in this sector have 
been	 found	 in	 London,	 Scotland	 (south-west,	 eastern),	 East	
Wales, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire. These businesses 
are usually used as fronts for criminal activities. For example, 
nail bars are used by Vietnamese communities as fronts for 
human	and	drug	trafficking	(Silverstone	&	Savage,	2010).
Hotels. British, Irish, Italian and Turkish OCGs have been 
found to own hotels in several locations, including Calabria 
(Italy),	 Andalusia	 (Spain),	 Turkey,	 Surrey,	 East	 and	 West	
Sussex. Hotels are typically purchased as an investment, 
but they are also used as fronts for criminal activities and to 
launder money. This includes investments in holiday villages 
and	 tourist	 complexes	 in	 tourist/beach	 resort	 areas	 of	 Italy,	
Spain	and	Turkey,	or	in	southern	parts	of	the	UK	(Thompson,	
2002;	Surinenglish,	2010).	
Other sectors with some evidence of OCG investments include 
casinos, VLT and betting activities; IT and other services; real 
estate activities and repair and retail of second hand vehicles.
The role of foreign countries as destinations for 
investment in companies is also growing. For example, a 
Northern Irish OCG was reported to have invested proceeds 
of illegal drug trade in several tourist complexes in Costa del 
Sol	and	Brazil,	as	well	as	 in	 the	sectors	of	 renewable	energy,	
infrastructure, recycling, telecommunications and recreational 
activities	(Sur	In	English,	2010).	
To conclude, there are various drivers behind investments 
in	 companies:	 some	 are	 functional/directly	 linked	 to	 the	
performance	 of	 an	 illegal	 activity	 (conceal,	 or	 enable/assist	
illegal	 activity);	 others	 are	 to	 ‘save	 and	 legitimize’	 illegal	
proceeds,	or	consume	them	(‘offend	and	spend’),	see	Table	89	
below.
Transportation and renting of motor vehicles
Turkish and British OCGs have been found in this sector. Most 
of	the	cases	were	discovered	in	London	and	Scotland	(South-
West and East),. Companies in this sector are often used as 
fronts	 for	criminal	activities	 (for	example,	 taxi	firms	are	used	
as fronts for money laundering and drug trafficking activities), 
but also as part of a criminal activity: for example, haulage 
businesses	are	used	 to	 transport	 illicit	goods	 (drugs,	 illicit	or	
counterfeit cigarettes, alcohol and other counterfeit goods), 
and warehouses are used for the storage of illicit goods or as 
venues	 for	 the	 ‘cutting	up	of	 loads	and	distribution	of	 stolen	
goods’	(D.	Hobbs	1998,	413).	Auto-recovery	companies	can	be	
used	as	part	of	a	criminal	business	(auto-recovery	as	part	of	
a	‘crash	for	cash’	scam)	(Leask	2010,	D.	Hobbs	1998,	Durham	
Constabulary 2013). 
Construction
OCGs	 found	 in	 this	 sector	 include	 Italian	 mafias	 (Camorra	
and	 other	 not	 specified	 groups),	 British	 and	 Irish	 OCGs.	
Geographically, most cases were found in East Anglia, Essex, 
Kent, North Eastern Scotland, Tees Valley and Durham and 
West Wales and The Valleys. Construction companies are 
usually a form of investment. Based on the records collected, 
money from drugs, trafficking, cigarette smuggling, arms 
sales, money laundering and other crimes is invested in a 
construction/renovation/decoration	business	or	infrastructure	
(Hobbs,	1998;	Sur	In	English,	2010).
Other sectors
A low amount of evidence does not necessarily mean that 
these	 sectors	 have	 less	 infiltration.	 It	 may	 mean	 that	 less	
evidence is available because of perhaps the relative ease 
of concealing illegal activities in some sectors such as waste 
management, traditionally less attention of law enforcement 
authorities to these sectors, and other reasons. 
For example, waste management is now highlighted as a 
potentially	highly	infiltrated	sector,	but	there	is	often	insufficient	
evidence to link it directly to OCGs. As noted in Section 5.7.2.8, 
organised	crime	involvement	in	the	waste	sector	is	recognized	
by the Environmental Agency as a growing threat. Northern 
Ireland is viewed as particularly vulnerable by the independent 
Mills report, but the whole of the UK is claimed to be at risk 
(Kenning,	2014).331 
Similarly, legal and professional activities	(financial	agents,	
accountants, solicitors, and others) have traditionally not 
been targeted by law enforcement agencies as enablers of 
organised crime because these links are difficult to prove. 
But the new Serious Crime Bill aims to address the gap by 
introducing a new offence of ‹participation in an organised 
crime	group›	(Travis,	2014).
Sports and gaming.	 Italian	 mafias	 (Camorra	 and	 Apulian	
OC),	British,	Chinese	and	Russian/Georgian	OCGs	have	been	
found	to	invest	in	this	sector.	They	invested	in	Scotland	(east,	
south-west, north-east, Highlands and Islands), Essex, Outer 
331. For example, ESAET cites a recent case in Northern Ireland: at a site in 
Mobuoy,	 near	 Londonderry,	 “516,000	 tonnes	 of	 waste	 were	 found	 to	 have	
been	illegally	dumped	in	sand	and	gravel	pits	by	an	apparently	legitimate	firm”	
(Taylor	et	al.,	 2014,	p.	8).	The	Scottish	Environment	Protection	Agency	set	up	
a new Waste Crime Team in December last year to help tackle serious and 
organised	crime	(Scottish	Environment	Protection	Agency,	2013).	Food	supply	
networks are considered to be another vulnerable sector because of the ease of 
penetration,	the	possibility	of	making	high	profits	from	food	fraud,	and	relatively	
low	risks	of	detection	(Elliott,	2013).
332. A payday loan company is a lending company in the UK that loans typically 
small	amounts	of	money	(up	to	£500)	to	be	repaid	over	short	term,	and	charges	
a	very	high	interest	rate	(1000%	APR	or	more).
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8.7.4. Actors
British OCGs 
Most frequently mentioned in the database, British OCGs 
are involved in a broad range of sectors. It also seems that 
in terms of geographical distribution of investments these 
criminal groups are represented in all areas of the UK,333 
not just London and big cities, and that they are linked to a 
wide range of criminal activities. They are involved in a range 
of sectors, with most frequent records of bars and restaurants 
and wholesale and retail of food. 
British OCGs of South Asian origin in particular seem to 
specialise in the wholesale and retail of clothing and textiles, 
money service businesses, bars and restaurants, other 
wholesale	 and	 retail	 (music	 shops),	 private	 security	 and	
construction	(Ruggiero	&	Khan,	2006).
Italian mafias 
Three	 Italian	 OCGs	 have	 been	 identified	 as	 active	 in	 the	
UK:	 Camorra,	 Ndrangheta	 and	 Apulian	 OCGs	 (Parisi	 clan).	
Camorra	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 most	 diversified	 group,	 involved	
in a range of sectors, including wholesale and retail trade, 
bars and restaurants, construction, real estate activities, 
sports and gaming, and casinos. However, there is a clear 
prevalence of records concerning food-related sectors: food 
import-export, restaurants, pubs, and secondly, sports and 
gaming, and casinos. The Apulian (Parisi Clan) is involved 
in sports, gaming and casinos. Less information is available 
on 'Ndrangheta, who were found to be involved in hotels 
and real estate activities. Geographically, most evidence of 
investments	by	these	groups	has	been	found	in	Scotland	(most	
records),	 London	and	Calabria	 (Italy).	The illegal activities 
in which these groups are involved include drug trafficking, 
extortion and racketeering, money laundering, murder, arms 
trafficking.
Chinese OCGs
Chinese OCGs invest in sports and gaming, sex, tattoo 
and personal activities, wholesale and retail trade and bars 
and restaurants. Evidence of these investments has been 
found in London, South Wales, Nottingham, Glasgow, Bristol, 
Liverpool,	Plymouth	and	Birmingham	(Wang,	2013),	Scotland	
(Silverstone,	 2011)	 and	 Northern	 Ireland.	 The	 investments	
are often related to the illicit activities in which these 
groups are involved, such as drug trafficking, sex trafficking, 
counterfeiting, and fraud. 
Turkish OCGs
Turkish OCGs invest in hotels, bars and restaurants, money 
service businesses, transportation and renting of motor-
vehicles. Most of these investments have been found in 
London, Brighton and Hove, and Lancashire. The illicit 
activities in which Turkish OCGs are involved include drug 
trafficking, money laundering and illegal gambling. 
Vietnamese OCGs
Vietnamese OCGs invest in bars and restaurants, jewellers, 
wholesale and retail of food, wholesale and retail trade, sex, 
tattoo and personal services. Evidence of investments has 
been found in London and Birmingham. Vietnamese OCGs are 
involved in the following illicit activities: Illegal immigration, 
drug	 trafficking	 (cannabis	cultivation)	and	money	 laundering	
(see	Table	90).	
There does not seem to be a clear pattern of investment linked 
to	particular	groups	or	types	of	crime;	rather,	 it	appears	that	
groups and networks operate opportunistically and invest 
where there are opportunities to use a business for money 
laundering, use it as part of an illegal activity, or legitimise illegal 
proceeds. As noted earlier, investments are often dictated 
by	 the	 group’s	 criminal	 activities.	 Groups	 involved	 in	 human	
trafficking will often own nail, hair or tanning salons or buy or 
rent	houses	to	house	the	victims	and/or	to	use	the	properties	
as brothels. Similarly, houses are bought to use for cannabis 
cultivation.	Shops,	hotels,	bars	and	restaurants,	taxi	hire	firms	
Box 40 – A drug baron invests in a pub chain, beer 
distribution business, private hire taxis, an art 
gallery, an accountancy business and a nursery
A drug baron invested in properties, a pub chain, a beer 
distribution	firm,	several	hundred	private	hire	taxis,	an	
accountancy	business	and	a	children’s	nursery.	He	also	
founded an art gallery, and was involved in mortgage 
fraud and money laundering. He owned a 1.5 million 
GBP	home	(Findlay,	2013).
Purpose of 
investment
Business sectors
To assist illicit 
business
Haulage	businesses	(transportation	
of drugs and illicit tobacco), banking 
and	financial	(claim	management,	
cash for crash scams), petrol 
stations	(fuel	laundering),	
convenience	stores	(sale	of	illicit	
goods)
Money laundering
Betting shops, sports and gaming, 
money-service businesses, cash 
businesses, businesses based on 
trust	( jewelers)
As a front for 
criminal activities
Wholesale and retail trade, sex, 
tattoo, tanning and nail salons, 
saunas, hotels, repair and retail of 
second hand vehicles, payday loans
Legitimization	of	
illicit proceeds
Wholesale and retail trade, bars 
and restaurants, construction, 
hotels, clubs, real estate activities, 
renewable energy, infrastructure, 
recycling, telecommunications, 
sports and gaming, manufacturing, 
wholesale and retail of clothing and 
textiles, private security
Table 89 – Drivers of OCGS investments in companies
Source: UDUR elaboration
333. In particular South-West Scotland, London, Yorkshire, East Scotland and 
foreign	countries	(especially	Spain,	Costa	del	Sol).
215 | Part 2
are often used as fronts for a number of criminal activities 
(drugs	 and	 sex,	 illicit	 alcohol	 and	 cigarettes,	 counterfeit	
goods). Drugs money is invested in all business sectors, as 
well	 as	 lifestyle	 items;	 an	 example	 is	 Willie	 O’Neil’s	 OCG	 in	
Scotland, which was involved in heroin trade and mortgage 
fraud, invested money in a pub chain, a beer distribution 
company, private hire taxis, an accountancy business, a 
children’s	nursery	and	an	art	gallery,	as	well	as	properties	and	
arts	(Findlay,	2013).	
Some investments may be driven by cultural preferences, for 
example, there were several mentions of Italians investing in 
food	import/export	and	restaurants	(the	La	Torre	clan	owned	
an olive oil and prosciutto-importing business and a restaurant 
in	Aberdeen);	 they	were	also	 linked	to	 investments	 in	sports,	
gaming and casinos. However, cases of other groups investing 
in bars and restaurants and sports and gaming have also 
been found. Vietnamese OCGs are linked, according to the 
data, to restaurants, takeaways and nail bars. According to 
one	estimate,	‘nail	bars‘	may	account	for	more	than	60%	of	all	
Vietnamese	 businesses	 (Silverstone,	 2011,	 p.	 27).	 According	
to the British police, they are sources of work for illegal 
immigrants and means to launder the proceeds from cannabis 
cultivation	 (Silverstone,	 2011).	 The	 findings	 are	 summarised	
below in Table 90. 
8.7.5. Concluding remarks
While no quantitative measure can be provided at present, 
the research indicates that there is some presence of 
OCG investments in some sectors of the economy, 
such as wholesale and retail trade, bars, restaurants and 
hotels, sex, tattoo and personal services, money service 
businesses and cash-intensive businesses, sports and 
casinos and transportation. However, none of the sectors 
are monopolised or fully controlled by organised criminal 
groups. There is also evidence of a growing presence in the 
sectors of renewable energy, waste and recycling and food 
supply The main purpose of investments in these sectors is to 
create fronts for illicit activities, although the businesses can in 
some	cases	provide	profits	in	their	own	right.	
London, North East (Aberdeen) and East Scotland 
(Edinburgh), and Essex appear to be places with the highest 
frequency of investments in companies. While at the upper 
levels of organised crime there may be opportunities for large 
investments in the legal economy, low-level offenders typically 
‘offend	 and	 spend’	 by	 investing	 in	 everyday	 consumption	
and lifestyle items. In terms of assets, there is evidence of 
investments in real estate, especially in London and South-
West Scotland, although other areas in the UK have been 
affected as well. There is also evidence of investments in real 
estate	abroad	(especially	Spain).	
The following types of investment behavior have been 
identified:
•		 Lifestyle investments	 (Hobbs,	 1998;	 L’Hoiry,	 2013;	
Ruggiero	&	Khan,	2006;	Dubourg	&	Prichard	2008).
•		 Symbolic investments	 (personalized	 number	 plates,	
designer watches, luxurious cars, boats)
OCG Infiltrated business sectors Related illegal activities
Camorra
Wholesale and retail trade, wholesale and retail of food, 
bars and restaurants, construction, real estate, sports 
and gaming, casinos
Drug trafficking, extortion racketeering
‘Ndrangheta N/A N/A
Apulian	(Parisi	Clan) Sports	and	gaming,	casinos	(a	betting	company)
Murder, drugs smuggling and money-
laundering
British	OCGs	(no	
distinct ethnic 
identity)
Renewable energy, construction, real estate 
activities, waste management, IT, sports and gaming, 
hotels, wholesale and retail of food and clothing, 
transportation, bars and restaurants, clubs, petrol and 
gas supply, manufacturing, sex, tattoo and personal 
activities, money service businesses, banking, private 
security, repair and retail of second hand vehicles
Drug trafficking, fraud, counterfeiting, 
gambling, distraction burglaries, robberies, 
theft, extortion, money laundering, 
prostitution, brothel keeping, sex racket 
British South-Asian 
OCGs
Wholesale and retail of food and clothing, money 
service businesses, bars and restaurants
Drug trafficking, immigration crime, fraud 
Chinese OCGs Sports and gaming
Drug trafficking, sex trafficking, counterfeiting, 
fraud
Turkish OCGs
Hotels, bars and restaurants, money service 
businesses, wholesale and retail trade, repair and 
retail of vehicles, transportation and renting of motor-
vehicles
Drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal 
gambling
Vietnamese OCGs
Bars and restaurants, jewellers, wholesale and retail 
of food, wholesale and retail trade, sex, tattoo and 
personal
Illegal	immigration,	drug	trafficking	(cannabis	
cultivation), money laundering
Table 90 - Types of OCGs and types of investments
Source: UDUR elaboration on DOCI
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•		 Fronts and money laundering – use of businesses 
as fronts for illicit activities or to launder illicit proceeds 
(Silverstone,	2011;	Annison,	2013)
•		 Functional:	to	perform	criminal	activities	(for	example,	use	
of	warehouses,	transport	etc.)	(Hobbs,	1998;	Silverstone	&	
Savage,	2010;	Jackson	et	al.,	2010).	
The research has found that organised crime groups invest in 
a broad and expanding range of sectors of economy. There is 
evidence of large-scale investments in assets worth several 
millions of GBP. That said, it is not possible at present to 
provide an accurate quantitative estimate of the ‘size’ 
of investments generated by illicit proceeds in the legal 
economy.
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9.1. How to measure the impact 
of organised crime investments 
on the legal economy?                            
An exploratory analysis 
This chapter attempts to describe how the impact of OCG 
investments on the European legal economy might be 
measured. It explores the many ways in which organised 
criminals’	 investment	patterns	 impact	on	 the	 legal	 economy	
itself, and it attempts to describe in some detail the ways in 
which these investment patterns are economically sub-
optimal, how they distort the legitimate markets and damage 
legitimate	businesses,	how	they	impact	on	ordinary	citizens	in	
terms	of	environmental	and	health	costs	and	on	significantly	
lowered life quality, and how they impact even at the highest 
levels of democratic government. 
Earlier sections of this Report have focused on the issues 
of the generation of illicit proceeds from crime by organised 
crime groups in the EU, and where it is invested. Chapter 7 has 
shown that: 
•		 Almost	 all	 EU	 Member	 States	 register	 evidence	 of	
investments	by	criminal	groups	in	the	legitimate	economy;	
•		 Legal	 companies	 are	 often	 used	 by	OCGs	 to	 cover	 illicit	
activities	 and	 as	 ways	 to	 infiltrate	 the	 local	 political	 and	
business	community	and	the	public	administration;
•		 Bars	 and	 restaurants,	 construction,	 wholesale	 and	 retail	
trade	 (in	particular	of	 food	products),	 transportation,	 real	
estate and hotels show high and medium evidence of 
infiltration	by	organised	crime.	Emerging	sectors	are	waste	
and scrap management, renewable energy, casinos VLT 
and	slot	machines,	money	service	businesses;
•		 Differences	 exist	 across	 countries	 and	 across	 different	
OCGs.
The costs of crime and the impact of organised crime 
investments
It	 is	not	 too	many	years	since	 the	first	studies of the costs 
of crime	 emerged	 (Walker,	 1992).334 Early research into the 
costs of crime typically focused on the direct costs of the 
crimes themselves, in terms of impacts on victims, and the 
costs of crime prevention, law enforcement and justice, with 
indirect costs being relegated to a secondary role, in part 
because of the inherent difficulties of measurement. However, 
researchers	 such	 as	Mayhew	 (Mayhew,	 2003a,	 2003b)	 and	
Brand	 and	 Price	 (2000)	 established	 that	 these	 indirect 
costs	were	 indeed	measurable	 (although	with	difficulty)	and	
significant.	 More	 recently,	 the	 European	 Commission	 has	
issued a formalised approach entitled “Mainstreaming 
Methodology for Estimating Costs of Crime” (University	
of	York,	2009),	which	aims	to	encourage	a	standard	“costs	of	
crime”	 approach	 across	 European	 Union	 countries.	 Building	
on	this	history	of	research,	the	EC’s	approach	 includes,	 in	 its	
“Costs	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 crime”	 section,	 some	 elements	
that	would	have	been	considered	rather	‘third-order’	impacts	
in early attempts to measure the costs of crime. Together with 
‘traditional’	 elements	 such	 as	 property	 losses	 and	 medical	
and mental health care costs, they include productivity losses, 
household services, lost school days, pain, suffering and lost 
quality of life, victim support services, tort claim expenses and 
‘long-term	consequences’.	They	are	described	in	the	report	as	
follows:
•		 Productivity loss: the time lost from work, by victims of 
crime, as a result of criminal victimisation. 
•		 Household services: the interruption of normal daily 
activities as a result of crime that leaves victims either 
relying on other household members to increase their 
service contribution or having to employ external suppliers 
of these services.
334. This report was recognised by the U.N. International Crime Research 
Institute	as	being	the	first	attempt	to	measure	the	costs	of	crime	in	a	country.
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•		 Lost School Days: the interruption to education that may 
result for victims still in full-time education.
•		 Medical and Mental Health Services: the costs to health 
services	 (whether	 funded	 through	 the	 public	 sector	 or	
otherwise) incurred in treating victims of crimes involving 
violence, or the threat of violence.
•		 Pain, suffering and lost quality of life: the pain and 
suffering resulting from personal injury in an assault, which 
may include psychic loss or post-traumatic stress disorder.
•		 Victim Support Services: the costs of supplying support 
to victims in the immediate aftermath of a crime.
•		 Tort Claim expenses: the costs incurred by victims on 
bringing their own private actions against offenders. 
•		 Long-term Consequences of Victimization: the longer-
term effects of crime: for example victims may want to 
relocate following a crime. There may also be longer-term 
consequences of business crime. Businesses may leave an 
industry or an area in extreme circumstances if they have 
incurred	significant	or	sustained	loss	from	crime.	
When the focus is on the impacts (i.e. the costs, but more 
broadly defined) of investments made by organised 
crime	 from	 their	 significant	 profits,	 these	 elements	 can	 be	
taken as a starting point, because we are considering similar 
types	 of	 ‘costs’.	 But	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 focus on the costs 
imposed by the OCGs’ patterns of investment, rather 
than the costs imposed by the crimes committed by the 
OCGs. It is therefore necessary to look much more closely 
into, for example, business management, labour markets, 
real estate values, and the corrosive impacts of corruption on 
public and private life. 
The	 findings	 earlier	 in	 this	 Report	 do	 not	 permit	 actual	
measurement, because of the extreme scarcity of hard 
data on the magnitude of the problem. However, several 
significant	 threads	 emerge	 from	 the	 research.	 They	 can	 be	
classified:	 Sub-optimal investments, Market distortion, 
and Interference in Government and Judicial decision 
making.
9.1.1. Sub-optimal investments 
According	 to	 Italian	 studies	 (e.g.	 Arlacchi,	 1983;	 Transcrime	
2013a;	Riccardi,	2014a)	most	of	the	companies	controlled	by	
OC are not well managed, are not necessarily profitable, 
have more employees than necessary, and stay in the 
market only because they use corruption, accounting 
manipulations and other criminal means. In this sense the 
business	activities	managed	by	OCGs	may	be	somehow	‘sub-
efficient’ or ‘sub-optimal’ thus implying loss of productivity 
and	profitability.	
Impacts of sub-optimal investments include:
•		 Irregular	work:	
•		 Consequences	of	confiscations	
•		 Environmental	and	health	implications	
Irregular work
According	 to	 the	 cases	 analysed	 in	 previous	 studies	 (see	
above)	 and	 previous	 sections	 (see	 e.g.	 Sections	 5.4.2.2,	 7.3,	
8.2.3 and 8.4), most of the companies controlled by OCGs use 
more employees than necessary and often hire irregular 
workers	 (or	 even	 exploit	 the	 labour	 of	 trafficked	 persons),	
making them dependent on welfare or petty crime to generate 
income. Australian studies, for example Australian Tax Office 
(2014),	 show	 that	 OCGs,	 particularly	 those	 operating	 in	 the	
building and construction industries, may systematically run a 
company into debt, and transfer the assets into a new company 
to	avoid	paying	creditors,	 tax	or	employee	entitlements	 (this	
is	 known	 as	 ‘Phoenix	 activity’	 after	 the	mythical	 bird	 that	 is	
continually reborn from its own ashes). The new company, 
usually operated by the same director, continues the business 
under a new structure to avoid responsibilities to creditors, but 
the employees are abandoned without hope of receiving their 
entitlements. Australian Tax Office studies are underway to 
estimate the costs and impacts of the use of such schemes by 
OCGs in Australia.
To the extent that this is true, then: 
•		 Productivity losses occur across the part of the workforce 
that	is	employed	by	OCG-controlled	businesses;
•		 Tax losses occur as a result of tax-evasive business 
practices by OCG-controlled businesses and as a result of 
the	lower	incomes	paid	to	employees;
•		 Dependency on welfare may become an issue for income 
support for poorly paid and laid-off workers, and for their 
dependents;
•		 Stress, related to working conditions, may lead to long-
term physical and mental health problems for employees 
of	OCG-controlled	businesses,	and	for	their	dependents;
•		 Children	of	poorly	paid	and	laid-off	workers	may	miss	out	
on educational opportunities, with the consequence of 
long-term disadvantage.
Consequences of confiscations
Once	 confiscated,	 criminal	 assets	 are	often not efficiently 
managed and hence soon lose productivity or fail. For 
example,	 most	 confiscated	 companies	 in	 Italy	 go	 bankrupt	
or	 are	 liquidated	 (Riccardi,	 2014a)	 -	 Transcrime	 research	
found that 65-70%	of	the	businesses	confiscated	from	OCGs	
ended in liquidation, 15-20% went bankrupt, while only 15-20% 
remained active. This will result in further loss of jobs, of 
productivity and of wealth.
Environmental and health implications 
Most companies controlled by OCGs use criminal means 
to survive in the market. For example, in order to reduce 
operating costs they avoid any kind of rule regarding 
waste disposal	(including	toxic	waste)	or	use	lower-quality 
products	 (e.g.	 cement	 with	 high	 percentages	 of	 sand,	
chemical additives in food products, etc.) which represent 
risks from the environmental and public health points of view. 
This will result in:
•		 Sickness,	miscarriage	and	birth	defects	from	tainted	food	
(CSPI,	2000),	and	
•		 Some	forms	of	illegal	dumping	such	as	chemicals	or	
asbestos can 
- lead to pollution of the environment, and
- directly cause harm or injury to humans and wildlife.
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A clear example of this is the contamination of the Caserta 
plain	(near	Naples)	due	to	environmental	damage	caused	by	
Camorra	companies.	It	 is	often	referred	to	as	the	‘Triangle	of	
death’	(Senior	and	Mazza,	2004),	and,	for	example,	the	annual	
death rate per 100,000 inhabitants from liver cancer is close 
to 34.5 for men and 20.8 for women, as compared to the 
national average of 14.
9.1.2. Market distortion
The	 ability	 of	 OCGs	 to	 pay	 ‘over-the-top’	 prices	 for	 the	
purchase	of	 registered	assets	 (cars,	 boats,	motorcycles	 etc.	
moveable	assets	 (such	as	fine	arts,	 jewels	or	 fur	coats),	 real	
estate	properties	and	companies	 (including	hotels,	bars	and	
restaurants, construction, wholesale and retail trade etc.) as 
identified	 in	 Section	 7.2,	 as	 part	 of	 their	 money	 laundering	
activities, can drive out legitimate investors from these 
markets. The use of corruption, intimidation and impositions 
(e.g.	on	suppliers’	materials,	etc.)	by	the	companies	controlled	
by OCGs, reducing their operating costs relative to legitimate 
forms of business, produces further distortions for legal 
competitors in the market, again leading to sub-optimal 
economic equilibrium. Of particular concern is the ability 
of OCG-controlled businesses to corrupt and co-opt 
professionals, including accountants and lawyers, distorting 
the markets for professional services. 
Impacts of market distortion may include:
•		 Price	bubbles	for	registered	assets,	moveable	assets,	real	
estate properties and companies
•		 Loss	of	confidence	in	the	professions
•		 Capital	 loss	 and	 capital	 flight	 amongst	 competitor	
businesses
•		 Loss	of	neighbourhood	prestige/reputation
•		 Reduced	municipal	services,	and	
•		 Fear	of	crime.
Price bubbles for registered assets, moveable assets, 
real estate properties and companies
For example, the World Economic Forum Global Agenda 
on	 Organised	 Crime,	 (WEF,	 2011)	 stated	 that	 ”Purchase	 of	
expensive	 homes	 by	 crime	 figures	 and	 corrupt	 officials	
shows that crime really does pay. Economic bubbles can be 
exacerbated by money laundering into real estate and ordinary 
citizens	 can	 be	 priced	 out	 of	 markets	 distorted	 by	 money	
launderers”.	There	is	consequently	the	risk	that	these	markets	
will collapse when the OCGs investment strategies change. 
Legitimate investors in these markets risk losing much of their 
investment, mirroring the impacts of the residential housing 
‘bubbles’	experienced	in	many	EU	countries	during	the	global	
financial	crisis.	
Loss of confidence in the professions
The employment of professionals, including corrupted 
accountants, police and lawyers, to facilitate the operations 
of businesses operated by OCGs, may drive out legitimate 
operators from these professions. This will result in:
•		 Significant	 loss	 of	 confidence	 by	 the	 community	 in	 the	
integrity of these professions;
•		 A	 reluctance,	 by	 legitimate	 businesses,	 to	 engage	 the	
services of these professionals, due to fears that they 
may infiltrate their business. Failure to employ legitimate 
professionals	 may	 lead	 to	 reduced	 efficiencies	 and/or	
productivity;
•		 A	 reluctance,	 by	 legitimate	businesses,	 to	 use	 the	courts	
to	resolve	business	disputes	(for	example,	customers	who	
fail to pay for goods and services provided), due to fears 
that they may have been corrupted by OCGs. Failure to 
pursue	such	civil	cases	may	reduce	profitability;
•		 The	loss of professionals who may leave the profession 
or the area as a result of intimidation or in search of more 
legitimate careers, reducing the attractiveness of the 
region for investment and employment opportunities.
Capital loss and capital flight amongst competitor 
businesses
Legitimate businesses may lose revenues, or leave an industry 
or an area in extreme circumstances if they have incurred 
significant	 or	 sustained	 loss	 from	 the	 unfair competition 
of OCG-controlled companies, or have been threatened 
by standover men. Or businesses that would otherwise have 
invested in the region prefer to invest in less OCG-controlled 
regions.	 As	 an	 extreme	 example,	 the	 American	 University’s	
‘InSightCrime’	 research	 group	 estimated	 that	 extortion	
and threats by OCGs led to the shutdown of 17,500 small 
businesses	 in	 Honduras	 during	 2012	 (Cawley,	 2014).	 Citing	
La	Prensa,	they	estimated	that	“some	25,000	Hondurans	are	
affected either directly or indirectly by the closure of these 
businesses, which include stores, restaurants, transportation 
companies,	 and	 street	 vendors”.	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 this	 is	
typical of regions with high OCG investment, it will result in
•		 Loss	of	services	and	amenities	to	the	community,	including	
retail	outlets,	cafes	and	restaurants;
•		 Loss	 of	 jobs	 in	 the	 region,	 and	 consequent	 emigration	 to	
more	prosperous	regions;
•		 Reductions	 in	 productivity,	 as	 better	 qualified	 staff	 leave	
the businesses, and
•		 A	spiral	of	economic	decline.
Loss of neighbourhood prestige/reputation
Although studies on the impact of criminal investments on 
neighbourhoods are lacking, there is evidence that the levels 
of crime may affect property prices and the reputation of 
neighbourhoods.	Linden	and	Rockoff	 (2006)	combined	data	
from the housing market with data from the North Carolina 
Sex Offender Registry to estimate how individuals value living 
in close proximity to a convicted criminal. Houses within a 
one-tenth mile area around the home of a sex offender fall 
by	 four	 percent	 on	 average	 (about	 USD	 5,500)	 while	 those	
further away show no decline. Linden and Rockoff estimated 
victimization	 costs	 of	 over	 1	 million	 USD	 –	 far	 in	 excess	 of	
estimates taken from the criminal justice literature. In a study of 
several	USA	cities,	Shapiro	and	Hassett	(2012)	found	that	“The	
largest	economic	benefits,	however,	arise	from	the	impact	of	
lower rates of violent crime on the housing values in the cities 
sampled	here”.	On	average,	a	reduction	in	a	given	year	of	one	
homicide	in	a	zip	code	causes	a	1.5	percent	increase	in	housing	
values	in	that	same	zip	code	the	following	year.	To	the	extent	
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that OCG-controlled businesses use violence, or are even 
reputed to use illegal business practices, this may impair the 
reputation of the neighbourhood, reducing property values to 
legitimate property owners.
Reduced municipal services
Shapiro	 and	Hassett	 (2012)	 estimated	 savings	 for	municipal	
budgets from a 25 percent reduction in violent crime ranging 
from 6 million USD per year in Seattle to 12 million USD per year 
in Boston and Milwaukee, to 42 million per year in Philadelphia 
and 59 million for Chicago. Lower out-of-pocket medical costs 
were	also	identified	for	those	who	would	otherwise	have	been	
victims, as well as their averted pain and suffering. Again, to 
the extent that OCG-controlled businesses use violence, or 
are even reputed to use illegal business practices, this may 
impact on municipal budgets and hence on services.
Fear of crime 
As discussed above, there is copious evidence to show that 
fear of crime itself, and the knowledge of criminal activity in 
the neighbourhood, impacts on real estate prices. Fear of 
crime can also have a range of other negative impacts on a 
community. Poor health caused by fears of intimidation in 
OCG controlled businesses/industries may impact on 
workers’	 performance,	 and	 therefore	 on	 company	 profits.	
World	 Bank	 findings	 suggest	 that	 fear	 of	 crime	 “leads	 to	
loss of output because of reduced hours of operation 
(including	 avoiding	 night	 shifts)	 or	 loss	 of	 workdays	 arising	
from outbreaks of violence, and avoidance of some types of 
economic	activity”	(The	World	Bank,	2003).
9.1.3. Interference in Government and 
judicial decision making
The costs of justice in the civil and criminal courts have 
increased, along with costs caused by delays in proceedings, 
due to the ability of OCGs to pay high fees to lawyers and 
accountants to protect their investments. The cost of tax 
scrutiny is increased, and the heightened need for vigilance 
by tax authorities imposes delays and costs on honest tax 
payers. Corrupt payments to politicians, public servants, 
police, court and customs officials result in loss of public 
confidence in government and state officials.
In	an	interview	with	L’Espresso	in	2008	(Di	Feo	and	Fittipaldi,	
2008), the boss of the Casalesi clan, G.V., admitted to 
systematically working for 20 years to bribe local police, 
politicians and officials to facilitate dumping toxic waste in the 
Caserta Plain referred to previously.
A submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the 
Australian	 Crime	Commission	 (Commonwealth	 of	 Australia,	
2009),	 said	 “organised	 criminal	 activity	 in	 South	 Australia	
involves …..a reliance … on professionals, such as lawyers and 
accountants, to create complicated structures to hide the 
proceeds	of	their	crimes”.
Impacts of interference in government and judicial decision 
making include:
•		 Higher costs to all legitimate users of the courts: While 
hard	evidence	is	impossible	to	find,	it	is	inevitable	that	law	
enforcement and civil litigants face higher costs in courts 
as	a	result	of	OCGs’	ability	to	pay	high	fees	for	lawyers.	It	is	
perhaps	significant	that	many	law	firms	–	particularly	in	the	
USA	–	stress	their	competence	in	fighting	charges	relating	
to organised crime. 
•		 Corruption of public officials: This Section has already 
identified	 instances	 in	 which	 OCGs	 have	 employed	 or	
bribed corrupt public officials in order to protect their 
investments.	 World	 Bank	 and	 IMF	 studies	 (World	 Bank	
Group,	2013)	find	that	“corruption	and	bribery	is	a	regressive	
tax. Not only smaller enterprises pay a higher share of 
their revenue in bribes than their larger counterparts, but 
also poorer households bear a disproportionate share of 
the bribery burden, paying a much higher share of their 
incomes than higher income households - often for public 
services	that	were	expected	to	be	provided	for	free”.	
Researchers	 at	 the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund,	 utilizing	
worldwide	 data	 on	 income	 distribution,	 also	 find	 that	
corruption is associated with increased income inequality. 
Gupta,	 Davoodi,	 and	 Alonso-Terme	 (Chapter	 17,	 IMF,	 2002)	
provide	evidence	of	significant	adverse	distributional	effects	
of	 corruption.	 They	 find	 that	 high	 and	 rising	 corruption	 is	
associated with higher income inequality and poverty. A 
worsening of the corruption index of a country by one standard 
deviation increases the Gini coefficient by 11 points, and 
one standard deviation increase in the growth of corruption 
reduces income growth of the poor by 4.7 percentage points 
a year.
Lanza	(2004)	finds	that:	
•		 Institutionalized	 bribery	 also	 introduces	 a	 new	 set	 of	
transaction costs – the costs of negotiating, monitoring and 
enforcing illicit agreements and avoiding detection by those 
not a party to the agreement. And since corruption involves 
the arbitrary use of discretionary power, uncertainty – the 
‘great	bogeyman’	of	business	confidence	–	grows,	and	the	
business	environment	becomes	less	secure;
•		 Political	 corruption	 undercuts	 free	markets	 and	hampers	
efficiency;	firms	with	political	connections	can	be	less	cost-
conscious since they are shielded from competition, and
•		 Corruption	 distorts	 the	 allocation	 of	 resources	 toward	
projects	 that	 can	 generate	 (illicit)	 payoffs.	 Besides	 the	
undesirable efficiency consequences arising from this 
distortion, the effect is likely to aggravate social inequalities, 
because	 the	 poor	 and	 powerless	 suffer,	 by	 definition,	 a	
comparative disadvantage in securing special favours.
UNAFEI	 (2013)	finds	 that	 “Even	minor	acts	of	corruption	are	
damaging, breeding feelings of distrust and unfairness toward 
the	government	among	ordinary	citizen.	As	a	consequence,	it	
may ultimately weaken or collapse the national or local ruling 
government	and	economic	structure	of	a	country”.
9.1.4. Conclusions
This chapter has attempted to describe – in the absence of 
hard data – the impacts of OCGs investments on the European 
legal economy. Impacts are widespread and impose very 
significant costs on society and the legitimate economy. 
Moreover most – if not all – of these impacts could be 
measured. Indeed, most of the impacts described here have 
been measured, at least in some context and at some point in 
time. 
In the same way that the development of population surveys 
of crime victimisation, during the 1980s and later, provided 
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much-needed data on the costs of crime in general, it may 
be possible to develop appropriately targeted data-
gathering techniques to address the impacts of OCGs 
and their investment strategies. Owing to the transnational 
nature of the problem, such techniques themselves would 
inevitably have to involve international collaboration.
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WHAT PROCEEDS 
ARE RECOVERED? 
THE CONFISCATION 
OF CRIMINAL ASSETS 
IN EUROPE
Part 3.                     
After	analysing	in	which	illicit	markets	organised	proceeds	are	produced	(Part 1) and where they are then 
invested	in	the	European	legitimate	economy	(Part 2), this section explores the extent to which they are recov-
ered	by	European	authorities,	with	an	analysis	of	the	current	state	of	confiscation	in	Europe	and	in	particular	in	
the 7 OCP countries. 
The Part has the following structure:
•		 Chapter 10 provides an overview of the regulatory framework on criminal asset recovery in Europe, 
with	a	focus	on	the	seven	OCP	countries	(Sections	10.3	–	10.9);The	related	methodological	issues	are	
discussed in Chapter 2 and in the Methodological Annex.
•		 Chapter 11 provides an assessment of the availability of data	on	confiscated	assets	in	Europe
•		 Finally	Chapter 12, based on the available data, provides a first comparative analysis of confiscated 
assets in the 7 OCP countries in relation to serious and organised crime, focusing, when possible, on their 
trend and their distribution per type, geography and related offence. 
Methodological issues related to this Part are discussed in Chapter 2 and in the Methodological Annex.
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10.1. Introduction 
In Europe awareness is growing of the crucial role that the 
confiscation of criminal proceeds and criminal assets 
can play	in	fighting	organised	crime,	interrupting	its	business	
cycle,	 protecting	 the	 legal	 economy	 against	 infiltration	 and	
returning	 criminal	 profits	 to	 European	 citizens	 (European	
Commission,	2008;	European	Commission,	2012).
In	recent	years,	confiscation	has	been	the	topic	of	a	number 
of new legislative measures and framework decisions,326 
as well as a strategic priority of the EU Internal Security 
Strategy	(ISS).	Since	2014	a	new EU Directive focuses on the 
freezing	 and	 confiscation	 of	 instrumentalities	 and	 proceeds	
of	 crime	 (Directive	 2014/42/EU).	 The	 Directive	 has	 been	
adopted with the aim of making it easier for Member States to 
confiscate	and	recover	the	proceeds	of	serious	and	organised	
crime. At the same time, operational networks, such as the 
EU	Platform	of	National	Asset	Recovery	Offices	(AROs),	have	
been established, with the cooperation of the Europol Criminal 
Assets	Bureau	(ECAB),	in	order	to	strengthen	the	cooperation	
and	 mutual	 recognition	 of	 seizure/confiscation	 among	 EU	
countries	 and	 agencies	 involved	 in	 this	 field	 (European	
Commission, 2008).
But to what extent are criminal assets actually being 
recovered? How much of the criminal proceeds and 
criminal investments estimated and mapped in Part 1 and 
Part 2 have been actually confiscated? 
Answering this question is far from easy. First of all because 
there is a wide range of confiscation regimes across 
European	 member	 states	 (Forsaith	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Although	
Directive	2014/42/EU	will	lead	to	greater	harmonisation,	many	
differences exist among countries in terms of measures that 
can	be	used	by	LEAs	 (e.g.	 in	some	countries	non-conviction 
based confiscation	is	allowed,	while	in	others	it	is	not	foreseen),	
the	extent	 of	 their	 application	 in	practice,	 and	finally	 among	
the	 national	 legal	 definitions	 and	 taxonomies.327 As a result, 
although	 an	 asset	 may	 be	 eligible	 for	 confiscation	 in	 one	
country, it may be impossible to recover in another one. This 
makes it almost impossible to assess and compare the extent 
of	the	recovery	of	criminal	assets	across	EU	MS	(see	Section	
12.1). 
Secondly, even though the new Directive will explicitly require 
the	 collection	 of	 statistics	 on	 seizure	 and	 confiscation	 (see	
art. 11),328 at present only few countries gather, at a central 
level, data on seized and confiscated assets	(see	Chapter	
11). The availability of statistics on this topic in Europe is, with 
some exceptions, very poor. And often, when available, data 
are fragmented, partial, refer to different stages of 
the confiscation process or lack important details and 
metadata	 (such	 as	 the	 related	 offences	 or	 the	 connected	
criminal group) which make it almost impossible to produce a 
solid statistical analysis.
Taking these limitations into account, this section attempts to 
provide an answer to the above question. In particular by: 
•		 presenting	an	overview of the regulatory framework on 
criminal asset recovery in Europe, with a focus on the seven 
OCP	countries	(Chapter	10);	
•		 providing	 an	assessment of the level of availability of 
data	on	confiscated	assets	in	Europe	(Chapter	11);
•		 providing	 an	 analysis of the available data on 
confiscated assets with a focus on the seven OCP 
countries	(Chapter	12).	
335.	Among	 the	 others,	 the	 Framework	Decisions	 2001/500/JHA,	 2003/577/
JHA,	2005/212/JHA,	2006/783/JHA	and	2007/845/JHA.
336.	For	example,	what	in	one	country	is	called	asset	freezing,	in	other	countries	
may	be	called	asset	seizure.	Similarly,	 in	some	countries	 the	term	forfeiture	 is	
preferred	to	confiscation.
337.	 “Member	 States	 shall	 regularly	 collect	 and	 maintain	 comprehensive	
statistics from the relevant authorities. The statistics collected shall be sent to 
the	Commission	each	year	and	shall	include:	(a)	the	number	of	freezing	orders	
executed;	 (b)	 the	 number	 of	 confiscation	 orders	 executed;	 (c)	 the	 estimated	
value	 of	 property	 frozen,	 at	 least	 of	 property	 frozen	 with	 a	 view	 to	 possible	
subsequent	 confiscation	 at	 the	 time	 of	 freezing;	 (d)	 the	 estimated	 value	 of	
property	 recovered	 at	 the	 time	 of	 confiscation.	 2.	 Member	 States	 shall	 also	
send each year the following statistics to the Commission, if they are available 
at	a	central	 level	 in	 the	Member	State	concerned:	 (a)	 the	number	of	 requests	
for	 freezing	 orders	 to	 be	 executed	 in	 another	Member	 State;	 (b)	 the	 number	
of	 requests	 for	 confiscation	orders	 to	be	 executed	 in	 another	Member	State;	
(c)	the	value	or	estimated	value	of	the	property	recovered	following	execution	
in another Member State. 3. Member States shall endeavour to collect data 
referred	to	in	paragraph	2	at	a	central	level”	(Directive	2014/42/EU,	art.	11).
10. The regulatory 
framework: confiscation 
in Europe                                                  
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10.2 A review of the confiscation 
process in Europe
Michele Riccardi and Priscilla Standridge (Università Cattolica 
del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
Any	 analysis	 of	 data	 on	 confiscated	 assets	 at	 national	 level	
would be impossible without prior understanding of how 
the	 confiscation	 process	 works.	 It	 is	 therefore	 necessary	
to examine the regulatory framework on criminal asset 
recovery in Europe in order to: 
First,	highlight	the	differences	in	terms	of	confiscation	regimes	
across member states and which must be taken into 
account for a comparative analysis;	
Second, clarify from which stage of the confiscation 
process the data derive: in fact, as outlined below, in some 
countries	 (e.g.	 Finland	 and	 the	 Netherlands)	 the	 available	
statistics	 refer	 to	 assets	 at	 the	 moment	 of	 seizure	 by	 the	
police,	while	in	other	cases	(e.g.	France	and	Italy)	the	data	refer	
to	definitive	confiscation.
Generally speaking, the asset recovery process moves 
through	various	stages	(see	Figure	47)	which	usually	start	with	
the identification and tracing	of	criminal	assets	(Forsaith	et	
al., 2012). This phase involves law enforcement investigations 
(usually	 with	 the	 supervision	 of	 a	 public	 prosecutor)	 and	
requires	 substantial	 financial	 investigation	 skills	 which	 may	
even involve foreign authorities in cases where the asset is 
located outside the national territory. 
Once	 identified,	 assets	 can	be	 seized,	 usually	by	a	 freezing 
or seizure order	 of	 a	 court.	 Meanwhile	 assets	 “should	 be	
properly	managed	between	the	time	when	they	are	frozen	and	
the	time	when	a	confiscation	order	is	issued,	so	that	their	value	
is	maintained”	(European	Commission,	2012).	
Then, after the issue of a confiscation order, assets can be 
confiscated.	Once	 the	 confiscation	 has	been	 enforced,	 they	
can be returned to the community in various ways, including 
social reuse of the asset or disposal aimed at compensating 
victims	or	funding	future	police	or	judicial	activities	(Forsaith	et	
al.,	2012;	Matrix	Insight,	2009,	p.	61).	
Even though this process is, in principle, similar in most EU 
countries, a wide range of variations on these general rules 
exists. For example, in order to keep up with the evolution of 
laundering	techniques	used	by	criminals	(see	Part	2)	together	
with ordinary confiscation newer	 forms	of	 confiscation	have	
been	introduced	(Forsaith	et	al.,	2012,	p.	1-2),	including:
•		Value confiscation, i.e. the recovery of assets of equivalent 
value	 when	 specific	 criminal	 assets	 cannot	 be	 located	 or	
identified;
•	 	Third party confiscation,	 i.e.	 the	 confiscation	 of	 assets	
transferred	to	third	parties;	
•	 	Mutual recognition of confiscation orders among asset 
recovery agencies of different countries, which helps when 
criminal assets are located outside the national jurisdiction.
At	 the	 same	 time,	 national	 confiscation	 powers	 have	 been	
extended	with	the	introduction	of	legal	developments	(Forsaith	
et al., 2012) such as: 
•	 	Extended confiscation,	 in	 which	 confiscation	 is	 applied	
not	only	to	those	assets	associated	with	the	specific	crime	
related to the criminal conviction, but also additional 
property which the court determines to constitute the 
proceeds	of	other	crimes;
Figure 47 – The asset recovery process in Europe
Management  
The asset is 
entrusted to a 
dedicated agency 
or a court 
appointed 
individual .
Tracing and identification  
Regardless of the nature of the confiscation order, criminal assets can only be 
confiscated once they are traced and identified. 
Preservation (Freezing/Seizure)  
The seized asset is in the custody of the law and it is not in the full control and 
availability of the accused person.  
The typical mechanisms are freezing (for bank accounts and real property) and 
seizure (for other movable assets).  
Redistribution/Disposal
Recovered assets may be returned to victims or deprived communities,
or they may revert to the state for disposal or reuse.
 
Confiscation and enforcement  
The confiscation order makes it legally possible to recover criminal assets. 
 
The confiscation order is enforced against particular assets. 
 
The person subjected to the measure loses all rights to the confiscated asset and the 
asset belongs to the State.
 
Source: Forsaith et al., 2012
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•	 	Non-conviction based confiscation, in which the asset 
is recovered, for example, through civil or administrative 
procedures;	
•	 	Extended criminalisation, which widens the applicability 
of	confiscation	to	a	range	of	non-traditional	crimes.	
However, not all these tools are adopted uniformly across 
European countries. The new directive will bring higher 
harmonisation but wide differences still exist, for example in 
terms of application of third party and extended	confiscation	
(Forsaith	 et	 al.,	 2012,	 p.	 22).	 Also	 non-conviction based 
confiscation	is	widely	used	in	some	countries	(e.g.	Ireland,	UK,	
see Chapter 12) but is not foreseen in others. As a result, each 
country employs a combination of various confiscation 
tools and legislative instruments.
Unfortunately, an updated picture of how the confiscation 
process works in each European country does not exist 
at present. The study commissioned in 2008 by the European 
Commission, DG JLS, from the Matrix Knowledge Group 
(Matrix	Insight,	2009),	and	the	impact	assessment	carried	out	
by the European Commission in preparation of the Directive 
on	 confiscation	 (Forsaith	 et	 al.,	 2012)	 explored	 the	 issue,	
but did not cover the most recent legislative developments 
introduced in certain member states. 
In order to provide a framework for the analysis of data 
on	 confiscated	 assets	 in	 Chapter	 12,	 there	 follows	 a	 brief 
description of how asset recovery works in the seven 
OCP countries.	In	each	country,	the	stage	of	the	confiscation	
process from which the statistics analysed in Chapter 12 
derive	will	be	specified.
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10.3.1. General overview
In the Finnish criminal justice system, forfeiture is based on the 
criminal policy principle that no-one should benefit from a 
crime, and the proceeds of crime shall be ordered forfeit to 
the State. Forfeiture of the proceeds of crime can also prevent 
new crimes. For example, in connection with a narcotics 
offence, ensuring the enforcement of forfeiture using coercive 
measures	and	enforcing	forfeiture	may	prevent	the	financing	
of new crimes.
The above principle is taken into account in a very concrete 
manner from the beginning of the criminal process, i.e. the 
criminal investigation.	Pursuant	to	Chapter	1,	Part	2(1)(2)	of	
the	Finnish	Criminal	Investigation	Act	(805/2011),	the	issues	to	
be	clarified	in	a	criminal	investigation	include	the	possibilities	
for the return of property obtained through the offence and for 
enforcement of forfeiture to be ordered as a consequence of 
the offence, or for compensation to be paid to an injured party. 
In addition, to ensure the enforcement of forfeiture, it should 
also be noted that in the Finnish Criminal Justice System, 
pursuant	to	the	Finnish	Criminal	Procedure	Act	(689/1997),	on	
the request of the injured party, the public prosecutor who has 
brought a charge is to pursue the civil claim of the injured 
party, arising from the offence for which the charge has 
been brought, as against the defendant in the criminal case. 
If compensation of the injured party is ordered in the criminal 
case, forfeiture shall not be ordered in so far as the proceeds 
of crime have been returned to the injured party. 
10.3.2. Description of the confiscation 
process in Finland
Preventative measures
Finland has not implemented preventative or precautionary 
forfeiture independently of the criminal process. However, 
this type of preventative action may be applicable in two 
scenarios. If a person is suspected, accused or found guilty of 
a terrorist offence	as	defined	in	Chapter	34a	of	the	Criminal	
Code	 of	 Finland,	 his	 or	 her	 assets	 may	 be	 frozen	 pursuant	
to	 the	 Finnish	 Act	 on	 the	 Freezing	 of	 Funds	 with	 a	 View	 to	
Combating	 Terrorism	 (325/2013).	 Pursuant	 to	 the	 same	
legislation,	assets	may	be	frozen	based	on	a	request	for	legal	
assistance pertaining to the investigation of a terrorist offence, 
provided that the conditions stipulated by law are met. 
Pursuant to the legislation, the assets of internal terrorists in 
the	European	Union	are	frozen	on	the	basis	of	a	list	published	
by	the	EU.	The	decision	on	the	freezing	of	funds	is	made	by	the	
Finnish National Bureau of Investigation. 
10.3. Finland                                                                                                                                     
Jukka Korkiatupa (National Bureau of Investigation, Finland)
 
 
Conviction based 
measures
(within the criminal proceeding)
FORFEITURE
Criminal Code of Finland, 
Chapter 10, Sections 2, 4, 5, and 8, 
Criminal Code of Finland, 
Chapter 32, Section 12
Finnish Tort Liability Act, Chapter 1, 
Section 1, Chapter 5, Section 1
EXTENDED 
FORFEITURE 
Criminal Code of Finland, 
Chapter 10, Section 3
Sections 2 and 3 Criminal Code of Finland, Chapter 10
Finnish Coercive Measures Act, seizure, restraint order
FORFEITURE/COMPENSATION FOR VICTIM: the natural or juridical person subjected to 
the measure loses all rights to the confiscated asset and the asset belongs to the Finnish State. 
Asset can be used as compensation for the victim.
PREVENTATIVE SEIZURE/ RESTRAINT ORDER:  freezing asset is in the custody of the 
law and it is not in the full control and availability of the suspect or accused person, but 
it is administrated by the pre-trial authorities or the Execution Office.
In Finland, criminal investigations are carried out and led by the police, the customs 
 and the border guard. They can use seizure and seizure for  security to ensure
 forfeiture and the enforcement of compensation to the injured party
Extended measures
(within the criminal proceeding)
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The second scenario applies to cases in which tax authorities 
impose a punitive tax increase on a taxpayer in an 
administrative procedure. Such cases are not subject to a 
criminal process due to the ne bis in idem	principle	(Chapter	
29,	Part	11(2)	of	the	Criminal	Code	of	Finland	(782/2013)).	As	a	
rule, the tax authorities decide whether to report the offence 
to the police or impose a punitive tax increase.
Forfeiture based on criminal sentence
Forfeiture based on a criminal offence is decided by the court 
on	 the	 request	of	 the	prosecutor;	 the	 injured	party	may	also	
request forfeiture when prosecuting charges on his or her own. 
The primary legislative provisions on forfeiture are contained 
in	Chapter	10	of	the	Criminal	Code	of	Finland	(875/2001).
Pursuant to Chapter 10, Part 1 of the Criminal Code of Finland, 
the prerequisite for forfeiture is an act criminalised by 
law. A forfeiture order may also be applied to a person who 
has	not	attained	the	age	of	fifteen	years	or	is	without	criminal	
capacity. A corporation can also be subject to a forfeiture 
order	pursuant	to	corporate	criminal	liability	(Chapter	9	of	the	
Criminal Code of Finland) even if the individual committing the 
offence	cannot	be	identified	or	sentenced	to	a	punishment	for	
some other reason.
Pursuant	 to	 Chapter	 10,	 Part	 2(1),	 the	 proceeds of crime 
shall be ordered forfeit to the State. The forfeiture shall be 
ordered on the offender, a participant or a person on whose 
behalf or to whose advantage the offence has been committed. 
Pursuant	to	Part	2(2),	if	there	is	no	evidence	as	to	the	amount	
of the proceeds of crime, or if such evidence is difficult to 
present, the proceeds shall be estimated, taking into 
account the nature of the offence, the extent of the criminal 
activity and the other circumstances. 
Part	2(3)	states	that	forfeiture	of	the	proceeds	of	crime	shall	
not be ordered in so far as they have been returned to the 
injured party, or in so far as they have been or will be ordered 
to be reimbursed to the injured party by way of compensation 
or restitution. If a claim for compensation or restitution has 
not	been	filed	or	 if	 the	claim	has	not	been	decided	when	the	
request for forfeiture is being decided, the forfeiture shall be 
ordered.
In other words, pursuant to Section 3 above, compensation 
to the injured party ordered in a criminal procedure 
supersedes forfeiture.
Chapter 32, Part 12 of the Criminal Code of Finland contains 
provisions on the forfeiture of property that has been the 
target of money laundering. Property that has been the 
target of money laundering shall be ordered forfeit to the State. 
Pursuant to Section 3 of Part 12, property that is the target of 
money laundering may instead of being ordered forfeit to the 
State be ordered as compensation or restitution to the person 
injured by the predicate offence. If the nature of the property 
is not suitable for this, the property shall be ordered forfeit to 
the State.
Pursuant to Chapter 10, Part 4 of the Criminal Code of Finland, 
an instrument of crime shall be ordered forfeit to the 
State.	 These	 include	 firearms,	 edged	 weapons	 and	 other	
similar lethal instruments, as well as any other objects or 
property the possession of which is punishable. An object or 
property that has been used in the commission of an intentional 
offence, and an object or property that is closely connected to 
an intentional offence for which the proceedings have been 
brought, when it has been obtained or prepared solely or 
mainly for the intentional offence or where its characteristics 
make it especially suitable as an instrument of an intentional 
offence, may also be ordered forfeit to the State. Pursuant to 
Part	4(3),	in	the	assessment	of	the	need	for	forfeiture,	special	
consideration shall be taken of the prevention of further 
offences.
Pursuant to Chapter 10, Part 5 of the Criminal Code of Finland, 
an object or property which has been produced, manufactured 
or brought about by way of an offence, or at which an offence 
has been directed, shall be ordered forfeit to the State if its 
possession is punishable.
Pursuant to Chapter 10, Part 6 of the Criminal Code of Finland, 
an object or other property referred to in Part 4 or 5 may not 
be ordered forfeit if it belongs in full or in part to someone other 
than the offender, a participant or a person on whose behalf 
or with whose consent the offence has been committed. 
However, the object or property may be ordered forfeit from 
a person to whom it has been conveyed after the commission 
of the offence, if, when receiving it, he or she knew or had 
justifiable	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 object	 or	 property	was	
linked to an offence, or if he or she has received it as a gift or 
otherwise free of charge.
Regardless of ownership, an object or property shall be 
ordered forfeit also if the owner would commit an offence by 
having the object or property in his or her possession.
Pursuant to Chapter 10, Part 8 of the Criminal Code of Finland, 
if an object or property referred to in Part 4 or 5 cannot be 
ordered forfeit owing to a restriction referred to in Part 6, 
Section 1, or because the object or property has been hidden or 
is otherwise inaccessible, a full or partial forfeiture of the value 
of the object or property may be ordered on the offender, a 
participant or a person on whose behalf or with whose consent 
the offence has been committed, instead of forfeiture of the 
object or property itself. In addition, forfeiture of value may be 
ordered on a person to whom the object or property has been 
conveyed,	if,	when	receiving	it,	he	or	she	knew	or	had	justifiable	
reason to suspect that the object or property was linked to an 
offence, or if he or she has received it as a gift or otherwise free 
of charge.
Chapter 10, Part 11 of the Criminal Code of Finland contains 
provisions on situations in which the forfeiture liability of 
someone other than the suspect or the defendant is being 
considered. This may apply in cases in which the suspect is 
deceased.
Extended forfeiture of the proceeds of crime
Full or partial forfeiture of property to the State may be 
ordered pursuant to the provisions contained in Chapter 10, 
Part 3 of the Criminal Code of Finland.
This applies in aggravated offences subject to a maximum 
penalty	(a	minimum	of	four	years’	imprisonment)	and	the	type	
of offence. For extended forfeiture to apply, the court must 
have	 found	 the	 offender	 guilty	 of	 at	 least	 one	 such	 offence;	
provided that the nature of the offence is such that it may 
result in considerable financial proceeds and that there 
is reason to believe that the property is fully or partially 
derived from criminal activity that is not to be considered 
insignificant.
The provision applies to a participant in an offence and to 
a person on whose behalf or to whose benefit the said 
offence has been committed.
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Section 2 applies to situations where there is reason to 
believe that the property has been conveyed to a natural 
person or corporation that has a close relationship to the 
offender in order to avoid forfeiture or liability. 
The participants in an offence generally have joint and several 
liability in the case of forfeiture.
Enforcement of forfeiture 
Forfeiture is enforced by the police, except forfeiture in money, 
which is enforced by the bailiff, unless the funds in question 
are	 in	 the	 possession	 of	 the	 police	 (Finnish	 Enforcement	 of	
Fines	Act,	672/2002).
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10.4.1. General overview 
In the past decade, there have been major changes in the 
French criminal justice system regarding the seizure and 
confiscation of criminal assets. The French Penal Code in 
article	131-21	 includes	provisions	for	the	criminal	confiscation	
of	 assets	 both	 connected	 to	 the	 crime	 (instruments	 and	
the direct and indirect objects or products) as well as the 
property of a convicted individual who cannot prove the legal 
origin	of	 the	assets	 (a	 form	of	extended confiscation). The 
amendment in 2010, known as the Warsmann Law (n°	2010-
768 of July 9th	 2010),	 instituted	 special	 seizure	measures	 to	
facilitate	criminal	confiscation.
Law 2010-768 also established the national agency for the 
management	 of	 seized	 and	 confiscated	 assets	 (Agence 
de gestion et de recouvrement des avoirs saisis et 
confisqués - AGRASC)338 and the adoption of measures to 
improve international cooperation in asset recovery, including 
mutual recognition of confiscation orders in accordance 
with	the	Framework	Decision	2006/783/JHA	of	the	European	
Union.
The French judicial system does not foresee civil 
confiscation, but only criminal confiscation.	Confiscation	
in France is a complementary criminal sanction along with 
imprisonment	and/or	a	fine	or	an	alternative	to	incarceration.	
Confiscation cannot be non-conviction based (in rem) 
due	 to	 the	 unjustifiable	 origin	 of	 the	 asset,	 but	 only	 as	 a	
consequence	of	a	guilty	 verdict	with	 regard	 to	 the	owner	 (in 
personam)	 (FATF,	 2011a;	 Ministère	 de	 la	 Justice,	 2013).339 
The	assets	that	can	be	subject	to	seizure	and	confiscation	in	
France fall into four categories:
•		 The instruments, objects and products of a crime: 
in the case of felonies and misdemeanours for which 
the penalty is a year or more of imprisonment. With the 
exception of assets that are subject to restitution to victims 
of the crime, instruments or products of counterfeiting and 
in	cases	explicitly	foreseen	by	law	or	regulations	(Art.	131-21,	
paragraph 1-3 of the Criminal Code).
•		 Assets for which the accused person cannot prove the 
legal origin: in the case of felonies and misdemeanours 
for	which	the	penalty	is	five	years	or	more	of	imprisonment	
and	provided	there	is	a	direct	or	indirect	profit	to	the	author	
(Art.	131-21,	paragraph	5	of	the	Criminal	Code).
•		 All or part of the assets of the convicted person: in 
the	 case	 of	 serious	 crimes	 foreseen	 by	 law	 (see	 below)	
regardless	of	the	origin	of	the	assets	(Art.	131-21,	paragraph	
6 of the Criminal Code). 
•		 Assets regarded as dangerous or harmful by law or 
regulation,	or	the	possession	of	which	is	illegal:	confiscation	
is mandatory regardless of whether or not they are owned 
by	 the	 condemned	person	 (Art.131-21,	 paragraph	 7	 of	 the	
Criminal Code). 
It	 is	also	possible	 to	confiscate	 the	equivalent value of the 
estimated profits of the crime	 (Art.	 131-21,	 paragraph	2	of	
the	 Criminal	 Code)	 or	 of	 an	 asset	 that	 cannot	 be	 seized	 or	
recovered	 (Art.	 131-21,	paragraph	8	of	 the	Criminal	Code).	 In	
the	following	Section,	the	process	of	seizure	and	confiscation	
in France will be presented in a flow chart and described in 
more detail.
10.4.2. Description of the confiscation 
process in France
338. The functions of the AGRASC are described in Section 12.3.
339.	 Previous	 legislation	 allowed	 for	 the	 seizure	 of	 “articles,	 documents	 or	
electronic	data	useful	for	the	discovery	of	the	truth”	(article	56,	paragraph	6	of	
the	Criminal	Procedure	Code)	but	the	seizure	of	assets	was	executed	according	
to	the	rules	of	the	Civil	Procedure	Code	(Art.	706-103	of	the	Criminal	Procedure	
Code).	This	form	of	seizure	followed	the	logic	and	processes	of	civil	procedures	
and	 magistrates	 were	 less	 inclined	 to	 pursue	 these	 measures	 (Bacarese	 &	
Gomes	Pereira,	2010;	Charpenel,	2012).
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Conviction based 
measures
(within the criminal proceeding)
SEIZURE : the seized asset is in the custody of the law and it is not in 
the full control and availability  of the accused person, but it is 
administrated by AGRASC, with the exception of seizure without 
relinquishing possession when it is controlled by a third party under 
the supervision of the court.
 Seizure of personal assets
 (Art. 706-148 and 706-149 of 
 the Criminal Procedure Code)
 Seizure of real estate
 (Art. 706-150 through 706-152 of 
 the Criminal Procedure Code)
 Seizure of intangible assets
 (Art. 706-153 through 706-157 of 
 the Criminal Procedure Code)
 Seizure without relinquishing 
possession 
 (Art. 706-158 of the Criminal 
 Procedure  Code)
Precautionary 
measures
(Art. 706-166 of 
the Criminal 
Procedure 
Code)
Art. 131-21 of the Criminal Code:
Confiscation of the 
instruments, objects 
and products of the 
crime (paragraph 2-3)
General confiscation
(paragraph 6)
Extended confiscation
(paragraph 5)
Mandatory confiscation
(paragraph 7)
 
CONFISCATION: the person subjected to the measure loses all 
rights to the confiscated asset and the asset belongs to the 
French State.
Amendments introduced 
by law n° 2010-768 of July 9th 2010
 
Special Seizures
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Seizure
Law 2010-768 of July 9th 2010 introduced into the French 
criminal	justice	system	the	procedure	for	the	seizure	of	assets	
in	preparation	of	a	criminal	confiscation.	 It	also	created the 
national agency for the management and recovery of 
seized and confiscated assets (AGRASC) which can be 
entrusted with custody of the assets by the public prosecutor 
with	the	authorization	of	the	 judge	of	 freedom	and	detention	
except	 in	 cases	 of	 seizure	 without	 relinquishing	 possession	
(see	12.3).
The	possible	types	of	seizure	include:
•		 Precautionary measures (Art.	 706-166	 of	 the	 Criminal	
Procedure Code): in the case of the investigation of crimes 
punishable by not less than three years imprisonment, 
contained in Title I of Book III of the Criminal Code, the 
judge of freedom and detention, upon request of the public 
prosecutor,	may	order	 the	seizure	of	 the	assets,	movable	
or immovable, jointly or entirely owned by the investigated 
person	 to	 ensure	 payment	 of	 fines	 and,	 if	 applicable,	
compensation for victims. 
•		 Special seizures: based on the type of asset four different 
types	of	seizure	can	be	applied:
- Seizure of personal assets	(Art.	706-148	and	706-149	
of the Criminal Procedure Code): in the case of felonies 
and	 misdemeanours	 for	 which	 the	 penalty	 is	 five	
years or more of imprisonment and provided a direct 
or	 indirect	 profit	 to	 the	 author	 (Art.	 131-21,	 paragraph	
5 of the Criminal Code) and of crimes foreseen by 
law	 regardless	 of	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 assets	 (Art.	 131-21,	
paragraph 6 of the Criminal Code) when the accused 
person cannot prove the legal origin of the assets. 
The judge of freedom and detention, upon request 
of	 the	 public	 prosecutor,	 authorizing	 the	 seizure	 at	
the	Treasury’s	 expense,	may	 order	 the	 seizure	 of	 the	
property. The judge of the investigation may, upon 
motion of the public prosecutor or independently upon 
notice	of	the	prosecution,	order	the	seizure	under	the	
same conditions. 
- Seizure of real estate	(Art.	706-150	through	706-152	
of the Criminal Procedure Code): in the case of crimes 
interrupted in the act or preliminary investigations, 
the judge of freedoms and detention, upon request 
of	 the	 public	 prosecutor,	 may	 authorize	 at	 the	
Treasury’s	expense,	the	seizure	of	real	estate	for	which	
confiscation	is	foreseen	in	Article	131-21	of	the	Criminal	
Code. The judge of the investigation may, when hearing 
new	 information,	 order	 the	 seizure	 under	 the	 same	
conditions. 
- Seizure of intangible assets	 (Art.	 706-153	 through	
706-157 of the Criminal Procedure Code): in the 
case of crimes interrupted in the act or preliminary 
investigations, the judge of freedom and detention, 
upon	 request	of	 the	public	prosecutor,	may	authorize	
at	 the	 Treasury’s	 expense,	 the	 seizure	 of	 intangible	
property	 for	which	confiscation	 is	 foreseen	by	Article	
131-21 of the Penal code. The judge of the investigation 
may,	when	hearing	new	 information,	order	the	seizure	
under the same conditions. 
- Seizure without relinquishing possession	 (Art.	
706-158 of the Criminal Procedure Code): in the 
case of crimes interrupted in the act or preliminary 
investigations, the judge of freedom and detention, 
upon	 request	of	 the	public	prosecutor,	may	authorize	
at	 the	 Treasury’s	 expense,	 the	 seizure	 of	 assets	
for	 which	 confiscation	 is	 foreseen	 by	 Article	 131-21	
of the Penal Code without divesting the owner of 
possession. The judge of the investigation may, when 
hearing	 new	 information,	 order	 the	 seizure	 under	 the	
same conditions. This option is also used to avoid 
incurring maintenance costs that would be prohibitive 
for AGRASC by instead paying an administrator 
designated by the court to maintain, conserve and 
use	the	asset	in	the	ways	specified	in	the	seizure	order	
(AGRASC,	2013).
Confiscation
Article 131-21 of the Criminal Code establishes the cases 
in	 which	 confiscation	 can	 be	 applied	 as	 a	 complementary	
criminal	sanction	along	with	imprisonment	and/or	a	fine	or	an	
alternative to incarceration:
•		 Confiscation of the instruments, objects and products 
of the crime (paragraph	2-3):	 In	 the	case	 in	which	a	 link	
can be proven between assets and the instruments, 
objects and products of felonies and misdemeanours for 
which the penalty is a year or more of imprisonment. With 
the exception of assets that a subject to restitution to 
victims and products of counterfeiting. It is also possible to 
confiscate	the	equivalent	estimated	value.
•		 Extended confiscation	(paragraph	5):	In	the	case	in	which	
a person convicted of felonies or misdemeanours, for 
which	the	penalty	is	five	years	or	more	of	imprisonment	and	
that	provided	a	direct	or	indirect	profit	to	the	author,	cannot	
prove the legal origin of the assets.
•		 General confiscation (paragraph	 6):	 all	 or	 part	 of	 the	
assets of the convicted person in the case regardless of 
the origin of the assets in the case of the following crimes 
foreseen by law:
-	Money	laundering	offences	(Part	12	of	Art.	324-7	of	the	
Criminal	Code);
- Conspiracy to commit an offence punishable by 10 
years	 of	 imprisonment	 (Art.	 450-5	 of	 the	 Criminal	
Code);	
-	 Violations	 of	 the	 legislation	 on	 drugs	 (Art.	 222-37	 to	
222-49	of	the	Criminal	Code);	
-	Counterfeiting	(Art.	442-16	of	the	Criminal	Code);	
-	Terrorism	(Art.	422-6	of	the	Criminal	Code);	
-	Human	trafficking	and	prostitution	(Art.	225-25	of	the	
Criminal	Code);	
-	 Organized	 corruption	 of	 minors	 and	 dissemination	
of	 child	 pornography	 (Art.	 227-22	 and	 227-23	 of	 the	
Criminal	Code);	
-	Crimes	against	humanity	 (Art.	213-1	and	213-3	of	 the	
Criminal Code). 
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- The inability to prove the legal origin of assets of an 
individual in habitual contact with persons convicted 
of	 human	 trafficking,	 extortion,	 organized	 crime	 or	
drug	trafficking	(Art.	450-5	of	the	Criminal	Code)	
•		 Mandatory confiscation (paragraph	7):	assets	regarded	
as dangerous or harmful by law or regulation or the 
possession of which is illegal regardless of whether or not 
they are owned by the condemned person. 
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10.5.1. General overview
During the 1990s, the Irish criminal justice system underwent 
important changes due to both the increase of criminal 
activities related to organised crime and the growing 
perception	of	organised	crime	as	a	threat	to	the	society	(King,	
2014a). Therefore, several legislative measures were adopted 
to	 trace,	 seize	 and	 confiscate	 the	 proceeds	 of	 criminal	
activities. 
In	 1994,	 Ireland	 introduced	 the	 criminal	 confiscation	 of	
proceeds of drug-related crimes and other serious crimes. The 
Criminal Justice Act 1994 (CJA)	 was	 the	 first	 regulatory	
framework containing provisions to combat money laundering 
and	activities	 related	 to	criminal	organisations	 (Office	of	 the	
Director	of	Public	Prosecutions,	2008,	p.	24–25;	McKenna	&	
Egan,	 2009;	 King,	 2014a;	 European	 Commission,	 DG	 Home	
Affairs,	&	Europol,	Forthcoming).	
In 1996 the government introduced a civil measure targeting 
illegal proceeds of crime: the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 
(POCA) (Cassidy,	2009;	King,	2014a).	In	addition,	the	Criminal	
Assets Bureau Act 1996 established the Criminal Assets 
Bureau (CAB), an independent agency in charge of targeting 
and	 confiscating	 the	 assets	 obtained	 from	 the	 commission	
of	 criminal	 activities	 (Vettori,	 2006,	 p.	 72;	McKenna	&	Egan,	
2009;	King,	2014a;	European	Commission,	DG	Home	Affairs,	
&	Europol,	Forthcoming).	
The	 Irish	 legislative	 framework	 identifies	 two different 
systems	 for	 the	 seizure	 and	 confiscation	 of	 criminal	 assets	
(McKenna	&	Egan,	2009;	King,	2014a;	European	Commission,	
DG	Home	Affairs,	&	Europol,	Forthcoming).	On	the	one	hand,	
the	 CJA	 1994,	 as	 amended,	 foresees	 the	 confiscation	 of	
criminal assets after a conviction, as it acts in personam. On 
the other hand, the POCA 1996, as amended, created a non-
conviction based system for	 confiscation	 of	 proceeds	 of	
crime that operates outside the conventional criminal justice 
system and acts in rem	 (McKenna	 &	 Egan,	 2009;	 Mitchell,	
2012;	King,	2012,	2014a).
The two systems have some similarities:
•		 They	both	act	for	direct and indirect proceeds of crime 
(Criminal	Asset	 Bureau,	 2013a;	McKenna	&	Egan,	 2009). 
This means that if it can be proved that some criminal 
assets have been transferred to a third party to conceal 
their	nature,	those	assets	may	be	subject	to	a	confiscation	
order. 
•		 Moreover,	the	seizure	or	restrain	of	access	to	the	criminal	
assets may be applied for ensure that the property will be 
available	for	a	future	confiscation	(McKenna	&	Egan,	2009;	
Criminal Asset Bureau, 2012, 2013a).
•		 In	addition,	the	standard340	of	proof	applied	for	confiscation	
is the civil one. Thus, the burden of proof is reduced in 
respect to the criminal proceeding to the “balance of 
probabilities” standard	(Vettori,	2006	p.	71;	McKenna	&	
Egan, 2009).
•		 Finally,	 both	 the	 CJA	 and	 the	 POCA	 can	 be	 applied	 to	
proceeds of crime committed both by an entity and an 
individual (Vettori,	2006	p.	71;	McKenna	&	Egan,	2009).
There follows a brief description of the double system for the 
seizure	 and	confiscation	of	 criminal	 assets	 according	 to	 the	
Irish legislation. 
10.5.2. Description of the confiscation 
process in Ireland
340.	The	“balance	of	probabilities”	standard	(or	preponderance	of	the	evidence)	
requires the plaintiff to prove that his or her version of events is, on balance, more 
likely or more believable than that of the defendant. This is often explained to 
juries	 in	 court	 as	 "which	 story	would	 you	believe"	 or	 "which	 story	 is	 the	more	
likely".	Thus,	it	has	a	lower	burden	of	proof	than	“beyond	a	reasonable	doubt”.
 Investigation activities, freezing and confiscation measures can 
be carried out by the Irish police or the Criminal Assets Bureau 
(CAB) and proposed by different subjects
 
Criminal 
measure
(within the 
criminal proceeding)
Non-conviction 
based 
measures
(independent from 
the criminal 
proceeding)
(Section 2, POCA)
(Section 3, POCA)
(Section 4, POCA)
(Section 4A, POCA)
(Section 24, CJA)
(Section 38 CJA)
(Section 4, CJA)
(Section 9, CJA)
(Section 39, CJA)
CONFISCATION:  the interested party loses all rights to the 
property, which is transferred to the Minister for Finance and the 
Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform or to others
SEIZURE: the seized asset is in the custody of the law. The person 
cannot dispose or deal with the property. A receiver can be 
appointed by the court to administrate and preserve the property
Non-conviction based measures
The Irish legislation foresees non-conviction based 
measures for seizure and confiscation of criminal assets as 
independent from the criminal proceeding. The Proceeds of 
Crime	Act	1996	(POCA),	as	amended,	includes	the	provisions	
for targeting criminal proceeds of crimes. Actually, the CAB 
targets assets deriving from serious criminal conducts, e.g. 
drug trafficking, fraud, theft, illicit trade and smuggling 
of fuel and the illicit trafficking in tobacco products 
(Criminal	Asset	Bureau,	2012).
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As already mentioned, the order is determined on the civil 
burden of proof and it targets both direct or indirect assets 
that	 have	 been	 identified	 as	 proceeds	 of	 criminal	 activities	
(McKenna	&	Egan,	2009;	Greenberg	et	al.,	2009;	Mitchell,	2012;	
Criminal	Asset	Bureau,	2012,	2013a;	King,	2012).	Moreover	 it	
can be issued against an individual or a legal entity.
According to the provision, the State has to prove that the 
property constitutes the proceeds of a criminal activity 
(King,	 2014a).	 The	 act	 can	 target	 money	 and	 all	 other	
properties	 (movable	or	not),	 inside	or	outside	 the	State,	 that	
have	 a	 value	 not	 less	 than	 13,000	 euro	 (McKenna	 &	 Egan,	
2009;	Greenberg	et	al.,	 2009;	Mitchell,	 2012;	Criminal	Asset	
Bureau, 2012, 2013a).
The non-conviction based system relies on three main types 
of	order:	an	interim	order,	an	interlocutory	order	and,	finally,	a	
disposal order through which the property is transferred to the 
Minister for Finance and the Minister for Public Expenditure 
and Reform or to other persons, according to the Court 
decision	 (for	 a	 review	 see	 Vettori,	 2006;	 McKenna	 &	 Egan,	
2009;	Greenberg	et	al.,	 2009;	Mitchell,	 2012;	Criminal	Asset	
Bureau,	2012,	2013a;	King,	2012).	
In particular, if an interim or an interlocutory order is in force, 
the High Court can appoint a receiver over the asset that it 
is in charge of, take possession of the property, preserve and 
managed	it	(section	7	POCA)	(Vettori,	2006;	McKenna	&	Egan,	
2009;	Criminal	Asset	Bureau,	2012,	2013a;	King,	2012).	
Finally, it may happen that the asset is already subject to 
seizure	 or	 confiscation	 under	 the	 CJA	 (McKenna	 &	 Egan,	
2009;	King,	2012).
Criminal measures
The Irish criminal system foresees the seizure and 
confiscation of criminal assets following a conviction 
for both drug-related crimes and other crimes. The 
confiscation	can	be	executed	only	after	 the	 interested	party	
has	been	sentenced	(Vettori,	2006,	p.	71).
The	Criminal	Justice	Act	1994	(CJA)	 is	applied	 if	 the	person	
tries to conceal or transfer outside the state any property 
that is the proceeds of criminal activities. The measure can 
be determined for properties that can be direct or indirect 
connected	 to	 the	 subject	 (Office	 if	 the	 Director	 of	 Public	
Prosecutions,	2008,	p.	24;	McKenna	&	Egan,	2009).	
As	already	underlined,	the	burden	of	proof	for	the	confiscation	
is “balance of probabilities” (the standard used in civil 
proceeding) and it can be issued against an individual or a 
legal entity. It is important to note that the standard of proof 
required for the conviction of the defendant must still be 
“beyond any reasonable doubt” (Vettori,	2006,	p.	70-71).
In addition, the Irish regulation contains provisions for the 
seizure and freezing of assets in	anticipation	of	confiscation	
(Part	24	and	38	CJA):
•		 Under	 Part 24, the Court can issue a restraint order 
freezing	the	assets	of	the	accused	person	once	the	Office	
of	the	Director	of	Public	Prosecutions	(DPP)	has	started	the	
prosecution. According to this measure, a receiver can be 
appointed	before	the	conviction	(Part	24	CJA)	or	after	the	
confiscation	order	has	been	made	(Part	20	CJA)	in	order	to	
manage	and	eventually	dispose	or	sell	the	assets	(Office	of	
the Director of Public Prosecutions, 2008, p. 24).
•		 Part 38	allows	the	seizure	of	cash	if	there	is	suspicion	that	
the cash represents the proceeds of any criminal conduct. 
The	 cash	 is	 seized	 by	 Garda	 or	 Customs	 (Office	 if	 the	
Director of Public Prosecutions, 2008, p. 24).
Then,	the	confiscation	can	be	applied	by	the	DPP	if	the	person	
is convicted of any offence and if it is proved that the criminal 
activity	has	produced	some	benefits.	Moreover,	 if	necessary,	
the property of the convicted person can be taken into 
possession	and	sold	to	satisfy	the	confiscation	order	(Vettori,	
2006,	 p.	 70;	 Office	 of	 the	 Director	 of	 Public	 Prosecutions,	
2008,	p.	24).	Therefore,	the	confiscation	refers	to	the	amount/
sum of money indicated by the court after a sentence.
The confiscation is foreseen under sections 4, 9 and 39 of 
the CJA	(Office	of	the	Director	of	Public	Prosecutions,	2008,	
p. 24–25):
•		 Part 4	 allows	 for	 criminal	 confiscation	 in	 cases	 of	 drug	
offences. The Court must identify the proceeds of drug 
trafficking	through	a	mandatory	investigation	after	the	final	
sentence	 (Office	 of	 the	 Director	 of	 Public	 Prosecutions,	
2008, p. 24).
•		 Part 9	 allows	 for	 confiscation	 in	 cases	 of	 non-drug	
offences	after	a	final	sentence.	The	amount	of	money	to	be	
confiscated	 is	 the	amount	of	money	 the	court	addressed	
as appropriate, according to the particulars of the offence.
•		 Part 39 allows for forfeiture of cash if there is suspicion that 
it	represents	the	proceeds	of	crime	after	a	final	sentence.	
In this case, the proceedings are conducted under the civil 
burden	of	proof.	The	seizure	and	confiscation	of	cash	can	
be undertaken by a LEA officer belonging to the Garda 
Síochána or the Revenue Customs.
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10.6.1. General overview
Since the Rognoni - La Torre law of 1982,341	the	first	measure	
specifically	 targeting	 the	 proceeds	 of	 mafia-type	 organised	
crime,	 the	 legislation	 on	 the	 freezing	 and	 confiscation	 of	
criminal assets has been developed over time with the inclusion 
of new provisions	(e.g.	extended	confiscation,	confiscation	of	
equivalent value, etc.). In 2011 the new Antimafia Code	(d.lgs.	
n.	 159/2011)	was	adopted:	 it	collects	all	 the	existing	 laws	and	
legal tools used to target organised crime and illegal assets. 
The Italian regulatory framework allows for two main types 
of confiscation: 
•		 criminal or conviction-based confiscation: issued 
within the criminal proceeding and includes both criminal 
and extended	confiscation	(see	below).
•		 preventative confiscation:	 developed	 specifically	 to	
target serious and organised crime offences. It can be 
issued outside the criminal proceeding and not necessarily 
as a result a criminal conviction. This measure shifts the 
focus	 from	 the	 individual	 to	 specifically	 target	 the	 asset	
itself.
All	 the	 types	 of	 seizure	 and	 confiscation	 have	 the	 same	
common prerequisites (Fraschini	&	Putaturo,	2014,	p.	15):
1. Assets which are the proceeds, product or price of a 
crime342 at the disposal of an accused person or a third 
party. 
2. An unjustifiable disproportion between the declared 
income and the real economic activity of the subject.
3. Absence of a clear explanation of the licit origin of 
the assets, which suggests that they have illegal origin. 
Despite these similarities, different characteristics can be 
identified	(Fraschini	&	Putaturo,	2014,	p.	15):
It is important to highlight that the legislation on the 
confiscation	of	criminal	assets	targets	not	just	natural	persons	
but also legal entities	 in	 the	 case	 of	 specific	 crimes	 (art.	 9	
d.lgs.	231/2001).	
10.6.2. Description of the confiscation 
process in Italy343
Preventative measures
Preventative seizure and confiscation of criminal assets 
are foreseen by Italian legislation for	 specific	 serious	 and	
organised crime offences344 independently of the criminal 
proceeding	 (see	 Antimafia Code	 d.lgs.	 n.	 159/2011).	 The	
measures shift from the prosecution of the person accused 
of being member of an OCGs to the prosecution of the asset 
per se. The prerequisite of the application of a preventative 
measure is the potentially socially dangerous conduct of the 
subject, e.g. potential affiliation to a criminal organisation or 
involvement	in	certain	serious	and	organised	crimes	(Art	4	of	
d.lgs.	n.	159/2011).	
In	 anticipation	 of	 confiscation,	 Italian	 legislation	 foresees	
the	seizure	of	criminal	assets.	 In	 this	case	 the	preventative 
seizure	 (sequestro di prevenzione, art. 20 et seq., d.lgs. 
n.	 159/2011)	 is	 issued	 inaudita altera parte	 (i.e.	 without	 the	
presence	of	 the	other	party)	but	 is	void	 if	 it	 is	not	confirmed	
by	a	court	order.	It	is	foreseen	for	specific	offences,	including	
organised crime, if: 
1. there is sufficient evidence that the assets are the 
proceeds of crime, or 
2. there is a disparity	between	the	defendant’s	wealth	and	
income	(art.	1	and	2	d.lgs.	n.	159/2011).
Criminal confiscation: Preventative confiscation:
Applied in connection to a 
definitive	conviction.	
Applied in the case of 
a potentially socially 
dangerous conduct of the 
subject. 
The	seized/confiscated	
assets must have a direct 
link with the criminal 
conduct.
Assets of licit origin 
unrelated to the crime can 
be	object	of	seizure	and	
confiscation.
Applied to a wide range 
of	crimes	(including	but	
not limited to serious and 
organised crimes).
Applied only in relation 
to	specific	serious	and	
organised crime offences 
(e.g.	criminal	association,	
mafia-related	crimes,	drug	
trafficking, trafficking in 
human beings, etc. – see 
below).
341.	 L.	 646/1982	 (Legge	 13	 settembre	 1982,	 n.	 646,	 Disposizioni	 in	 materia	
di	 misure	 di	 prevenzione	 di	 carattere	 patrimoniale	 ed	 integrazioni	 alle	 leggi	
27 dicembre 1956, n. 1423, 10 febbraio 1962, n. 57 e 31 maggio 1965, n. 575. 
Istituzione	di	una	commissione	parlamentare	sul	fenomeno	della	mafia).
342.	With	“proceeds”	the	law	refers	to	the	economic	gain	(direct	or	indirect)	from	
the	 commission	 of	 the	 crime;	 the	 term	 “product”	means	 the	 results	 from	 the	
commission	of	the	crime	(e.g.	assets	or	goods	bought,	obtained	or	created	from	
the	criminal	conduct);	“price”	means	the	amount	of	money	give	or	promised	for	
the	commission	of	the	offence	(Fraschini	&	Putaturo,	2014,	p.	12).
343.	C.p.p.	refers	to	the	Italian	Criminal	Procedure	Code	(Codice	di	procedura	
penale);	c.c.	refers	to	the	Italian	Criminal	Code	(Codice	penale).
344.	Art.	4	d.lgs.	n.	 159/2011:	 individuals	suspected	of	belonging	 to	mafia-type	
organisations;	individuals	indicted	for	crimes	of	slavery,	child	prostitution,	child	
pornography, tourism aimed at child prostitution, trafficking in human beings, 
buying	 and	 selling	 of	 slaves;	 crimes	 against	 the	 intellectual	 and	 industrial	
property,	trade	of	counterfeit	goods;	members	of	criminal	organisations	involved	
in	 drug	 trafficking;	 members	 of	 organized	 crime	 groups	 involved	 in	 tobacco	
smuggling;	 members	 of	 organisations	 involved	 in	 the	 smuggling	 of	 waste;	
individuals	 engaged	 in	 smuggling	 or	 the	 unjustified	 possession	 of	 valuables;	
socially	 dangerous	 individuals	 referred	 to	 in	 Article	 1;	 individuals	 involved	 in	
committing crimes against the State and public security, including kidnapping 
and	terrorism;	former	members	of	fascist	organisations;	those	who	have	violated	
the	 rules	on	 the	use	and	possession	of	weapons;	 instigators	and	financiers	of	
the	 offenses	 listed	 above;	 instigators	 and	 facilitators	 of	 violent	 actions	during	
sporting events.
10.6.  Italy                                                                                                                                     
Cristina Soriani (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
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In particular, the different types of preventative measures are:
•		 Seizure (sequestro,	art.	20	d.lgs.	n.	159/11):	seizure	of	goods	
under the direct or indirect control of the accused person.
•		 Early seizure	 (sequestro anticipato, art. 22, paragraph 
1,	 d.lgs.	 n.	 159/2011):	 seizure	 of	 assets	 in	 tangible	 danger	
of being consumed, misappropriated or transferred for 
which	confiscation	is	foreseen	according	to	art.	24	d.lgs.	n.	
159/2011	(issued	before	setting	the	hearing).
•		 Urgent seizure	 (sequestro urgente, art. 22, paragraph 2, 
d.lgs.	 n.	 159/2011):	 seizure	 of	 assets	 in	 tangible	 danger	 of	
being consumed, misappropriated or transferred for which 
confiscation	can	be	requested	according	to	art.	24	d.lgs.	n.	
159/2011	(in	the	course	of	the	proceeding).
•		 Seizure and confiscation of equivalent value	(sequestro 
e confisca per equivalente,	art.	25,	d.lgs.	n.	159/2011):	when	
the	goods	that	should	be	confiscated	are	hidden,	destroyed	
or inaccessible, or if the assets have been transferred in 
good	faith	to	third	parties	(if	the	suspect	had	the	intent	to	
avoid the measure).
•		 Delayed seizure	(sequestro differito, art. 24, paragraph 3, 
d.lgs.	n.	159/2011):	the	seizure	of	goods	is	applied	following	
the application of other preventative measures.
•		 Judicial administration of goods	 (amministrazione 
giudiziaria dei beni personali,	 art.	 33	 d.lgs.	 n.	 159/2011):	 if	
there is adequate evidence that the free access to the 
assets of the subject will facilitate socially dangerous 
conduct.
•		 Judicial administration of assets related to economic 
activities	 (amministrazione giudiziaria dei beni connessi 
ad attività economiche,	art.	34	d.lgs.	n.	159/2011):	if	there	is	
the suspicion that certain economic activities are subject 
to intimidation or misuse by organised crime described in 
art.	416-bis	c.c.	(either	directly	or	indirectly)	or	can	facilitate	
the criminal activities of individuals subject to investigation.
•		 Preventative confiscation of criminal assets	 (confisca 
di prevenzione,	 art.	 24	d.lgs.	n.	 159/2011):	 is	applied	 in	 the	
course of the implementation of preventative measures. 
The	 confiscation	 of	 assets	 is	 applicable	 to	 assets	 not	
directly owned by the suspect but transferred to third 
parties	(intestazione fittizia	art.	26	d.lgs.	n.	159/2011).
 Investigation activities, seizure and confiscation measures can be carried out 
by different law enforcement agencies (Guardia di Finanza, Carabinieri and Polizia di Stato) and proposed 
by different subjects (e.g. judge, public prosecutor, etc.)
 
Criminal/ Conviction 
based measures
(within the 
criminal proceeding)
Extended measures
(extended beyond 
the criminal proceeding)
Preventative 
measures
(independent from the 
criminal proceeding)
Preventative and 
conviction 
based measures 
can coexist
(art. 24 d.lgs. N. 159/2011) (art. 12-sexies d.l. 306/92)(art. 240 C.C.)
(art. 322-ter C.C.)
(art. 335-bis C.C.)
(art. 416-bis C.C.
(art. 640-quarter C.C.)
(art. 644 C.C.)
(art. 648-quarter C.C.)
(art. 722 C.C.)
(600-septies C.C.)
(art. 301 d.p.r. 1973 n. 43)
(art. 12 d.lgs. N. 286/1998)
(art. 186 d.lgs. 285/1992)
(art. 2641 civil code)
(art. 187-sexies d.lgs. 58/1998)
(art. 44 d.p.r. 380/2001)
(art. 9 d.lgs. 231/2001)
(art. 20 et seq., d.lgs 159/11)
CONFISCATION:  the person subjected to the measure loses all rights to the confiscated asset and the asset belongs to the Italian State
SEIZURE:  adminis-
SEIZURE: the seized asset is in the custody of the law and it is not in the full control and availability of the accused person, but is
administrated by a third person (e.g. a judicial administrator) under the supervision of the court.
(art. 321 et seq. C.C.P.)
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Finally, according to the preventative approach the measures 
listed above are issued even in case of death of the 
defendant	 (within	 5	 years	 of	 the	death)	 (Applicazione delle 
misure di prevenzione patrimoniali. Morte del preposto art. 18 
d.lgs.	n.	159/2011).
Confiscation can be revoked according to the art. 28 et seq., 
d.lgs.	 n.	 159/2011	 (Revocazione della confisca), even after a 
definitive conviction. The revocation is foreseen if:
•		 new	crucial	judicial	evidence	came	to	light	after	the	end	of	
the proceeding, 
•		 it	 is	 proven	 that	 the	 conditions	 of	 applicability	 of	 the	
measure were lacking or
•		 the	 confiscation	 order	 was	 based	 solely	 or	 decisively	 on	
false documents.
Criminal or conviction-based measures
The criminal seizure and confiscation of criminal assets 
is foreseen in connection to a final sentence. In terms of 
seizure/freezing,	within	the	conviction-based	system	it	can	be	
mandatory	or	optional	(sequestro preventivo, art. 321 et seq. 
c.c.p.):
•		 optional seizure	(sequestro facoltativo, art. 321, paragraph 
2	 c.c.p.):	 to	 ensure	 an	 expected	 confiscation	 (according	
to the art. 240 c.c.) in order to disrupt the connection 
between the accused person and the asset even before the 
conviction, or
•		 mandatory	 (sequestro obbligatorio, art. 321, paragraph 1 
c.c.p.): in the case of goods related to the criminal offence 
in order to avoid the facilitation of the commission of other 
offences.
General confiscation, according to art. 322-ter c.c., similarly, 
can	 be	 optional	 (art.	 240,	 paragraph	 1	 c.c.)	 following	 a	
conviction	or	mandatory	(art.	240,	paragraph	2	c.c.). It can be 
applied	even	when	the	goods	that	should	be	confiscated	are	
hidden,	destroyed	or	 inaccessible	after	 the	final	sentence	or	
a	plea	bargain	for	specific	crimes	(art.	321	c.c.	and	art.	322-bis	
paragraph 2 c.c.). 
Conviction-based	 confiscation	 can	 be	 applied	 in	 relation	 to	
the crimes listed below:
•		 Crimes committed by public officials against the 
public administration (art.	335-bis	c.c.:	 the	confiscation	
of	goods	and	proceeds	of	crime	after	a	final	sentence	for	
offences foreseen in art. 314-320 c.c.).
•		 Mafia-type criminal association	 (416-bis	 c.c.):	
confiscation	 of	 the	 means	 used	 for	 commission	 of	 the	
crime and the price, products, proceeds of crime owned 
by	members	of	organised	crime	groups	(in	this	case,	there	
must	be	evidence	of	a	causal	link	between	the	confiscated	
good and the offence).
•		 Fraud (art.	640-quarter	c.c.);
•		 Usury	(art.	644	c.c.);	
•		 Money laundering	(art.	648-quarter);
•		 Illegal gambling	(art.	722	c.c.);
•		 Human trafficking and sexual exploitation of children 
and women (art.	 600,	 600-bis,	 600-ter,	 600-quarter,	
600-quinquies, 600-septies, 601, 602 c.c.)
•		 Contraband (art.	301	D.P.R.	23/01/1973	n.	43);	
•		 Human smuggling	(art.	12	d.lgs.	n.	286/1998);
Alcohol-related conduct	(art.	186	d.lgs.	285/1992);
•		 Economic crimes	(art.	2641	civil	code,	art.	187-sexies	d.lgs.	
58/1998);	
•		 Unauthorized construction	(art.	44	D.P.R.	380/2001);
•		 Criminal liability of legal entities	(art.	9	d.lgs.	231/2001).
Extended measures
Article	 12-sexies	 of	 the	 d.l.	 n.	 306/1992	 (confisca allargata) 
contains provisions for confiscation of the assets of 
criminal organisations even when not connected to a 
crime	for	specific	offences	typically	related	to	the	activity	of	
criminal groups.345
Extended	 confiscation	 is	 applied	 to	 specific	 crimes	 listed	 in	
the law and does not take into account the social danger of the 
subject. It can be issued if:
•		 there	 is	 an	 unjustifiable disproportion between the 
declared income and the real economic activities of the 
subject, regardless of whether or not the property can 
be associated with the offence object of the criminal 
proceeding and 
•		 the	 defendant is not able to prove the licit origin of 
these assets even beyond the direct proceeds of the crime 
foreseen	by	the	final	conviction.
In	anticipation	of	confiscation,	art.	321	et	seq.	c.c.p.	 foresees	
the	 seizure	 of	 criminal	 assets.	 It	 is	 issued	 before	 a	 final	
confiscation,	 which	 occurs	 after	 a	 final	 sentence	 or	 a	 plea	
bargain.
Furthermore,	 confiscation	of	 equivalent	 value	 is	 foreseen	by	
the	art.	12-sexies,	paragraph	2-ter	d.l.	n.	306/1992.
345.	 E.g.	 criminal	 association	 (art.	 416,	 paragraph	 6	 c.c.);	 human	 trafficking	
(art.	 600-601-602	 c.c.);	 mafia-type	 association	 (art.	 416-bis	 c.c.);	 kidnapping	
for	the	purpose	of	extortion	(art.	630	c.c.);	Usury	(art.	644	c.c.);	resale	of	stolen	
valuables	(art.	648,	paragraph	1	c.c.);	money	laundering	(art.	648-bis	c.c.);	crimes	
related	to	drug	trafficking	and	terrorism;	crimes	involving	public	administration	
art. 314 et seq. c.c.
238 | Part 3
10.7.1. Description of the confiscation 
process in the Netherlands
Criminal seizure and sequestration
After suspicion is established, there are two types	of	seizure	
possible in the Netherlands: criminal seizure and pre-
judicial seizure.	 Criminal	 seizure	 (art.	 94	 Dutch	 Criminal	
Procedure Code) is when objects are taken to be used in the 
investigation or in court. A typical example might be a shirt with 
a bloodstain on it. Another example may be an administration 
and/or	 bank	 statements	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 estimate	 the	
illegally	obtained	benefit.	Pre-judicial	seizure	 (art.	94a	Dutch	
Criminal Procedure Code) is when objects are taken before 
the judgment takes place to secure the goods that might later 
be	eligible	for	confiscation.	Typical	examples	can	be	jewellery,	
cars or real estate.346 
Confiscation
To ensure that crime does not pay, the Dutch Criminal Code 
contains an article on the confiscation of possessions of 
Dutch	defendants	(art.	36e	Dutch	Criminal	Code,	also	known	
346.	 Seizure	 is	 also	 possible	 by	 the	 Dutch	 Tax	 Office	 (via	 administrative	 or	
criminal proceedings), but this is considered to be outside the scope of this 
project.
10.7. Netherlands                                                                                                                                  
Joras Ferwerda and Brigitte Unger (Utrecht University, the Netherlands)
 
 
Criminal seizure
objects are taken to be used 
in the investigation or in court 
(Art. 94 Dutch Criminal Procedure Code)
Confiscation procedure
goal of the confiscation process is 
to cause the financial position 
of the defendant to be equal to that before or 
without the criminal acts; therefore an estimation 
of the illegally obtained benefit is made.
(Art. 36e Dutch Criminal Code)
Withdrawal
objects are destroyed because they are 
illegal to possess (like guns and drugs)
(Art. 36b Dutch Criminal Code)
Settlement
Agreement between defendant 
and prosecutor, without involvement of a judge
(Art. 511c Dutch Criminal Procedure Code)
Forfeiture
objects are generally put up for 
auction by the state
(Art. 33a Dutch Criminal Code)
Note that this overview focuses on the Dutch Criminal Code and the Dutch Criminal Procedure Code.
 In the Netherlands there are more possibilities to deprive criminal gains: through fiscal legislation, 
administrative law and civil law.
COLLECTION PROCESS: collection of the sum determined by a judge 
CONFISCATION: in a separate judgment the judge imposes the obligation to pay the illegally obtained benefit to the state.
SEIZURE: the accused person loses all rights to the seized assets. Can be performed as soon as suspicion is established.
Collection procedure
Undertaken by the Dutch Central Judicial Collection Agency
If the defendant does not accept the payment, seizure is possible.
If the defendant does not fulfil the payment, while there are substantive indications he/she could do so, he/she can 
 be sentenced to imprisonment for a maximum of 3 years (Art. 577c Dutch Criminal Procedure Code). 
This is a coercive measure that does not replace the obligation to pay.
Pre-judicial seizure
objects are taken to ensure that there 
are goods to be confiscated
(Art. 94a Dutch Criminal Procedure Code)
(illegal obtained benefit) or that is agreed upon by settlement
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as	the	‘Pluk ze-wet’, which can be literally translated as Pluck-
them law). A judge may impose, in a separate judgement, the 
obligation to pay illegally obtained benefit	(wederrechtelijk 
verkregen voordeel) to the state	(Art.	36e	paragraph	1	Dutch	
Criminal Code). This can be applied against both natural and 
legal	persons.	The	goal	of	the	confiscation	process	is	to	cause	
the	 financial	 position	 of	 the	 defendant	 to	 be	 equal	 to	 that	
before	the	criminal	act(s)	(BOOM,	2013a).	
To determine the amount of the payment for the defendant, 
his/her	 illegally obtained benefit has to be estimated. 
A judge decides the amount of this payment on the basis of 
financial	 investigations.	When	 it	 is	plausible	 that	a	defendant	
has	obtained	some	benefit	with	one	or	several	criminal	acts,	
a	judge	may	make	some	assumptions	to	estimate	this	benefit.	
A judge may impose that all expenses that the defendant 
has	 made	 and	 all	 possessions	 (both	 physical	 and	 financial)	
obtained by the defendant in the six years before the criminal 
act,	may	fall	under	the	scope	of	illegally	obtained	benefit.	This	
is the case only if there are no indications that these expenses 
and	possessions	have	been	paid	by	legal	income;	there is no 
need to prove the illegal nature	 (Art.	36e	section	3	Dutch	
Criminal Code).347 The value of the possessions is estimated 
according to current market value and may incur cost savings. 
Although	this	is	rarely	put	into	practice	(after	2003),	the	judge	
may set the amount of the payment lower than the estimated 
benefit,	 for	 example	 when	 the	 financial	 capacity	 of	 the	
defendant	is	not	sufficient	(Art.	36e	section	5	Dutch	Criminal	
Code). Compensations to injured parties are subtracted from 
this	 estimated	 benefit	 (Art.	 36e	 section	 8	 Dutch	 Criminal	
Code).
Investigations may start at any given time when indications 
arise	 that	 the	 defendant	 received	 substantial	 benefit	 from	
his criminal acts. These financial investigations are 
conducted	 by	 financial	 detectives	 from	 the	 investigation	
service	 concerned	 (Functioneel Parket, a division of the 
Dutch	 Public	 Prosecutors’	 Office).	 The	 investigations	 are	
mostly led by the public prosecutor of the case, but may be 
led	by	a	special	confiscation	prosecutor	 in	 the	case	of	 large	
benefits	 (>100,000	 euro)	 in	 cooperation	 with	 the	 public	
prosecutor	 of	 that	 case	 (BOOM,	 2013b).	 The	 confiscation	
investigations are separate from the criminal case, because 
of	 possible	 complexities	 of	 the	 financial	 investigations	 and	
the possibility of international affairs. The sentence of the 
criminal	 case	 is	 therefore	 separate	 from	 the	 confiscation	
sentence.	 For	 thorough	 financial	 investigations	 (including	
preliminary	conservatory	confiscations)	a	judge	needs	to	give	
permission	for	a	criminal	financial	investigation	(SFO)	(BOOM,	
2013c). These investigations eventually lead to a report which 
estimates	 the	 illegally	 obtained	 benefit	 of	 the	 defendant	
(BOOM,	2013d).	
If	 the	 confiscation	 prosecutor	 has	 sufficient	 evidence,	 the	
prosecutor can start a confiscation case.	 The	confiscation	
case can also be completed by a settlement between the 
defendant	 and	 the	 prosecutor	 (Art.	 511c	 Dutch	 Criminal	
Procedure Code). Either way, collection of the sum will be 
undertaken	 by	 the	 CJIB	 (Dutch	 Central	 Judicial	 Collection	
Agency)	 (BOOM,	 2013e).	 The	 CJIB	 and	 the	 defendant	 can	
reach a payment agreement, but if the defendant does 
not accept this agreement, the CJIB may seize properties 
and claims of the defendant. If it is difficult and not directly 
347.	However,	the	judge	must	be	convinced	with	indications	if	the	benefit	comes 
from crimes for which the defendant is not convicted.
possible	 to	 seize	 properties	 to	 satisfy	 the	 payment	 set	 by	
the	 judge,	 the	 CJIB	 cooperates	 with	 BOOM	 (Dutch	 Asset	
Recovery	Office)	to	seize	properties	which	are	hard	to	trace.	
If	 a	 defendant	 does	 not	 fulfil	 the	 payment	 but	 there	 are	
substantive	indications	that	he/she	is	able	to	do	so,	he/she	can	
be sentenced to imprisonment for a maximum of three years, 
under	article	577c	of	Dutch	Criminal	Procedure	Code	(BOOM,	
2013f). According to the law, the defendant must make it 
plausible	 that	 he/she	 is	 not	 able	 to	 fulfil	 the	payment,	 but	 in	
practice	 the	Public	Prosecutors’	Office	often	already	tries	 to	
show	that	he/she	is	able	to	pay.	
Withdrawal and Forfeiture
A	 public	 prosecutor	 (with	 written	 permission	 from	 the	
magistrate, Art. 103 Dutch Criminal Procedure Code) can 
forfeit	 property	 from	 a	 defendant	 (Art.	 33a	 Dutch	 Criminal	
Code). A judge can decide to withdraw property from a 
defendant	 (Art.	 36b-d	 Dutch	 Criminal	 Code).	 Generally,	
withdrawal is used for all types of property that are illegal to 
possess	 (or	 are	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 public	 interest,	 Art.	 36c,	
Dutch Criminal Code), like guns and drugs, and which are 
therefore destroyed afterwards. No conviction is needed 
to withdraw goods. Forfeiture is used for all property that 
cannot be withdrawn. These goods will in general be put up for 
auction by the state. It should be noted that, for instance, in a 
money-laundering	case,	 the	 illegally	obtained	benefit	can	be	
withdrawn	or	forfeited	without	a	confiscation	measure.
Note that this overview focuses on the Dutch Criminal 
Code and the Dutch Criminal Procedure Code, but in the 
Netherlands there are other possibilities to deprive criminal 
gains:	through	fiscal	legislation,	administrative	law	and	civil	law	
(Staatscourant,	2013).
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10.8.1. General overview
The Spanish legal system has undergone major changes 
in relation to the aspects of confiscated assets. Prior to 
2010, it was not possible to apply the civil recovery of assets 
to criminals. Also, there was no specialised asset recovery law 
designed to tackle proceeds of criminals better. The organic 
law	5/2010,	of	22nd	June	transposes	the	European	Union	(EU)	
Council	Framework	Decision	2005/212/JHA,	of	24th February 
on	Confiscation	of	Crime-Related	Proceeds,	Instrumentalities	
and	Property	(Cereijo,	2010).
The	 current	 regulation	 of	 confiscation	 is	mainly	 covered	 by	
Article 127 of the Spanish Criminal Code. This particular 
article	allows	judges	and	courts	to	order	the	confiscation	of	the	
proceeds of a crime, including goods, means and tools used 
to	commit	it.	The	early	realization	of	seized	assets	is,	in	some	
cases, regulated by the Articles 367 bis et seq. of the Spanish 
Criminal	 Procedure	 Code	 (Zaragoza,	 2006).	 The	 Spanish	
criminal code and the code of criminal procedure are under 
deep	review	in	order	to	adapt	the	procedures	on	confiscation	
and	property	management	 to	fit	 today’s	necessities348	 (G20,	
2014).
Also worth mentioning are the difficulties that the Spanish 
legal system has encountered. First, the absence of a 
centralised banking registry is a major impediment to the 
efficient	 localization	 of	 bank	 accounts	 related	 to	 organised	
crime. Secondly, the procedure for obtaining real estate data 
seems to be slow and very complex, owing to the difficulties 
in locating assets. Finally, the organisational structure of the 
Spanish	 justice	 system	 constricts	 the	 judiciary’s	 ability	 to	
handle the current high volume of organised crime cases 
because of the complex structure of the system and the 
different	appeals	process	(Matrix	Insight,	2009).
10.8.2. Description of the confiscation 
process in Spain
Preventative measures
Preventative measures need to be proposed by the public 
prosecutor or the judge as a temporary measure. Preventative 
seizure	 (medidas precautelares, arts. 589 LECRIM) is 
designed to ensure the effective enforcement of the judgment. 
It	is	levied	on	the	accused´s	assets	and	is	intended	primarily	
to	ensure	the	financial	responsibility	that	may	be	designated	
in civil or criminal proceedings. This measure can be enforced 
regardless of the trial verdict if an individual defendant is 
considered socially dangerous or the criminal trial involves 
certain	specific	offences.	These	offences	may	vary	depending	
on	 the	 case	 and	 the	 type	 of	 preventative	 seizure	 (Montero	
2012).	There	are	only	two	types	of	preventative	seizure:
•		 Seizure	 (secuestro u ocupación de bienes o cosas, arts. 
619 and 620 LECRIM): this seeks to ensure the restitution 
of the assets and to cover any possible civil responsibility.
•		 Subsidiary seizure	 (embargo subsidiario, arts. 597 to 
614 LECRIM and art. 614 LEC): this is only applied if the 
deposit	is	not	paid	by	the	accused.	The	seizure	should	be	
equivalent in value to the deposit.
Conviction based measures
The Official English translated version of the Spanish Criminal 
Code uses the term seizure	 (instead	 of	 confiscation) 
348. Today, in the mentioned review, articles 127 et seq of the Criminal Code are 
subject to close analysis, since the government is seeking to regulate the sale 
of	 illegal	 effects	 in	 advance	and	 the	management	and	 recovery	of	 the	 seized	
assets.
349.	 The	 term	 ‘seizure’	 refers	 to	 a	 preventive	 measure,	 whereas	 the	 term	
‘confiscation’	 is	defined	as	 the	power	of	a	court	 to	 take	 from	an	offender	any	
benefit	derived	from	a	committed	crime.
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Seizure
(Arts. 619 and 620 
LECRIM)
Subsidiary seizure
(Arts. 597 to 614 LECRIM 
and art. 614 LEC)
Confiscation
(Art. 127.1 C.P Conviction 
based measure and related 
with Organised Crime)
Non-conviction based confiscation
(127.4 C.P. in relation to article 367 quárter LECRIM.)
Extended confiscation
(Art. 127. 3 y 4 C.P further 
extended measures)
CONVICTION-BASED MEASURES (decomiso) 
(Art. 127 C.C.) 3 
 (Within the criminal proceeding) 
CONFISCATION: the sentenced person loses all rights 
to the confiscated assets and the assets belong to 
the Spanish State
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES (Embargo preventivo) 
(Art. 597 LECRIM) 1 
(Within the criminal proceeding) The accused person loses all 
rights to the seized assets, which are administrated by a third
person (e.g. a judicial administrator or civil person). 
Requirements: art. 357 quárter 
 
 
 
 
2
1.  LECRIM denotes the Criminal Procedure Code (Ley del Procesamiento Criminal).
2. LEC denotes the Civil Procedure Code (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil).
3. C.C. denotes the English translated version of the Spanish Criminal Code 
     (Código Penal).
 
The management and disposal of confiscated assets 
related to the illicit traffic of drugs, and other crimes 
associated with it, is carried out by Plan Nacional Sobre 
Drogas (PNSD). Currently, this is the only source of data 
regarding confiscated assets in Spain.
The judge carries out the management and disposal of 
the confiscated assets related to other crimes (not 
related to drug trafficking). 
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regarding the confiscation procedure.349 Conviction-based 
measures are applied during the criminal proceeding. The 
judge, the public prosecutor or the civil party proposes them 
after	having	verified	criminal	 liability	of	 the	 suspect	 (Cereijo,	
2010).	According	to	art.	127.1	C.C.	the	confiscation	is	foreseen	
for all types listed below:
•		 Confiscation	of	goods related to the criminal offence. It 
is foreseen for assets obtained therefrom and of the goods, 
means or instruments with which they were prepared or 
executed, as well as the gains obtained from the felony or 
misdemeanour, whatever the transformations these may 
have undergone. Except when the goods belong to third 
person in good faith, who is not responsible for the felony, 
and has acquired them legally. 
•		 Criminal or terrorist organisation or group. It is applied 
for	the	confiscation	of	the	means	used	for	the	commission	
of the crime and the price, products, proceeds of crime 
owned	by	members	of	organised	crime	groups	(there	must	
be	 evidence	 of	 a	 causal	 link	 between	 the	 confiscation	 of	
goods	and	the	offence).	For	the	legal	definition	of	criminal	
organisation and groups see Section 4.6.1 and art. 570 bis 
C.C.	(General	Attorney,	2011)
Following article 127.2 C.C, when the sentence of imprisonment 
exceeds one year for committing an imprudent felony, the 
instruments and the gains related with this offences should be 
confiscated.	
The	 confiscation	 of	 other	 assets	 for	 an	 equivalent value 
is	 applied	 when	 the	 goods	 that	 should	 be	 confiscated	 are	
hidden,	 destroyed	 or	 inaccessible	 after	 the	 final	 sentence	
or	 the	 sentence	 in	 a	 plea	 bargain	 for	 specific	 crimes.	 If	 the	
confiscation	 is	 not	 possible,	 the	 confiscation	 of	 equivalent	
value	is	foreseen	(art.	127.3	C.C.).	All	these	types	of	confiscation	
may be used, provided that the unlawful status of the assets 
is proven, even when there is no punishment for the person 
involved. 
Extended Confiscation
Extended confiscation can occur according to art. 127.3 and 
127.4	 C.C.	 Extended	 confiscation	 (ampliación del decomiso 
penal	art.	127.3	and	127.	4	C.C.	modified	by	LO	5/2010)	is	applied	
if	there	is	an	unjustifiable	disproportion	between	the	declared	
income and the real economic activities of the subject, 
regardless of whether or not the property can be associated 
with	a	particular	offence	(unless	the	defendant	is	able	to	prove	
it is of licit origin). This means that the property of each and 
every one of the persons found guilty of felonies committed 
within the criminal or terrorist organisation or group or of an 
offence of terrorism that is disproportionate in relation to the 
revenue lawfully obtained by each one of those persons shall 
be deemed to have been obtained by the criminal activity 
(González,	2006).
Article	 5	 of	 the	 European	 Directive	 42/2014	 defines	 what	
kinds	of	offences	shall	include	the	notion	of	‘criminal	offence’.	
350. Note that the Spanish regulation was established in 2010 and the European 
Directive in 2014. Probably the next review of the Spanish Criminal Code will 
take these notions into consideration.
351. As already mentioned in the previous note, the Spanish Criminal Code is 
subject	to	review;	a	new	article	will	regulate	some	more	cases	like	death,	illness,	
risk	of	prescription,	etc.	(G20,	2014).
Spain’s	 regulation	 of	 extended	 confiscation	 in	 articles	 127.3	
and 127.4 C.C includes only the notion of offences relating to 
participation in a criminal organisation. Consequently, the 
Spanish regulation350 does not take the following notions into 
account:	active	and	passive	corruption	 in	 the	private	sector;	
causing or recruiting a child to participate in pornographic 
performances;	 illegal	 system	 interference	 and	 illegal	 data	
interference, or a criminal offence that is punishable by a 
custodial sentence of a maximum of at least four years. 
Non-Conviction Based Confiscation 
Currently, article 127.4 C.P in relation with article 367 quárter 
of LECRIM regulates cases of non-conviction based asset 
confiscation if:351 
•		 the	owner	expresses	abandonment	of	the	assets	
•		 conservation	and	deposit	costs	are	greater	than	the	value	
of the object itself
•		 conservation	may	be	dangerous	to	public	health	or	safety
•		 there	is	a	substantial	reduction	of	its	value
•		 may	seriously	affect	 the	normal	use	and	operation	of	 the	
assets. 
Collected and analyzed confiscation data 
The National Plan on Drugs (PNSD) is a governmental 
initiative	 to	 establish	 a	 Fund	 of	 confiscated	 assets.	 This	
Fund manages the group of assets coming from Illegal drug 
trafficking	 and	 related	 proceedings	 (see	 Section	 12.7).	 The	
PNSD	works	 as	 follows:	 first	 the	 court	 notifies	 the	 definitive	
sentence	in	no	more	than	three	days,	and	then,	if	cash/money	
is	 confiscated,	 the	 court	 deposits	 it	 directly	 in	 the	 PNSD	
account. The court and the PNSD work together in order to 
identify	and	recover	the	confiscated	goods.	Once	the	assets	
are	 located,	 identified	and	valuated,	 the	PNSD	decides	 their	
disposal.
242 | Part 3
10.9.1. General overview
In	the	UK,	confiscation	of	criminal	assets	is	currently	regulated	
by the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002	 (Proceeds	
of	 Crime	 Act,	 2002).	 Lister	 and	 Bullock	 (2014)	 trace	 the	
development	 of	 UK	 confiscation	 legislation	 that	 started	 in	
1986 in England and Wales with the Drug Trafficking Offences 
Act. A similar regime was introduced in Scotland by the 
Criminal	Justice	(Scotland)	Act	1987.	 In	Northern	Ireland,	the	
Criminal	Justice	(Confiscation)	(Northern	Ireland)	Order	1990	
introduced	 powers	 to	 confiscate	 both	 the	 proceeds	 of	 drug	
trafficking	and	other	crimes	(UK	Government,	n.d.).	Nine	more	
acts were introduced between 1988 and 1998, progressively 
extending and consolidating legislative provisions in this area. 
Despite this legislative activity, note Lister and Bullock, 
concerns	about	law	and	practice	remained	(Lister	&	Bullock,	
2014). Loopholes in the law, the lack of expertise and lack of 
prioritisation of this area appeared to reduce the effectiveness 
of	 the	 law.	 The	 POCA	 2002	 “consolidated,	 updated	 and	
reformed previous UK legislation relating to money laundering 
and	 criminal	 property”	 (NCA,	 n.d.b).	 This	 considerably	
improved the capacity of law enforcement agencies to 
recover the proceeds of crime	(Crown	Prosecution	Service,	
2014). However, some loopholes remaining in the law allowed 
criminals to retain their criminal proceeds.352
Agencies involved
Criminal investigation and preparing the case: Financial 
investigators	 and	 accredited	 ‘confiscators’	 from	 a	 range	 of	
organisations	including:	police	forces,	HM	Revenue	&	Customs,	
the	 Department	 for	 Work	 &	 Pensions,	 Crown	 Prosecution	
Service, National Crime Agency and other organisations such 
as Trading Standards.
Prosecution, confiscation hearing and the judgment: 
Crown Prosecution Service, Serious Fraud Office, HM Courts 
&	Tribunals	Service,	Judiciary.
Enforcing a confiscation order:	 HM	 Courts	 &	 Tribunals	
Service, Crown Prosecution Service, Serious Fraud Office, 
National Offender Management Service and Magistrates.
Other key stakeholders include: the Home Office, which 
is responsible for the policy and legislation surrounding 
confiscation	orders,	the	National	Crime	Agency	(its	Proceeds	
of Crime Centre is responsible for training, accrediting and 
monitoring	 the	 performance	 of	 financial	 investigators	 in	
England, Wales and Northern Ireland), the Association of Chief 
Police	Officers,	and	the	Cabinet	Office	(Controller	and	Auditor	
General, 2013, p. 11).
This next section provides a description of the process of 
confiscation	 of	 criminal	 assets	 in	 the	 UK.	 The	 figure	 below	
describes	the	four	types	of	asset	recovery:	(a)	recovery	of	cash	
in	summary	proceedings;	(b)	confiscation;	(c)	civil	recovery	in	
court;	 (d)	taxation,	and	 it	 is	 followed	by	a	brief	description	of	
each process.
10.9.2. Description of the confiscation 
process in the United Kingdom
Recovery of cash in summary proceedings
Chapter 3 of Part 5 of POCA 2002 has widened the ability of 
the	courts	and	police	or	customs	offices	to	seize	cash	during	
searches. Under the previous law there was no power to forfeit 
cash unless a person was prosecuted. POCA introduced 
power	 to	 search	 premises	 and	 persons	 (POCA	 2002	 s289)	
and	power	to	seize	and	detain	cash	(POCA	2002	s294-296).	A	
magistrates court may forfeit the cash detained or any part of 
it	if	it	is	satisfied	that	it	is	recoverable	property	or	intended	by	
any	person	for	use	in	unlawful	conduct	(POCA	2002,	s	298(1)–
(2)).	A	person	who	claims	 that	detained	or	 forfeited	cash,	or	
any part of it, belongs to him may apply to a magistrates› court 
for	the	cash	to	be	released	to	him	(POCA	2002,	s	301(1)).353 
Confiscation
•		 Confiscation order Confiscation	orders	are	made	by	the	
Crown Court and impose on a defendant the obligation to 
pay	a	sum	of	money	 that	 reflects	 the	benefit	he	 received	
from his criminal conduct.354
•		 Confiscation investigation a	confiscation	investigation	is	
an	investigation	into	whether	a	person	has	benefited	from	
his criminal conduct, or the extent or whereabouts of his 
benefit	(POCA	2002,	s	341(1)).
•		 Production order A production order requires the person 
specified,	 as	 appearing	 to	 be	 in	 possession	 or	 control	 of	
material, to produce it to an appropriate officer for him to 
take away, or give the appropriate officer access to the 
352. For example, if an offender has absconded, law enforcement agencies 
cannot	access	his/her	bank	account	to	seize	his/her	money.	Also,	confiscation	
is	 difficult	 when	 assets	 are	 in	 spouses’	 or	 third	 parties’	 names.	 The	 penalties	
for	 non-payment	 of	 confiscation	 orders	 also	 appear	 to	 be	 not	 strong	 enough	
and	some	offenders	still	prefer	a	 jail	 term	to	paying	off	confiscation	orders.	 In	
response	 to	 these	 issues,	 the	Serious	Crime	Bill	 (at	 the	 time	of	writing	 at	 the	
committee stage in the House of Lords) is aimed to amend the Proceeds of 
Crime Act. In particular, it will:
	a)	Increase	prison	sentences	for	failure	to	pay	confiscation	orders.	
b) Ensure that criminal assets cannot be hidden with spouses, associates or 
other third parties. 
c) Require courts to consider imposing an overseas travel ban for the purpose of 
ensuring	that	a	confiscation	order	is	effective.	
d) Enable assets to be restrained more quickly and earlier in investigations. 
e)	Reduce	the	defendant’s	time	to	pay	confiscation	orders.	
f) Extend investigative powers so that they are available to trace assets once a 
confiscation	order	is	made	(HM	Government,	2014).
353. Under Part 6 of POCA 2002, NCA can assume the taxation functions of Her 
Majesty's	Revenue	and	Customs	in	order	to	recover	proceeds	of	crime	(POCA	
2002,	s	317(2)).	Tax	legislation	is	applied	to	the	income	and	a	tax	assessment	is	
then raised against the respondent.
354.	There	are	two	conditions	for	the	making	of	a	confiscation	order.	The	first	
condition is that either the defendant has been convicted of an offence in 
proceedings before the Crown Court, or he is committed to the Crown Court 
for sentence in respect of an offence under s 3, 4 or 6 of the Powers of Criminal 
Courts	(Sentencing)	Act	2000	or	POCA	2002,	s	70	(POCA	2002,	ss	6(2)(a),	(b)	
&	 (c)).The	 second	condition	 is	 that	 the	prosecutor	 asks	 the	court	 to	proceed	
under	this	section	or	the	court	believes	it	is	appropriate	to	do	so	(POCA	2002,	
s	6(3)).
10.9. United Kingdom                                                                                                                                 
David Wall and Yulia Chistyakova (Durham University, United Kingdom)
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material (POCA	2002,	s	345(4)).The	order	will	be	granted	if	
it	can	be	shown	that	the	person	specified	in	the	application	
is	 in	possession	or	control	of	the	material	 (POCA	2002,	s	
346(3)).
•		 Disclosure order Disclosure	 orders	 authorize	 an	
appropriate officer to give notice, in writing, to anyone they 
consider to have relevant information to the investigation to 
disclose	it	(POCA	2002,	s	357(4)).
•		 Account monitoring order an account monitoring order 
requires	a	financial	institution	to	provide	specified	account	
information to an appropriate officer for a period not 
exceeding	90	days	(POCA	2002,	s	370(6)	&	(7)).	‘Account	
information’	is	information	relating	to	an	account	held	at	the	
financial	 institution	by	 the	specified	person,	whether	held	
solely	or	jointly	with	another	(POCA	2002,	s	370(4)).
•		 Customer information order A customer information 
order	 requires	 that	 a	 specified	 financial	 institution	 must,	
on being given notice in writing given by an appropriate 
officer, provide any such customer information as it has 
relating	 to	 the	person	 specified	 in	 the	application	 (POCA	
2002,	 s	 363(5)).	 ‘Customer	 information’	 is	 information	
about whether a person holds, or has held any accounts 
at	 the	 financial	 institution	 and	 information	 surrounding	
that	account	including	all	personal	details	(POCA	2002,	s	
364(1),	(2)	&	(3)).
•		 Search and seizure warrant A	 search	 and	 seizure	
warrant is a warrant authorising an appropriate person 
to	enter	and	search	the	premises	specified	and	seize	and	
retain any material found there which is likely to be of 
substantial value to the investigation for the purposes of 
which	the	application	is	made	(POCA	2002,	s	352(4)).	
•		 Restraint order prohibits	a	defendant	from	 ‘dealing	with’	
any	 realisable	 property	 that	 is	 held	 by	 him/her	 and	 is	
potentially	 liable	 for	confiscation	 (Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	
2002,	 s	69(1)).	Realisable	property	 is	defined	as	any	 free	
property held by the defendant or the recipient of a tainted 
gift	(POCA	2002,	ss	83(a)	&	(b)).	
•		 Determining criminal lifestyle: a defendant is considered 
to have a criminal lifestyle if one of the following three 
criteria	are	satisfied:
(a)	the	offence	for	which	he/she	has	been	convicted	is	
one	of	those	specified	in	Schedule	2,	for	example	money	
laundering, people trafficking and arms trafficking 
(POCA	2002,	s	75(2)(a));	or
(b)	 the	 offence	 for	 which	 he/she	 has	 been	 convicted	
constitutes conduct forming part of a course of criminal 
activity	(POCA	2002,	s	75(2)(b));	or
 
Confiscation
(POCA 2002 s6, 7, 70, 35, 50, 
69, 75, 76, 83, 84, 139, 
240-246, 234, 304, 316, 341-370)
Confiscation investigation. 
Production order, disclosure order, 
account monitoring order or 
customer information order. 
Search and seizure warrant.
Civil recovery in court
(POCA 2002 s240-246, 316)
Civil recovery investigation. 
Production order, disclosure order, 
account monitoring order or 
customer information order. 
Search and seizure warrant.
Recovery of cash in 
summary proceedings
(POCA 2002 s289-301)
Searches of premises 
and/or persons
Seizure and detention of cash
Cash forfeiture
Restraint order
Determining criminal lifestyle
Determining and calculating 
the amount of benefit and 
the available amount
Confiscation order Civil recovery order
Release of detailed cash Enforcement of confiscation order Enforcement of civil recovery order
The court asks if a specific 
property is recoverable
Property freezing or 
interim receiving order
COLLECTION PROCESS: collection of the sum that is determined by a judge (illegally obtained benefit)
CONFISCATION: the illegally obtained benefit becomes property of the state
SEIZURE: the accused person loses all rights to the seized assets
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(c)	 the	 offence	 for	 which	 he(she	 has	 been	 convicted	
was committed over a period of at least six months and 
the	 defendant	 has	 benefited	 from	 the	 conduct	 which	
constitutes	the	offence	(POCA	2002,	s	75(2)(c)).
•		 Determining and calculating the amount of benefit 
from criminal conduct and the available amount: if 
a defendant has a criminal lifestyle the Court calculates 
the	benefit	from	general	criminal	conduct	(all the criminal 
conduct of the defendant). It is immaterial whether or 
not the conduct occurred before or after the passing 
of POCA 2002. If he or she does not have a criminal 
lifestyle,	the	Court	will	calculate	the	benefit	from	particular	
criminal	conduct	(the	defendant’s	criminal	conduct	which	
constitutes the offence concerned or any offences in the 
same proceedings or that will be taken into consideration 
when	 deciding	 the	 defendant’s	 sentence	 for	 the	 offence)	
(POCA	 2002,	 s	 76(3)).	 The	 amount	 recoverable	 is	 the	
amount	equal	to	the	defendant’s	benefit	from	the	conduct	
concerned	(POCA	2002,	s	7(1)).	However,	if	the	defendant	
shows	that	the	available	amount	is	less	than	the	benefit,	the	
recoverable	amount	is	the	available	amount	(POCA	2002,	s	
7(2)).	The	burden	of	proof	rests	with	the	defendant	to	show	
that	 the	 recoverable	 amount	 is	 less	 than	 the	defendant’s	
benefit	from	the	conduct	concerned.
•		 Enforcement Confiscation	 orders	 are	 enforced	 by	 the	
magistrates’	court	(POCA	2002,	s	35(2)).	When	the	court	
makes	a	confiscation	it	must	also	fix	a	term	of	imprisonment	
in	 default	 of	 payment	 (POCA	 2002,	 s	 139(2);	 Powers	 of	
Criminal	Courts	(Sentencing)	Act	2000). 
Civil recovery in court
It is not always possible to commence criminal proceedings 
where,	for	example,	the	criminal	offender	has	kept	him/herself	
distant	 from	 the	crime	he/she	 is	controlling	or	 is	outside	 the	
United Kingdom. Also, there are occasions where a criminal 
dies leaving recoverable assets or simply transfers them to a 
third party. In such situations, where the Crown Prosecution 
Service has decided that it is not in the public interest to 
prosecute, the use of civil recovery to recover the proceeds of 
unlawful conduct will be considered.
•		Civil recovery investigation A civil recovery investigation 
is an investigation into whether property or associated 
property is recoverable, who holds it, and its nature, extent 
and	 whereabouts	 (POCA	 2002,	 s	 341(2)). The focus of 
an	 investigation	 can	 be	 a	 person	 or	 property	 (Crime	 and	
Courts Act, 2013).
•	 	Property freezing order A	property	 freezing	 order	 is	 an	
order that prohibits any person whose property the order 
specifies	from	dealing	with	that	property	in	any	way	(POCA	
2002,	s	245A(2)). 
•	 	 Interim receiving order An interim receiving order is 
an order for the detention, custody and preservation of 
property	and	the	appointment	of	an	interim	receiver	(POCA	
2002,	s	246(2)). 
•	 	Recoverable property Recoverable property is property 
obtained	through	unlawful	conduct	(POCA	2002,	s	304(1)).	
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11.1. The availability of data on 
confiscated assets in Europe
Analysis	 of	 the	 criminal	 assets	 confiscated	 in	 Europe	 is	
complicated not only by the wide variety of asset recovery 
regimes	and	legislative	tools	that	exist	across	EU	MS	(as	seen	
above in Chapter 10) but also by the lack of publicly available 
statistics in this field. At present, there is no systematic 
information	on	the	amount	or	value	of	criminal	assets	seized,	
frozen	and	confiscated	across	Europe.
Article	 11	of	 the	new	confiscation	Directive	(2014/42/EU)	has	
introduced the requirement for EU Member States to 
regularly collect statistics on the asset recovery process,355 
but	to	date	each	country	has	had	its	own	specific	system.
Since,	 as	 anticipated	 in	 Section	 10.1,	 one	 of	 the	 specific	
objectives of Project OCP was to understand what 
and where data on criminal investments in the EU are 
available,	 including	 statistics	 on	 confiscated	 assets,	 an	
assessment of the existing information on criminal assets 
recovered in Europe has been conducted.
Why assess the level of availability of the data on 
confiscated assets? 
The assessment of the level of available statistics has not 
been solely the basis of an evaluation of the amount of criminal 
proceeds that are recovered by law enforcement, it can prove 
crucial for other purposes as well.
First,	the	functions	of	agencies	involved	in	the	tracing,	seizing	
and	managing	seized	and	confiscated	assets	are	complex	and	
multifaceted. To guarantee a transparent and accountable 
functionality of these agencies, it is crucial that these 
activities and the assets with which the agency comes 
into contact be documented in an efficient manner	(Brun	
et	al.,	2011;	FATF,	2012a;	OAS,	2011,	2014a;	Stephenson,	Gray	&	
Power, 2011).
Second,	 improvement	 in	 the	 collection	 of	 data	 on	 seized	
and	 confiscated	 assets	 can increase the efficiency of 
these agencies by providing updated and readily available 
information on assets. It can also aid national investigations 
and trials by providing information regarding assets 
associated	with	various	criminal	individuals	and	groups	(OAS,	
2014a).	 Developing	 centralized	 data	 collection	 systems	
can better integrate the activities of LEAs and financial 
crime investigators with asset management agencies 
(Stephenson,	 Gray,	 &	 Power,	 2011;	 OAS,	 2011,	 2014a).	 This	
in turn can also facilitate international cooperation by 
expediting	 the	 exchange	 of	 information	 regarding	 seized	
and forfeited assets, particularly in the case of transnational 
organized	crime	(FATF,	2012a;	OAS,	2011,	2014a;	Stephenson,	
Gray,	&	Power,	2011).
Third, as pointed out by the 2014 Directive itself, the 
collection of statistics is crucial to evaluate the degree of 
implementation of this Directive as well of other regulation 
in	this	field.356 
Accordingly,	the	assessment	of	available	data	on	confiscated	
assets, and their collection, carried out under Project OCP 
and presented in this section, will not only provide the EU 
Commission with instruments to encourage the production 
of harmonised statistics but also make it possible to 
evaluate the efficiency of current confiscation regimes, 
at both national and EU level, and to identify where and 
11. Assessing the 
availability of data on 
confiscated assets in 
Europe                                         
 Michele Riccardi, Cristina Soriani and Priscilla Standridge (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, 
Italy)
355.	 “Member	 States	 shall	 regularly	 collect	 and	 maintain	 comprehensive	
statistics from the relevant authorities. The statistics collected shall be sent to 
the	Commission	each	year	and	shall	include:	(a)	the	number	of	freezing	orders	
executed;	 (b)	 the	 number	 of	 confiscation	 orders	 executed;	 (c)	 the	 estimated	
value	 of	 property	 frozen,	 at	 least	 of	 property	 frozen	 with	 a	 view	 to	 possible	
subsequent	 confiscation	 at	 the	 time	 of	 freezing;	 (d)	 the	 estimated	 value	 of	
property	 recovered	 at	 the	 time	 of	 confiscation.	 2.	 Member	 States	 shall	 also	
send each year the following statistics to the Commission, if they are available 
at	a	central	 level	 in	 the	Member	State	concerned:	 (a)	 the	number	of	 requests	
for	 freezing	 orders	 to	 be	 executed	 in	 another	Member	 State;	 (b)	 the	 number	
of	 requests	 for	 confiscation	orders	 to	be	 executed	 in	 another	Member	State;	
(c)	the	value	or	estimated	value	of	the	property	recovered	following	execution	
in another Member State. 3. Member States shall endeavour to collect data 
referred	to	in	paragraph	2	at	a	central	level”	(Directive	2014/42/EU,	art.	11).
356.	“[…]	To	allow	for	the	evaluation	of	this	Directive,	it	is	necessary	to	collect	a	
comparable	minimum	set	of	appropriate	statistical	data	[…]”	 (paragraph	36	of	
Directive	2014/42/EU).
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how these measures could be improved and made more 
effective against serious and organised crime.
How the assessment has been conducted
Three main sources have been used to perform the 
assessment:
•		 The	 findings	 of	 a	 survey specifically designed by the 
OCP research team and administered among national 
agencies involved in the recovery and management of 
criminal	assets	at	European	level	(see	Section	11.2);
•		 The	 reports published by some of these national asset 
recovery	or	asset	management	agencies;
•		 The	 evidence emerging from previous research in 
this field, and in particular from the work of the EU Asset 
Recovery Office Platform and of Europol Criminal Assets 
Bureau	(ECAB).357
General findings
Besides a detailed discussion on the results of the survey, 
presented	below,	some	general	findings	can	be	highlighted:
•		 First,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 methods and criteria 
used to collect data on confiscated assets vary 
widely across European countries: the taxonomy and 
classification	 of	 assets,	 format	 of	 the	 information,	 type	
and amount of the data collected are often different from 
country	to	country;358
•		 Second,	 in	 the	same	country	data may be collected by 
different agencies:
- Involved in different stages of the asset recovery 
process	 (e.g.	 at	 the	 seizure/freezing	 phase	 or	 the	
management	phase);359
-	Active	at	different	levels	(e.g.	at	a	national/centralized	
or	regional/peripheral	level);360
•		 These	agencies	may	often	adopt	different	data	collection	
methods. As a result, in the same country different 
databases	on	seized/frozen/confiscated	assets	may	exist	
at the same time but with no connection and unable 
to ‘talk’ to each other. Similarly, unique ID numbers 
attributed to criminal assets throughout the recovery 
process are very seldom used.
•		 This	makes	it	impossible	in	most	the	countries,	with	some	
exceptions	 (e.g.	 the	 Netherlands,	 see	 Sections	 10.7	 and	
12.6), to trace a criminal asset, and to connect it to the 
indicted natural or legal person, from the beginning of 
the process	 (e.g.	 the	 investigation)	 to the end	 (e.g.	 the	
disposal of the asset or its reuse). 
•		 As	a	 result,	 the	available	databases	often	provide	a	very 
partial picture of asset recovery in a country. It is very 
hard,	 for	 example,	 to	 determine	 how	many	 of	 the	 seized	
assets	 are	 actually	 confiscated,	 or	 how	 much	 of	 the	
estimated value of the proceeds of crime returns to the 
public, or to measure any kind of attrition rate.361
•		 The	 use of IT systems to organise data is very 
infrequent.	Information	on	confiscated	assets	is	often	only	
available in hardcopy, while the use of electronic databases 
is not widely adopted. 
•		 The	lack of detailed and disaggregated data: often only 
aggregate	data	are	available,	while	specific	information	on	
each asset is not collected or available.
•		 The	 lack of publicly available data: according to the 
survey, in most cases data are collected but cannot be 
shared for research purposes and as such could not be 
accessed under Project OCP.
•		 Countries	 that	 tend	 to	 adopt	 a	 value-based	 confiscation	
system are the least inclined to collect disaggregate 
data: in these countries, the available information is almost 
exclusively	on	 the	 total	confiscated	value.	To	gather	data	
on the types of assets it would be necessary to extract 
each	case	file.
•		 The	 calculation	 of	 the	 value of the asset can also be 
problematic. Estimation criteria vary according to the 
national legislation. Besides the market value of the asset 
per se, in some countries the valuation also includes the 
estimated	economic	damage;	in	some	others	it	is	based	on	
the	estimated	benefit	that	the	criminals	have	gained	from	
the	asset	or	the	criminal	conduct	(e.g.	 in	the	Netherlands,	
see 10.7 and 12.6).
In this situation, the best scenario would be to obtain 
aggregate data	on	the	total	number	of	assets	confiscated	in	a	
certain	country	(or	on	their	total	value)	in	a	given timeframe. 
More	 ambitious	 inquiries	 (e.g.	 the	 number	 of	 assets	 related	
to certain offences and nationality of the owner and located 
in	a	specific	territory)	would	be	feasible	only	in	few	European	
countries.
Considering	 the	significant	developments	 that	 the	collection	
and analysis of data on suspected, prosecuted, convicted 
and imprisoned persons have undergone in the past 20 
years at European level,362 it is not encouraging to see how 
still underdeveloped the collection of statistics on 
criminal assets is. It is to be hoped that the new Directive will 
push national AROs and AMOs to achieve the same level of 
excellence	 of	 national	 statistical	 offices	 in	 the	 field	 of	 crime	
and criminal justice statistics.
357. Since January 2014, in the framework of the EU ARO Platform activity, 
ECAB	has	been	collecting	statistics	on	asset	recovery,	and	specifically	on	the	
amount	of	criminal	assets	 that	are	 identified,	 frozen	and	finally	confiscated	 in	
the EU. The results of the data collection will be published in the next months.
358. As will be better described in 11.2, the type of information collected varies 
also	 in	 according	 to	 the	confiscation	 regime.	 In	 countries	where,	 for	 example,	
only	value	confiscation	is	applied,	it	is	difficult	to	obtain	information	on	the	type	
of	assets	confiscated,	while	it	is	easier	to	obtain	information	on	their	value.
359.	For	example	in	Italy	a	database	exists,	managed	by	the	ANBSC	–	Agenzia	
Nazionale	 per	 l'amministrazione	 e	 la	 destinazione	 dei	 beni	 sequestrati	 e	
confiscati	alla	criminalità	organizzata,	which	contains	data	on	assets	definitively	
confiscated	and	under	the	agency’s	management;	at	the	same	time,	a	database	
exists	(SIPPI,	now	SIT-MP),	managed	by	the	Ministry	of	Justice,	which	includes	
statistics	on	seized	assets	and	confiscated	assets.	Although	there	are	overlaps	
between the two databases, it is difficult to understand what differences exist 
between the two. In parallel, other databases exist which include only the assets 
seized	by	certain	law	enforcement	agencies	or	judicial	authorities	(Transcrime,	
2013a).
360. According to some preliminary evidence from the EU ARO Platform, only 
46% of the designated AROs collect data at a centralised level.
361.	 In	 crime	 and	 criminal	 justice	 statistics,	 attrition	 is	 a	 measure	 of	 “which	
proportion of cases entering the system are duly resolved, closed or dispensed 
with	by	criminal	 justice	agencies”	(Shaw,	Van	Dijk,	&	Rhomber,	2003,	p.	51-52).	
In	 the	 case	 of	 asset	 recovery,	 it	 refers	 to	 the	 proportion	 of	 confiscated	 and	
disposed	assets	out	of	the	traced	and	then	seized	ones.
362.	 See	 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/about_eurostat/
introduction.
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11.2. Results of a survey across 
European countries
In order better to assess the level of availability of the 
information	 on	 confiscated	 goods,	 a	 survey	 was	 conducted	
among the agencies involved in Europe in the recovery and 
management of criminal assets.
The survey covered both the official Asset Recovery Offices 
designated at a national level and other public agencies 
that may collect, store or manage information on the asset 
recovery and management process.363 In particular, the 
assessment was conducted through analysis of:
•		 Questionnaires364 administered to the national designated 
Asset Recovery Offices through the EU ARO Platform 
system;
•		 Annual reports and other public documents issued by 
national AROs and other agencies involved in the recovery 
and	management	of	criminal	assets;
•		 Databases of confiscated assets that are publicly 
available or for which it was possible to obtain access for 
the purpose of Project OCP.365
For each of the datasets analysed, the type of information 
available for each confiscated asset was assessed. Four 
categories	of	information	were	identified:	
1. General information
2. Information about real estate
3. Information about companies
4.	Information	about	registered	(i.e.	cars,	motorcycles,	
boats and other vehicles) and other movable assets.
The	general	 information	 (e.g.	 the	date	of	 confiscation	or	 the	
location) concerns all types of assets, while other information 
applies	only	to	certain	categories	(e.g.	the	make	or	the	model	
of	 a	 confiscated	car).	Three	 levels	of	 information	availability	
were	classified:
•		 Information available and public: collected by the 
agency	 and	 made	 publicly	 available	 (e.g.	 through	 annual	
reports	or	on	the	official	website);
•		 Information available but not public: collected at 
national level and not public but can be obtained upon 
request from LEAs, FIUs, AMOs or in certain cases for 
statistical	purposes;
•		 Information not available: not collected or not available 
at national level.
Results
While all the designated AROs of the EU 28 MS gave a 
feedback to the request for participation in the survey, 
24 agencies from 16 EU MS provided a written answer, 
a completed questionnaire or access, full or in part, to the 
relevant database.366 For 17 databases a detailed analysis of 
the type of available information for each confiscated asset 
was possible. It is presented below.
Figure 48 shows the status of availability of general 
information	 on	 seized	 and	 confiscated	 assets.	 Data	 on	
the	 type	of	asset,	date	of	confiscation	and/or	of	 seizure	and	
location	(at	least	at	NUTS	2)	seem	to	be	collected	by	most	of	
the surveyed agencies, but are not often publicly available in 
reports	or	websites.	 Information	about	the	owner	(e.g.	name,	
nationality, criminal affiliation) and on the condition of the 
assets	 (in	 terms	 of	 both	 physical	 situation	 and	 legal	 status)	
are	 not	 always	 collected;	 nor	 is	 information	 on	 the	 related	
offence(s),	on	the	asset	value	and	type	of	confiscation.
In regard to the different macro types of assets, it emerges 
that for real estate information on the type of property 
(e.g.	house,	villa,	flat,	garage,	etc.)	 is available in most of the 
agencies	that	provided	feedback	to	the	survey	(Figure	49).
By contrast, with regards to confiscated companies (Figure 
50), much less information	 is	 collected	 (e.g.	 the	 company	
name, the legal form or the business sector) and only in a 
couple of cases are data publicly available. Moreover, in most 
cases	 (those	 identified	 as	 not applicable) no answer has 
been provided. The main reason is that in these countries 
companies are often not confiscated at all	 (see	Chapter	
12).
Finally, in regard to registered and movable assets it seems 
that information on these assets is available in most of the 
AROs included in the survey.
363.	 Council	 Decision	 2007/845/JHA1	 obliges	 Member	 States	 to	 set	 up	 or	
designate	national	Asset	Recovery	Offices	(“AROs”)	as	national	central	contact	
points which facilitate, through enhanced cooperation, the fastest possible EU-
wide tracing of assets derived from crime. For a list of the designated national 
AROs, please see Report From The Commission To The European Parliament 
And	To	The	Council	based	on	Article	8	of	the	Council	Decision	2007/845/JHA	
of 6 December 2007 concerning cooperation between Asset Recovery Offices 
of	the	Member	States	in	the	field	of	tracing	and	identification	of	proceeds	from,	
or other property related to, crime. Note that in some countries more than one 
agency	has	been	designated	(e.g.	in	France	both	a	police-based	agency	–	PIAC	
– and a judicial agency – AGRASC – are ARO contact points at European level: 
see Section 12.3).
364. The full questionnaire is available in the Methodological annex.
365.	The	categorization	of	assets	is	available	in	the	Methodological	annex.
366. In particular the following seventeen agencies have provided detailed 
information for the analysis through the questionnaire: Organe Central pour 
la	 Saisie	 et	 la	 Confiscation	 (Central	 Office	 for	 Seizure	 and	 Confiscation	 –	
COSC),	 Belgium;	 Ministry	 of	 the	 Interior	 (MUP),	 Criminal	 Police	 Directorate,	
National	 Police	 Office	 for	 Suppression	 of	 Corruption	 and	 Organized	 Crime,	
Economic	 Crime	 and	 Corruption	 Department,	 Croatia;	 Unit	 for	 Combating	
Money	 Laundering	 (MOKAS-FIU),	 Cyprus;	 Unit	 Combating	 Corruption	 and	
Financial	 Crimes	 (UOKFK),	 Czech	 Republic;	 State	 Prosecutor	 for	 Serious	
Economic	 Crime	 (Statsadvokaten	 for	 Særlig	 Økonomisk	 Kriminalitet),	
Denmark;	 National	 Police	 Board,	 Ministry	 of	 the	 Interior,	 Finland;	 Agency	 for	
the	 management	 and	 recovery	 of	 seized	 and	 confiscated	 assets	 (Agence	
de	 gestion	 et	 de	 recouvrement	 des	 avoirs	 saisis	 et	 confisqués	 -	 AGRASC),	
France;	 Federal	 Office	 of	 Justice	 (Division	 III	 1:	 Extradition,	 Transfer	 of	
Prisoners, Mutual Legal Assistance, European Judicial Network in Criminal 
Matters),	Germany;	Criminal	Assets	Bureau	(CAB),	 Ireland;	Agenzia	Nazionale	
per	 l'amministrazione	 e	 la	 destinazione	 dei	 beni	 sequestrati	 e	 confiscati	 alla	
criminalità	organizzata	(ANBSC),	 Italy;	Guardia	di	Finanza	(GdF),	 Italy;	Servizio	
Analisi	Criminale	(SAC),	Ministry	of	 the	 Interior,	 Italy;	Criminal	Police	(Lietuvos	
kriminalines	 policijos	 biuras),	 Lithuania;	 Criminal	 Assets	 Deprivation	 Bureau	
of	 the	 Public	 Prosecution	 Service	 (Bureau	 Ontnemingswetgeving	 Openbaar	
Ministerie	 -	 BOOM),	 Netherlands;	 The	 Public	 Prosecutor’s	 Office	 for	 serious	
fraud,	environmental	crime	and	asset	confiscation	(PPO),	Netherlands;	Fiscalía	
Especial	 para	 la	 Prevención	 y	 Represión	 del	 Tráfico	 Ilegal	 de	 Drogas,	 Spain;	
Plan	Nacional	Sobre	Drogas	(PNSD),	Spain.	In	addition,	seven	agencies	provide	
a	 feedback:	 Bundeskriminalamt	 (Division	 SO	 35	 –	 VIVA	 -	 Asset	 Recovery	
Office),	Germany;	Ministry	of	Justice	(Sistema	Informativo	Prefetture	e	Procure	
dell'Italia	 -	 SIPPI),	 Italy;	 National	 Office	 for	 Crime	 Prevention	 and	 for	 Asset	
Recovery,	Ministry	of	Justice,	Romania;	Financial	Intelligence	Unit	of	the	Bureau	
of	Combating	Organised	Crime	of	the	Presidium	of	the	Police	Force,	Slovakia;	
Crown	 Prosecution	 Service	 (CPS),	 United	 Kingdom;	 National	 Crime	 Agency,	
United	Kingdom;	Organised	Crime	and	Counter	Terrorism	Unit	(OCCT)	of	Police	
Scotland, United Kingdom.
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12.1. A comparative analysis 
among the seven OCP countries
Previous	chapters	showed	that	any	examination	of	confiscated	
assets in Europe is complicated on the one hand by the 
complexity and diversity of the regulatory framework on 
the	asset	recovery	process	across	EU	countries	(see	Chapter	
10), and on the other, by the lack of available statistics and 
usable	data	(see	Chapter	11).
Taking these limitations into account, this chapter provides 
an analysis of the assets confiscated in the seven OCP 
countries: Italy, Spain, France, Ireland, UK, Netherlands 
and Finland. This task has been possible only thanks to the 
statistics provided, for the purpose of Project OCP, by the 
relevant asset recovery and asset management offices of 
these countries.367
In particular, for each of the seven OCP countries, full or partial 
access to some data was granted. In some cases, access was 
possible only to aggregate statistics	(e.g.	in	Spain	with	PNSD)	
while in others to disaggregated information per each asset 
(e.g.	 in	 Italy	 with	 ANBSC	 or	 in	 Ireland	with	CAB).	 Data	 from	
different countries differ in terms of the stage of the asset 
recovery process	(see	Figure	52)	and	types of confiscation;	
and they may also cover different types of related offences 
(e.g.	PNSD	data	 in	Spain	 refer	only	 to	drug-related	offences;	
ANBSC	data	in	Italy	to	organised	crime	offences).	Specifically:
•		 In	Finland	data	from	the	Police	Information	System	(Patja)	
have been accessed. Although they may refer to the 
tracing/investigation	stage,	it	is	not	possible	to	say	exactly	
in	 which	 phase	 of	 the	 confiscation	 process	 the	 data	 are	
collected	(see	Section	12.2);
•		 In	 France access has been possible to aggregate data 
on seized assets and to detailed data on a limited set of 
confiscated	assets,	both	provided	by	AGRASC	(see	12.3);
•		 In	 Ireland,	 Criminal	 Asset	 Bureau	 (CAB)	 provided	 three	
datasets	 referring	 to	 three	different	 types	of	confiscation	
(see	12.4);
•		 In	 Italy, disaggregated information on assets definitively 
confiscated	 (ANBSC)	 and	 on	 assets seized	 by	 a	 specific	
LEA, the Guardia di Finanza	 (GDF)	have	been	used,	while	
limited access to few aggregate statistics provided by 
Min.	Justice	 (SIPPI)	and	Min.	 Interior	 (SAC)	has	also	been	
possible	(see	12.5);
•		 In	the	Netherlands,	statistics	on	confiscation	provided	by	
the	Dutch	Public	Prosecutor’s	Office	(PPO)	have	been	used	
(12.6);
•		 In	 Spain,	 aggregate	 data	 on	 assets	 confiscated	 due	 to	
drug-related offences, provided by Plan Nacional Sobre 
Drogas (PNSD),	have	been	accessed	(12.7);
•		 In	the	United Kingdom, limited access to some aggregate 
data	 from	 the	JARD	 (Joint	Asset	Recovery	Database)	 of	
the	National	Crime	Agency	(NCA)	has	been	possible	(see	
12.8).
Given the differences in terms of regulatory framework and 
data availability among the seven countries, performing a 
comparative assessment would be neither easy nor very 
meaningful. Therefore it has been preferred to perform a 
detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 data	 by	 adopting	 a	 country-specific	
focus	 (Sections	 12.2–	 12.8).	 However	 the	 Section	 below	
provides a very basic statistical analysis across the 7 OCP 
countries of two aspects: the typological breakdown and the 
trend	of	seizures/confiscation.
What types of assets are confiscated in the seven OCP 
countries?
Table 91 shows how confiscated assets break down across 
different macro types in each of the seven OCP countries. 
Owing to the lack of statistics, it has not been possible to 
present	data	on	assets	at	the	same	stage	of	the	confiscation	
process, or to consider only the same types of offences. The 
table	therefore	specifies	the	sources,	the	stage	of	the	process,	
and	the	related	offences	for	which	assets	have	been	seized/
confiscated.368
12. Focus on seven 
European countries                                         
Priscilla Standridge and Michele Riccardi (Università Cattolica
 del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime, Italy)
367. In particular, in Italy data from ANBSC which is responsible for asset 
management	but	not	asset	recovery.	To	be	recalled	is	that	Guardia	di	Finanza,	
AGRASC and Criminal Asset Bureau are associate partners of the project.
368.	Where	possible,	the	focus	has	been	on	those	assets	seized	or	confiscated	
for	serious	and	organised	crimes;	but	in	some	countries	only	general	statistics	or	
ones	on	certain	offences	(e.g.	drugs)	are	available.	For	more	details,	see	country	
profiles	(Sections	10.3-10.9).
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In analysing this table, all the limitations regarding the 
possibility to compare data across EU MS must be borne 
in mind. In particular, it should be considered that data at 
different stages of the asset recovery process can tell very 
different stories, since some assets may be liquidated or 
sold in due course, and this often happens especially with 
some types of goods, such as movable goods or companies, 
which may therefore be underrepresented in later stages of 
the	confiscation	process.369
Bearing these biases in mind, it is evident that: 
•		 in	most	countries,	most	of	the	goods	seized	or	confiscated	
for serious and organised crimes are registered assets 
(cars, motorcycles, vehicles, etc.) and movable assets 
(mainly	cash and bank accounts);
•		 the	share	of	real estate	is	substantial	only	during	the	final	
stage	of	 the	process	(final	confiscation)	and	only	 in	some	
countries	(e.g.	Italy,	France);
•		 Instead,	 companies represent a tiny share	 of	 seized	
and	 confiscated	 assets	 in	 all	 the	 European	 countries	 (in	
analysis), except for Italy.370
At	present,	 it	seems	that	the	seizure	of	cash,	bank	accounts,	
cars, motorbikes, boats and, to a lesser extent, real estate is a 
common practice in most EU states, while the confiscation 
of companies is not a widespread practice. Italy is an 
Figure 52 – Stages of the asset recovery process originating the data used in Chapter 12
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369. The entire asset recovery process may take several years from start to 
finish.	The	custody	of	assets	after	seizure	can	be	a	very	costly	process,	both	in	
terms of expenses related to maintaining and preserving their value, and in terms 
of	the	time	and	energy	of	specialized	personnel	involved	in	the	management	of	
more complex assets, such as real estate and companies. A solution sometimes 
adopted	in	these	cases	(e.g.	 in	France	and	in	Spain)	is	the	advance	sale	of	the	
assets	for	which	management	is	not	financially	viable	or	for	which	the	passing	
of	time	can	cause	serious	deterioration	or	loss	of	value	(OAS,	2011).	This	means	
that	an	analysis	of	criminal	assets	in	later	stages	of	the	process	(e.g.	at	the	time	
of	 final	 confiscation	 or	 disposal)	may	 not	 provide	 an	 accurate	 picture	 of	 the	
nature and volume of recovered assets in a country.
370. This is often due to the fact that, during the asset recovery process, movable 
assets such as cash, bank accounts and vehicles can be disposed, depending on 
each	country’s	regulatory	framework,	before	the	final	confiscation	occurs.	This	
means	that,	at	the	final	confiscation	stage,	the	share	of	these	goods	decreases,	
while that of real estate can increase, relatively speaking.
These results are somehow in contradiction with 
the	 findings	 of	 the	 analysis	 of	 criminal	 investments	
conducted in Part 2. There seems to be a inconsistency 
between what criminals invest in and what is actually 
confiscated.	 This	 is	 especially	 clear	 for	 legitimate	
companies. 
exception, with a much higher weight of companies and 
immovable goods. Although the focus here is on the seven 
OCP countries, there is reason to believe that this situation is 
shared by the other European countries.
The reasons why the companies are less subject to 
confiscation	are	many,	 and	 they	deserve	a	wider	discussion	
which will be conducted in the conclusions of this report 
(Chapter	 13).	However,	 they	can	be	summarised	 in	 the	 three	
following issues:
•		 First,	 it	can	be	difficult to trace and identify legitimate 
businesses controlled by criminals. Increasingly complex 
money	laundering	and	concealment	techniques	exist	(e.g.	
Chinese boxes, off-shore banking, etc.) which make it 
harder	 for	 investigators	 to	 identify	 the	 criminal	 beneficial	
owners	behind	corporate	entities	(Madinger,	2011;	van	der	
Does	 de	Willebois	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Soriani,	
2013;	Gray	et	al.,	2014;	Riccardi,	2014a;).
•		 Second,	as	anticipated	 in	Chapter	 10,	 there	may	be	gaps 
in the regulation of European countries which make 
it	 difficult	 to	 seize	 legitimate	 businesses	 (Allum	 &	 Boer,	
2013;	 Calderoni,	 2010;	 Brun	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Mendell,	 2006;	
Stephenson,	Gray	&	Power,	 2011).	 For	 example,	 extended	
confiscation,	 which	 would	 allow	 for	 wider	 application	 of	
the	 confiscation	 of	 companies,	 is	 available	 only	 in	 a	 few	
countries	(see	10.3	-	10.9);
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Country Number
Real 
estate
Companies
Registered 
assets
Movable 
assets
Source Years
Asset 
recovery 
process 
stage
Type of 
offence
Finland 302 3.0% 0.0% 34.1% 62.9% PATJA
2003-
2013
Seizure
Serious 
and OC 
offences371
France
18,373 0.7% 0.0% 3.1% 96.2%
AGRASC, 
Rapport 
d’activité	
2012
2008-
2012
Seizure
Drug 
related 
offences
56 87.5% 0.0% 5.4% 7.1% AGRASC
2008-
2012
Confiscation
Serious 
and OC 
offences372
Ireland 301 16.8% 1.0% 9.8% 72.4% CAB
2005-
2012
Confiscation
Serious 
offences373
Italy
24,014 51.3% 8.1% 23.2% 17.4% ANBSC
1983-
2012
Confiscation
Serious 
and OC 
offences374
16,824 28.5% 15.3% 27.6% 28.5% GDF
2000-
2013
Seizure
Serious 
and OC 
offences375
113,753 47.7% 6.7% 20.1% 25.5% SIPPI
2009-
2013
Seizure	and	
confiscation
OC 
offences
12,567 44% 5% 18% 33% SAC
2007-
2011
Seizure
All 
offences
Spain 27,541 1.0% 0.0% 49.1% 49.9%
PNSD, 
Informe 
de 
gestión 
2012
1996-
2012
Confiscation
Drug 
related 
offences
Netherlands N/A376 N/A PPO
2008-
2013
Confiscation
OC 
offences377
United 
Kingdom
N/A378 N/A JARD
2003-
2013
Confiscation
Proceeds 
of crime379
Table 91 – Breakdown by type of the assets seized/confiscated for serious and organised crime in the seven OCP countries
Source: Transcrime elaboration on ANBSC, GDF, SIPPI, SAC, PNSD, AGRASC, PATJA, CAB, PPO, JARD data
371. These include aggravated narcotics offences, money laundering, fraud, 
payment card fraud, tax fraud, extortion, receiving offences, accounting 
offences, registration offence, usury and alcohol offences, including aggravated 
forms of these economic crimes. See Section 0 and the Methodological Annex 
for details.
372. A selection of cases relevant to OCP was extracted from AGRASC for the 
study.
373. Crimes foreseen by the POCA under Section 4, 4A and the CJA under 
sections 4 and 9.
374.	 Assets	 confiscated	 as	 a	 result	 of	 preventative	 and	 criminal	 confiscation	
in relation to serious and organised crime offences foreseen by article 51, 
paragraph	 3-bis	 of	 the	 Italian	Code	 of	 Criminal	 Procedure,	 e.g.	mafia-related	
crimes, organised crime, counterfeiting, trafficking in human beings, etc. For a 
detailed breakdown of the types of offences related to the data for which the 
analysis has been carried out see 12.5 and Methodological Annex.
375.	Assets	seized	and	confiscated	 in	relation	to	serious	and	organised	crime	
offences,	 including	 organised	 crime,	 mafia-related	 crimes,	 drug	 trafficking,	
trafficking in human beings, etc. For a detailed breakdown of the types of 
offences related to the data for which the analysis has been carried out see 12.5 
and Methodological Annex.
376.	Only	the	total	value	of	confiscated	assets	is	available,	so	it	is	not	comparable	
to the other available data in this table.
377. OC offences: drugs, human trafficking, weapon trafficking, ITTP, 
counterfeiting,	 illegal	 gambling,	 fraud	 (see	 Table	 102	 and	 the	 Methodological	
Annex).
378.	Only	the	total	value	of	confiscated	assets	is	available,	so	it	is	not	comparable	
to the other available data in this table
379.	 Under	 the	 Powers	 of	 Criminal	 Courts	 (Sentencing)	 Act	 2000	 or	 POCA	
2002. See Section 12.8.
•		 Third,	there	are	problems in the disposal/management 
phase:	 confiscated	 companies	 are	 difficult	 to	 manage	
(Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Donato,	 Saporito,	 &	 Scognamiglio,	
2013;	OAS,	 2014b	and	Section	 12.5)	 and	 this	may	 lead	 to	
the	sub-optimal	use	of	confiscation	against	businesses,	or	
may	induce	prosecutors	to	avoid	the	seizure	of	companies	
unless strictly necessary.
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Each of these three issues needs to be addressed separately: 
from an investigative	perspective,	e.g.	by	improving	financial	
investigation techniques, from a regulatory perspective, 
e.g. allowing extended confiscation	 and	 easing	 the	 seizure	
of companies, as well from a management perspective, by 
improving	 the	 management	 of	 confiscated	 companies,	 for	
example by supporting judicial administrators with stronger 
managerial	 skills	 (see	 Chapter	 13	 for	 a	 wider	 discussion	 on	
research and policy implications).
Figure 53 shows the average percentages, for each of the 
four	macro	types	of	assets,	calculated	on	five	out	of	the	seven	
OCP	 countries	 (Finland,	 France,	 Ireland,	 Italy,	 Spain.	 For	 the	
Netherlands and UK only data on value are available and are 
not taken into account). Movable assets (including cash) 
represent approximately 60% of the total number of assets 
confiscated.	 The	 percentage	 is	 even	 higher	 after	 excluding	
Italy.
What is the trend of confiscated assets in the seven OCP 
countries?
However, despite the problems highlighted above, it should be 
pointed out that the number of seizures and confiscations 
in relation to serious and organised crime assets has been 
increasing throughout Europe, and especially in certain 
countries.
This trend will gain further momentum with implementation 
of the Confiscation directive	 (Directive	 2014/42/EU)	 and	
with stronger international cooperation among national AROs, 
in the framework of EU ARO Platform or the Camden Assets 
Recovery	Interagency	Network	(CARIN).	
Although the trend is similar in most EU MS, Figure 54 focuses 
on 3 OCP countries for which data are available with a 
significant	time	series:	Ireland	(CAB),	Italy	(ANBSC)	and	Spain	
(PNSD).	
Figure 54 – Trend in the number of confiscated assets in 
three OCP countries (2005-2012)
Source: T ranscrime elaboration on ANBSC, CAB and PNSD data
In addition, it should be noted that together with an increase in 
the	number	of	confiscated	assets,	many	countries	also	record	
an increase in their value. In France, according to AGRASC, 
the	 total	 value	 of	 confiscated	 assets	 increased	 five	 times	 in	
two years, from 212.8 million euro in 2011 to 1,148.5 euro in 2013 
(see	12.3).	Also	in	the	Netherlands	a	significant	increase	since	
2005	can	be	highlighted	(see	12.6).
In	 the	 following	Sections	 the	 specific	 situation	of	 the	 7	OCP	
countries will be described providing an in-depth analysis 
of	 the	 application	 of	 seizure	 and	 confiscation	 in	 the	 field	 of	
serious and organised crime at national level.
Figure 53 – Average percentages per macro type of assets 
confiscated in five OCP countries380
Source: Transcrime elaboration on ANBSC, CAB, PATJA, PNSD and AGRASC 
data
362.	Arithmetic	average	calculated	on	five	databases:	ANBSC	(Italy	–	see	12.5),	
CAB	(Ireland	–	see	12.4),	PATJA	(Finland	-	12.2),	PNSD	(Spain	–	see	12.7)	and	data	
on	seizures	from	AGRASC	(France	–	see	12.3).
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12.2.1. Introduction 
Data	 on	 confiscated	 assets	 –	 forfeiture	 based	 on	 a	 criminal	
offence decided by the Court on the request of the prosecutor 
(see	 Section	 10.3	 for	 details)	 –	 that	 are	 confiscated	 from	
organised crime are not recorded systematically by any 
organisation in Finland. 
Moreover, only the Police database includes a category 
for classifying cases as organised crime (see	 below), 
while all the other databases, including those of the Finnish 
Asset Recovery Office, Financial Intelligence Unit, National 
Administrative Office for Enforcement, National Board of 
Patents and Registration of Finland and Legal Register Centre, 
do not. For this reason it is very difficult to identify cases or to 
collect	 statistics	on	confiscated	assets	 in	 relation	 to	 serious	
and organised crime.381 
For this reason, although, as widely illustrated in Section 8.1, 
OCGs in Finland largely invest illicit proceeds in the legitimate 
economy, it is hard to estimate how much and which of these 
criminal assets are actually recovered by the Finnish 
authorities.
Methodological remarks 
In order to obtain quantitative and qualitative information on 
assets	 confiscated	 from	 OCGs	 in	 Finland,	 the	 best	 option	
is to use the Police Information System (Patja), which is 
maintained	by	the	National	Police	Board	(under	the	Ministry	of	
the Interior). The police record in Patja information about crime 
reports and measures of executive assistance. Information is 
available	e.g.	on	crimes,	suspects’	personal	details,	 locations,	
addresses, crime-related assets, and coercive measures such 
as	 prohibition	 of	 transfer	 and	 confiscation	 for	 security.	 The	
added value of Patja is that it includes a classification and 
definition of organised crime,382 so that registered cases 
regarding	OC	can	be	filtered	and	identified	accordingly.	
However, there are some weaknesses in the Patja register:
•		 First,	 the	OC classification is not used systematically, 
e.g. if the connection to OC is found later during the pre-
trial investigations, it is not always marked retrospectively. 
•		 Similarly,	 nor	 are	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 state	 of	 the	 seizure 
recorded in the Patja retrospectively after the trial, 
so	 that	 the	 final	 outcome	 of	 the	 seizure	 or	 the	 type	 of	
confiscation,	e.g.	if	it	is	forfeiture	based	on	criminal	offence	
decided by the court, is unknown.
•		 It	 is	 also	 impossible to say in which phase of the 
confiscation process the data are collected.383
•		 In	 addition,	 the	 results	 of	 the	 searches	 are	 not	
comprehensive, because access is forbidden to those 
sections and cases in Patja that contain confidential and 
restricted information. It is also practically impossible to 
assess the proportion of lost information. 
•		 In	 addition,	 the	 number of cases is not shown in the 
database, so that it is impossible to say whether the 
confiscations	pertain	to	one	or	more	cases.384
12.2.2. Analysis 
Types and trends
The results come from two different searches conducted in the 
Patja register, both of them with the timeframe from January 
1, 2005 until June 30, 2013	(see	details	in	the	Methodological	
annex).	 The	 confiscated	 assets	 were	 classified	 into	 four	
macro-types, as explained above: real estate, companies, 
registered assets, and other movable assets. 
As depicted in Figure 55, there were altogether 302 assets 
confiscated	for	serious	and	organised	crime	between	January	
2005	and	June	2013.	Most	of	the	confiscated	assets	 in	both	
the databases are movable assets. The other notable 
macrotype is registered assets.
Figure 55 – Confiscated assets per macrotype in Finland 
(2005-2013)
Source: PCF elaboration on data from Police Information System, Patja
381. Options regarding the registers of the above-mentioned organisations 
would have been either to make searches with titles of crimes typical of OC or 
to use personal details of OCG members. The crimes typical of OC comprise a 
large set of mixed titles, and most of these crimes are typically committed by 
persons other than OC members. Therefore this search strategy would produce 
a mass of search results of cases with a potential linkage to OC, making the 
analysis very laborious. Moreover, in order to use the personal details of the 
members of the OCGs, separate permission would have been needed from the 
National Police Board and the Office of the Data Protection. The search in the 
above-mentioned registers would also have cost a notable sum of money since 
there is a charge for some of the registers. 
382.	The	classification	 for	OC	 in	 the	Patja	 includes	 four	criteria	which	slightly	
differ	from	the	EU	criteria	for	OC.	A	case	can	be	classified	as	pertaining	to	OC	if	
the actions meet all the following minimum criteria: 
1. There is cooperation between more than two persons.
2. There is a suspicion of the commission of serious offences.
3. It has been going on for a long time.
4.	It	is	motivated	by	substantial	profit	or	power.
383.	The	 state	 of	 the	 confiscation	can	be	 "precautionary	measure",	 "seizure",	
"confiscation"	or	"returned	to	owner".
384. Another caveat, as already mentioned in Section 8.1, is the impossibility of 
obtaining extensive lists of the possessions from the OC, since especially the 
most experienced OC members launder illegal proceeds by reporting the assets 
under the names of strawmen. This, as mentioned, makes it difficult for the law 
enforcement authorities to trace the assets to criminals or the real owners. 
Therefore,	 data	 on	 confiscated	 assets	 gathered	 from	Patja	 can	be	 seen	 as	 a	
proxy	for	assets	confiscated	from	criminal	groups	which	indirectly	indicates	OC	
assets, but this is not a comprehensive and updated picture of the situation of 
the OC portfolio in Finland.
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Movable	assets	represent	about	63%	of	the	total	(190	items)	
and consist mainly of cash	 (about	85	%	of	 the	confiscated	
movables). The sums vary from a few euro to hundreds of 
thousands	of	euro.	Also	some	bank	accounts	(11),	jewellery	(6)	
and	stock	certificates	(11)	of	e.g.	apartments	(with	values	up	to	
800,000	euro)	have	been	confiscated.	
The search of the Police Information System revealed the 
confiscation	of	only	nine	real	estate	properties,	and	not	a	single	
company. Real estate properties represented roughly 3% 
of	 all	 confiscated	 items.	The	 values	of	 the	properties	 varied	
from 15,000 euro to 200,000 euro, while in three cases the 
value	was	unknown.	The	offences	related	to	confiscated	real	
estates were two frauds and one drug trafficking, tax fraud, 
money laundering, extortion, doping offence and alcohol 
offence.
Figure 56 - Confiscated movable assets per number and 
value in Finland (2005-2013)
Source: PCF elaboration on data from Police Information System, Patja
An	 analysis	 of	 the	 values	 of	 movable	 assets	 (cash,	 bank	
accounts,	 jewellery	and	stock	certificates)	 is	shown	in	Figure	
56. 
Box 43 - Amphetamines, strawmen, luxury cars 
and real estate properties
In a large-scale amphetamines case, the money 
acquired from the illegal drug trafficking was invested 
in	 a	 house	 and	 an	 expensive	 Mercedes-Benz,	 which	
were registered under the names of companies owned 
by	close	relatives	of	the	suspect	(Patja).
In	all	cases,	 the	country	requesting	confiscation	of	 the	asset	
was	Finland.	Almost	all	 of	 the	confiscations	were	also	made	
in	Finland,	except	for	one	carried	out	in	Tallinn,	Estonia	(cash	
from a Finnish suspect in a drug trafficking case) and two in 
Stockholm,	Sweden	(two	cars	from	a	Finnish	suspect	in	a	case	
regarding professional receiving offences). 
Geographical distribution
The	 locations	 of	 the	 confiscations	 vary	 from	 South	 to	
North Finland, concentrating in the richest areas with large 
populations and criminal opportunities where the influence 
of	the	OC	is	known	to	be	strong	(see	Section	4.1).	Most	of	the	
confiscations	 were	 recorded	 in	 the	 province of Uusimaa 
(147 items), which includes the three big cities of the Helsinki 
metropolitan area: Helsinki (56), Vantaa (44) and Espoo 
(20). Other cities that often appeared in the databases were 
Tampere	(25),	Joensuu	(15),	Rovaniemi	(9),	Turku	(8),	and	Oulu	
(8),	which	are	also	rich	regions	of	the	Finnish	OCGs	(see	Figure	
57 and Figure 58). 
The	 most	 significant	 groups	 are	 active	 throughout	 the	
country and are expanding their operations in new areas 
logistically	significant	from	the	point	of	view	of	 illegal	activity	
(see	Sections	5.1	and	8.1).	Confiscated	assets	concentrate	 in	
the areas which are strong regions of the Finnish OCGs, like 
the Helsinki metropolitan area, the city of Tampere, South-
East Finland close to the routes leading to Russia and to 
the sea, Northern Finland close to the land border between 
Finland and Sweden, and South-West Finland close to the sea 
routes	to	Sweden	and	other	Baltic	Sea	ports	(NBI,	2013).	
Box 41 - Confiscation of movable assets between 
Finland and Estonia
Significant	 sums	 of	 euro	 and	 Estonian	 crowns,	 stock	
certificates	 and	 money	 in	 bank	 accounts	 were	
confiscated	 in	 an	 OC	 case	 of	 aggravated	 tax	 fraud	
in which large amounts of alcohol and tobacco were 
brought	from	Estonia	and	resold	in	Finland	(Patja)
As anticipated in 8.1, the other notable macro-type was 
registered	 assets	 (103	 items,	 about	 34%	 of	 the	 total),	 of	
which the majority were motor vehicles, mainly cars and 
motorcycles. As discussed in 8.1, these may be linked to 
some	 OCGs’	 cultures	 (e.g.	 motorcycles for OMCGs) or 
used in illegal activities. The values of the motor vehicles 
were usually not available, but, when available, it varied from 
a few thousand to 50,000 euro. The motor vehicles were 
confiscated	 especially	 in	 cases	 of	 aggravated	 narcotics	
offences and tax frauds.
Box 42 - Ferrari and BMWs as proceeds of aggra-
vated drug and money-laundering offences
An	 expensive	 Ferrari	 Testarossa	 was	 confiscated	
in a case of aggravated money laundering, in which 
an attempt was made to conceal the origin of the 
proceeds of crime and loan arrangements by bringing 
the valuable car from Spain to Helsinki. In another 
case of aggravated money laundering, which included 
also aggravated narcotics offences, the suspect tried 
to transfer his possessions, for example a valuable 
BMW, under the name of his girlfriend in order to avoid 
confiscation	measures.	Also	several	stock	certificates,	
with	 values	 up	 to	 800,000	 euro,	 were	 confiscated	
because	they	had	been	used	to	cover	illegal	profits	and	
change	them	into	cash	(Patja).
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Figure 57 – Geographical distribution of assets confiscated 
in Finland (NUTS 2)385
Figure 58 – Geographical distribution of assets confiscated 
in Finland (NUTS 3)386
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Figure 59 – Confiscated assets per type of offence in 
Finland
Related offences
Illicit drug trafficking	 was	 the	most	 common	 offence	 (120	
assets, about 40 % of the total). Another common type of 
offence	 in	 connection	with	 the	 confiscations	was	economic 
crime.	 There	 were	 tax	 frauds	 (40),	 frauds	 (23),	 money	
laundering	 (21),	 extortions	 (13),	 counterfeiting	 of	 means	 of	
payment	(9)	and	accounting	offences	(7).	Almost	all	of	these	
offences were of aggravated form. 
The	 confiscations	 were	 also	 connected	 to	 alcohol	 offences	
(18),	receiving	offences	(15),	illicit	arms	trafficking	(11),	robberies	
(11),	thefts	(8),	human	trafficking	(7),	manslaughter	or	attempted	
manslaughter	(6),	and	doping	offences	(5).	It	was	not	possible	
to include all different offences in the search.
Organised crime group and nationality of owners
Almost	57%,	or	171	out	of	the	302	items,	was	confiscated	from	
the	four	largest	OCGs	(of	which	three	are	motorcycle gangs 
used in the second search in the Police Information System. Of 
this	figure,	 the	relative	share	of	Bandidos MC	was	44	%	(75),	
Cannonball	MC	38	%	(65),	United	Brotherhood	12	%	(20)	and	
Hells	Angels	MC	6	%	(11).	There	were	also	some	references	to	
Estonian OCGs in the databases. 
However, it is necessary to be cautious in drawing conclusions 
because the name of the OCG was not mentioned in every 
385.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
386.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
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case.	Moreover,	because	most	of	the	confiscated	assets	for	all	
the groups were cash or motor vehicles, it was not possible to 
differentiate criminal groups in terms of their asset portfolios 
or investment strategies solely on the basis of an analysis of 
confiscated	assets
In almost all cases the nationality of the owner of the asset 
was Finnish	 (280	 items,	or	about	93	%).	Other	nationalities	
However, the information analysed reaffirms the overall picture 
of the state of OC in Finland, in particular in terms of typical 
criminal activities (with illicit drug trafficking and economic 
crimes	offences	most	frequently	related	to	confiscation) and 
geographical distribution (with	confiscation	concentrating	
in areas where the influence of criminal groups is known to be 
strong). 
In	 terms	 of	 types	 of	 assets,	 there	 are	 only	 few	 confiscated	
real estate properties and no companies at all. Patja yields a 
picture of an organised crime portfolio consisting mostly of 
cash and motor vehicles. But the police intelligence reports 
give more diverse information: as well described in Section 8.1, 
based on intelligence, court cases and media reports there 
is evidence that criminal groups do invest in real estate 
properties and can exploit company structures	 (e.g.	 in	
construction and the restaurant business). 
Especially in recent years, money laundering has become 
more systematic and professional, employing business 
structures, companies and professionals both at home 
and	 abroad.	 Especially	 in	 the	 field	 of	 financial	 crime,	 the	
exploitation of legitimate businesses is an integral part of 
the illegal activity of upper-level OC in Finland. As illustrated 
in	Section	8.1	infiltration	of	business	activities	is	an	important	
means not only to establish relations with the licit sphere, gain 
influence, and obtain critical information, but also to make and 
launder illegal money and carry out other criminal activities. 
Therefore, it is quite likely that companies and real estate 
properties cannot be found in the Police Information System 
because the holdings of the upper-level OCG members, who 
probably invest in companies and immovable properties, are 
often reported under legal fronts and reliable facades which 
may make it harder for the police to trace and confiscate 
the assets. But it is also conceivable that the law enforcement 
agents	have	limited	capabilities	to	confiscate	companies	and	
real estates, whereas cash and motor vehicles are easier 
targets.
Finally, it is worth noting that, as said in Section 8.1, most of the 
activities of Finnish OCG members may be quite small scale. 
The lower-level members of crime groups live hand-to-mouth 
and commit crimes only in order to satisfy their daily 
needs. The small sums of money that they earn from criminal 
activities go to everyday costs, and there may be nothing 
left to buy properties or invest. This can be seen in the data 
gathered from the Patja register: altogether, there were not 
that	many	confiscated	assets,	and	the	ones	found	were	mainly	
quite small sums of money or motor vehicles. But is this the 
real picture of the phenomenon?
Figure 60 – Assets confiscated from the main criminal 
groups in Finland
Box 44 - Confiscation from Russian criminal 
groups involved in sexual exploitation
In an aggravated pandering case, notable sums of 
money	 were	 confiscated	 from	 Russian	 suspects.	 In	
another case, a Russian suspect hid over 50,000 euro 
inside his jacket when being arrested for aggravated 
counterfeiting	of	means	of	payment	(Patja).
which appeared more than once in the databases were 
Russian (12), Estonian (4), and Swedish (2). This can 
be seen as a consequence of the fact that the cooperation 
partners of the Finnish OCGs mainly come from the 
neighbouring countries of Estonia, Russia and Sweden.
The	dates	of	the	seizures	and	confiscations	together	with	the	
type/state	of	the	confiscation	are	not	recorded	systematically	
in the Patja, nor marked retrospectively after the trial. 
Consequently, they are excluded from the analysis. It is 
impossible	to	say	in	which	phase	of	the	confiscation	process	
the data were collected.
12.2.3. Concluding remarks 
The	 data	 on	 confiscated	 assets	 gathered	 from	 the	 Police	
Information System, Patja, give examples of the types and 
values of the assets confiscated from organised crime in 
Finland. Also the data on actors, offences and locations of 
the	confiscations	must	be	 taken	as	proxies	without	aspiring	
to provide a comprehensive and actual picture of the 
phenomenon. 
Source: PCF elaboration on Patja data
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12.3.1. Introduction
As highlighted in Section 10.4, the recent improvements in the 
regulation on asset recovery in France and the creation of the 
AGRASC agency have led to expansion and enrichment in 
the quantity and the quality of data	on	confiscated	assets.	
At the national level, statistics are collected by two main 
institutions	(Ministère	de	la	Justice,	2013):387 
•		 PIAC (Plateforme d’Identification des Avoirs 
Criminels), which is a specialised law enforcement 
unit,	 established	 in	 2005,	 dedicated	 to	 financial	 and	
patrimonial	investigation	and	to	identifying	and	centralizing	
all	 information	 on	 criminal	 assets	 (including	 properties,	
movable	assets	and	financial	flows	and	assets	identified	as	
illegal and detected both in France and abroad).
•		 AGRASC (Agence de Gestion et de Recouvrement des 
Avoirs Saisis et Confisqués), which is in charge of the 
management	 of	 seized	 and	 confiscated	 assets,	 including	
cash, bank accounts and the money received from assets 
sold	before	judgement	(see	Section	10.4).
Thanks to the collaboration of AGRASC, two types of statistics 
were accessed for the purpose of the analysis presented in 
this Section:
1. The aggregate data on seized and confiscated assets 
provided	 in	 the	 AGRASC’s	 annual	 reports	 for	 2011,	 2012	
and	 2013	 (respectively	 AGRASC,	 2012;	 AGRASC,	 2013;	
AGRASC, 2014). 
2. A limited dataset, provided by AGRASC for the purpose 
of the OCP Project in June 2013, including information on 
56 assets definitively confiscated between 2008 and 
2012 in relation to serious and organised crime.388 
The	 following	 Sections	 present	 an	 analysis	 of	 confiscated	
assets	in	France	focusing	mainly	on	the	first	database.	A	short	
analysis of the second set of statistics is also provided.
12.3.2. Analysis
Types and trends
•		 As	a	 result	of	 the	developments	 in	 the	 legislation	and	the	
introduction and consolidation of new tools in the asset 
recovery	and	management	process	in	France	(see	Section	
10.4),	the	number	and	the	value	of	seized	and	confiscated	
assets managed by AGRASC have grown steadily since 
its establishment (Table	91).
In	 2013,	 the	 seized	 and	 confiscated	 assets	 managed	 by	
AGRASC reached almost 57,000 units, increasing by more 
than 6 times since 2011,	 the	first	year	of	activity	(AGRASC,	
2014). In turn, the value of managed assets increased from 212 
million	euro	in	2011	to	1.1	billion	euro	(+440%)	in	2013.
Inspection of the breakdown by type of assets shows, as in 
most EU member states, that the vast majority of seized 
and confiscated assets in France consist of cash and 
bank accounts, which represent more than 85% of the total 
(see	Figure	61	and	Figure	62).	Real	estate	represents	a	minor	
share	 (1.6%	on	 average),	 but	 in	 any	 case	 higher	 than	 that	 of	
companies	 (only	 two	 companies	 were	 confiscated	 between	
2011 and 2013). However, in terms of value, real estate 
represents more than 50% of the total value	of	seized	and	
confiscated	assets,	and	increased	by	45%	between	2012	and	
2013	(see	values	in	Table	91).
On average, real estate has the highest value per asset 
(more	 than	 600	 thousand	 euro),	 followed	 by companies 
(Table	93).	Also	the	value	of	other	movable	assets	is	high,	due	
mainly	 to	 the	 contribution	 of	 receivables/credits	 (about	 90	
thousand euro on average).
387. Other agencies that collect and exchange information that might be linked 
to/related	 to	 criminal	 assets	 are:	 1)	 the	 FICOBA,	 a	 centralised	 bank	 system	
which	registers	and	exchanges	(upon	judicial	request)	information	on	any	kind	of	
bank	account;	2)	The	Real	Estate	Property	registry,	which	contains	information	
on	 real	 estate	 properties,	 developed	 land	 and	 non-developed	 land;	 3)	 The	
National	Asset	Database	(BNDP),	that	keeps	track	of	any	transfer	of	ownership,	
regardless	 of	 the	 exchange	 of	 payment;	 4)	 The	 Register	 of	 Commerce	 and	
Companies	(Registre	du	Commerce	et	des	Sociétés	-	RCS)	identifies	ownership	
and	shareholders	as	well	as	providing	financial	information	on	any	business	and	
commercial	 activity.	 (Ministère	 de	 la	 Justice,	 2013)	Note	 that	 in	 France	 other	
company registers exist.
388.	Provided	for	each	record	are	details	on	the	type	of	assets	 (house,	boats,	
cars),	sub-type	of	assets,	location	of	the	asset	at	Local	Administrative	Unit	(LAU	
2)	level,	crime	associated	with	the	confiscated	asset,	as	well	as	information	on	
the nationality of the perpetrators. Some information on the value of the assets 
is also available for a few records.
Figure 61 - Breakdown by macro-type of seized and 
confiscated assets in France (stock 2013)
12.3. France                                                                                                                                 
Diana Camerini and Michele Riccardi (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on AGRASC Data (AGRASC 2014)
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Geographical distribution
In terms of geographical distribution, the areas recording the 
highest	 number	 of	 seized	 and	 confiscated	 assets	 are	 those	
that concentrate also the most evidence of organised crime 
infiltration	 (see	 Section	 8.1).	 In	 particular,	 they	 concentrate	
in the Île-de-France region	 (Paris	 area).	 According	 to	
the	 statistics	 on	 cash	 and	 real	 estate	 seizures	 published	
by	 AGRASC	 (2013),	 Île-de-France records the highest 
percentage	of	cases	of	seized	real	estate	(27.6%),	whereas	the	
value	of	cash	seized	in	this	region	accounts	for	47%	of	all	cash	
seizures	registered	 in	France.	The	second	most	represented	
regions are Provence-Alpes-Côte d›Azur	 for	 seized	 cash	
(in	 terms	 of	 value)	 and	 Nord-Pas-de-Calais,	 followed	 by	
Rhône-Alpes	 for	 real	 estate	 (in	 terms	of	 number	of	 seizures	
registered).	This	is	consistent	with	findings	on	investments	by	
OCGs	(see	Section	8.2).
Macrotype
2011 2012 2013
Number
Value (mn 
euro)
Number
Value (mn 
euro)
Number
Value (mn 
euro)
Real Estate 225 97.2 621 402.4 967 586.7
Cash and bank accounts 11,698 102.8 32,961 401.7 49,362 404.1
Registered assets 717 7.5 1,922 1.6 2,438 20.4
Companies 1 0.3 1 0.3 2 0.5
Other movable assets 532 5.0 1,844 171.8 2,739 135.9
Miscellaneous 181 0.1 945 2.1 1,439 0.9
TOTAL 13,354 212.8 38,294 979.8 56,947 1148.5
aTotals may not sum up due to rounding
Table 92 - Stock of seized and confiscated assets per year and macrotype – Number and value
Figure 62 - Breakdown of macro-type of seized and 
confiscated assets by value in France (stock 2013)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on AGRASC Data (AGRASC 2014)
Asset macro-category 
Average 
values (euro)
Real Estate 607,000
Cash and bank accounts 8,000
Registered assets 8,000
Companies 250,000
Other movable assets 50,000
Miscellaneous 1,000
TOTAL 20,000
Table 93 - Average unitary values of seized assets (stock 
2013)
Large urban areas account for an important part of 
assets recovered in France: in regions where the population 
density	is	higher	than	100	people	per	square	km,	seized	cash	
amounts on average to 2.73 million euro in less populated 
regions;	 the	 average	 amount	 of	 cash	 seized	 is	 equal	 to	0.49	
million	euro.	The	same	goes	for	real	estate	seizures	(with	8.86	
real	estate	seizures in densely populated regions, versus 2.91 
in departments with lower population density).
Related offences
Drug trafficking is the most frequent related offence 
recorded	 in	 the	AGRASC	database	 (AGRASC,	2013).	Assets	
seized	for	drug	crimes	remarkably	increased	in	2013	(+	54.2%	
with respect to the previous years), constituting 67.5% of total 
seized	 assets.	 The	 AGRASC	 data	 reveal	 that	 thefts are in 
second place,	but	their	number	is	significantly	lower	than	drug	
Source: Transcrime elaboration on AGRASC Data (AGRASC 2014)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on AGRASC Data (AGRASC 2014)
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Region
Cash Real estate
Total cash seizures 
(in million euro)
% of total 
cash seizures
Total number of real 
estate seizures
% of total real 
estate seizures
Alsace 2.6 1.9% 7 1.4%
Aquitaine 4.8 3.6% 27 5.4%
Auvergne 1.2 0.9% 4 0.8%
Basse-Normandie 1.3 1.0% 5 1.0%
Bourgogne 1.0 0.8% 10 2.0%
Bretagne 1.8 1.3% 23 4.6%
Centre 3.5 2.6% 6 1.2%
Champagne-Ardenne 1.3 0.9% 12 2.4%
Corse 0.5 0.4% 3 0.6%
Franche-Comté 1.2 0.9% 6 1.2%
Haute-Normandie 1.7 1.3% 13 2.6%
Île-de-France 63.5 47.0% 138 27.6%
Languedoc-Roussillon 5.0 3.7% 7 1.4%
Limousin 0.8 0.6% 17 3.4%
Lorraine 4.0 3.0% 24 4.8%
Midi-Pyrénées 2.7 2.0% 34 6.8%
Nord - Pas-de-Calais 9.4 6.9% 55 11.0%
Pays de la Loire 1.1 0.8% 6 1.2%
Picardie 1.3 1.0% 5 1.0%
Poitou-Charentes 0.8 0.6% 12 2.4%
Provence-Alpes-Côte	d'Azur 15.7 11.6% 32 6.4%
Rhône-Alpes 10.0 7.4% 54 10.8%
TOTAL 135.2 100% 500 100%
Table 94 - Total and average seized cash (in value) and total and average regional real estate (in number) seizures (2011-2012)
Source: AGRASC, 2013
cases.	The	classification	of	crime-types	adopted	in	the	table	
below is the one provided by AGRASC in its annual reports 
On reclassifying the offences into OCP criminal activities and 
illicit markets covered in Part 1,391 it emerges that the latter 
represent more than three quarters of cases linked to 
seized and confiscated assets in the AGRASC database 
(Figure	65).
On distinguishing between drug-related and other offences, 
it emerges that cash and real estate constitute the assets 
with	 the	 highest	 value	 seized	 (44%	 and	 37%	 respectively),	
while	 for	 other	 offences	 they	 are	 real	 estate	 (41%)	 followed	
by	 bank	 accounts	 (29%).	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 that	 these	
patterns	have	been	identified	also	in	other	countries	(see	for	
example Section 12.4 on Ireland).
Focus on individual confiscated assets
Besides the publicly available AGRASC reports, it was possible 
to access also an additional portion of the AGRASC dataset 
containing a limited set of data on 56 assets confiscated 
definitively between 2008 and 2012 and under the 
management of AGRASC. The assets were selected because 
they related to serious and organised crime.
For each asset of the database, the following information is 
available
•		 Year	of	confiscation
•		 Macro-type	of	confiscated	asset	(e.g.	real	estate,	
registered asset, company, etc.)
•		 Type	of	confiscated	asset	(e.g.	flat,	villa,	car,	etc.)
•		 Country	of	the	authority	requesting	confiscation	of	the	
asset
391. Drugs, corruption, counterfeit money, money laundering, betting and 
gaming, procuring, extortion, environment, misappropriation of public funds, 
obtaining property by deception. For a detailed description of the crimes 
covered by this report see Chapter 2
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Type of offencea
2011-2012 2013
Number of assets % of Total Number of assets % of Total
Drugs 24,264 55.3% 37,411 67.5%
Theft 5,902 13.5% 8,719 15.7%
Obtaining property by deception 2,623 6.0% 3,807 6.9%
Money laundering 641 1.5% 970 1.7%
Illegal labour 621 1.4% 908 1.6%
Procuring 534 1.2% 722 1.3%
Betting and gaming 252 0.6% 430 0.8%
Forgery 193 0.4% 286 0.5%
Illegal immigrants 192 0.4% 281 0.5%
Tax evasion 102 0.2% 160 0.3%
Non-justification	of	wealth 96 0.2% 135 0.2%
Taking unfair advantage of 
weaknesses
78 0.2% 113 0.2%
Corruption 50 0.1% 71 0.1%
Terrorism 41 0.1% 54 0.1%
Counterfeit money 27 0.1% 45 0.1%
Extortion 23 0.1% 36 0.1%
Misappropriation of public funds 13 0.0% 18 0.0%
Environment 2 0.0% 3 0.0%
Other 8,189 18.7% 1,293 2.3%
TOTAL 43,843 100% 55,462 100%
a Classification	provided	by	AGRASC	in	annual	report	2013
Table 95 - Type of offences connected with seized and confiscated assets
Source: AGRASC, 2013, 2014
Figure 63 - Value of seized cash (mn euro) in France (NUTS 2)389 Figure 64 - Number of real estate seizures in France (NUTS 2)390
Legend
< 1.75
1.75 - 4.99
4.99 - 15.74
<15.74
Legend
< 13
14 - 34
35 - 55
> 55
389	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
390.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
Source: Transcrime elaboration on AGRASC Data (AGRASC 2014) Source: Transcrime elaboration on AGRASC Data (AGRASC 2014)
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•		 Country	of	location	of	the	asset,	with	details	up	to	LAU2	
level	(municipality)
•		 Nationality	of	the	owner/shareholder
•		 Confiscation-related	offence
•		 Type	of	confiscation:	conviction-based	versus	extended	
conviction
•		 Value	of	the	asset	(many	data	are	missing)
•		 Other	information
Despite the limited number of assets, given the many 
details available, this dataset aids understanding of some 
characteristics	of	confiscated	assets	in	France	that	cannot	be	
identified	 with	 the	 analysis	 of	 AGRASC	 aggregate	 statistics	
provided in annual reports.
Out	 of	 56	 confiscated	 assets,	 49	 are	 real	 estate	 properties	
(88%),	3	are	 registered	assets	 (5%)	and	4	are	movable	non-
registered assets. No companies are included in the dataset. 
As regards real estate, 37 assets are confiscated houses, 4 
are	buildings,	6	are	 registered	as	 ‘land’.	The	 three	 registered	
assets are all boats, whereas among the non-registered 
assets	 the	dataset	 reports	 only	 on	 confiscation	of	 cash	and	
bank	accounts	(Figure	67).
In terms of geographic location, 48 assets are located in France 
(as	 at	 the	moment	 of	 confiscation),	 whereas	 the	 others	 are	
located in Spain, Romania (2	assets	each),	and	the	remaining	
ones in Italy, Belgium, Germany and Switzerland.
Among the assets located in France, the great majority of 
them are located in Île-de-France	 (37.5%),	 Rhône-Alpes 
(16.7%)	 and	 in	 Provence-Alpes-Côte d›Azur	 (10.4%).	 It	 is	
interesting	to	note	that	almost	all	assets	confiscated	in	the	Île-
de-France region are located outside the Department of Paris, 
whereas	 those	 in	 the	 Provence-Alpes-Côte	 d›Azur	 are	 all	 in	
the extreme south-east Department of Alpes-Maritimes.
As far as the actors are concerned, most criminals from whom 
assets	 have	 been	 confiscated	 are	 French	 nationals	 (70%),	
followed by Algerian	 nationals	 (16%),	 and	 by	 Italians and 
Romanians. Assets linked to Italian shareholders or owners 
are real estate located in the Alpes-Maritimes Department, 
whereas those linked to Algerians are located in the regions 
of	 Rhône-Alpes	 and	 Île-de-France.	 Although	 the	 number	 of	
observations	 in	 the	 dataset	 is	 not	 significant,	 these	 figures	
reflect the geographical distribution of OCG investments as 
described in Section 8.2 on investments in France. 
12.3.3. Concluding remarks
On the basis of the analysis, some issues can be highlighted:
•		 As	in	many	other	European	countries	(see	Chapter	11	and	
12.1),	 most	 of	 confiscated	 assets	 in	 France	 refer	 to	 cash 
and bank accounts. Real estate represents a minor share 
(in	 terms	 of	 number),	 while	 confiscation	 of	 companies	 is	
almost non-existent.
•		 In	terms of value, also real estate	constitutes	a	significant	
portion	 of	 the	 portfolio	 confiscated	 from	 criminal	
organisations,	 thus	 confirming	 that	 properties	 (especially	
high-valued villas or houses) can be a preferred target for 
the	investment	of	illegal	proceeds	(see	Section	8.2).
•		 In	 terms	 of	 the	 geographical	 distribution	 of	 assets,	
confiscation	activity	by	French	agencies	seems	to	address	
Figure 66 - Breakdown of assets seized for drug-related 
offences versus other offences, in values (2011-2012)
Figure 67 - Breakdown of confiscated assets by type of 
asset in France
Source: Transcrime elaboration on AGRASC Data 2012
Source: Transcrime elaboration on AGRASC Data (AGRASC 2013)
OCP illicit 
markets and 
other euro 
crimes
78.5%
Other crimes 
21.5%
N = 55,462
Figure 65 - Macro-type of crime associated with asset seized 
and confiscated in France (stock 2013)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on AGRASC Data (AGRASC 2014)
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primarily those regions that, according to the evidence 
collected and discussed in Section 8.2, are particularly 
affected	by	OCG	infiltration.	In	particular,	most	seized	and	
confiscated	assets	concentrate	in	the	region	of	Paris (Île-
de-France) and in regions at the borders of the country, 
in	 particular	 in	 Southern	 France	 (Rhône-Alpes and 
Provence-Alpes-Côte D’Azur) and on the border with 
Belgium	(Nord-Pas-de-Calais). 
•		 This,	 as	 anticipated	 in	 Section	 8.2,	 may	 be	 due	 to	 the	
presence in these regions of criminal groups active 
in both illegal markets and laundering activities. In 
particular, evidence of investments by local OCGs, Italian 
OCGs	 (especially	 ‘Ndrangheta)	and	Russian	OCGs	 in	 the	
real	 estate	 sector	 of	Southern	France	 (in	 particular	Côte 
d’Azur)	has	been	found.	
•		 Similarities	can	be	also	highlighted	 in	terms	of	the actors 
involved: besides French nationals, assets have been 
confiscated	 from	 North	 African	 (in	 particular	 Algerians),	
Italian	 and	Romanian	 criminals.	 The	 first	mainly	 invest	 in	
the Rhône-Alpes	while	Italians’	assets	were	detected	in	the	
Department	of	Alpes-Maritimes	(which	includes	a	portion	
of the Côte	D’Azur).
In	conclusion,	criminal	asset	recovery	in	France	has	significantly	
improved in recent years due to the introduction of new 
legislative tools	 (see	 10.4)	and	 the	 full implementation of 
good practices	 in	 the	 identification	 and	 seizure	 of	 criminal	
assets,	 and	 in	 the	 management	 of	 confiscated	 ones.	 The	
strengthened activity has led to a growth not only in the number 
and value of goods but also in international cooperation, 
with	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 assets	 confiscated	 abroad	
(mostly	in	neighbouring	countries).	
However, future challenges remain: despite the interest of 
criminal organisations in investments in companies in France, 
including both small kebab kiosks and larger businesses 
(see	 8.2),	 the	 number of confiscated companies is still 
very limited. This gap needs to be addressed in order more 
effectively to undermine the portfolios of criminal groups and 
stop	their	infiltration	of	the	legitimate	economy.	
To this end, it seems particularly important to improve the 
management of confiscated companies in the country: 
good management is a necessary pre-condition for effective 
confiscation.	 In	 this	 regard,	 recent initiatives promoted 
at national level	 (such	 as	 the	 conference	 “Thorough	
management	of	 seized	and	confiscated	assets:	How	are	 the	
AGRASC›s	institutional	partners	involved?”	organised	on	the	
20th June 2014 by AGRASC in cooperation with the Conseil 
Supérieur du Notariat) can ensure a wider dissemination of 
best practices and more effective cooperation with foreign 
agencies with particular regard to the management of 
confiscated	businesses.
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12.4.1. Introduction
As already underlined in previous chapters, Ireland has been 
adopting effective measures to contrast money laundering 
activities	 and	OCGs	 infiltration	 in	 the	 legal	 economy	 and	 to	
remove	proceeds	of	crimes	from	criminal	organisations	(see	
Section 8.3 and 10.5). The creation of an ad hoc institution for 
the recovery, management and disposal of criminal assets, 
the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB)	 (see	 Section	 10.5),	
has not only given further impetus to this process but also 
made	 it	 possible	 to	 keep	 aggregate	 statistics	 on	 seized	 and	
confiscated	goods.	
For the purpose of this study, thanks to the collaboration of 
the CAB, data from three different data sources have been 
accessed. Each data source comprises a different set of 
information and different levels of detail: 
•		 The	first	data	set	contains	301	assets	confiscated	by	 the	
CAB since 2005 to 2012 in application of the Proceeds 
of	 Crime	 Act	 (POCA)	 1996/2005	 (hereinafter	 POCA 
database).	 In	particular,	 the	assets	are	confiscated	under	
Sections 4 and 4A of POCA	 (mostly	 related	 to	 serious	
crimes, see Section 10.5 for details) and are managed by 
the CAB. For each asset, information on the macro type 
of	 the	 asset,	 date	 of	 confiscation,	 location,	 related	 main	
offence and nationality of owner is reported. 
•		 The	 second	 data	 set	 refers	 to	 385	 confiscation	
orders issued by the Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) under the provisions of the Criminal 
Justice	Act	(CJA)	1994,	as	amended	(see	Section	10.5)	and	
in particular pursuant to Sections 4, 9 and 39.392
•		 The	 third	 data	 set	 contains	 87	 records	 gathered	 from	
the Revenue Customs	 and	 related	 to	 the	 seizure	 and	
confiscation	 of	 cash	 pursuant	 to	Part 39 CJA 1994, as 
amended.
Whilst	 the	 first	 database	 can	 be	 extensively	 analysed,	 the	
second and third databases include limited information about 
the	 sum	 or	 the	 monetary	 amount	 confiscated.	 They	 can	
therefore be subjected only to a narrow statistical analysis.
It is important to underline some limitations regarding these 
data.	 First,	 as	 mentioned	 in	 previous	 Sections,	 seized	 and	
confiscated	 assets	 represent	 only	 a	 sample	 of	 the	 universe	
of criminal assets. Second, the databases do not include data 
about	foreign	requests	for	confiscation.	Third,	although	assets	
covered by the three datasets are mostly related to serious 
crimes, it is not always possible to identify, according to public 
sources, whether they were related to OCGs.
12.4.2. Analysis
The	POCA	database	 includes	301	 assets	 confiscated	under	
section	 4	 and	4A	 of	 the	 Proceeds	 of	Crime	Act	 1996/2005	
from 2005 to 2012. The analysis will focus on the POCA 
database for several reasons:
•		 First,	 it	 includes	different	 types	of	assets	 (e.g.	 real	estate,	
registered	 assets,	 movable	 goods),	 while	 the	 DPP’s	 and	
Revenue	 Customs’	 databases	 contain	 only	 confiscated	
sums or cash.
•		 Second,	 for	each	asset	 it	provides	a	 range	of	 information	
including	 location,	 nationality	 of	 the	 owner/shareholder,	
type	of	criminal	affiliation,	business	form	(where	available)	
and	related	business	sector	(where	available).
•		 Third,	 it	 allows	 consistent	 comparisons	 and	 correlations	
with	the	aggregate	figures	reported	by	CAB	annual	reports	
(e.g.	CAB,	2010,	2011,	2012).	
Types and trends
According	to	the	available	data,	64%	of	confiscated	assets	are	
movable	goods,	and	in	particular	bank	accounts	and	cash	(see	
Figure	68).	13%	refers	to	registered	assets	(e.g.	vehicles),	while	
22% to houses and lands. Stocks and shares represent only 
less than 1% of the total number of assets.
Figure 68 – Confiscated assets in Ireland by types (POCA, 
2005-2012)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on CAB data
The	number	of	confiscated	assets	constantly	increases from 
51	 assets	 confiscated	 in	 the	 two-year	 period	 2005-2006	 to	
98	 in	 2011-2012	 (Figure	 69).	 However,	 relatively	 speaking,	
the	 confiscation	 of	 registered	 assets	 (i.e.	 vehicles)	 and	 of	
properties	 (i.e.	 houses/land)	 increases	 more	 than	 cash	 and	
movable	assets	(Figure	70).
As in many other EU MS covered by this report, movable 
goods represent, in terms of number of records, the majority of 
confiscated	assets.	In	this	regard,	Ireland	is	in	line	with	the	EU	
average	(see	Chapter	11).	Most	movable	assets	refer	to	bank 
accounts (33%) and cash (19%)	(Figure	68).	Other	movable	
assets	 include	 other	 types	 of	 accounts	 (e.g.	 online	 betting	
accounts), jewels and valuable goods, credit and other assets 
12.4. Ireland                                                                                                                                 
Cristina Soriani (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Transcrime)
392.	In	particular,	a	confiscation	order	for	cash	pursuant	to	section	39	CJA	can	
be	applied	both	by	the	Garda	Síochána	and	the	Revenue	Customs.	In	this	group,	
the	data	on	confiscation	of	cash	are	those	collected	from	the	Garda	Síochána.
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not	specified,	while	evidence	of	confiscation	of	bitcoins and 
virtual currencies	is	also	emerging	(CAB,	2014).
About	22%	of	assets	confiscated	under	section	4	and	4A	of	
POCA is real estate,	 including	 both	 land	 and	 houses	 (see	
Figure 68), which is a quite significant share if compared to 
that of other countries analysed in this report. As mentioned, 
the	number	of	properties	confiscated	has	also	 increased in 
recent years	with	respect	to	other	types	of	assets	(Figure	70).	
In fact, real estate may be considered not only a solid and safe 
investment	 for	OCGs	 (see	 the	analysis	below	 in	comparison	
with market prices) but also as functional for some illegal 
activities, because properties can be used as deposits or as 
laboratories for synthesising drugs or cultivating cannabis, 
warehouses for storing illicit or smuggled goods, or as houses 
for concealing OCG members or victims of sexual exploitation 
(see	Section	5.3	and	8.3).
Geographical distribution
Most	of	confiscated	real	estate	properties	concentrate	in	the	
Dublin area	 and,	 in	 general,	 in	 Eastern	 counties	 (Figure	 71).	
The	location	of	‘criminal’	real	estate	may	be	explained	by	where	
the	illicit	activity	was	carried	out	(e.g.	if	the	building	was	used	
as a warehouse, laboratory or brothel), or where the criminals 
lived,	 or	 linked	 to	 real	 estate	market	 prices	 (if	 the	 property	
was intended as form of investment). Figure 71 compares the 
distribution	of	confiscated	properties	with	values	of	 the	real 
estate market	 in	 Ireland	(average	house	prices	2005-2012).	
A strong correlation can be found in County Dublin, while it 
is weaker in other Irish regions. However, the available data 
do not allow more detailed analysis as carried out instead on 
other	countries	such	as	Italy	(see	Sections	8.4	and	12.5).
To be noted is that the POCA database also includes one 
confiscated	property	in	Alicante (Spain) in 2009. As already 
mentioned, Spain is used by Irish OCGs as a logistical base 
for illicit trades, mainly drug trafficking, and also as a place for 
laundering	money	(see	Section	5.3	and	8.3).
Although the database includes only 4 cases of confiscation 
of shares,394 so that no comprehensive elaboration is possible, 
in two cases the share refers to an oil supply company, 
and the related main offence is precisely fuel smuggling,395 
therefore	confirming	the	‘instrumental’	use	that	may	be	made	
of legal companies in the commission of illicit activities in 
Ireland	as	elsewhere	(see	Section	8.3	for	details).
Similar results come from an analysis of the business sectors 
of	 the	 companies	 whose	 bank	 accounts	 were	 confiscated	
(Figure	72).	 Information	on	the	business	sector	 is	available396 
for	 33	 out	 of	 the	 102	 confiscated	 bank	 accounts	 in	 the	
Figure 70 – Trend of confiscated assets by type 2005-2012 
in Ireland (Index 2005=100)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on CAB data
Figure 71 – Number of confiscated real estate properties 
(2005-2012) and average house prices in Ireland (2005-
2012, euro)393
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Source: Transcrime elaboration on CAB and Central Statistics Office data
393.	Classification	obtained	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
394.	Two	confiscation	decrees,	both	in	2007.
395. In the other case, the business sector of the company is not available and 
the related offence is drug trafficking.
396.	 Moreover,	 7	 out	 of	 8	 investment	 bonds	 confiscated	 refer	 to	 oil	 supply	
companies.
Figure 69 – Trend of confiscated assets in Ireland (POCA, 
2005-2012)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on CAB data
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database. Oil supply companies represent 21.2% of the 
database	 (excluding	 N/A,	 not	 available).374 Another activity 
that can be instrumental for illicit activities is car sales	(6.1%),	
possibly related to car theft and illicit trafficking of spare parts 
(see	 Section	 5.3).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 banking	 and	 financial	
companies	(36.4%)	may	perform	different	functions,	while	the	
significant	weight	of	entertainment and catering companies 
(more	 than	 21%	 altogether)	 which	 are	 also	 cash-intensive	
businesses, suggests the importance of these sectors in 
receiving OCG investments for money laundering purposes, 
as hypothesised in Section 8.3. 
Criminal groups and nationality of owners
As regards the nationalities of the individuals against whom 
confiscation	 orders	 have	 been	 issued	 (Table	 96),	 Irish 
nationals are the most frequently targeted, followed by 
Chinese, British and Dutch nationals. Apart from Russians, 
these nationals appear to be those most linked to the Irish 
criminal	 environment	 (see	 Section	 5.3).	 In	 particular,	 there	
is evidence of Chinese involvement in both illegal markets 
(especially	 ITTP	and	human	trafficking)	and	infiltration	in	the	
legal economy in Ireland. Instead, strong ties of Irish OCGs 
with	 both	 the	UK	 and	 the	Netherlands	 (see	 Section	 5.3	 and	
in	 particular	 An	 Garda	 Síochána	 &	 PSNI,	 2012a,	 An	 Garda	
Síochána,	2013;	Europol,	2013c;	PSNI,	2013;	Nilsson,	2013)	are	
also registered.
Related offences
All the three databases provide information on the main 
predicate offence	 to	 which	 the	 confiscation	 is	 related.	 In	
particular,	both	the	POCA	and	the	Revenue	Customs’	datasets	
include detailed information on the main offence, while the 
DPP distinguishes only between drug-related and non-drug-
related	confiscations.
The distribution of assets per main offence is reported below 
(Figure	 73,	 Figure	 74	 and	 Figure	 75).	 In	 all	 the	 three	 cases,	
most	 of	 the	 confiscated	 assets	 relate	 to	 drug trafficking 
(as	 the	 main	 predicate	 offence)	 in	 terms	 of	 both	 numbers	
(POCA	database)	and	values	(Revenue	Customs’	database).	
Drug	offences	also	 represent	a	significant	share	 (43%	of	 the	
total value) of the DPP dataset, although it is not possible to 
Figure 72 – Business sectors of companies related to 
confiscated bank accounts in Ireland: percentages of total397
Source: Transcrime elaboration on CAB data on confiscation orders under 
POCA
Nationality of the 
owner
Number of 
confiscated 
assets
% of Total (N 
= 301)
Irish 266 88.4%
Chinese 16 5.3%
British 15 5.0%
Dutch 1 0.3%
N/A	 3 1.0%
Table 96 – Nationality of persons subject to a POCA 
confiscation order (2005-2012)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on CAB data on confiscation orders under 
POCA
Figure 73 – Number of confiscated assets by main offence 
in Ireland (POCA, 2005-2012)
Figure 74 – Number of confiscation orders by main offence 
in Ireland (DPP, 1997-2013)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on CAB data
Source: Transcrime elaboration on data on confiscation orders under CJA 
legislation (DPP)
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distinguish among other crimes.
Crossing the analysis by type of assets and type of offence, it is 
possible to identify whether patterns exist in terms of portfolio 
preferences according to the main offence. The exercise can 
be conducted only on the POCA database, which is the only 
one	specifying	 the	 type	of	 the	assets	confiscated.	Figure	76	
shows some interesting results:
•		 Bank accounts	represent	the	most	frequently	confiscated	
assets in cases involving, as the main offence, prostitution, 
fraud and smuggling. 
•		 In	 frauds, and especially drug trafficking, houses/land 
predominate. 
•		 Registered assets represent more than 50% of the assets 
confiscated	when theft is the main offence. This is likely 
to be particularly true in cases involving car theft, which is 
particularly	 common	 in	 certain	 Irish	 regions	 (see	Section	
5.3).
Unfortunately, as already underlined, the location of the asset 
is	available	only	for	real	estate	confiscated	under	the	POCA.	
Crossing location of properties by main offence shows that the 
majority	of	assets	confiscated	in	the	Dublin	region	and	in	the	
Mid-East are related to drug trafficking.
Value
Finally, it is interesting to determine if and how the value of 
confiscated	 assets	 (cash	 and	 movable	 assets),	 available	 in	
the	Customs	Revenues’	 and	DPP’s	databases,	 varies	across	
different offences. 
The	total	value	recovered	under	confiscation	orders	included	
in the DPP database is 9,090,445 euro	 (1997-2013;	about	8	
million euro were collected between 2005 and 2013 - Figure 
77). Of these, about 3.8 million euro, i.e. 43% of the total value, 
was related to drug crimes.
This	figure	is	confirmed	by	Revenue	Customs’	statistics,	where	
the	 total	 value	of	 cash	confiscated	between	2007	and	2012	
amounted	to	around	4.7	million	euro:	the	confiscation	of	cash	
is	 related	most	 to	 drug	 trafficking	 (71%)	 and	 fraud	 offences	
(16%).
In terms of average values, i.e. the amount of money collected 
per	each	confiscation	order,	quite	marked	differences	emerge	
(Table	 97).	 In	 particular,	 from	 the	 DPP	 database	 a	 mean	
value of more than 23 thousand euro is collected by each 
confiscation	 order.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 drug-related	 crimes,	 this	
amount	increases	to	37,000	euro	(Table	97).	
Figure 75 – Number of confiscation orders by main offence 
in Ireland (Revenue Customs, 2007-2012)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on data on confiscation orders under CJA 
legislation (Revenue Customs)
Figure 76 – Type of confiscated assets by main offence under POCA in Ireland: percentages of total, N/A excluded
Source: Transcrime elaboration on CAB data
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In	 the	Customs’	Revenues	dataset,	 the	highest	average	sum	
collected	 relates	 to	 drug	 trafficking	 (63	 thousand	 euro),	
followed by money laundering, smuggling of jewellery and of 
oil. 
These results are useful because, on the one hand, they 
suggest the portfolios available to criminals involved in certain 
crimes	i.e.	the	‘profitability’	of	each	illegal	activity;	on	the	other,	
they allow the design of law enforcement strategies better 
able to target illicit proceeds of crimes.
12.4.3. Concluding remarks
Although it has not been possible to access all the statistics 
on	confiscated	assets	in	Ireland,	analysis	of	the	three	datasets	
for which data were available reveals some interesting issues:
•		 First,	 as	 in	 many	 other	 EU	 countries,	 movable assets, 
and in particular cash, represent the biggest share, in 
numerical	terms,	of	confiscated	goods.	The	main	offences	
related	to	confiscated	bank	accounts	are	drug	crimes,	fraud	
and	human	trafficking	(in	particular	for	sexual	exploitation	
purposes). Cash is instead mainly linked to theft and drug-
Main offence
Average values 
(euro)
Fraud 36,025
Drugs 63,335
Money Laundering 50,635
Oil Smuggling 45,132
Prostitution 32,612
Jewellery Smuggling 51,806
N/A 43,084
ALL OFFENCES 54,047
Table 97 – Average value by main offence of the amount 
recovered by confiscation orders of Revenue Customs 
(N = 87 confiscation orders, 4,702,108.88 euro collected, 
2007-2012)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on data on confiscation orders under CJA 
legislation (Revenue Customs)
Figure 77 – Value (euro) recovered from confiscation 
orders by DPP (1997-2013) and Revenue Customs (2007-
2012) in Ireland
Source: Transcrime elaboration on data on confiscation orders under CJA 
legislation (DPP and Revenue Customs)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on data on confiscation orders under CJA 
legislation (Revenue Customs)
Figure 78 – Value recovered from confiscation orders by 
Revenue Customs by main offence in Ireland (2007-2012) 
related offences.
•		 However,	also	real estate represents	a	significant	fraction	
of	 confiscated	 goods	 in	 Ireland,	 at	 least	 those	 recovered	
according to section 4 and 4a of POCA. Properties are 
mainly located in Dublin, which is also the area in Ireland 
with	 the	 highest	 real	 estate	 value	 (see	 Figure	 71).	 These	
figures	suggest	a	speculative purpose of OCG investments, 
although, as also underlined in Section 8.3, investments in 
real estate properties may be driven by functional needs 
(e.g.	 as	 brothels,	 massage	 parlours,	 deposits	 for	 illicit	
goods, etc.).
•		 Whilst	 data	 on	 confiscated	 companies	 are	 not	 available,	
it is possible to determine the business sectors most 
involved	 by	 considering	 those	 related	 to	 the	 confiscated	
bank	accounts.	According	 to	 this	 information	 (see	Figure	
72), banking/finance	 (36.4%),	 oil supply	 (21.2%)	 and	
bar, restaurants, catering and entertainment	 (21.2%	
altogether)	are	the	most	frequently	related.	These	findings	
may	confirm	the	relative	importance	of	these	sectors	in	the	
OCGs’	economies,	as	highlighted	also	in	Section	8.3.
•		 Irish nationals are most frequently associated with 
confiscation,	 followed	 by	 British and Chinese, who are 
also the ethnic groups most frequently related to illegal 
markets	 (see	 Section	 5.3)	 and	 infiltration	 of	 the	 legal	
economy.
•		 Finally,	 inspection	 of	 the	 value	 of	 confiscated	 goods	
(available	only	for	the	datasets	made	available	by	the	DPP	
under	the	provisions	of	the	Criminal	Justice	Act	(CJA)	1994	
and by the Revenue Customs pursuant to Part 39 CJA) 
shows that the highest average values are associated with 
confiscation	orders	in	which	drug trafficking was the main 
offence,	suggesting	the	higher	‘profitability’	of	this	crime,	or	
at least a higher availability of resources.
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12.5.1. Introduction
As described in Section 10.6, Italy has developed a complex 
asset recovery system characterised by variety of 
legislative tools, confiscation measures, and actors 
involved	in	all	the	stages	of	the	recovery	process	(see	Section	
10.6). Each of these actors collects and stores statistics 
specific	to	the	stage	in	which	they	are	involved.	
As said, this may result in a plurality of databases	on	seized	
and	 confiscated	 assets	 at	 national	 level,	 while	 a	 centralised	
dataset tracing criminal assets from the beginning to the end 
of	the	process	is	at	present	unavailable	(Transcrime,	2013a).398
After examining available data sources, and building on 
previous	 literature	 (in	 particular	 Transcrime,	 2013a),	 the	
following	datasets	were	identified:
•		 SIPPI (SIT-MP) Database:399 managed by the Ministry of 
Justice,	this	includes	data	on	seized	and	confiscated	assets	
since 2007, aggregated according to the 26 Italian districts 
of the Court of Appeal.400 The database does not provide 
publicly disaggregated information per each individual 
asset	 (e.g.	 address,	 value,	 legal	 form,	 etc.)	 (Transcrime,	
2013a,	p.	366);	
•		 SAC Database: managed by the Criminal Analysis 
Service – Servizio Analisi Criminale	 (SAC)	of	 the	Ministry	
of	 the	 Interior,	 this	 contains	 information	 on	 goods	 seized	
and	confiscated	in	Italy	since	2007	as	the	result	of	criminal	
proceedings	 and	 preventative	 measures	 (Transcrime,	
2013a, p. 366). Information on individual assets is not 
available for the purpose of analysis.401 
•		 ANBSC Database:	 managed	 by	 the	 ANBSC	 –	 Agenzia	
Nazionale	 per	 l'amministrazione	 e	 la	 destinazione	 dei	
beni	 sequestrati	 e	 confiscati	 alla	 criminalità	 organizzata,	
of the Minister of the Interior, this includes data on assets 
definitively	 confiscated	 because	 of	 organised	 and	mafia-
related crimes402 in Italy since 1983. Information is available 
at disaggregate level for each asset, but does not include 
information	on	the	specific	related	offence	or	the	criminal/
criminal	group	 to	which	beneficial	ownership	of	 the	asset	
can	be	attributed	(Transcrime,	2013a).403
•		 Guardia di Finanza (GDF) Database: This contains data 
on	all	 the	assets	 seized	and	confiscated404 from 2000 to 
2013	as	a	result	of	GDF	investigations	of	specific	offences	
related to serious and organised crimes.405 Although not 
publicly available, the database has been made partially 
accessible	(with	some	information	per	each	asset)	for	the	
purpose of this analysis.406 
Methodological remarks
Given the plurality of databases, it was decided to focus the 
analysis only on the two with data at disaggregate level, i.e. per 
each asset: the ANBSC database and the one of the Guardia 
di Finanza (GDF).407
As	 discussed	 in	 Section	 8.4,	 data	 on	 confiscated	 assets	
from the ANBSC database have been already widely used 
as a proxies of mafia investments in previous research 
(Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Transcrime,	 2013b;	 Riccardi,	 2014a;	
Riccardi,	 Soriani,	 &	 Standridge,	 2014;	 Dugato,	 Favarin,	 &	
Giommoni, forthcoming). However, this causes a major 
bias	 which	 have	been	discussed	 above	 (see	8.4).	Moreover,	
to be noted is that the SIPPI and SAC databases do not 
show substantial differences in terms of typological and 
geographical distribution with respect to the ANBSC database 
(Transcrime,	2013a),408 but on the other they furnish a smaller 
amount of information. Hence the ANBSC dataset may be 
preferred.
398.	The	information	system	foreseen	by	the	D.Lgs	159/2011	(Antimafia	code)	to 
be	managed	by	the	Agenzia	Nazionale	per	l'amministrazione	e	la	destinazione	
dei	 beni	 sequestrati	 e	 confiscati	 alla	 criminalità	 organizzata	 is	 still	 under	
development at the time of this project. The new database should be able to 
keep record of assets since the beginning of the investigation phase, through 
freezing,	 confiscation,	 management,	 until	 the	 disposal	 phase	 (Transcrime,	
2013a, p. 96).
399.	See	http://bit.ly/1G2v06j
400. The 26 districts do not coincide exactly with the distinction at either 
regional or provincial level. See http://bit.ly/1G2v06j
401.	 Information	 is	 provided	 only	 at	 aggregate	 level:	 by	 year	 (since	 2007),	
geographic	area	(NUTS	2	or	NUTS	3),	macrotype	(real	estate,	other	movables,	
companies,	registered	assets)	or	mafia	membership	(Cosa	Nostra,	'Ndrangheta,	
Camorra, Apulian Organised Crime and Other criminal organisations), the latter 
classification	being	only	available	at	NUTS	2.
402.	Assets	confiscated	as	a	 result	 of	preventative	and	criminal	 confiscation	
orders in relation to serious and organised crime offences foreseen by article 
51,	 Section	3-bis	 of	 the	 Italian	Code	of	Criminal	Procedure,	 e.g.	mafia-related	
crimes, organised crime, counterfeiting, trafficking in human beings, etc.
403. As said, the database is still under development and has increased the 
amount	 of	 information	 stored	 so	 as	 to	 include	 data	 on	 related	 offence(s),	
previous owners, and information that would ensure full traceability of the asset 
from	the	beginning	of	the	asset	recovery	process	to	the	end	(Transcrime,	2013a,	
p.	 366).	 At	 present,	 it	 does	 not	 include	 information	 on	 the	 criminal/criminal	
group	from	whom	the	asset	has	been	confiscated.	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	7,	
previous	research	(Standridge,	2012;	Transcrime,	2013a;	Soriani,	2013;	Riccardi,	
2014a;	Dugato,	Favarin,	&	Giommoni,	forthcoming)	has	established	a	connection	
between	 assets	 (only	 companies	 and	 real	 estate)	 and	 the	 criminal	 group	 by	
relying	 on	 open	 sources	 (see	 the	 Methodological	 Annex	 for	 details).	 Some	
findings	of	the	analysis	of	confiscated	assets	and	criminal	groups	are	reported	
in Chapter 8.4.
404.	 The	 database	 includes	 assets	 resulting	 from	 five	 types	 of	 seizure/
confiscation	(see	the	Methodological	Annex	for	details).	For	the	purpose	of	the	
analysis they are grouped together without distinction.
405.	Assets	seized	and	confiscated	in	relation	to	serious	and	organised	crime	
offences,	 including	criminal	association,	mafia-related	crimes,	drug	trafficking,	
trafficking in human beings, etc. For a detailed breakdown of the types of 
offences related to the data on which the analysis was carried out see 12.5 and 
Methodological Annex.
406. For each asset, information is available regarding type of asset, location 
(since	2007),	main	offence	and	number/amount/value	of	the	asset.	 It	 includes	
seizures	 of	 both	 legal	 and	 illegal	 goods	 (e.g.	 drugs,	 counterfeit	 goods).	 To	 be	
noted	 is	 that	 the	 database	 does	 not	 include	 statistics	 on	 seizures	 made	 by	
other	law	enforcement	agencies	(e.g.	Carabinieri,	Polizia	di	Stato),	which,	in	turn,	
manage their own databases.
407.	The	assets	included	in	the	two	databases	analysed	have	been	reclassified	
in	 order	 to	 make	 them	 as	 comparable	 as	 possible	 (see	 the	 Methodological	
Annex for details).
408. In particular, the correlation with ANBSC in terms of geographic distribution 
(NUTS	2)	is	always	very	high:	0.985	between	ANBSC	and	SIPPI;	0.961	between	
ANBSC	and	SAC	 (confiscations);	0.826	between	ANBSC	and	SAC	 (seizures)	
(Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	367).
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At the same time, it was decided to extend the analysis to the 
GDF database because it can provide, in addition to ANBSC, 
more details on the related offence, although it may offer a 
partial	account	because	it	is	related	only	to	seizures	executed	
by GDF, not by the other law enforcement agencies.
The Sections below, building on previous research, will 
provide descriptive statistics on the two ANBSC and GDF 
datasets focusing on the following issues: type and trend 
of	 confiscated	 assets,	 geographical distribution, types of 
related offences, and value. References to the SIPPI and 
SAC databases will also be provided. 
12.5.2. Analysis
Types of confiscated assets
Analysis of the types of recovered assets across the available 
databases in Italy shows that real estate is the macrotype 
with	the	highest	number	of	confiscations	and	seizures	(Table	
98).	 However,	 to	 be	 noted	 is	 also	 the	 significant	 weight	 of	
companies	 (between	5%	and	15%	across	all	the	databases),	
which	 confirms	 that	 Italy	 is	 one of the few European 
countries seizing legitimate businesses, due to the 
powerful	 asset	 recovery	 regulatory	 framework	 (see	 10.6)	
but also to the wide experience of Italian law enforcement 
agencies in identifying and tracing criminal assets.
Comparison	of	 the	 five	datasets	 under	 consideration	 shows	
that the results are consistent and similar. The lower number, 
relatively speaking, of movable assets and registered assets 
in the ANBSC database with respect to the other datasets 
may be due to their liquidation or disposal before the 
final confiscation stage	 (Florio,	Bosco,	&	D’Amore,	2014,	p.	
712;	722;	see	also	Section	10.6).	At	the	same	time,	the	higher	
percentage of movables in the GDF dataset may be due to the 
fact	that	movable	assets	can	also	be	seized	as	evidence	in	the	
course	of	the	investigation	and	trial	(e.g.	drugs	and	weapons).	
Despite these general patterns, differences exist from a 
geographical point of view, in that the confiscated portfolio 
may differ from region to region. Figure 79 and Figure 80 
show the typological breakdown of the ANBSC and GDF 
databases in the seven Italian regions with the highest number 
Database Ref. years
N. 
Assets
Real 
Estate 
(%)
Companies 
(%)
Registered 
assets (%)
Other 
movable 
assets (%)
Source
ANBSC 1983-2013 24,014 51.3% 8.1% 23.6% 17.0%
Transcrime elaboration 
on ANBSC data
SIPPI 2009-2013 113,753 47.7% 6.7% 20.1% 25.5% Min.	Giustizia	(2013)
SAC	(Seizures) 2007-2011 57,619 44% 5% 18% 33%
Transcrime, 2013a, p. 
367
SAC 
(Confiscations)
2007-2011 12,567 46% 4% 27% 24%
Transcrime, 2013a, p. 
367
GDF 2000-2013 16,824 28.5% 13.3% 24.4% 33.7%
Transcrime elaboration 
on GDF data
Table 98 – Breakdown of assets seized and confiscated in Italy for serious and organised crime offences
Source: Transcrime elaboration on ANBSC, SIPPI, SAC and GDF data
Figure 79 – Breakdown of definitively confiscated assets 
by type of assets in seven Italian regions (ANBSC, 1983-
2012)
Figure 80 – Breakdown of assets seized by GDF in seven 
Italian regions (2000-2013)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on data on confiscation orders under CJA 
legislation (Revenue Customs)
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of	 confiscated	 and	 seized	 assets.	Although	 the	 figures	 refer	
to different stages of the asset recovery process, some 
similarities	between	the	two	databases	can	be	identified.	
In	 particular,	 confiscation	 of	 real estate seem to have a 
higher incidence in southern regions	 (e.g.	 Apulia,	 Sicily	
and Calabria) while the weight of companies and of movable 
and registered assets is higher in northern and central 
regions	 (e.g.	 Lombardy,	 Lazio	 and	 Piedmont).	 This	 may	 be	
due, among other reasons, to a stronger inclination of criminal 
groups,	 and	 in	 particular	 mafia	 organisations,	 to	 invest	 in	
real estate in areas where they have closer control of the 
territory	 (Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Dugato,	 Favarin,	 &	Giommoni,	
forthcoming), or where the economic system is weaker and 
provides fewer opportunities for investment in legitimate 
businesses	(see	Section	8.4).409
Trend of confiscated assets
According to ANBSC data,	the	number	of	final	confiscations	
in relation to serious and organised crime offences in Italy 
has steadily increased since the early 1990s	 (Figure	
82). It is likely that the timings reflect the introduction of the 
new	 legislative	 measures	 (since	 the	 Rognoni-La Torre law 
in 1982, see Section 10.6) which took several years to be 
fully	 implemented	 and	 to	 bring	 assets	 to	 final	 confiscation	
(Transcrime,	2013a,	p.	99).
The	 upward	 trend	 is	 confirmed	 by	 data	 from	 the	 Ministry 
of Justice	 (Ministero	 della	 Giustizia,	 2013),	 which	 show	 an	
increase	 of	 +220%	 between	 2009	 and	 2012	 (Fraschini	 &	
Putaturo, 2014) and from the Guardia di Finanza. According 
to	 GDF	 statistics,	 the	 number	 of	 assets	 annually	 seized	
increased	from	422	in	2000	to	6,174	in	2012	(about	+1400%).
409. These are not the only possible reasons. Generally speaking, these 
statistics are highly influenced by the number and nature of the operations 
carried out by law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities. For example, 
the	high	percentage	of	confiscated	registered	assets	in	Piedmont	evident	from	
the	 ANBSC	 database	 is	 the	 result	 of	 a	 single	 operation	 that	 led	 to	 the	 final	
confiscation	of	hundreds	of	vehicles.	In	addition,	it	should	be	borne	in	mind	that,	
as	anticipated	in	Section	8.4,	statistics	on	confiscated	assets	from	the	ANBSC	
database	may	provide	a	not	very	updated	overview	of	seizures	in	the	country.	
For	example,	it	is	likely	that	the	composition	of	the	portfolio	of	confiscated	assets	
in	Piedmont	and	Lombardy	may	significantly	change	when	the	seizures	made	in	
investigations	such	as	Minotauro	or	 Infinito	reach	the	final	confiscation.	These	
investigations,	 in	fact,	have	been	characterised	by	the	freezing	of	hundreds	of	
companies	(see	Section	8.4).
Figure 81 – Breakdown of confiscated real estate 
properties in Italy (1983-2012)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on ANBSC data
Focusing on real estate properties, according to the 
Transcrime elaboration on ANBSC data, the category most 
frequently mentioned is residential buildings	 (41.8%	 of	 the	
total	 number	 of	 real	 estate	 properties	 at	 final	 confiscation),	
followed	 by	 premises	 (24.7%)	 and	 land	 (24%)	 (Figure	 81).	
Among	 residential	 properties,	 flats	 (33.5%)	 prevail	 over	
detached houses and villas. This may be due, as anticipated 
in Section 8.4, to the propensity of criminal groups to invest 
in immovable goods for personal use or for ‘buy and rent’ 
purposes	 (Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Dugato,	 Favarin,	 &	Giommoni,	
forthcoming;	see	Section	8.4).
Figure 82 – Number of definitively confiscated assets per 
year in Italy (1983-2012)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on ANBSC data
Figure 83 – Number of definitively confiscated assets per 
year and macrotype in Italy (Index 2000=100) 
Source: Transcrime elaboration on ANBSC data
However, different types of assets show different tendencies. 
In particular, on considering ANBSC data, a relative increase 
in companies and registered assets with respect to other 
types	 of	 assets	 (including	 real	 estate)	 can	 be	 highlighted	
in	 terms	 of	 definitively	 confiscated	 assets	 (Figure	 83).	
The increasing weight of companies may reflect on the 
one hand the evolution of criminal groups towards ‘more 
sophisticated’ forms of investments, including legitimate 
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Figure 84 – Distribution of definitively confiscated assets 
across Italian regions (NUTS 2) (1983-2012) 410
Figure 85 – Distribution of definitively confiscated assets 
across Italian provinces (NUTS 3) (1983-2012) 411
Source: Transcrime elaboration on ANBSC dataSource: Transcrime elaboration on ANBSC data
Legend Legend
Figure 86 – Distribution of seized and confiscated assets 
by GDF across Italian regions (NUTS 2) (2007-2013) 412
Figure 87 – Distribution of seized and confiscated assets 
by GDF across Italian provinces (NUTS 3) (2007-2013) 413
Legend
Low
Medium
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Legend
Source: Transcrime elaboration on GDF dataSource: Transcrime elaboration on GDF data
410.	Classification	based	on	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
411.	Classification	based	on	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
412.	Classification	based	on	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
413. All other Italian regions.
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businesses	(as	hypothesised	in	Section	8.4),	and	on	the	other,	
the improved capacity of law enforcement to trace, identify 
and	seize	companies.
However, to obtain a more updated picture of the evolution of 
seizure	and	confiscation	in	Italy,	in	particular	in	the	latest	5-10	
years, it is necessary to take a picture at ‘earlier stages’ of 
the	asset	recovery	process,	i.e.	at	the	investigation	or	seizure/
freezing	stage.	In	Italy	it	may	take	years	for	an	asset	to	reach	
final	confiscation.	Any	recent	trend	in	terms	of	seizures	will	be	
visible	in	the	ANBSC	database	only	in	some	years’	time.
Geographical distribution 
Figure 84 and Figure 85 present the geographical distribution 
of	the	definitively	confiscated	assets	for	serious	and	organised	
crime between 1983-2012, and recorded by the ANBSC 
database,	 respectively	 across	 Italian	 regions	 (NUTS	 2)	 and	
provinces	 (NUTS	 3).	 As	 anticipated	 in	 Section	 8.4,	 most	 of	
the assets concentrate in a few regions: Sicily, Calabria, 
Campania, Apulia and Lombardy. 
Although southern Italy and capital provinces still collect most 
of	 the	 confiscated	 assets,	 the weight of northern regions 
and of smaller provinces is growing. Figure 88 shows that 
the	 confiscation	 trend	 in	 southern	 regions414 is increasing 
at a rate lower than that of northern and central ones.415 The 
upward trend of ‘non-traditional’ geographic areas is 
confirmed	by	the	data	of	the	Ministry	of	Justice	(SIPPI)	which	
highlight	an	increase	in	the	number	of	seized	and	confiscated	
assets especially in large urban areas of northern and central 
Italy	 (e.g.	 Rome,	 Milan,	 Turin,	 Bologna)	 (Ministero	 della	
Giustizia,	2013).	
414. Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicily.
415. All other Italian regions.
Figure 88 – Number of definitively confiscated assets per 
year and location in Italy (Index 2000=100)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on ANBSC data
In particular, as mentioned above, higher number of assets can 
be found in provinces characterised by large urban areas 
(e.g.	Rome,	Milan,	Naples,	Palermo,	Turin)	or	which	comprise	
the chief town of their region, where, as noted in Section 8.4, 
judicial authorities may be better-equipped or have longer 
experience in identifying and confiscating mafia assets, 
thus	generating	a	higher	number	of	confiscations.
Figure	86	reports	the	distribution	of	assets	seized	by	Guardia 
di Finanza (2000-2012) across Italian regions, which is 
similar to the distribution based on ANBSC data, with a 
stronger	weight	 of	 the	 provinces	 of	Naples	 (Campania)	 and	
Rome	(Lazio).
This evolution may be due, on the one hand, as already 
widely described in Section 8.4, to the expansion of mafia 
investments in northern regions	 (Sciarrone	&	Storti,	2014;	
Osservatorio	 sulla	 Criminalità	 Organizzata	 dell’Università	
degli	 Studi	 di	Milano,	 2014;	 Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Varese,	 2011;	
Campana, 2011a), and on the other, to a wider adoption of 
confiscation measures in ‘non-traditional’ areas	 (also	
because	of	the	growing	application	of	confiscation	measures	
against foreign criminal groups such as Chinese OCGs or 
Eastern European ones, which are prevalent in central and 
northern regions, see 8.4). 
Related offences
The ANBSC database does not provide data on the type of 
offence	 related	 to	 the	 confiscation.	 Consequently,	 analysis	
of how asset recovery distributes across crimes can be 
conducted only through examination of the data on GDF 
seizures.
Seized	 assets	 are	 classified	 by	 GDF	 according	 to	 four 
categories of main offences that can be related to serious 
and organised crimes.416 Organised and mafia-related 
crimes	 (87%)	are	the	most	frequent	main	offences,	 followed	
by	 criminal	 association	 (10%)	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 drug	
trafficking and illicit trafficking of waste. As to be expected, 
mafia	association	as	the	main	offence	is	higher in southern 
regions	 (94%	 of	 assets)	 than	 in	 northern	 and	 central	 ones	
(78%),	while	criminal	association	is	more	frequently	applied	in	
northern	ones	(Figure	89).	
If assets are analysed according to their macrotype and main 
offence	 (Figure	90),	 it	emerges	 that	real estate represents 
the largest share of mafia-related crimes, followed 
by registered and movable assets. By contrast, movable 
and registered assets represent a large share of criminal 
association for offences such as counterfeiting or smuggling 
of	 tobacco.	This	may	be	due	 to	 the	seizure	of	vehicles	used	
by	 criminals	 to	 transport	 smuggled	goods	 (such	as	 tobacco	
products).
0
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This evolution may be due, on the one hand, as already 
widely described in Section 8.4, to the expansion of mafia 
investments in northern regions	 (Sciarrone	&	Storti,	2014;	
Osservatorio	 sulla	 Criminalità	 Organizzata	 dell’Università	
degli	 Studi	 di	Milano,	 2014;	 Transcrime,	 2013a;	 Varese,	 2011;	
Campana, 2011a), and on the other, to a wider adoption of 
confiscation measures in ‘non-traditional’ areas	 (also	
because	of	the	growing	application	of	confiscation	measures	
against foreign criminal groups such as Chinese OCGs or 
Eastern European ones, which are prevalent in central and 
northern regions, see 8.4). 
Related offences
The ANBSC database does not provide data on the type of 
offence	 related	 to	 the	 confiscation.	 Consequently,	 analysis	
of how asset recovery distributes across crimes can be 
conducted only through examination of the data on GDF 
seizures.
Seized	 assets	 are	 classified	 by	 GDF	 according	 to	 four 
categories of main offences that can be related to serious 
and organised crimes.416 Organised and mafia-related 
crimes	 (87%)	are	the	most	frequent	main	offences,	 followed	
by	 criminal	 association	 (10%)	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 drug	
trafficking and illicit trafficking of waste. As to be expected, 
mafia	association	as	the	main	offence	is	higher in southern 
regions	 (94%	 of	 assets)	 than	 in	 northern	 and	 central	 ones	
(78%),	while	criminal	association	is	more	frequently	applied	in	
northern	ones	(Figure	89).	
If assets are analysed according to their macrotype and main 
offence	 (Figure	90),	 it	emerges	 that	real estate represents 
the largest share of mafia-related crimes, followed 
by registered and movable assets. By contrast, movable 
and registered assets represent a large share of criminal 
association for offences such as counterfeiting or smuggling 
of	 tobacco.	This	may	be	due	 to	 the	seizure	of	vehicles	used	
by	 criminals	 to	 transport	 smuggled	goods	 (such	as	 tobacco	
products).
12.5.3. Concluding remarks
Analysis	 of	 the	 data	 on	 confiscated	 assets	 in	 Italy,	 with	 a	
particular	 focus	 on	 the	 statistics	 on	 definitively	 confiscated	
assets	 (provided	 by	 ANBSC)	 and	 on	 the	 assets	 seized	 by	
Guardia	di	Finanza,	highlights	some	important	issues:
•		 In	the	past	twenty	years,	full	implementation	of	confiscation	
measures and the introduction of new measures has led to 
an increase in the total number of confiscated assets. 
•		 Confiscation	 has	 been	 growing	more	 steadily	 in	northern 
and central regions than in southern ones. This may 
be	 explained,	 as	 suggested,	 by	 the	 expansion	 of	 mafia	
investments	 in	northern	regions	(see	8.4)	and	by	the	wider	
application	of	confiscation	in	‘non-traditional’	mafia	regions;
•		 Real	estate	still	represents	the	majority of assets seized 
and confiscated in Italy,	 confirming	 the	 ‘traditional’	and	
territorial	 specific	nature	of	 the	 investments	of	organised	
crime groups, as widely discussed in Section 8.4 and 
confirmed	also	in	other	countries	(e.g.	the	Netherlands,	see	
12.6).
•		 However,	 confiscation of companies	 and	 of	 movable/
registered assets is increasing to a much greater extent 
than	the	confiscation	of	immovable	goods,	again	suggesting	
that companies have an increasingly important role in the 
portfolios	of	criminal	organisations,	both	Italian	mafias	and	
foreign	OCGs,	in	Italy	(see	Section	8.4).
•		 In	terms	of	related	offences,	although	the	available	data	do	
not allow a comprehensive analysis, statistics shows that 
confiscation	has	been	primarily used against organised 
and mafia-related crimes, although the weight of other 
offences seems higher in northern regions.
•		 In	conclusion,	 the	confiscation	of	assets	 in	 Italy	seems	 to	
respond, better than in other European countries, to 
the developments and new trends of criminal investments, 
in	 both	 geographic	 terms	 (e.g.	 the	 expansion	 of	 mafia	
investments towards northern regions) and typological 
ones	 (e.g.	 the	 increasing	 importance	 of	 companies	 and	
other more movable assets in the criminal portfolio). 
Particularly important is the capacity of the Italian public 
authorities to target legitimate businesses: Italy is one of the 
few European countries seizing companies thanks to the 
powerful	 ‘arsenal’	 of	 confiscation	measures	 and	 to	 the	wide	
experience of Italian law enforcement agencies in identifying 
and tracing criminal assets. Other EU MS should take this 
experience	into	account	in	order	to	improve	their	confiscation	
systems, and Italy should be able to transfer this know-how 
to international partners.
However, some aspects can still be improved: 
•		 most	 confiscation	 orders	 are	 still	 issued	by	 the	 courts	 of	
large cities and chief-towns while more attention should 
be paid to the application of confiscation measures 
in smaller towns and more ‘peripheral’ courts, 
considering	 the	 expansion	 of	 OCG	 infiltration	 in	 these	
understated	areas	(see	Section	8.4).
•		 similarly,	 the	 use	 of	 confiscation	 measures	 should	 be	
increased against foreign OCGs: to date, they have been 
extensively	 adopted	 against	 mafia	 groups,	 but	 evidence	
of	 investments	 by	 foreign	 criminals	 (especially	 Chinese,	
Russian/Georgian	and	Eastern	European	OCGs)	is	rapidly	
emerging	(see	8.4).
Finally, the management of confiscated assets, in 
particular	of	confiscated	companies, should improve rapidly. 
Good management is the necessary requisite for effective 
confiscation:	there	is	the	risk	that	problems	in	the	management	
of	 assets	 (Riccardi,	 2014b;	 Fraschini	 &	 Putaturo,	 2014;	 La	
Repubblica, 2014) and their deterioration and depreciation 
during	 the	course	of	 judicial	administration	 (see	above)	may	
induce	 prosecutors	 to	 use	 confiscation	 less extensively 
and more reluctantly against	 criminal	 assets	 (especially	
companies) in order not to lose jobs, wealth and business 
opportunities in already weak areas.
416. As said above, the four categories are: Drug trafficking, Criminal 
association	 for	 the	 commission	 of	 serious	 offences	 (including	 human	
trafficking, counterfeiting, smuggling of tobacco products and other crimes), 
Organised	crime	and	mafia-related	crimes,	and	Environmental	crimes	(see	the	
Methodological	Annex	for	details	on	the	classification	of	GDF	data).
In	 this	 sense	 alternative	 instruments	 than	 confiscation	 could	
be explored and used more extensively, such as the temporary 
suspension	 of	 the	 business	 administration	 (art.	 34	 of	 the	
Antimafia	 code)	 or	 administrative	 bans	 and	 disqualifications	
(e.g.	 interdittive).	 Effective	 results	 could	 be	 obtained	 against	
companies	 infiltrated	 by	 organised	 crime	 without	 necessarily	
resorting	 on	 their	 definitive	 confiscation	 (on	 this	 see	 Visconti,	
2014).
Figure 89 – Main offence related to seizure by macro area 
in Italy (2000-2013)
Source: Transcrime elaboration on GDF data
Source: Transcrime elaboration on GDF data
Figure 90 – Main offence related to seizure by type of asset 
in Italy (2000-2013)
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12.6.1. Introduction
In the Netherlands, the public prosecutor’s office records all 
criminal	confiscations	in	the	Netherlands	in	its	databases,417 to 
which full access has been granted for this research. Although 
there	is	a	database	specifying	all	detailed	seizures	–	which	has	
already been analysed in Section 8.5 – the same database 
only	has	the	total	amount	confiscated,	without	specifications.	
The analysis in this Section therefore focuses on the 
descriptive statistics of the confiscations and which 
OCGs and crimes are related to the. Furthermore, the relation 
between	the	amount	confiscated	and	the	amount	estimated	
as	criminal	profits	will	be	analysed.	For	this	analysis,	the	same	
database as used in Sections 5.5 and 8.5 and described 
in the methodological annex will be used. This means that 
the database is tailored to represent only organised crime 
cases	 as	much	 as	 possible.	 The	 figures	 presented	 here	 will	
consequently	be	 lower	 than	general	figures	on	confiscations	
in the Netherlands.
The	 database	 lists	 the	 imposed	 confiscation	 amount	 and	
the	 actual	 confiscated	 amount.	 The	 table	 below	 gives	
some descriptive statistics on the imposed and actual 
confiscations. As will be seen, the distribution of the amounts 
confiscated	 is	 rather	 skewed,	 as	 indicated	 by	 the	 large	
difference between the average and the median. Hence there 
are	a	 couple	of	 very	 large	confiscations	and	many	 relatively	
small ones. What is also obvious from the descriptive statistics 
below	is	that	the	actual	confiscations	are	many	fewer	than	the	
imposed ones. 
Therefore Table 100 shows the descriptive statistics for the 69 
suspects for which the imposed and the actual confiscation 
is known. It shows that the difference between the imposed 
and	actual	confiscations	is	small	and	most	often	(85.5%)	even	
the same in most cases. This indicates that, in general, the 
imposed	confiscation	is	accepted.	It	also	means	that	the	wide	
difference	between	 the	 imposed	 and	 actual	 confiscations	 is	
explained	by	large	imposed	confiscations	that	have	not	been	
accepted	as	 actual	 confiscations	 (yet).	 The	main	 reason	 for	
this is that large-scale cases may take more time and are 
therefore less often already concluded in terms of the overall 
process in court.418 To make sure that this bias does not affect 
the	results	presented	in	this	chapter,	the	imposed	confiscation	
amount	instead	of	the	actual	confiscation	amount	will	be	the	
unit of analysis.
Confiscations	in	the	Netherlands	can	be	based	on	pre-judicial	
(art.	94a)	and	criminal	seizures	(art.	94	of	the	Dutch	Criminal	
Procedure Code), as described in Section 10.7. In general, 
the	 amount	 of	 confiscations	 based	 on	 criminal	 seizures	 in	
the database is comparable to the amount based on pre-
judicial	seizures.	This	is	interesting,	since	pre-judicial	seizures	
have the purpose of conserving the assets so that they 
can	 be	 confiscated	 later,	 while	 criminal	 seizures421 have the 
Number of suspects Average Median Lowest Highest
Imposed	confiscations 321 505,846.85 40,000.00 336.00 25,733,754.45
Actual	confiscations 176 294,907.06 16,643.76 750.00 12,500,000.00
Table 99 - Descriptive statistics on confiscations from organised crime suspects (2003-2014)419
Source: UU elaboration on PPO database
417.	 It	has	to	be	noted,	however,	 that	concerning	the	use	of	police	and/or	PPO	
data,	there	is	also	a	bias	in	the	sense	that	suspects	end	up	in	police	and/or	PPO	
statistics based on where they are prosecuted. For example, the media reported 
that	 an	 important	 figure	 of	 the	 ‘Ndrangheta	 was	 caught	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	
but this does not end up in the PPO database in the Netherlands, because this 
suspect was directly sent to Italy where he was already prosecuted.
418. Note that the PPO database consists of cases that are closed in terms of 
the investigation by the PPO, but that the process in court may not yet have 
concluded.
419.	 All	 numbers	 except	 the	 number	 of	 suspects	 are	 in	 euro.	 A	 confiscation 
amount	of	0	euro	is	considered	a	no	confiscation	amount.	
420. All numbers except the number of suspects in euro.
421.	Of	the	321	suspects	for	which	the	imposed	confiscation	amount	is	known,	
60	cases	are	based	on	pre-judicial	seizures,	60	are	based	on	criminal	seizures,	
83 on both, and it is unknown for the remaining 118. Of the 176 suspects for which 
the	 actual	 amount	 confiscated	 is	 known,	 26	 cases	 are	 based	 on	 pre-judicial	
seizures,	22	are	based	on	criminal	seizures,	24	on	both,	and	 it	 is	unknown	 for	
the remaining 104.
Number of suspects Average Median Lowest Highest
Imposed	confiscations 69 44,619.75 7,900 750 720,000
Actual	confiscations 69 43,475.70 7,500 750 720,000
Table 100 - Descriptive statistics on the 69 suspects for whom an imposed and an actual confiscation is known (2003-2014)4120
Source: UU elaboration on PPO database
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primary goal of ensuring that the assets can be used for the 
investigation and in court. Apparently, these goals are hard to 
separate in practice and often overlap.
12.6.2. Analysis
Organised crime groups and nationalities of owners
This section explores the extent to which the OCGs active 
in	 the	Netherlands	are	subject	 to	confiscations	and	to	which	
crimes	is	the	latter	are	related.	Most	confiscations	are	related	
to Dutch OCGs, but this is not surprising since the majority of 
the OCGs in the Netherlands are Dutch. Therefore this section 
compares its results with the actual presence of OCGs already 
set out in Section 5.5.
Since	 the	database	consists	 of	 11097	 suspects	 (see	Section	
5.5),	with	an	imposed	confiscation	for	321	of	them,	the	amount 
on which a confiscation order is imposed is about 3%. 
Table 101 shows that the suspects of Dutch OCGs represent 
the entirety? in this respect. Most striking is that all 27 suspects 
belonging to a Colombian OCG	 have	 a	 confiscation	 order	
imposed upon them. It should be noted that these 27 suspects 
come from 4 large-scale cases, which means that this result 
may easily be due to coincidence. The relative high percentage 
of suspects related to French OCGs is uninformative due to 
the low amount of observations.
Related offences
Table	102	shows	the	extent	to	which	the	imposed	confiscations	
are related to the different types of crimes committed by 
OCGs.	 As	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 table,	 confiscations	 are	 only	
related to OCGs that commit fraud, drugs crimes, human 
trafficking and counterfeiting. In itself this may not be too 
surprising since these are the main crimes of OCGs in the 
Netherlands	(see	Section	5.5).	
Value
In	 recent	 years,	 confiscation	 has	 received	 considerable	
attention in the Netherlands. In 2010, the institutions involved 
started a complete programme with extra resources to 
increase	the	effectiveness	of	confiscations.	(Dutch	PPO,	2013)	
When the effectiveness is measured in terms of the amount of 
assets	confiscated,	this	programme	seems	successful.	In	2013	
the	 total	 amount	 of	 confiscated	 assets	 reached	 the	 record-
high	amount	of	90	million	euro;	this	was	more than enough to 
meet the prescribed goal of almost 60 million.
Confiscations related to the estimated illegally obtained 
benefit
Almost	 all	 cases	 (98%)	 in	 which	 a	 confiscation	 is	 imposed	
also	 have	 an	 estimation	 of	 the	 illegally	 obtained	 benefit	 (for	
316 of the 321 suspects). This in itself is not surprising since 
the	 confiscation/recovery	 procedure	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 is	
based on the idea that illegally obtained profits must be 
paid back, which therefore has to be estimated. This makes it 
possible	to	compare	what	amounts	of	illegally	obtained	profits	
The	 amount	 of	 imposed	 confiscation	 is	 the	 same	 as	 the	
estimated	 illegally	 obtained	 benefit	 for	 72	 suspects	 (23%). 
For	33	suspects	 the	 imposed	confiscation	 is	higher	 than	 the	
OCG
Number of suspects with 
imposed confiscations
Number of suspects in the 
database
% of suspects on which a 
confiscation order has been 
imposed
Dutch 208 7486 3%
Colombian 27 27 100%
Turkish 20 326 6%
Other Asian 16 105 15%
South American 14 181 8%
African 10 108 9%
North African 9 84 11%
Chinese 4 30 13%
Other Eastern 
European
4 38 11%
Balkan 2 23 9%
Middle Eastern 2 141 1%
British 1 33 3%
French 1 2 50%
North American 1 12 8%
Total423 321 11097 3%
Table 101 - OCG relation of the suspects on which a confiscation order has been imposed (2003-2014)422
Source: UU elaboration on PPO database
422.	The	OCGs	 for	which	none	of	 the	 suspects	has	an	 imposed	confiscation	
have been omitted from the table.
Source: Dutch PPO (2013)
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estimated	illegally	obtained	benefit.	In	the	other	210	cases,	the	
imposed	confiscation	is	lower.426 The judge has the freedom to 
reduce the amount initially estimated by deducting business 
costs or for other moderation reasons, such as a disabled 
drug	dealer	who	has	less	chance	of	obtaining	paid	work	(Van	
Duyne,	de	Zanger,	&	Kristen,	forthcoming).	
As	has	been	often	found	by	other	studies	(Levi	and	Osofsky,	
1995;	van	Duyne	&	Soudijn,	2010	and	Van	Duyne,	de	Zanger,	
&	 Kristen,	 forthcoming)	 here	 it	 is	 once	 again	 evident	 that	
criminal	proceeds	and	the	related	confiscated	assets	are	very 
unevenly distributed	(indicated	here	by	the	wide	differences	
between the average and median values). The use of offshore 
corporate vehicles is often mentioned in the literature as a 
modus operandi of	OCGs	(FATF,	2006),	but	this	is	rarely	found	
in	Dutch	 confiscation	 data	 (Meloen	 et	 al.,	 2003,	Van	Duyne,	
2003	and	Van	Duyne,	de	Zanger,	&	Kristen,	forthcoming).	Also	
the	research	for	this	report	supports	this	finding	in	light	of	the	
underlying	seizures	discussed	in	Section	8.5.
12.6.3. Concluding remarks
The database of the Dutch PPO provides insight into the total 
amount	of	confiscations	and	how	they	relate	 to	 the	different	
OCGs and different types of crime. About 3% of the suspects 
in the PPO database face a confiscation procedure. 
Most	confiscations	are	 related	 to	Dutch	OCGs	and	 to	drugs	
and fraud offences. The general trend is that the amount of 
confiscations	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 is	 clearly	 increasing over 
time. 
Although	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 analyse	 the	 confiscation	 data	
and retrieve some descriptive statistics to make general 
observations,	 the	 confiscation	 data	 in	 the	 Dutch	 PPO	
database did not allow more advanced analyses like those 
on	seizure	data	in	Section	8.5	without	relying	on	very	labour-
intensive	case-by-case	analysis.	Confiscation	data	specified	
like	seizure	data	would improve the research possibilities. 
Another	item	on	a	researcher’s	wish-list	might	be	the	location	
where	 the	 seizure/confiscation	 has	 been	 performed,	 so	 as	
to make geographical analysis possible. However, it should 
be noted that the Dutch PPO database itself is not intended 
for research but for administration purposes. In this sense, it 
is clear that the data have the potential to allow for policy 
and science-relevant research in the future	 (especially	
when improvements such as those mentioned above are 
made). The data themselves are quite complete and of a 
relatively	 good	 quality,	 have	 a	 relatively	 long	 history	 (same	
data storage methodology since 2003), and have information 
from different institutions in one database, which is rarely seen 
internationally. 
Crime
Number of imposed 
confiscations
Drugs 97
Human trafficking 31
Weapon trafficking 0
ITTP 0
Counterfeiting 24
Illegal Gambling 0
Fraud 106
Table 102: The crime relation of organised crime suspects 
with an imposed confiscation, 2003-2014424
Table 103 - The relation between the estimated illegally obtained profit and the imposed confiscation (2003-2014)425
Source: UU elaboration on PPO database
Source: Dutch PPO (2013)
423.	Note	that	the	OCG	could	not	be	identified	in	all	cases,	especially	when	all	
the suspects are companies.
424. Note that the crime for which the OCG was suspected could not be 
classified	 in	our	categories	 in	all	cases.	These	are	 therefore	omitted	 from	 the	
table.
425.	All	numbers	except	the	number	of	suspects	are	in	euro.	The	five	suspects	
for	 which	 a	 confiscation	 has	 been	 imposed	 without	 a	 (documented)	 illegally	
obtained	profit	estimated	are	omitted	from	this	table	to	make	the	comparison	
more pure.
426.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 data	 show	 that	 the	 illegally	 obtained	 benefit	
is	 often	 estimated	 (or	 at	 least	 registered)	 for	 the	 whole	 case,	 with	 multiple	
suspects,	 while	 the	 imposed	 confiscation	 is	 on	 the	 suspect	 only.	 This	means	
that in a hypothetical case with three suspects the estimated illegally obtained 
benefit	could	be	3	million	euro,	while	 the	 imposed	confiscation	 is	 1	million	per	
suspect.	 The	 data	 then	 report	 three	 times	 that	 the	 illegally	 obtained	 profit	 is	
estimated	at	3	million,	while	the	imposed	confiscation	is	only	1	million,	creating	a	
difference	between	the	total	amount	of	estimated	illegally	obtained	benefits	and	
the	imposed	confiscation	of	6	million	euro	(2	million	difference	for	each	suspect).	
This issue is hard to resolve with the database in its current form.
Number of suspects Average Median Lowest Highest
Imposed	confiscations 316 509,316.00 37,399.00 336.00 25,733,754.45
Actual	confiscations 316 694,631.84 76,229.50 1200.00 25,733,754.45
Confiscations related to the estimated illegally obtained 
benefit
Almost	 all	 cases	 (98%)	 in	 which	 a	 confiscation	 is	 imposed	
also	 have	 an	 estimation	 of	 the	 illegally	 obtained	 benefit	 (for	
316 of the 321 suspects). This in itself is not surprising since 
the	 confiscation/recovery	 procedure	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 is	
based on the idea that illegally obtained profits must be 
paid back, which therefore has to be estimated. This makes it 
possible	to	compare	what	amounts	of	illegally	obtained	profits	
are estimated and how much is consequently imposed as 
confiscation.	
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12.7.1. Introduction 
As seen in previous chapters, Spanish institutions have been 
developing new methods in order to be more efficient in terms 
of	data	management	(see	Section	8.6	and	10.8).	The	present	
chapter will focus on the analysis of data regarding different 
aspects	of	the	confiscation	of	assets	in	Spain.	
Criminal assets recovery and management is implemented 
by different governmental institutions. The Intelligence Centre 
against	 Organised	 Crime	 (CICO)	 (see	 Section	 10.8)	 and	 the	
Special	 Anti-Drug	 Prosecution	 Office	 (Fiscalia	 Special	 Anti	
Drogas) have been designated as the Spanish contact points 
for	asset	recovery	(Palomo	et	al.,	2009).	At	present,	Spain	has	
not yet officially designated an asset recovery office. The Plan 
Nacional sobre Drogas (PNSD)427 was created to manage 
confiscated	 assets	 related	 to	 the	 illicit	 traffic	 of	 drugs	 and	
money laundering in relation to drug trafficking offences, and 
it could be considered an Asset Management Office for assets 
of these types.
Methodological remarks
The PNSD publishes an annual report on its website with 
updated	 data	 concerning	 different	 aspects	 of	 confiscated	
assets, such as estimated values or geographical location 
(Ministerio	del	 Interior,	2013).	Accordingly,	the	annual	reports	
from 2001 to 2013 have been analysed from different 
perspectives. The statistics in the PNSD reports are the 
only available data on confiscated assets in Spain, and 
they will constitute the only set for this analysis. Initially, this 
may	be	regarded	a	limitation	since	all	the	confiscated	assets	
considered will derive from drug trafficking and money 
laundering	 offences.	 However,	 because	 most	 confiscation	
orders regarding organised crime in Spain concern drug-
trafficking	and	money-laundering	offences	 (see	Section	5.6),	
we do not expect biased results, and the analysis may be 
taken	as	the	current	general	view	of	Spanish	confiscation.	
12.7.2. Analysis
Types and trends428
The different types of assets managed by the PNSD are 
classified	into	five	categories	(boats,	vehicles,	objects,	 jewels	
and	 real	 estate).	 However,	 according	 to	 the	 classification	
adopted	by	Project	OCP	(see	the	Methodological	Annex),	they	
have been grouped into the four OCP categories.429
According to the latest data available, 49%	of	the	confiscated	
assets fall within the category of registered assets, including 
watercrafts and vehicles;	43%	are	movable	assets	(objects	
and	 jewels);	 and	 the	 rest	 (7%)	 are	 real	 estate	 properties,	
including	 companies’	 properties.	 As	 regards	 bank	 accounts	
and cash, there are no available data on the number of cases 
in	which	money	has	been	confiscated.	However,	confiscated	
cash amounts can be found in the annual reports of the PNSD.
427. Founded in 1985, its main goal is to address the complex phenomenon 
of drug dependency with a holistic and multidisciplinary approach. Later, in 
1995,	 the	 Spanish	 government	 decided	 to	 establish	 a	 fund	 of	 confiscated	
assets integrated in the PNSD. Among its duties, the PNSD is involved in the 
management	 and	 disposal	 of	 confiscated	 assets	 related	 to	 the	 illicit	 traffic	
of drugs and other crimes related to it. In addition, the PNSD promotes social 
programmes regarding the prevention of drug use as well as special social 
assistance rehabilitation programmes. It is regulated by Royal Decree No. 846, 
of 6 June 1997, adopting the regulation of the fund originating from property 
confiscated	on	account	of	drug	 trafficking	and	other	 related	offences	 (PNSD,	
2014).
428.	 The	 information	 regarding	 confiscated	 assets	 is	 provided	 by	 each	
autonomous community. However, some important cases are handled by the 
Spanish National High Court and the Spanish Supreme court located in Madrid. 
This	causes	the	appearance	of	confiscated	assets	(such	as	boats	or	vessels)	in	
Madrid	when	they	may	have	been	originally	confiscated	in	another	region.
429.	 Cash	 and	 bank	 accounts:	 liquid	 money	 amounts	 and	 bank	 accounts;	
Other	Movable	Assets:	e.g.	objects	 (clothes,	cellphones,	 furniture,	electronics,	
appliances,	etc)	and	 jewels	 (watches,	gold	and	silver	ornaments	and	precious	
stones);	Registered	Assets:	e.g.	watercrafts	(e.g.	vessels	and	boats)	and	vehicles	
(cars,	vans,	motorcycles,	trucks,	etc);	Real	Estate;	houses,	apartments,	ranches,	
parking	spaces,	business	premises,	etc.;	Companies.	Company	properties	have	
been included in the real estate category.
Figure 92 - Confiscated assets by type of assets in Spain
Figure 93 - Trend of confiscated assets in Spain (2000-2013)
Source: URJC elaboration on PNSD data
12.7. Spain                                                                                                                              
Jesús Palomo, Jerónimo Márquez and Pilar Laguna (Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Spain)
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The number of confiscated assets increased from 1,762 
in	 2007	 to	 2,391	 in	 2013.	 The	 total	 amount	 of	 confiscated	
assets managed by the PNSD between 2000 and 2013 rose 
to 25,296. 
As	Figure	94	shows,	the	confiscation	of	real	estate	properties	
has surged in recent years. Although movable assets 
decreased between 2004 and 2006, in recent years it is 
evident that they have constantly increased. Moreover, 
registered assets seem to have increased the most since 
2000	(see	Figure	95).
In	 terms	 of	 confiscated	 companies,	 as	 mentioned	 earlier,	
there	 is	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 real estate agencies and 
screen companies with little activity and mainly focused 
on	 money	 laundering.	 After	 confiscation,	 when	 the	 PNSD	
starts the administration process, there is usually not much 
to manage in these companies and, in most cases, the value 
of the company equals the value of its assets	(mainly	real	
estate properties). Occasionally, some company shares are 
confiscated	 and	 the	 court	 integrates	 the	 liquid	 amounts	 of	
money attributable to these shares into the process. However, 
in	some	cases	confiscated	companies	have	a	real	economic	
activity.	 In	 a	 particular	 case,	 there	 were	 27	 confiscated	
companies subject to management, and twelve of them 
remained under judicial administration and had actual activity 
in	the	real	estate	sector	(PNSD,	2014).
430.	The	SEPI	 (Sociedad	Estatal	de	Participaciones	 Industriales)	 is	a	Spanish	
public	entity	created	under	Royal	Decree	5/1995	with	the	main	goal	of	managing	
public business participations.
431. In both cases, the PNSD contacted a public auditing company to estimate 
the	 economic	 situation	 of	 the	 business	 and	 its	 potential	 future	 profitability	
after	confiscation.	In	the	former	case,	the	vineyard	was	judicially	administrated	
and managed by the PNSD for more than eight years until it was successfully 
auctioned to the private sector with a remarkable social reuse programme 
implemented. In the latter case, after the large taxes, debts and loans had 
been	paid,	 it	was	decided	to	 liquidate	 the	company	since	profitability	was	not	
guaranteed	for	a	future	public	auction	of	the	company	(PNSD,	2014).
Figure 94 – Trend of confiscated real estate properties in 
Spain (2000-2013)
Movable assets include objects such as clothes, cell phones, 
furniture, electronics, appliances, etc., while the jewellery 
category comprises various items, including watches, gold, 
silver ornaments and precious stones. During 2013, jewellery 
represented only about 14% of total movable assets, while 
objects reached 86%.
Figure 95 - Trend of confiscated movable and registered 
assets in Spain (2000-2013)
Source: URJC elaboration on PNSD data
As mentioned, registered assets represent the majority 
of	 confiscated	 assets	 (49.6%).	 This	 percentage	 includes	
watercrafts	(boats,	vessels,	jet	skis,	sailboats,	etc.)	and	motor	
vehicles	 (cars,	 vans,	 motorcycles	 and	 trucks)	 managed	
and disposed by the PNSD. The number of vehicles has 
increased noticeably since 2000, reaching the amount of 
10,872	 confiscated	 vehicles	 and	 representing	 87.4%	 of	 total	
registered assets.
Figure 96 – Number of confiscated vehicles and boats in 
Spain (2000-2013)
Source: URJC elaboration on PNSD data
There	 have	 been	 two	 cases	 (Pazo	 Bayón	 in	 Galicia	 and	 a	
public	 parking	 lot	 “Parking	 el	 Molino”	 in	 Marbella,	 Málaga)	
where	 the	 conviction	 included	 confiscation	 of	 companies	
that had real economic activity and actively working 
employees. In these cases, management was undertaken by 
the	PNSD	(Award	Board)	until	the	final	sentence.	Owing	to	the	
lack	 of	 staff	with	 professional	 qualifications	 to	 carry	 out	 the	
management task, the PNSD has contracted COFIVACASA, 
a state company belonging to the SEPI group,430 to assist the 
Coordinating	Board	(PNSD,	2013)	in	profitability	analysis	of	the	
companies	confiscated.431
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Geographical distribution
According	 to	 the	 data,	 confiscated	 assets	 can	 be	 found	 in	
all the autonomous communities in Spain. However, some 
regions	record	a	higher	number	than	others	(see	Figure	97).
In 2013, within the southern region, the autonomous 
community of Andalusia heads the list in terms of number 
of	 confiscated	 assets,	 with	 a	 total	 number	 of	 751	 (PNSD,	
2014),	more	than	30%	of	all	the	assets	confiscated	in	2013	in	
Spain. The Mediterranean coast also records a large number 
of assets. In this area, the region of Valencia together with 
Catalonia	 concentrates	 most	 of	 the	 confiscated	 assets.	
Another important area is the autonomous community of 
Madrid	 where	 385	 confiscated	 assets	 (16%)	 were	 reported	
also	in	2013.	The	distribution	of	confiscated	assets	reflects	the	
distribution	of	evidence	on	criminal	investments	(see	Section	
8.6). Finally, Galicia, the Canary Islands and the autonomous 
city	of	Ceuta	recorded	high	levels	of	confiscation	in	2013.
On focusing on the geographical distribution of real estate 
properties	 (Figure	 98),	 it	 emerges	 that	 most	 confiscated	
properties are concentrated in Andalusia, with a total amount 
of	 42	 confiscations	 since	 2000.	 Andalusia	 is	 followed	 by	
Galicia	 (18)	and	Valencia	 (11).	However,	 the	available	data	do	
not	make	it	possible	to	determine	whether	these	confiscated	
properties are related to organised crime. As mentioned 
in Chapter 8.6, it seems that the location of the real estate 
properties in Andalusia may have some relation to its higher 
house	price	index	(see	Section	8.6).
Both maps show that coastal areas, especially Andalusia, 
present	high	levels	of	confiscations.	It	is	also	worth	mentioning	
that the results obtained from the DOCI investments database 
present	some	similarities	with	the	level	of	confiscated	assets	
(see	 Section	 8.6).	 Even	 though	 figures	 cannot	 be	 directly	
Box 45 – Pazo Bayón: confiscation and manage-
ment of a wine production company
During	 the	 investigation	 of	 the	 Pazo	 (Palace)	 Bayón	
case, several real estate and movable assets were 
seized	 in	 the	 autonomous	community	 of	Galicia.	One	
of	 the	main	 activities	 of	 the	 seized	 companies	was	 a	
vineyard producing a well-known high quality white 
wine	 in	 Spain	 (Albariño).	 The	 trial	 began	 in	 1994	 and	
lasted until 2006, becoming the biggest operation 
against	 the	 Oubiña	 criminal	 family.	 The	 various	
companies	 seized	 were	 temporarily	 managed	 by	 a	
specialized	 private	 company	 (Freixenet)	 in	 order	 to	
preserve	 their	 activities	 and	 employees’	 employment	
conditions.	After	the	final	confiscation	order	in	2006,	a	
public auction was announced in 2007 specifying not 
only the economic aspects on the bids but also other 
requirements such as: maintaining transparency in the 
sale process, preventing future speculation with the 
assets,	obtaining	profits	not	only	for	the	Spanish	state	
but also for the region of Galicia and its population. A 
Galician company submitted the best offer and the 
entire property was sold for 15,102,000 euro in July 
2008.
Figure 97 – Number of confiscated assets per region in Spain 
(NUTS 2, 2013)432
Figure 98 – Geographical distribution of confiscated real 
estate in Spain (2000-2013)433
Source: URJC elaboration on PNSD data
Source: URJC elaboration on PNSD data
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432.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
433.	Classes	identified	using	Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
434.	The	 information	on	confiscated	assets	 is	provided	 to	 the	PNSD	by	each	
autonomous community court. However, some important cases are handled 
by the Spanish National High Court and the Spanish Supreme Court which are 
located	 in	Madrid.	Consequently,	some	of	 the	assets	originally	confiscated	by	
regional	courts	may	be	included	in	the	number	of	assets	confiscated	in	Madrid.
compared,434 it is apparent that regions with high levels 
of investments also have high numbers of confiscated 
assets. Following this tendency, regions with low levels 
of organised crime investment also have a low number of 
confiscated	assets.
Value
Even	 though	 the	 classification	 of	 confiscated	 assets	 can	 be	
found in the data provided by the PNSD, there is no detailed 
explanation	 for	 each	 specific	 asset.	 Nevertheless,	 the	
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available data allow calculation of the average sale value per 
each category.435 
According to the latest data, the current economic crisis has 
had	an	impact	on	the	confiscated	asset	value	of	some	assets.	
The average sale value of objects has decreased by almost 
50%	 since	 2012.	 As	 for	 watercrafts,	 there	 are	 no	 significant	
changes in their respective average sale values in recent years 
(see	Table	104).	The	total	value	of	the	assets	disposed	in	2013	
was 1,765,268 euro with an increase of 85% in the number of 
disposed assets, mainly due to the lower value of the objects 
and	vehicles	being	auctioned	(PNSD,	2014,	p.	16).
to the fact that a high number of real estate properties were 
sold. In particular, over 60% of the real estate proprieties sold 
during 2008 were owned by three companies.437 Moreover, 
the estimated average value per sentence for the period 1999-
2013 was barely 1,300 euro.
The real estate sale value, including prices obtained from 
public auctions and direct sales, may fluctuate due to a wide 
variety of reasons, such as the current situation of the real 
estate market, the location of the properties being sold, or 
changes in the legislation regulating real estate valuation 
(Navarro	and	Perez,	2006).	Owing	to	data	limitations,	no	major	
analysis	can	be	carried	out	in	terms	of	sale	prices;	however,	it	
is worth mentioning that the real estate trend is similar to the 
decrease in real estate prices due to the economic recession 
(see	Section	8.6).	Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 also	necessary	 to	point	
out	 that	 real	 estate	 confiscations	 have	 increased	 in	 recent	
years with a maximum and minimum sale value of 145,992 and 
55,744	euro	respectively	(PNSD,	2014).
As for the monetary values	 confiscated	 in	 each	 Spanish	
region, it seems that a substantial number of them range 
between the medium and high levels. Madrid, Andalusia, 
Valencia, Galicia and the Basque Country are the highest 
in terms of monetary value in Spain. After these regions, 
435. The average selling value has been calculated on the basis of data on public 
auctions and direct divestitures managed by the PNSD. Data from selling values 
in different years has been collected in other to produce a diverse number of 
times series for each type of asset.
436.	Note	that	a	court	sentence	can	order	the	confiscation	of	diverse	goods	of	
different natures, as well as in terms of number of assets.
437. A total number of 16 real estate properties were sold. Stocks and shares are 
also included in the value shown for real estate properties.
438. The map shows contribution by each autonomy community based on the 
value	of	the	assets	confiscated.	The	types	of	assets	used	for	the	map	include	
registered	assets,	movable	assets,	real	estate	and	cash.	Classification	based	on	
Jenks	natural	breaks	optimization.
Type of assets 2012 2013
Real estate 63,871.88 55,774.20
Motor vehicles 2,717.65 1,704.15
Watercrafts 10,076.87 10,562.60
Jewels 3,854.17 900
Objects 864.15 51.57
Table 104 – Average sale value of assets 2012-2013
Source: URJC based on data from the PNSD 2014
Figure 99 – Asset average selling value 2001-2013 excluding 
real estate in Spain (euro)
On the other hand, time series for the average sale value 
of	 confiscated	 assets	 show	 a	 growing	 trend	 over	 the	 years.	
Watercrafts seem to have the highest sale value over the 
years, with a moderate tendency to grow.
As for the average value per sentence,436	the	figure	below	shows	
its tendency over the available years. In general, it seems that 
the trend of the average value per sentence has undergone 
moderate growth. In 2008 a notable change is apparent, due 
Figure 100 – Value of confiscated assets (mn euro) by 
autonomous community in Spain438
Source: URJC elaboration on PNSD data
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Castilla León, Castilla La Mancha, and Catalonia form 
another	 important	group	 for	 the	value	of	confiscated	assets.	
As shown in Section 8.6, Andalusia and coastal areas seem 
again to record levels higher than those of other regions, which 
suggests	 that	 the	 large	 number	 of	 confiscated	 assets	 and	
investments in these regions is related to organised crime.
Although	the	main	purpose	of	confiscated	assets	is	their	final	
disposal, processing time plays a key role in terms of asset 
depreciation. According to data, between 1996 and 2013, a 
total	of	27,523	confiscated	assets	were	completely	processed	
by the PNSD, which represents about 92% of the total 
amount	 of	 assets	managed	 by	 this	 institution	 (PNSD,	 2014).	
Source: URJC elaboration on PNSD data
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The latest data show a clear tendency towards a reduction 
in the processing time of the assets being managed. 
Noticeable in Figure 101 is the increasing number of assets 
being	completely	processed	(60%)	within	the	same	year	that	
they enter the PNSD. Nevertheless, the data cannot be used 
to perform a yearly depreciation value analysis for each type 
of asset.
12.7.3. Concluding remarks
Because	 data	 on	 confiscated	 assets	 are	 limited,	 deeper	
analysis has not been possible. However, despite this difficulty, 
some general conclusions can be drawn. First, it seems that 
the	 number	 of	 assets	 confiscated	 in	 the	 period	 analysed	
increased over the years. In terms of assets allocation, the 
autonomous community of Andalusia headed the list of the 
number	of	confiscated	assets,	as	well	as	showing	high	 levels	
of investment evidence. Moreover, together with Andalusia, 
coastal areas like Catalonia, Valencia and Madrid also exhibit 
the	same	trend	in	terms	of	confiscated	assets.
As	 regards	 the	 most	 common	 types	 of	 confiscated	 assets,	
registered and movable assets represent the majority of 
confiscated goods. Motor vehicles appear very often in the 
data provided by the PNSD, as well as in those of the DOCI. 
Regarding	 confiscated	 real	 estate	 properties,	 low	 levels	 of	
confiscation	have	been	found	to	date.	Hence,	examination	of	
439. Figure 101 shows the evolution and tendency of asset-processing time 
over	the	years.	The	main	goal	of	PNSD	is	to	protect	the	value	of	the	confiscated	
assets by increasing the number of assets processed within the same year as 
their entry.
the	value	of	confiscated	goods,	and	time	series	for	the	average	
sale	 value	 of	 confiscated	 assets,	 showed	 a	 rising	 tendency	
over	the	years.	When	findings	in	Chapter	8.6	were	compared	to	
the data obtained from the PNSD, a wide gap was apparent 
between the high level of investments made by OCG in 
businesses and the low confiscation numbers in terms of 
companies related to drug trafficking.
The geographical location of assets seems to be aligned with 
the level of investments found in the southern region of the 
country and in the coastal areas. Moreover, the processing time 
of assets managed by the PNSD shows a decreasing tendency 
towards more efficient managing protocols. Nevertheless, 
the impossibility of accessing disaggregated data	 (on	 a	
case-by-case	basis)	on	confiscated	assets	has	restricted	the	
possibility to perform an analysis richer in terms of statistical 
results.
Figure 101 – Asset processing time in relation to its entry (Spain, 1996-2013)439
Source: URJC elaboration on PNSD data
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12.8.1. Introduction
The JARD (Joint Asset Recovery Database) database 
contains	data	on	confiscated	assets.440 The JARD is a central 
repository	of	information	relating	to	seizures	of	the	proceeds	
of crime.441 The data are not public. The database records all 
restraint,	confiscation,	cash	seizure	and	civil	recovery	orders	
made in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, together with 
brief details of the assets taken into account in making such 
orders	 (Crown	 Prosecution	 Service,	 n.d.,a).	 It	 also	 shows	
the	 balance	 outstanding	 on	 confiscation	 orders	 at	 any	 time	
(Millington	&	Sutherland	Williams,	2010,	p.	262).	4,500	users	
have	access	to	the	database,	including	financial	investigators,	
prosecutors and enforcement staff across the UK. The 
database is listed in the CEART Project White Paper as a best 
practice	in	asset	recovery	(Palomo	et	al.,	2009).
For the purpose of this project, limited access to a subset 
of the JARD data	was	kindly	provided	by	the	NCA	(formerly	
SOCA) with the help of the Home Office. The dataset includes 
the	 following	 information:	 (a)	 monetary	 value	 (in	 GBP)	 of	
annual	 confiscation	 receipts	 broken	 down	 by	 type	 of	 crime	
and	by	type	of	authority,	2003-2013,	and	(b)	monetary	value	of	
annual	confiscation	orders	made	that	relate	to	these	receipts,	
2003-2013	(an	aggregate	value	for	each	year).
Analysis of asset recovery in the UK is impeded by the lack of 
complete and consistent published data. The predecessor of 
NCA, SOCA, did not provide a complete set of asset recovery 
figures,	 and	 those	 that	 were	 published	 made	 comparisons	
difficult because of some lack of clarity over the meaning of 
the	terms	used	in	its	reports	(Sproat,	2011).
12.8.2. Analysis
Types and trends
Based	on	a	JARD	data	analysis	conducted	by	Fleming	(2006,	
cited	in	Dubourg	&	Prichard,	2008,	p.	74)	the	largest	stock	of	
investment	(in	terms	of	the	value of assets) is in real estate 
properties and areas of land, followed by bank accounts, 
vehicles, financial products	 (pensions,	 investments	 and	
shares) and other assets: see Figure 102.
Types of seized/restrained goods:443 the records of 
confiscations	recorded	in	the	investments	database	included	
a	wide	range	of	assets,	such	as	properties	(houses	and	flats),	
plots of land, cars, motorbikes, boats, number plates, jewellery 
and other valuables, designer clothes, cash, bank accounts. 
Cash seems to be a fairly commonly recovered asset. 
Even	though	evidence	of	cash	seizures	was	not	systematically	
collected, this provides an indication that this type of asset is 
recovered fairly frequently.
Geographical distribution
The assets were recovered from a range of locations across 
the UK.444 The locations include London, Surrey, East and West 
Sussex, Edinburgh, Glasgow, North Eastern Scotland, Eastern 
Scotland, South Western Scotland, Greater Manchester, Tees 
Valley and Durham, West, North and South Yorkshire, York, 
Lincolnshire, Hampshire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, 
Kent, Merseyside, Lancashire, Southampton, Leicestershire, 
Rutland and Northamptonshire, West Wales and The 
Valleys, Shropshire and Staffordshire, East Anglia, Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire.
Criminal groups and nationality of owners
There	 were	 very	 few	 records	 of	 confiscations	 where	 it	 was	
possible to establish the nationality of the owner. In the 
majority	of	these	cases,	the	owners	of	confiscated	assets	were	
British OCGs whose assets included property and land, cars, 
gold,	other	valuables,	and	bank	accounts;	there	were	several	
records	 of	 confiscations	 from	 Eastern European OCGs 
whose assets included cars, bank accounts, vehicles and 
houses. In the case study of a	‘crash	for	cash’	scam	in	County	
Durham, restrained assets included several properties, land, 
vehicles, private registration numbers and cash. 
Figure 102 - Assets held by offenders in the UK (stock 
measure of the value of assets)442
Source: adapted from Dubourg & Prichard, 2008
12.8. United Kingdom                                                                                                                              
David Wall and Yulia Chistyakova (Durham University, United Kingdom)
440.	 Assets	 obtained	 as	 a	 result	 of	 enforcement	 of	 confiscation	 orders,	 see	
‘Confiscation’	in	the	previous	section,	under	s	3,	4	or	6	of	the	Powers	of	Criminal	
Courts	(Sentencing)	Act	2000	or	POCA	2002,	s	70	(POCA	2002,	ss	6(2)(a),	(b)	
&	(c)),	and	under	s	6(3)	of	POCA	2002
441. It is worth noting here that JARD does not only relate to organised crime. 
It	 records	 all	 confiscations	 related	 to	 acquisitive	 crimes,	 both	 organised	 and	
unorganised.
442.	 ‘Bank/building	 society’	 refers	 to	 money	 in	 bank	 accounts	 or	 in	 building	
society	accounts.	The	source	does	not	specify	what	‘other	financial	assets’	refer	
to.
443.	 This	 is	 based	 on	 the	 data	 been	 collected	 from	 open	 sources	 (the	
‘investments’	database).
444.	 The	 locations	 are	 based	 on	 the	 data	 collected	 from	 open	 sources	 (the	
‘investments’	 database).	 The	 JARD	 dataset	 with	 which	 we	 worked	 did	 not	
contain a breakdown of data by geographical location.
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According to the JARD data,445 in total 960 million GBP of 
criminal assets	were	 recovered	 in	 the	UK	between	2003/4	
and	2012/13.	In	2012/13,	around	133	million	GBP	was	recovered.	
The	value	of	assets	recovered	(confiscation	receipts)446 in the 
UK between 2003 and 2013 shows an upward trend	 (see	
Figure	103).	But	the	confiscation	orders	made	exhibit	a	much	
steeper	upward	trend,	showing	that	the	value	of	confiscation	
orders made has been growing at a higher rate compared to 
the	value	of	confiscation	receipts	that	relate	to	these	orders.
According to the National Audit Office, the estimated amount 
confiscated	for	every	100	GBP	of	criminal	proceeds	in	2012-
13	was	26	pence.	This	is	based	on	the	use	of	the	fraud	figure	
as	 a	 proxy.	This	 figure	 increases	 to	 35	GBPif	 all	 other	 asset	
recovery	 measures	 are	 included	 (Controller	 and	 Auditor	
General, 2013). According to the same source, 76% of the 
Figure 103 - Value of confiscation receipts and of 
confiscation orders in the UK (mn GBP, 2003-2013)
Source: University of Durham analysis of JARD data
Figure 104 - Percentage collected of the total value of 
confiscation orders by size of confiscation order in the UK 
(orders imposed since 1987)
Source: adapted from Controller and Auditor General, 2013, p. 15
Figure 105 – Share of the value of assets confiscated 
for each type of offence in the total value of confiscated 
assets in the UK (GPB 2003-2013)
Figure 106 – Trend in the value of confiscation receipts per 
type of offence in the UK (2003-2013)
Source: University of Durham-OCP analysis of 2003-2013 confiscation data held 
on the JARD database
Source: University of Durham-OCP analysis of 2003-2013 confiscation data held 
on the JARD database
amount recovered	 using	 confiscation	 orders	 each	 year	
was spent on enforcing confiscation orders. Enforcement 
agencies	collected	133	million	GBP	from	confiscation	orders	
in	2012/13,	while	the	estimated	annual	cost	of	the	confiscation	
order process was 102 million GBP (Controller	 and	 Auditor	
General, 2013).
Size of orders:	 in	 the	 UK	 the	majority	 of	 orders	 (80%)	 are	
for relatively small amounts	(25,000	GBP	and	under).	The	
reason for this, according to the National Audit Office, is that 
low-value orders are easier to enforce;	and	while	the	success	
rate	is	high	for	orders	under	1,000	GBP	(90%),	it	is	much	lower	
for	orders	over	1	million	GBP	(18%),	see	Figure	104.
445. Provided by the NCA and the Home Office for the purposes of this project.
446.	Confiscation	order	 is	 the	 amount	 of	money	 that	 the	offender	 is	 ordered	
to	pay	by	the	court.	Confiscation	order	receipt	is	the	amount	that	has	actually	
been paid by the offender. The two values are in most cases different, with 
confiscation	order	receipts	usually	lower	than	confiscation	orders.	There	are	a	
number	of	reasons	for	the	attrition	(the	loss	of	the	value	of	assets	in	the	process	
of	enforcement	of	the	confiscation	order).	 In	many	cases,	offenders	fail	to	pay	
part	or	all	of	the	confiscation	order	that	they	have	been	given.
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Related offences
Examination	of	 the	 relative	value	of	confiscation	 receipts	by	
type of offence, using the JARD dataset,447 shows that of the 
total value of the receipts, the largest value was recovered 
from frauds (35%), closely followed by drug trafficking 
(30%) and money laundering (15%).	 Burglary/theft	 and	
counterfeiting/forgery	contribute	relatively	little	to	the	overall	
value	 of	 confiscation	 receipts	 (4%	 and	 3%	 respectively,	 see	
Figure	105).	This	certainly	is	not	an	unexpected	finding,	which	
shows that most of the value of assets obtained through 
confiscation	orders	 is	 recovered	 from	the	two largest illicit 
markets in the UK: frauds and drugs, showing that the 
structure	of	confiscations	generally	reflects	the	structure	and	
profitability	of	the	illicit	economies	(see	Section	5.7).
Examination of the changes in the value recovered from each 
offence	since	2003	(Figure	105)	shows	that	the	value	of	assets	
recovered from different offences follows different trends. 
For	drugs,	after	an	initial	increase	in	the	value	of	confiscation	
receipts	between	2003	and	2004,	the	trajectory	then	‘flattens’,	
showing recovery of around 30 million GBP a year between 
2008/9	and	2012/13.	Recoveries	from	frauds, however, follow a 
remarkably different trajectory: they continue to grow rapidly 
between 2003/4 and 2006/7, reaching 40 million GB GBP in 
2006/7;	there	is	then	a	fall	in	the	next	two	years,	to	33	million	
GBP	in	2008/9.	Thereafter,	confiscations	from	frauds	resume	
an	upward	trend,	which	continues	until	2012/3,	reaching	nearly	
50	million	GBP	in	2012/13.	For	money laundering, an upward 
trend starts slowly, but becomes much more pronounced 
around	2006/7	and	then	stabilising	around	27	million	GBP	in	
2011/12.	 Recoveries	 from	 counterfeiting	 and	 burglary/thefts	
also	 experienced	 clear	 upward	 trends	 between	 2003/4	
and	2012/13,	 although	 the	 increase	 in	 recoveries	 from	 these	
offences was much more modest. It must be noted here 
that the Fraud Act was adopted in 2006, and Anti-Money 
Laundering Regulations in 2007. It is also important to note 
that in 2006 the Asset Recovery Agency that was initially 
created to lead the process of asset recovery in the UK was 
abolished and the Serious and Organised Crime Agency was 
set up. These legislative and institutional changes may to some 
extent explain the increase in recoveries from both frauds and 
money	laundering	after	2005/6.
Bullock and colleagues used the JARD database to examine 
the	distribution	of	the	number	of	confiscation	orders	per	type	
of	offence,	as	well	as	the	value	of	orders	(Bullock	et	al.,	2009).	
The	 majority	 of	 confiscation	 orders	 were	 for	 drug-related	
offences.	This	was	followed	by	fraud	and	burglary/theft	(Table	
105).	They	also	looked	at	mean	values	of	confiscation	orders.	
When	ranked	according	to	their	value,	confiscation	orders	with	
the highest mean values were VAT frauds	(366,000	GBP),	
followed	 by	money	 laundering	 offences	 (255,000	GBP)	 and	
drug	offences	(20,000	GBP).
This analysis shows that recoveries from drug-related 
offences	consist	of	a	 large	number	of	confiscation	orders	of	
relatively low value, while recoveries from frauds consist of a 
smaller number of orders of higher value.
The process of attrition 
Bullock	and	colleagues	(Bullock	et	al.,	2009)	used	the	JARD	
to examine attrition and concluded that the levels of attrition 
were high: the attrition between value of orders sought and 
value of orders imposed was 38% for drug supply cases	(71.5	
million GBP vs. 44 million GBP), and 34 per cent for all non-
drugs	offences	 (120	million	GBP	vs.	 79.1	million	GBP).	These	
findings	 are	 supported	 by	 the	 recent	 National	 Audit	 Office	
report	 (Controller	 and	Auditor	General,	 2013).	 The	 following	
case study illustrates how the process of attrition affects the 
amount of assets recovered.
	“An	offender	was	convicted	in	September	2008	for	a	complex	
fraud	 relating	 to	 precious	 metals	 trading.	 The	 confiscation	
case was heard in August 2010, with the judge ruling that the 
offender	had	benefited	by	over	£1	billion.	However,	the	actual	
order made was for £20 million, much of which was considered 
hidden	overseas.	There	were	significant	complications	to	this	
case including monies being transferred through multiple trust 
funds, bankruptcy imposition on the various companies set 
up	for	the	crime,	and	the	offender’s	wife	claiming	ownership	of	
assets. The offender has paid just £200,000 as of September 
2013 and is currently serving a seven-year default sentence 
for	non-payment”	(Controller	and	Auditor	General,	2013,	p.	13).
Lister	 and	 Bullock’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 development	 and	
447. See above for details on the data made available for the analysis.
Type of offence Mean value (GBP)
VAT fraud 336,000
Money laundering 255,000
Fraud/deception 51,000
Robbery 21,500
Drug trafficking 20,000
Burglary/theft 14,500
Table 105 - Mean value of confiscation orders per type of 
offence, thousand GBP
Source: Adapted from Bullock, Mann, Street, & Coxon, 2009, p. 13
Box 46 – Case study: Metal trading fraud
	 “An	 offender	 was	 convicted	 in	 September	 2008	 for	
a complex fraud relating to precious metals trading. 
The	confiscation	case	was	heard	in	August	2010,	with	
the	 judge	 ruling	 that	 the	 offender	 had	 benefited	 by	
over £1 billion. However, the actual order made was 
for £20 million, much of which was considered hidden 
overseas.	 There	 were	 significant	 complications	 to	
this case including monies being transferred through 
multiple trust funds, bankruptcy imposition on the 
various companies set up for the crime, and the 
offender’s	 wife	 claiming	 ownership	 of	 assets.	 The	
offender has paid just £200,000 as of September 2013 
and is currently serving a seven-year default sentence 
for	 non-payment”	 (Controller	 and	 Auditor	 General,	
2013, p. 13).
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operation	 of	 the	 regime	 of	 confiscation	 law	 in	 England	 and	
Wales concludes that the effectiveness of ‘confiscation’ to 
secure its crime control objectives is uncertain	 (Lister	&	
Bullock, 2014). This is supported by the recent reports by the 
National	Audit	Office	(Controller	and	Auditor	General,	2013).	
The	NAO	reports	identifies	several	key	problems	(a)	a	flawed	
incentive	 scheme	 with	 limited	 oversight;	 (b)	 lack	 of	 good	
performance data or benchmarks for organisations means 
that	there	 is	a	 limited	perspective	on	which	cases	to	pursue;	
(c)	outdated	and	slow	ICT	systems	and	numerous	data-entry	
errors	 are	 also	 problems;	 (d)	 the	 central	 sanctions	 used	 to	
enforce	confiscation	orders,	which	 include	prison	sentences	
and	8%	interest	on	the	amount,	 ‘do	not	work’;	 (e)	not	enough	
being	done	to	enforce	the	orders;	(f)	the	bodies	involved	with	
confiscation	do	not	have	enough	 information	(Controller	and	
Auditor	 General,	 2013;	 House	 of	 Commons	 Committee	 of	
Public Accounts, 2014).
12.8.3. Concluding remarks
Due	to	incompatibility	of	the	data	on	investments	(see	Section	
8.7)	 and	 confiscations	 as	 seen	 in	 this	 Section)	 it	 is	 difficult	
to draw conclusions about the differences and similarities 
between	 investments	 and	 confiscations.	 However,	 a	 few	
observations can be made. According to a source cited in this 
chapter,	the	largest	stock	of	assets	held	by	offenders	(in	terms	
of the value of assets) is in real estate properties and areas 
of land, followed by bank accounts, vehicles, financial 
products	 (pensions,	 investments	 and	 shares)	 and	 other	
assets. This is based on the JARD data, that is, information on 
cases	where	a	confiscation	order	was	granted.	On	 the	other	
hand,	 the	analysis	of	 the	 investments	database	(see	Section	
8.7) suggested that most frequently mentioned investments 
were	companies,	 followed	by	properties	and	other	 (movable	
and	 registered)	 assets	 (but	 there	 was	 no	 measure	 of	 the	
relative	 ‘value’	 of	 each	 type	 of	 investments).	 From	 the	
available data, if companies are not taken into consideration, 
confiscations	appear	to	be	broadly	in	line	with	investments.
With regard to cash, a proportion of cash seizures were 
recorded	in	the	‘illicit	markets’	database,	but	because	data	on	
confiscations	could	not	be	collected	systematically	from	open	
sources,	it	was	impossible	to	say	whether	cash	seizures	were	
more	or	less	common	than	other	confiscations.
Properties appear to be the assets that are commonly used to 
pay	confiscation	orders.	It	is	likely	that	a	significant	proportion	
of money from frauds and money laundering ends up as 
property investments in the UK and abroad or investments 
in	 other	 high-value	 assets.	 An	 analysis	 of	 the	 ‘investments’	
database shows that frauds recorded in the database were 
relatively frequently associated with investments in real estate 
(31	 mentions	 out	 of	 96	 mentions	 of	 frauds,	 or	 32%).	 While	
interpretation and explanation of such quantitative measures 
should be approached with great caution, these data may 
suggest that a considerable proportion of investments 
in real estate comes from frauds, and that LEAs that are 
increasingly focused on frauds since the introduction of the 
POCA 2002 are recovering increasingly more real estate 
as an asset readily available for confiscation. Certainly, the 
POCA 2002 has widened the number of institutions required 
to	file	suspicious	activity	 reports,	and	thus	widened	the	 ‘net’,	
making it possible to identify more suspicious transactions, 
link them to criminal activities and identify assets available for 
confiscation.
Companies do not seem to be an asset commonly 
‘recovered’ by LEAs in the UK. First, it may not be easy to 
identify and detect connections between companies and 
specific	 criminal	 activities.	 Secondly,	 this	 may	 be	 explained	
by	the	specifics	of	 law	in	the	UK.	Companies	enjoy	their	own	
legal personality separate and distinct from the offender. 
The Crown Prosecution Guidance explains that, in normal 
circumstances,	 “they	 do	 not	 constitute	 realisable	 property	
of	 the	defendant”,	 however,	 “where	a	defendant	 is	 in	 control	
of a company and it has been used to facilitate the criminal 
conduct complained of, the court may pierce the corporate 
veil of the company and treat it as the realisable property of 
the defendant. The Court will not, however, permit the restraint 
order to operate at the pre-conviction stage is such a way as to 
preclude	the	company	engaging	in	legitimate	trading	activity”	
(Crown	Prosecution	Service,	n.d.).
In other words, the company will be allowed to continue to 
operate, but the court may appoint a management receiver 
to enable continuous operation of the company pending the 
resolution of the case. Examples of such businesses include 
haulage	firms,	factories	and	bureaus	de	change.	It	is	however	
often difficult to prove that a company was used for criminal 
conduct, because these companies are often used as fronts 
for	 illicit	activities	(Laver,	2013).	 It	 is	more	common	in	the	UK	
to	make	confiscation	orders	against	individuals	(Murray,	2011).	
Other possible causes cannot be excluded: for example, the 
problems	in	tracing	back	the	company	to	its	beneficial	owner	
and	 also	 possibly	 ‘reluctance’	 by	 prosecutors	 to	 confiscate	
companies	that	may	still	keep	on	working	and	produce	profits.
It is also important to mention the problem of attrition. In 
the	 UK,	 offenders	 are	 required	 to	 “repay	 a	 sum	 of	 money	
equivalent to the amount adjudged to have been made from 
crime”,	rather	than	hand	over	the	actual	assets	in	which	they	
invested	(Bullock	et	al.,	2009,	p.	1).	In	other	words,	it	is	the	value 
of the proceeds that is being sought, not the actual proceeds. 
Bullock and colleagues identify a number of reasons for 
attrition,	 including,	“shortfall	between	the	expected value of 
assets when orders are made and the actual value they fetch 
when	sold;	difficulties	faced	by	imprisoned	offenders	in	selling	
assets	to	pay	their	orders;	complications	around	the	position	
of third parties in asset ownership, preventing the sale of 
property	 in	 particular;	 actions	 on	 part	 of	 some	 offenders	
to	 avoid	 recovery,	 e.g.	 hiding	 assets;	 offenders	 absconding,	
dying,	 or	 being	 deported”	 (Bullock	 et	 al.,	 2009,	 p.	 iii).	 Their	
conclusions agree with those of the NAO: in particular, they 
point	out	the	need	for	greater	clarity	on	the	scope	of	POCA’s	
use,	a	more	systematic	and	strategic	approach	to	confiscation,	
and improved coordination.
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This	 report	 has	 presented	 the	 final	 results	 of Project OCP 
– Organised Crime Portfolio	 (www.ocportfolio.eu),448 to 
furnish a first study of the economics of organised crime in 
Europe. In particular, it has answered three research questions 
addressed by the three sections of the report. 
•		 Part 1 has analysed where organised crime proceeds are 
generated, and from what illicit markets;
•		 Part 2 has studied where these proceeds are then 
invested in the legitimate economy, in what regions, 
assets	and	business	sectors	(Part	2);
•		 Part 3 has studied the extent to which these proceeds 
are confiscated and recovered by European authorities 
(Part	3).
The report has focused on seven EU countries	 (Finland,	
France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United 
Kingdom), represented by the OCP project partners, but it has 
also provided a broader overview on the situation in Europe as 
a whole.
Considering the limited number of previous studies and 
the lack of data	 in	 this	 field,	 the	 report	 has	 provided	 only	
an exploratory analysis, conducted with an innovative 
methodology and a wide variety of data sources	(statistics	
on	 confiscated	 assets,	 judicial	 evidence,	 police	 reports,	
academic literature, open sources – see Chapter 2 and the 
Methodological Annex).
Given its pioneering nature and its data limitations, the report 
should be considered only a first step towards better 
understanding of how the business cycle of organised 
crime in Europe works, and a starting point for future risk 
assessment tools aimed at reducing the opportunities for 
criminal infiltration of the legitimate economy, and therefore 
to strengthen the prevention of organised crime business. 
Where do criminal proceeds come from? Illicit markets 
in Europe 
The report has provided a first quantification of the 
revenues produced by the main illicit markets in Europe. 
According to this estimation, developed on the basis of a 
transparent	 and	 verifiable	methodology	 (see	Chapter	 2	 and	
the Methodological Annex), illicit markets in the European 
Union produce around 110 billion euro every year,449 
equivalent to approximately 1% of the EU GDP, with a higher 
weight	 in	 southern	 and	 eastern	 European	 countries	 (see	
Section 3.1). The seven OCP countries represent about 60% 
of this total amount.
Although traditional markets such as drug trafficking	(annual	
revenues of 28 million euro at EU level, see Section 4.1) still 
play a crucial role in the economics of organised crime groups, 
other illicit activities are emerging as key sources of proceeds 
for such groups, primarily fraud	 in	 its	various	forms	(such	as	
organised VAT fraud, excise fraud or credit card fraud: see 
4.9). According to the OCP estimates, also counterfeiting is 
potentially	very	profitable	(see	4.5);	and	so	too	are	emerging	
activities like ITTP (with	 annual	 revenues	 comparable	 to	
those of heroin at EU level: see 4.4) and organised property 
crime	 (especially	 thefts	 of	 car	 parts,	 medicines	 and	 other	
high-valued	 products	 which	may	 be	 ‘laundered’	 and	 re-sold	
on the legal market: see 4.10). OCGs in Europe may shift from 
traditional illicit markets such as drugs or THB to these high-
return	and	low-risk	criminal	activities	(see	3.3).	
The revenues produced by illegal markets in Europe are not 
monopolized by a few criminal organisations;	rather,	they	
are shared among a plurality of actors (see	3.2).	It	is	not	easy	
to determine who earns what amount: the number of smaller 
groups and freelance criminals is increasing, especially in 
emerging illicit activities such as synthetic drugs, home-grown 
cannabis	(see	4.1),	fraud	(see	4.9)	or	ITTP	(see	4.4).	
Although some ethnic-based groups still play a crucial role 
(e.g.	 Albanian	 or	 Turkish	 OCGs	 in	 heroin	 trafficking),	 OCGs	
in Europe are increasingly multi-ethnic, heterogeneous 
and interconnected (see	 3.2).	 While	 some	 groups	 are	
specialising	 in	specific	 illicit	activities	 (e.g.	Eastern	European	
OCGs in organised property crime: see 4.10), most OCGs are 
involved in multiple crimes. In this regard, the use of the same 
channels, routes, and modus operandi for different illicit trades 
may generate economies of scale, reduce operational costs, 
and increase OCGs’ profit margins. 
However, it should be borne in mind that the number, nature, 
composition, and level of organisation of these criminal 
actors change according to the country, the market, the 
opportunities, and the particular stage of the illicit supply 
chain in which they are active. For example, while illicit markets 
in southern Italy	seem	to	be	dominated	by	local	mafia	groups,	
13. Conclusions                                    
448.	 Project	 OCP	 has	 been	 carried	 out	 with	 financial	 support	 from	 the	
Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union - 
European Commission, DG Home Affairs, and it has been developed by an 
international consortium of eight partners: Transcrime – Joint Research Centre 
on	Transnational	Crime	(www.transcrime.it)	of	the	Università	Cattolica	del	Sacro	
Cuore	di	Milano	and	 the	Università	degli	Studi	di	Trento	 (Italy),	coordinator	of	
the	project;	Police	college	of	Finland	(PCF	–	Finland);	Agence	de	Gestion	et	de	
Recouvrement	des	Avoirs	Saisis	et	Confisqués	(AGRASC	–	France);	An	Garda	
Siochana	-	Criminal	Assets	Bureau	(CAB	–	Ireland);	Guardia	di	Finanza	(GDF	–	
Italy);	Utrecht	University	(UU	-	The	Netherlands);	Universidad	Rey	Juan	Carlos	
(URJC	–	Spain);	Durham	University	(UDUR	–	United	Kingdom).
449.	The	figure	refers	to	the	estimate	of	the	annual	revenues	from	those	 illicit	
markets	for	which	a	figure	was	available	or	has	been	produced	for	the	EU	MS	
for	 which	 the	 data	 were	 available.	 This	 figure	 includes	 trafficking	 in	 heroin,	
cocaine, cannabis, amphetamines, ecstasy, illicit trade in tobacco products, 
counterfeiting,	 illicit	 trafficking	 in	 firearms,	 MTIC	 frauds	 and	 cargo	 theft	 (see	
Chapters 3 and 4 for details).
Michele Riccardi (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore - Transcrime, Italy)
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central or northern Italian regions witness the presence of 
different	 actors	 (see	 5.4).	 Similarly,	 transit countries like 
France, the Netherlands or Spain register numerous OCGs 
(see	 respectively	5.2,	5.5	and	5.6)	characterised	by	different	
ethnic backgrounds and often functionally linked to local 
groups.
Finally, not all the illicit revenues produced are available for 
investment in the legitimate economy. OCGs must bear 
operational, management and other costs. Employing an 
innovative	 methodology	 applied	 to	 the	 heroin	 market	 (see	
Chapter 6), this report has estimated that between 25% and 
42% of the revenues from heroin in the 7 OCP countries may 
be	available	for	laundering	(see	6.1).
Where are criminal proceeds invested in the legitimate 
economy? 
Having determined how much is produced by illicit markets, 
and how much may be available for laundering, the report has 
analysed where these illicit proceeds are then invested by 
OCGs in the legitimate economy. To this end, it has carried out 
a large-scale collection of evidence on criminal investments 
by	 drawing	 on	 many	 sources,	 including	 judicial	 files,	 police	
reports, FIU reports, academic literature and open sources 
(see	Chapter	2	for	details	on	the	data	collection).
In terms of geographical distribution (see	 7.1),	 criminal	
investments seem to concentrate in regions characterised 
by	 the	 traditional	 presence	 of	 OCGs	 (e.g.	 southern	 Italy),	 in	
border	regions	which	play	a	strategic	role	in	illicit	traffics	(e.g.	
Andalusia, south and eastern France), in areas with important 
ports	 or	 airports	 (e.g.	 Amsterdam-Rotterdam,	 PACA-
Provence-Alpes-Côte	d›Azur),	in	large	urban	areas	(e.g.	Rome,	
Madrid, Paris, London), or in tourist and coastal areas which 
can	provide	investment	opportunities	(e.g.	PACA	or	Costa	del	
Sol).450 While some of these regions collect investments by a 
few	local	criminal	groups	(e.g.	southern	Italy	–	see	8.4),	others	
seem	to	attract	a	variety	of	both	local	and	foreign	OCGs	(e.g.	
Spain – see 8.6).
As regards the types of assets composing the portfolios of 
criminal	 groups	 (see	 7.2),	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 all	 types	 –	
movable	goods	(from	cash	to	jewels	to	financial	instruments),	
registered	assets	 (cars,	motorbikes,	boats,	 helicopters,	 etc.),	
real estate properties and companies – are the targets of 
OCG expenditure and investments. Particularly important is 
the role of companies. In this regard, the preferred business 
sectors	 (see	 7.3)	 are	 bars	 and	 restaurants,	 construction,	
transportation, real estate activities, hotels, and wholesale and 
retail trade, in particular of food products and clothing. Also 
emerging are cases of criminal investments in waste and scrap 
management, renewable energy, money transfer businesses 
(MTB),	casinos,	VLT,	slot	machines,	betting	and	gaming.
However,	differences	exist	across	countries	 (see	Chapter	8)	
and	across	criminal	organisations	(see	7.4).	For	example,	while	
Italian	mafia	OCGs	prefer	construction	activities	(in	Italy)	and	
wholesale	trade	of	 food	products	(abroad	–	see	7.4	and	8.4),	
Motorcycle gangs show a preference for, e.g., private security 
or	renovation	activities	(see	7.4	and	8.1),	and	Chinese	OCGs	for	
wholesale	and	retail	trade	and	bars	and	restaurants	(see	7.4).451
In general, it seems that the selection of these sectors 
responds	to	different	OCG	needs	(see	7.5):	to	launder money 
(with	cash-intensive	businesses),	but	also	 to	gain	control of 
the territory	(with	territorial-specific	economic	activities),	to	
infiltrate the public administration and the local political 
sphere, to facilitate illicit trafficking	 (e.g.	 transportation	
companies can be used as fronts for the smuggling of drugs 
and other illicit goods), and to maximise the return while 
minimising the risk of being traced, for example by investing 
in new sectors characterised by weak or developing regulation 
(e.g.	renewable	energy	or	VLT	and	slot	machines).
According to the analysis carried out, it is evident that criminal 
groups use investments in the legitimate economy not only to 
launder money but also as tools to exert their power and 
influence, and to exploit economies of scale with the criminal 
activities in which they are involved. OCGs do not discriminate 
between illicit and legitimate markets, but instead see them as 
on a continuum along which to seize profit opportunities 
and expand their power and economic gain.
To what extent are these proceeds confiscated by 
European authorities? 
In seeking to answer this question, the report has encountered 
two	 main	 difficulties.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 wide	 differences in 
terms of regulatory framework that exist among EU 
countries	(see	Chapter	10):	types	of	confiscation,	of	predicate	
offences,	of	confiscable	assets	differ	from	country	to	country	
and make it difficult to perform a comparative analysis. The 
second difficulty is the lack of data on confiscated assets 
(see	Chapter	 11).	This	 report	 has	assessed	what	 information	
is	available	 in	Europe	 in	 terms	of	seizures	and	confiscations,	
and the result is not encouraging: statistics are lacking and 
of poor quality;	 the	 use	 of	 IT	 systems	 to	 organise	 data	 is	
infrequent,	 they	 lack	 useful	 information	 (e.g.	 the	 related	
offence or the asset location), and in the best of cases different 
databases exist in the same country but are managed by 
different	agencies,	refer	to	different	stages	of	the	confiscation	
process,	and	are	unable	to	‘talk	to	each	other’.	
In this situation it has not been easy to analyse what is recovered 
from OCGs in Europe. According to the available data, it has 
emerged	 that	most	 confiscated	 assets	 are	movable goods 
(in	 particular	 cash) and registered assets	 (e.g.	 cars,	 etc.)	
(see	12.1).	The	confiscation	of	real	estate	properties	is	not	very	
frequent, and that of companies is almost non-existent, 
with	the	exception	of	a	few	countries	(e.g.	Italy	–	see	12.5).	
In summary, a significant discrepancy has emerged between 
what criminals invest in and what is actually confiscated 
by European authorities, not only in terms of amount but also 
in terms of types of criminal assets. This applies in particular 
to	 the	confiscation	of	companies.	However,	 it	 is	encouraging	
that,	in	all	the	countries	analysed	by	this	report,	confiscation	is	
increasing	(in	number	of	assets	and/or	in	value	–	see	12.1),	and	
the growth has receive further impetus from the new Directive 
2014/42/EU.
450. Other European areas outside the 7 OCP countries recording a higher 
number of cases are Berlin, the area of Duisburg, the French-German border, 
Bucharest, and the Romanian border with Moldova.
451. Similarly, there are differences among groups also in terms of geographical 
patterns: while some criminal groups prefer to invest locally, there is evidence 
that	others	(e.g.	North-African	or	Colombian	OCGs	involved	in	drug	trafficking)	
tend to transfer and invest abroad the illicit proceeds generated in Europe, in 
particular	in	their	home	country	(see	7.4,	8.2	and	8.5).
Research and policy implications
Given its pioneering nature, its data limitations and the limited 
number of EU MS covered, this report should be considered 
only a first step towards better understanding of this 
phenomenon, and a solid basis for forthcoming studies in this 
field.	 In	 particular,	 the	OCP	 report	 has	highlighted several 
challenges which should be addressed by future research 
and policy initiatives at European level.
From a research standpoint:
•		 This	report	has	provided	a	picture	of	the	activity	of	OCGs	
in illegal and legitimate markets on the basis of police and 
judicial cases. However, to strengthen the prevention of OC 
infiltration,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	move	 from	 cold pictures of 
past cases to heat maps of risk highlighting not only where 
risks	of	criminal	 infiltration	are, but also where they could 
emerge in the future. In other words it is necessary, starting 
from this study, to develop risk assessment models 
which take account also of contextual variables	(e.g.	the	
current and proposed regulation, economic incentives, the 
level and type of crime control policies) which affect the 
probability	 of	 criminal	 infiltration	 occurring.	 To	 improve	
the	 prevention,	 it	 is	 necessary	 first	 to	 determine	 where	
opportunities of criminal infiltration can emerge and 
then develop policies to reduce them. 
•		 In	order	to	do	so,	it	is	also	necessary	to	extend the study 
to the other EU MS not covered by Project OCP. This 
report has shown that criminal investments are intrinsically 
transnational, and it is not possible to limit their analysis 
within country borders. There is the need to extend the 
data collection and analysis to all the 28 EU MS, e.g. by 
setting up a monitoring network in order to gain a detailed 
picture of this phenomenon throughout Europe and identify 
the areas on which to focus research and policy initiatives.
•		 OCP	has	provided	a	‘wide-angle’	picture	of	the	economics	
of OCGs, highlighting macro patterns and trends in the 
activity of criminal groups operating in illicit and legitimate 
markets. It is necessary to enrich this account with a micro 
approach which focuses on	specific	 issues:	 for	example,	
how investment decisions are taken and agreed among 
different members of the same OCG. Future research 
initiatives should integrate the macro findings of OCP 
with the micro results of other limited-in-scope research 
projects conducted at EU level,452 so as to produce more 
focused	and	practical	knowledge	in	this	field.	
From a policy perspective:
•		 This	 report	 has	 highlighted	 that	 data in this field are 
lacking and of poor quality across EU MS. This applies 
above	 all	 to	 statistics	 on	 confiscated	 assets	 but	 also	 to	
STRs,	financial	investigations,	and	administrative	statistics	
related	 to	 financial	 crimes.	 The	 lack	 of	 data	 makes	 any	
study in this area arduous and partial. European agencies 
should propel the collection of better data across EU 
countries and guarantee access to researchers active 
in	 this	 field.	 As	 regards	 statistics	 on	 confiscations,	 the	
EU Commission, relying on Article 11 of the new Directive 
2014/42/EU,	should	improve	the	collection	of	harmonised 
data, e.g. by disseminating standard templates among EU 
AROs in order to facilitate the exchange of information 
across countries and allow comparative analyses. 
•		 This	report	has	shown	that	there	is	a	discrepancy	between	
what	criminals	invest	in	and	what	is	confiscated	by	European	
authorities, in particular with regard to criminal investments 
in legitimate businesses. There is a need to improve the 
confiscation of companies. To do so, it is necessary to 
intervene at three levels. First, the tracing of criminal 
assets	should	be	 improved	by	strengthening	 the	financial	
investigation skills of European LEAs and FIUs. This can be 
achieved for example with courses and workshops and by 
providing investigators with better access to registries and 
more effective IT tools.453 Second, regulation should be 
improved, e.g. by widening the use of extended confiscation 
or third-party confiscation	 which	 in	 some	 countries	 (e.g.	
Italy)	has	greatly	facilitated	the	confiscation	of	enterprises.	
Third, the management	of	confiscated	companies	should	
be improved: in some European countries, prosecutors may 
avoid	 the	seizure	of	companies	because	they	are	difficult	
to	 manage	 once	 confiscated.	 It	 is	 necessary	 to	 develop	
effective management policies which keep, when possible, 
companies and jobs alive. EU policymakers could learn 
from those countries (such as Italy)	where	confiscation	
of companies has long been successfully implemented and 
has proven to be one of the most effective instruments with 
which	to	fight	organised	crime.
•		 for	better	public-private partnerships. Public authorities 
and private companies should cooperate through the more 
effective exchange of data and best practices in order to 
prevent criminal groups from exploiting loopholes in legal 
supply	chains	(to	commit,	e.g.,	theft,	fraud	or	counterfeiting)	
and using corporate entities as fronts for their illicit trade or 
for money laundering purposes.
European institutions and national governments should 
provide human and technological resources in order to meet 
these challenges. This may also require reshaping the 
organisation of LEAs, FIUs and AROs so that they are able 
not only to apply crime control policies but also to identify, 
assess and manage the risks	of	criminal	 infiltration	of	 illicit	
and legitimate markets. Adopting an opportunity reduction 
approach and focusing on high-risk situations could lead to 
achievement of these outcomes with fewer resources and 
lower	costs	for	European	citizens.	
452.	 For	 example	 with	 the	 findings	 of	 Project	 ARIEL	 (www.arielproject.eu),	
funded	by	DG	Home	Affairs	and	expected	 to	finish	 in	spring	2015.	ARIEL	has	
been carrying out a script analysis of some selected cases studies of organised 
crime	 infiltration	 into	 legitimate	 companies	 in	 5	pilot	EU	countries	 in	 order	 to	
better understand how OCGs acquire and keep control of European corporate 
entities.
453.	For	example,	EU	 funded	Project	EBOCS	 (www.ebocs.eu)	will	produce	an	
IT prototype available to LEAs, FIUs and AROs to facilitate the collection and 
analysis of data on shareholders and administrators across different business 
registries	 of	 five	 EU	MS.	 If	 this	 pilot	 tool	 were	 extended	 to	 other	 countries,	 it	
would	crucially	facilitate	financial	investigations	at	transnational	level	–	the	most	
important in transnational organised crime cases – aimed at identifying the 
beneficial	owners	behind	infiltrated	companies	and	corporate	entities.
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